permitting a suit for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on age discrimination despite the fact that a separate statutory remedy exists for age discrimination
How later courts described this case
- permitting a suit for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based on age discrimination despite the fact that a separate statutory remedy exists for age discrimination
- finding employee who bases wrongful-termination claim on violation of R.C. 4112.02 must strictly comply with the statute
- applying six-year limitations period where complaint referred to Chapter 4112 generally
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Slaby, Judge,
dissenting.
{¶ 56} I respectfully dissent. The majority determined that a final, appeal-able order exists and, therefore, this court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal. As I find that the judgment entry from which appellant appeals is not a final, appealable order, I would dismiss the appeal.
{¶ 57} Particularly, I must address the validity of the trial court’s Civ.R. 54(B) certification of its June 14, 2001 judgment entry. Initially, it should be noted that the mere presence of Civ.R. 54(B) language will not transform a nonfinal judgment into a final and appealable order.
Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ.
(1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 89 , 541 N.E.2d 64 . Therefore, when analyzing whether an order that has been granted Civ.R. 54(B) certification is final and appealable, an appellate court must determine (1) whether the order is final pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 and (2) whether the trial court appropriately determined that “there is no just reason for delay.”
Wisintainer v. Elcen Power Strut Co.
(1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 352, 354 , 617 N.E.2d 1136 . A trial court’s determination is appropriate if it finds that an interlocutory appeal furthers the interests of sound judicial administration. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. Moreover, the trial court’s decision must advance judicial economy at the trial level. Id. at 355 , 617 N.E.2d 1136 .
{¶ 58} In this case, the trial court’s determination that “there is no just cause for delay” was not appropriate, since its decision does not advance judicial economy. Specifically, the majority stated that judicial economy would be better served if all of appellant’s claims were tried in a single action. It supports its contention by noting that it is more important to avoid piecemeal trials than piecemeal appeals. See id. Notwithstanding that fact, “[t]he prompt and orderly disposal of litigation is an object much to be desired” in our system of jurispru
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dence. See
Ohio Historical Soc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd.
(1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 45, 48 , 549 N.E.2d 157 , citing
Squire v. Grdn. Trust Co.
(1946), 147 Ohio St. 1, 5 , 68 N.E.2d 312 . Accordingly, the certification of the judgment entry does not further this objective. Specifically, either party may appeal our decision to the Ohio State Supreme Court, thereby continuing to tie the trial court’s hands, as it would be unable to proceed until all of the appeals have run. Additionally, this certainly does not promote judicial economy. Finally, the mere fact that these claims may be disjointed does not reflexively hinder judicial economy. See
Wisintainer,
67 Ohio St.3d at 354 , 617 N.E.2d 1136 . Thus, the trial court’s certification was inappropriate, and the June 14, 2001 order is not final or appealable. See id.
{¶ 59} Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal, as this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.