“It is only where the acts of the governmental employee are motivated by actual malice or other situations giving rise to punitive damages that their conduct may be outside the scope of their state employment.”
How later courts described this case
- “It is only where the acts of the governmental employee are motivated by actual malice or other situations giving rise to punitive damages that their conduct may be outside the scope of their state employment.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
William B. Hoffman, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s analysis and disposition of appellant’s first assignment of error. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of appellant’s second assignment of error.
Unlike the majority, when considering the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant, as required by Civ.R. 56, I believe reasonable minds could differ whether appellee acted in a malicious, wanton, or reckless manner and, if so found, whether such conduct proximately caused injury to appellant. Appellee has maintained that the purpose of the e-mail was to support, motivate, and boost the morale of employees at the CSEA. However, placing appellant’s name on the subject line of the e-mail was not necessary to accomplish that purpose.
There is evidence of record to indicate that appellee was.aware that appellant suffered from an anxiety disorder. Appellant’s affidavit avers that appellee participated in an Ohio Civil Rights Commission case dealing with her anxiety disorder. Additionally, appellee admitted that he knew that appellant suffered from anxiety-type situations, and he was aware of this condition before he sent the offending e-mail. Notwithstanding this knowledge, appellee testified that he did not think about the effect the e-mail would have on appellant.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.