Opinion

Marcus Hensley v. Carolyn W. Colvin

  • 829 F.3d 926
  • 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13091
  • 2016 WL 3878219
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed
Jul 18, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Loken, Gruender, Kelly
Cited by
826 cases
Authority
More cited than 2.5%

recognizing that “[i]n the absence of medical opinion evidence, medical records prepared by the most relevant treating physicians can provide affirmative medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s [RFC] findings” (citation and quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that “[i]n the absence of medical opinion evidence, medical records prepared by the most relevant treating physicians can provide affirmative medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s [RFC] findings” (citation and quotation marks omitted)
  • stating that while “an ALJ’s assessment of [the RFC] must be supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace . . . there is no requirement than an RFC finding be supported by a specific medical opinion”
  • finding “adequate medical evidence of [the claimant’s] ability to function in the workplace” where treating doctor noted claimant was in no acute distress and had a normal knee exam and gait, another physician noted a normal knee assessment, with “full knee range, good lower limb and spinal flexibility,” and claimant reported reduced knee and back pain after treatment
  • explaining how Ms. Wingler’s opinion was “not consistent with the record as a whole” including a specific treatment note by Ms. Wingler herself, and noting that her treatment of the claimant had been limited

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2829

___________________________

Marcus J. Hensley

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

Submitted: January 14, 2016

Filed: July 18, 2016

____________

Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Marcus Hensley suffered a serious knee injury while deployed by the United

States Army in Iraq combat in 2005. In September 2007, he underwent right knee

surgery, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) awarded him benefits for

service-connected disability. He then applied for Social Security disability insurance

benefits, claiming as severe impairments: posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),

back pain, right knee pain, and facial twitching. The Commissioner denied the

application, ruling that Hensley was not disabled as of May 19, 2011. Hensley sought

judicial review; the denial was affirmed. Hensley v. Colvin, No. 4:12CV00352, Mem.

& Order (E.D. Ark. Aug. 23, 2013).

Hensley filed this second application for disability insurance benefits in August

2012, while his appeal from the first denial was pending. He alleged the same severe

impairments and a disability onset date of May 20, 2011. His earnings record limited

him to insurance coverage through September 30, 2011. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.131.

After an August 2013 hearing at which Hensley and a vocational expert (“VE”)

testified, the ALJ denied the application, concluding that Hensley’s impairments were

severe but he retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform certain

sedentary work during the relevant period, May 20 to September 30, 2011. The

Appeals Council denied further review, the district court1 upheld the denial of

benefits, and Hensley appealed. It was established in the prior proceeding that

Hensley was not disabled prior to the alleged May 20 onset date. Thus, the question

is whether he met his burden to show that he became disabled during the four-month

period at issue. Concluding that substantial evidence on the administrative record as

a whole supports the ALJ’s contrary determination, we affirm. See Welsh v. Colvin,

765 F.3d 926, 927 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard of review).

I. Background

A. The Medical Evidence Relating to Physical Impairments. In May 2011,

Hensley saw his primary-care VA physician, Richard McKelvey, complaining of

worsening low back pain and pain in his left knee, reporting that his surgically

repaired right knee had improved. Dr. McKelvey observed that Hensley appeared

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Arkansas, adopting the Recommended Disposition of the Honorable Joe

J. Volpe, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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well, was in “no acute distress,” and had a “normal” knee exam and gait. Dr.

McKelvey ordered x-rays of the lumbar spine and left knee, and an MRI of the lumbar

spine. The spine x-ray showed “very mild spurring in the lower thoracic region” but

was “otherwise unremarkable.” The left knee x-ray was “normal.” X-rays of

Hensley’s right knee, taken in 2010, showed “small suprapateller joint fluid

collection,” but were otherwise “normal” and “unremarkable.”

