Opinion

Landwehr v. Village of Batavia

  • 173 Ohio App. 3d 599
  • 2007 Ohio 6035
  • 879 N.E.2d 825
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Nov 13, 2007
Status
Published
Author
Walsh
On the bench
Young, Bressler, Walsh
Cited by
4 cases
Authority
More cited than 43.2%

The opinion

Walsh, J.,

dissenting.

{¶ 26} Appellant asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it provided the hydrant in question for fire protection, which is a governmental function with no applicable statutory exception from immunity. The majority agrees with appellant’s argument. I believe the hydrant is part of the water-supply system and is therefore par of a proprietary function. For that reason, I must respectfully dissent.

{¶ 27} The Ohio Supreme Court stated in its 1968 decision of

Hall v. Youngstown,

15 Ohio St.2d 160 , 44 O.O.2d 140 , 239 N.E.2d 57 , that a hydrant is part of a water-supply system and involves a proprietary function of government. The

Hall

court noted that the utility of a hydrant “stems from its connection with a water supply system.” And, as the majority herein noted, the

Hall

court found the proprietary nature ended and the fire fighting (governmental function) began “at the hydrant nozzle.”

*605

{¶ 28} However, according to the majority, the

Hall

opinion has fallen into disfavor. The majority agrees with the Fifth District Court of Appeals in

Albertoni v. Robinson

(Aug. 29, 1994), Stark App. No. 94-CA-0023, 1994 WL 478148 , which found that the hydrant and the placement thereof was part of a fire-protection system and therefore, a governmental function. The

Albertoni

court distinguished

Hall ,

noting that it was a pre-Chapter 2744 case that was “effectively reversed” by the immunity for discretionary actions contained in R.C. 2744.03(A)(3).

{¶29} R.C. 2744.03 provides the defenses and immunities available for loss caused by acts of omission in connection with either a governmental or proprietary function. The defenses and immunities available in R.C. 2744.03 may or may not have had a significant impact on the result in

Hall

if the statute existed when

Hall

was considered. Nonetheless, the reasoning used by the

Hall

court when it found that the hydrant was part of the water-supply system and a proprietary function remains sound and has not been adequately distinguished by

Albertoni

or the majority here.

{¶ 30} R.C. 2744.01 defines a proprietary function as including, but not limited to “[t]he establishment, maintenance, and operation of

a utility, including, but not limited to,

a light, gas, power, or heat plant, a railroad, a bus line or other transit company, an airport, and a municipal corporation water supply system.” (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 31} The majority finds significance in the fact that the

Hall

court said that hydrants are an incidental part of a city water system.

Hall v. Youngstown,

paragraph two of the syllabus. The majority contrasted the “incidental” language in

Hall

with the holding in

Hill v. Urbana.

The majority stated that “the Ohio Supreme Court [in

Hill

] found that the proprietary function of establishing, maintaining, and operating a municipal water system includes only ‘necessary’ parts of the system.”

{¶ 32}

Hill v. Urbana

stated as follows: “[T]he ‘establishment, maintenance, and operation’ of a municipal corporation water supply system encompasses, but is not limited to, the installing of water lines, equipment, and other materials which are a necessary part of the system and such activity is a proprietary function of a political subdivision.” I do not read this statement as narrowly as the majority does and do not find that this language excludes hydrants from the water-supply system.

{¶ 33} It is common knowledge that water departments use hydrants to flush the water lines when there are breaks in the system or when other repairs or modifications are made to the water-supply system. This use does not implicate fire protection, but reinforces the role of the hydrant in the proprietary function of providing a water-supply system.

*606

{¶ 34} In conclusion, the trial court was correct when it denied appellant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. I would overrule appellant’s assignment of error, and therefore, I must dissent from the majority opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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