Opinion

State Ex Rel. Mason v. State Employment Relations Board

  • 133 Ohio App. 3d 213
  • 727 N.E.2d 181
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Apr 20, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Deshler
On the bench
Kennedy, Lazarus, Deshler
Cited by
8 cases
Authority
More cited than 43.6%

reversing earlier holding that only an aggrieved person could bring action under the Sunshine Law and holding that a person seeking to enforce the law need not demonstrate that he had been aggrieved or that he had a personal stake in the outcome or controversy

How later courts described this case

  • reversing earlier holding that only an aggrieved person could bring action under the Sunshine Law and holding that a person seeking to enforce the law need not demonstrate that he had been aggrieved or that he had a personal stake in the outcome or controversy
  • common-law standing principles were not required because the Ohio General Assembly conferred standing on "any person" seeking to enforce Ohio's Sunshine Law under R.C. 121.22

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Deshler, Judge,

concurring separately.

While I concur in the judgment rendered today, I do not agree with the majority that, in reaching a judgment, we must overrule our earlier decision in

Ohio Valley Mall Co. v. Wray

(1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 629 , 662 N.E.2d 1108 . I still believe that only “any aggrieved person” has standing to assert a violation of R.C. 121.22, the so-called “Sunshine Law.” However, in the case before us, appellant clearly had standing as an aggrieved party, as he was a member of the decision-making body alleged to have violated the statute. Thus, appellant had not only participated in official activity imposed by law upon the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”), but he had a special interest in seeing to it that deliberations of this public body were in conformity with law. Thus, under the facts, appellant was not just “any person” and was directly involved in the process being challenged.

This court’s earlier decision in

Wray

should remain intact, as I do not agree with the majority that R.C. 121.22 must be construed to allow anyone, aggrieved or not, to challenge a public body’s efforts as violative of the Sunshine Law.

Because I believe appellant had standing in his own right to challenge the activity of SERB, as violative of the “Sunshine Law,” I agree with the judgment

*223

of the court, but without overruling our decision in

Wray .

Any substantive change in R.C. 121.22 should come from the legislature’s amendment of the statute.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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