On July 13, 2011, Jose Escarda, M.D., reviewed the MRI of Hensley’s lumber

spine. Dr. Escarda determined Hensley had “elements of strain from a pelvic

malignment” and recommended a home exercise program with physical therapy

(“PT”). He also noted that Hensley’s knee assessment was “normal,” he had “full

knee range, good lower limb and spinal flexibility,” and he was no longer using a

cane. Hensley received PT in July and August of 2011 and reported his pain fell from

seven or eight on a ten-point scale to four. He also used a “TENS” unit and heat pack

to manage his pain. At his final PT session, Hensley said his pain that morning was

“minimal” and he had no pain at times; the physical therapist concluded Hensley was

“in alignment.” In September 2011, Dr. McKelvey noted Hensley was “doing very

well,” had “full flexion” in his lower back, and his back pain was “stable” due to the

home exercises and PT. Dr. McKelvey also reported that Hensley’s facial tics were

“very well controlled” with medication.

At a May 2012 disability exam, Dr. McKelvey noted that Hensley was “well

appearing,” in “no acute distress,” “with no restriction in mobility,” and “[f]ully alert

and oriented.” Dr. McKelvey summarized his exam findings in a “To Whom It May

Concern” letter. The letter reported that Hensley’s back pain had “been stable for the

past year” though severe at times; he was no longer using a cane; and he had “full

forward flexion,” normal strength, and a normal gait. Dr. McKelvey reported that

Hensley’s right knee pain was “stable” and the knee was less painful on palpation, had

a full range of motion, flexion, and extension, and could bear weight without a brace

or crutch. Treatment of Hensley’s facial tics was continuing, thus far with “limited

-3-

results.” His symptoms of PTSD and depression were being treated with two

medications and were “stable,” though he complained of nightmares.

B. The Medical Evidence Relating to Mental Impairments. The VA first

diagnosed and treated Hensley for PTSD and depression between 2007 and 2009. In

July 2011, he returned to the VA’s mental health clinic for the first time since April

2009 and saw Sandra Ellis, M.D., complaining of “intrusive thoughts, nightmares,

hypervigilance and depression.” Dr. Ellis confirmed the prior diagnosis of PTSD and

major depressive disorder. She assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning

(“GAF”) score of 51, increased the dosage of an antidepressant, and referred Hensley

to outpatient PTSD group therapy. Hensley agreed with the referral and attended the

first therapy orientation session, where he “was attentive and asked questions.” When

he missed the last three sessions, the clinic notified him on September 20 that he was

being discontinued from the program.

Hensley returned to the VA Mental Health Management unit in late August

2012, meeting with Advanced Practice Nurse Penelope Pollock. Hensley reported that

he was sleeping five hours per night with fewer nightmares, was willing to decrease

the dosage of his antidepressant, and was “interested in enrolling in treatment

programming.” Nurse Pollock again scheduled him in the outpatient PTSD therapy

program. He cancelled the initial session, failed to show for the next session, and was

discontinued from the program for lack of attendance on October 2, 2012.

C. The Hearing Testimony. At the administrative hearings, Hensley testified

that depression and PTSD were the primary reasons he felt disabled. He explained

that those conditions made it difficult to “adapt to certain environments,” though he

had no problem functioning with supervisors or coworkers. He testified that

antidepressant medication provided stability, and he felt better and “more stable” after

the increased dosage in July 2011. He outlined his typical activities, which included

driving his children around town, helping with homework, running quick errands,

-4-

attending church twice a month, and assisting with family finances and chores such

as mowing the lawn. The ALJ asked:

Q. Tell me why you can’t get a job where it’s mostly sitting all

day and just do it.

A. My mental state. I used to be a very social guy. After the stuff

I’ve been through and I’ve seen, it’s hard for me to socialize with people.

Q. What about a job where I set you in the corner and let you look

at the wall? Your desk is up against the wall and you can do your work

there. Tell me why you can’t do that?

A. I would be up and down out of my chair with pain. The leg

starts hurting. My back kills me. I’ve got to have some type of support

in my chair. This chair isn’t helping. I would be embarrassing myself

due to my PTSD and anxiety and depression. I just can’t do it.

Prior to the hearing, the ALJ recognized that Hensley suffered from one or more

severe impairments and therefore testimony by a VE would be needed to complete

steps four and five of the well-established disability evaluation -- determining whether

Hensley had the RFC to perform his past relevant work or “other work [that] exists

in significant numbers in the national economy.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

404.1560. At the hearing, after Hensley testified, the ALJ asked VE Elizabeth Clem

to assume that a person of Hensley’s age, education, and work experience was limited

to jobs at the sedentary exertional level with the following limitations: never climb

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally balance,

stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; and with a simple routine, repetitive tasks, only

incidental interpersonal contact, and supervision that is simple, direct, and concrete.

Clem testified that this person could not do Hensley’s past relevant work but could

perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national or regional economies.

Clem cited two examples from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) --

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lamp-shade assembler, DOT 739.684-094, and stringing-machine tender, DOT

689.585-018.

D. The ALJ’s Decision. In a September 2013 decision, the ALJ found (i) that

Hensley had severe impairments -- degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,

PTSD, anxiety disorder, and status-post right knee arthroscopy – that “could

reasonably be expected to cause” his complained-of symptoms; (ii) that his

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his]

symptoms are not entirely credible”; and (iii) that he had the RFC described in the

hypothetical to VE Clem, except that he was limited to no climbing. Based on this

RFC and the testimony of Clem, the ALJ concluded that Hensley was not disabled

because he retained the RFC to do certain unskilled sedentary jobs during the four-

month time period at issue. The ALJ acknowledged that the VA had awarded Hensley

disability payments but noted that “a finding of disability from another agency is not

binding on the Social Security Administration,” which must make an independent

determination of disability as defined by the Social Security Act.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Hensley argues that the ALJ erred in: (1) determining the RFC; (2)

partially discounting his credibility; and (3) addressing the VA disability finding.

“We review the district court’s decision upholding the denial of benefits de novo but,

like the district court, we must uphold the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by

substantial evidence on the administrative record as a whole.” Welsh, 765 F.3d at

927. “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable

mind might accept it as adequate to support a decision.” Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614,

617 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

A. The RFC Determination. RFC is defined as the most a claimant can do

despite his limitations, including both physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R.

-6-

§ 404.1545(a). “The Commissioner must determine a claimant’s RFC based on all of

the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating

physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of [his] limitations.”

Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). Where, as

here, the claimant proves he cannot perform his past relevant work, the Commissioner

has the burden of producing evidence that he has the RFC to perform other jobs. Golf

v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005). However, “the burden of persuasion

to prove disability and to demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant, even when the

burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at step five.” Id. (alteration and

quotation omitted).

Hensley argues that “reversal is warranted” because “no medical opinion

supports the ALJ’s RFC” determination, and the ALJ failed to order a consultative

examination (“CE”) to correct this lack of direct opinion evidence. We disagree.

“Because a claimant’s RFC is a medical question, an ALJ’s assessment of it must be

supported by some medical evidence of the claimant’s ability to function in the

workplace.” Cox, 495 F.3d at 619. However, there is no requirement that an RFC

finding be supported by a specific medical opinion. See Myers, 721 F.3d at 526-27

(affirming RFC without medical opinion evidence); Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086,

1092-93 (8th Cir. 2012) (same).

In the typical Social Security disability case, the administrative record includes

one or more opinions by the claimant’s treating physician(s) as to the impact of

impairments on his RFC. In this case, after Hensley applied for Social Security

disability benefits, he asked “if Dr. McKelvey could complete an assessment of ability

to do work related activities.” The VA advised “that primary care providers at the VA

cannot complete those kinds of assessments.” Instead, Dr. McKelvey provided a “To

Whom It May Concern” letter summarizing his May 2012 disability exam that

addressed each of Hensley’s severe impairments. Together with the extensive VA

treatment records, this provided adequate medical evidence of Hensley’s ability to

-7-

function in the workplace. Accord Cox, 495 F.3d at 620 n.6. In the absence of

medical opinion evidence, “medical records prepared by the most relevant treating

physicians [can] provide affirmative medical evidence supporting the ALJ’s residual

functional capacity findings.” Johnson v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2011).

With the medical record adequately developed, the ALJ was not required to seek

additional information from Dr. McKelvey or order a CE. See KKC ex rel. Stoner v.

Colvin, 818 F.3d 364, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a(b).

Hensley’s remaining attacks on the ALJ’s RFC findings and determination fall

in the category of deficiencies in opinion writing. “[A]n arguable deficiency in

opinion writing that had no practical effect on the decision . . . is not a sufficient

reason to set aside the ALJ’s decision.” Welsh, 765 F.3d at 929.

Hensley first argues the ALJ “ignored” a November 2010 letter from Dr.

McKelvey stating that Hensley “needs a residence on the ground level with no stairs.”

This letter was written well prior to the time period at issue on a subject addressed by

the climbing restriction included in the RFC. The ALJ properly focused on Dr.

McKelvey’s later reports during the relevant period. “[A]n ALJ is not required to

discuss every piece of evidence submitted.” Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th

Cir. 1998). Relatedly, Hensley argues the ALJ erred in relying on the VE’s testimony

because the ALJ’s hypothetical to the VE assumed a worker who can occasionally

climb ramps and stairs, whereas the ALJ’s subsequent RFC finding limited him to no

climbing. However, this discrepancy was irrelevant to the ALJ’s RFC determination.

The two jobs the VE identified in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical -- lamp-shade

assembler and stringing-machine tender -- do not require climbing. See DOT

739.684-094 (lamp-shade assembler), 689.585-018 (stringing-machine tender); cf.

Van Vickle v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2008).

-8-

Hensley further argues the ALJ “essentially ignored” his alleged foot condition,

mild bilateral halux valgus2 deformities, which allegedly prevented him from doing

the standing and walking involved in sedentary work. Though Hensley did not list

this impairment in his application for disability benefits, the ALJ inquired about it at

the August 2013 hearing. Hensley testified he had the condition for as long as he

“could remember.” It caused some pain, but he had not yet agreed to surgery his VA

medical providers offered in March 2011. The ALJ was not required to address this

condition in his opinion. See Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir. 1996)

(refusing surgery suggests condition is not disabling).

Finally, Hensley argues the ALJ failed to consider whether he could sustain his

ability to work over a full day in a real world work setting, as Social Security Ruling

96-8p required. However, Hensley “neither identifies evidence the ALJ failed to

consider nor specifies how the ALJ’s assessment was unrealistic.” Juszczyk v. Astrue,

542 F.3d 626, 633 (8th Cir. 2008). The ALJ explicitly considered the persistence and

limiting effects of Hensley’s symptoms and impairments, and the RFC took into

account the effect particular work environments would have on Hensley’s ability to

function by limiting the jobs he could perform to those with direct supervision and

incidental interpersonal contact. Thus, the ALJ properly “engaged in a realistic

assessment of [Hensley’s] abilities.” Id.

After careful review of the administrative record, like the district court we

conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. Regarding

Hensley’s mental impairments, the medical records reflect that Dr. Ellis assigned

2

Hallux valgus is an “angulation of the great toe away from the middle of the

body, or toward the other toes; the great toe may ride under or over the other toes.”

Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 818 (32nd ed. 2012).

-9-

Hensley a GAF score of 51 in July 20113 and increased the dosage of an

antidepressant medication. Dr. McKelvey observed that Hensley was “doing very

well” and later reported that Hensley’s mental illness symptoms had stabilized.

Hensley testified that, after the increased dosage, he got “better” and felt “more

stable.” He also testified to having no problem functioning with coworkers or

supervisors. In August 2012, Nurse Pollock noted that Hensley was continuing with

the medications, agreed to a reduced antidepressant dosage, and was sleeping five

hours a night and having fewer nightmares. After both sessions, Hensley expressed

interest in attending a prescribed group therapy program but then failed to attend. The

ALJ found that Hensley’s mental impairments were controlled, or at least controllable,

during the relevant period. “If an impairment can be controlled by treatment or

medication, it cannot be considered disabling.” Brace v. Astue, 578 F.3d 882, 885

(8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530(a) (“to get benefits, you

must follow treatment prescribed by your physician if this treatment can restore your

ability to work”). The ALJ’s RFC determination accounted for Hensley’s mental

impairments by limiting him to jobs that involve simple, repetitive tasks learned by

rote, with incidental interpersonal contact and simple, direct, concrete supervision.

Regarding Hensley’s physical impairments, the medical evidence during and

immediately after the time period in question showed that, after completing PT,

Hensley reported greatly reduced, sometimes nonexistent, back and knee pain. His

physical therapist determined he “was in alignment,” Dr. McKelvey confirmed his

3

This score indicates “moderate difficulty” in social and occupational

functioning. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed. 2000).

GAF scores are not determinative of RFC, see Nowling v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1110,

1116 n.3 (8th Cir. 2016), but they offer some evidence of a claimant’s ability to

function. See Myers, 721 F.3d at 525. Hensley notes that his GAF score was lower

in August 2012, but that assessment by Nurse Pollock occurred almost a year after the

relevant time period.

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pain was “stable” as a result of the therapy, and both Dr. Escarda and Dr. McKelvey

reported that Hensley’s knee range, flexion of knee and spine, gait, and strength were

“normal.” Following the May 2012 disability exam, Dr. McKelvey confirmed

Hensley’s pain had “been stable for the past year,” he had “no restriction in mobility,”

was not using a cane, and could bear weight without a brace or crutch. Hensley

testified he no longer used a knee brace because of effective pain medication. Dr.

McKelvey also observed that Hensley’s facial tics were “very well controlled” with

medication. Hensley’s testimony regarding his daily activities supported the ALJ’s

finding that he had the RFC to perform a limited universe of sedentary jobs. The ALJ

accounted for Hensley’s physical impairments by limiting him to sedentary jobs that

do not require climbing of ladders, rails, or stairs and that require only occasional

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling.4

B. Subjective Complaints. Hensley claims the ALJ erred in discounting his

complaints about the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of his subjective

complaints. The ALJ properly cited and considered the factors enumerated in Polaski

v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), before discounting Hensley’s

complaints of disabling pain and other subjective symptoms. The ALJ did not dispute

that Hensley experienced symptoms, but found those symptoms not to be as limiting

as Hensley claimed because, among other reasons, no treating physician had opined

that he was disabled; he did not follow the recommended course of treatment for

PTSD; his impairments were controlled by medication and treatment; and he

performed “a wide range of daily activities.” “We will defer to an ALJ’s credibility

finding as long as the ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant’s testimony and gives a

good reason for doing so.” Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007)

(quotations omitted).

4

Notably, the two state-agency physicians who reviewed Hensley’s medical

record found he had the RFC to do certain light work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)-

(b). The ALJ afforded Hensley a more restricted, sedentary-based RFC.

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Hensley attacks each of these findings. Each is supported by substantial

evidence in the administrative record, and Hensley’s contentions that the ALJ should

have weighed these facts differently or drawn different conclusions do not warrant

relief under our deferential standard of review. “It is not the role of this court to

reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ.” Cox, 495 F.3d at 617 (quotation

omitted). However, one contention deserves further discussion.

Hensley argues the ALJ erred in discounting his subjective complaints based

on his failure to attend prescribed group therapy to treat his PTSD, without inquiring

into the circumstances surrounding the alleged failure. Hensley relies on Pate-Fires

v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 937, 945-46 (8th Cir. 2009), where the evidence

“overwhelmingly demonstrate[d]” that the failure of a claimant to take her prescribed

medication “was a medically-determinable symptom of her mental illness,” described

as “bipolar disorder I severe, with psychotic features.”

The Social Security Administration has recognized that there are circumstances

in which a claimant’s failure to follow prescribed treatment is justifiable and therefore

does not preclude a finding of disability. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 82-59. Whether severe

mental illness has resulted in justifiable noncompliance is a fact-intensive issue. Here,

Hensley accepted and completed PT that lessened his physical impairments. In the

relevant time period, he was prescribed and took medications that stabilized his mental

impairments, PTSD and depression. In July 2011 and again in August 2012, he was

prescribed and expressed interest in completing a group therapy program to treat his

PTSD. But after attending one session in 2011, he twice failed to attend and was

discontinued from that program.

When questioned at the hearing, Hensley testified that the VA mental health

providers failed to contact him about the sessions. The medical records suggest

otherwise, but in any event, there is no evidence that Hensley’s failure to attend “was

a medically-determinable symptom of [his] mental illness.” Therefore, the ALJ could

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reasonably conclude that Hensley’s repeated failure to attend a prescribed course of

treatment was evidence that his mental impairment was less disabling than Hensley

claimed. See Bradly v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008).

C. VA Disability Finding. Hensley’s final argument is that the ALJ did not

“properly evaluate and discuss” the VA finding that he is disabled. He relies on

Morrison v. Apfel, 146 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1998), but in that case the ALJ did not

even mention a VA finding that the claimant was “permanently and totally disabled.”

Here, the ALJ explicitly acknowledged the VA’s disability finding, and correctly

noted that the disability finding of another agency like the VA was not binding on the

Social Security Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. There was no error. See

Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 579-80 (8th Cir. 2006) (“the ALJ did not err

because he fully considered the evidence underlying the VA’s final conclusion that

Pelkey was . . . disabled”).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

In my view, the ALJ did not adequately identify and take into account the

limitations imposed by the severe PTSD Hensley has suffered from since returning

from deployment in Iraq, where he experienced mortar attacks. I would therefore

remand this case to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the Social

Security Administration for further consideration of the evidence concerning

Hensley’s PTSD.

The court’s description of the medical evidence is accurate so far as it goes, but

some additional facts are needed to complete the picture. Initially, Hensley’s GAF

score, recorded at 51 in June 2011, had fallen to 41 as of August 2012. These

assessments suggest that Hensley’s GAF score was in the 40–50 range during the

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disability period, a range that is generally incompatible with the ability to work. See

Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 944 (8th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). Yet the

ALJ failed to even discuss these scores, much less explain how the limitations in

functioning they reflect were incorporated into the hypothetical he posed to the

vocational expert.5

It is certainly true that “an ALJ may afford greater weight to medical evidence

and testimony than to GAF scores when the evidence requires it.” Jones v. Astrue, 619

F.3d 963, 974 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). But here the GAF scores are

consistent with the medical evidence and testimony, not belied by them. Hensley’s

wife reported in August 2012 that Hensley was unable to prepare meals because of his

nervousness and the fact that he would lose focus on what he was cooking. He was

unable to mow lawns without taking breaks every 10–15 minutes, resulting in his

taking nearly five hours to complete the entire lawn. He didn’t feel comfortable going

out alone without a family member, and according to his testimony before the ALJ,

he hadn’t been to a football game in about two years due to the discomfort he felt

around other people. He and his wife no longer went out to dinner together.6

5

The court correctly notes that the GAF of 41 postdates Hensley’s disability

period, see ante at 10 n.3, but Hensley’s condition following the disability period can

constitute evidence of his level of functioning during the disability period – which is

presumably why the court relies on other information gathered in August 2012 to

support its decision to deny disability benefits. See ante at 10; Pyland v. Apfel, 149

F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Evidence of a disability subsequent to the expiration

of one’s insured status can be relevant, however, in helping to elucidate a medical

condition during the time for which benefits might be rewarded.”); Poe v. Harris, 644

F.2d 721, 723 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Evidence of an applicant’s condition ‘subsequent

to the date upon which the earning requirement was last met is pertinent evidence in

that it may disclose the severity and continuity of impairments existing before the

earning requirement date . . . .’” (citation omitted)).

6

The ALJ discounted Hensley’s testimony because he dropped out of therapy

sessions in 2010 and 2011, despite the fact that the testimony is consistent with his

-14-

None of these limitations were reflected in the ALJ’s hypothetical, which

simply asked the vocational expert to opine on a person “[l]imited to simple routine

and repetitive tasks with only incidental interpersonal contact in work where the

supervision is simple, direct, and concrete.” “When a hypothetical question does not

encompass all relevant impairments, the vocational expert’s testimony does not

constitute substantial evidence.” Hunt v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 622, 626 (8th Cir.

2001). In fact, when Hensley’s attorney modified the hypothetical to specify a person

who was significantly impaired in his ability to maintain concentration and focus,7 the

vocational expert testified that such a person would be unable to perform any of the

jobs she had listed in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical.

The court relies instead on a June 2012 assessment by Hensley’s primary-care

physician, Dr. Richard McKelvey, that Hensley’s symptoms of PTSD and depression

were “stable,” as well as testimony to the same effect from Hensley. See ante at 10.

low GAF scores. There are any number of reasons why a claimant might not take

advantage of treatment that do not bear on his credibility in addition to the specific

ground recognized in Pate-Fires, 564 F.3d at 945 – that the failure “was a medically-

determinable symptom of [the claimant’s] mental illness.” See Charles W. Hoge, et

al., PTSD Treatment for Soldiers after Combat Deployment: Low Utilization of

Mental Health Care and Reasons for Dropout, 16 Psychiatric Services 997, 997–98

(Aug. 2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/appi.ps.201300307 (collecting evidence to

suggest that therapy is underutilized for reasons including distrust or negative

perceptions of care, perceptions of self-reliance, lack of availability, and stigma); Soc.

Sec. Ruling 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7–*8 (1996) (“[T]he adjudicator must not

draw any inferences about an individual’s symptoms and their functional effects from

a failure to seek or pursue regular medical treatment without first considering any

explanations that the individual may provide.”). The ALJ inquired only in the most

cursory fashion about Hensley’s reasons for not going to therapy, so it is not possible

to determine whether those reasons reflect badly on his credibility or not.

7

In his exact words, a person who “[c]ould not maintain concentration and focus

with a marked restriction which would significantly impair the ability to do so, but it

wouldn’t be precluded.”

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But to describe symptoms as “stable” is simply to state that they are not getting any

better or worse; it says nothing about whether the symptoms are disabling. Cf. Cox

v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 2003) (“It is possible for a person’s health to

improve, and for the person to remain too disabled to work.”); Hutsell v. Massanari,

259 F.3d 707, 712 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Commissioner erroneously relied too

heavily on indications in the medical record that [the claimant] was ‘doing well,’

because doing well for the purposes of a treatment program has no necessary relation

to a claimant’s ability to work or to her work-related functional capacity.”); Gude v.

Sullivan, 956 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the fact that a physician

reported that the claimant was “doing well” could mean that they were “doing well for

someone with a kidney transplant,” not that they weren’t disabled). Indeed,

immediately after Hensley testified that the medications made his condition “more

stable,” he clarified that he didn’t feel he was getting any better. Nothing in Dr.

McKelvey’s assessment is inconsistent with Hensley’s GAF scores and testimony,

both of which point to his PTSD being disabling.

Accordingly, I would remand this case for further consideration.

______________________________

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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