holding that “[i]n proving knowing falsity and intent to mislead or deceive, a plaintiff is not necessarily required to present direct evidence, such as a confession by the tortfeasor that he knowingly deceived plaintiff. Rather, a plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence to show the required knowledge or intent.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[i]n proving knowing falsity and intent to mislead or deceive, a plaintiff is not necessarily required to present direct evidence, such as a confession by the tortfeasor that he knowingly deceived plaintiff. Rather, a plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence to show the required knowledge or intent.”
- “In a case based upon an intentional tort such as fraud or tortious interference, however, where the intervening act complained of is the act of the plaintiff, an analysis of intervening cause is tantamount to a comparative negligence claim, which is no defense to an intentional tort.”
- “[Jjurors may rely upon their own personal experiences in determining the severity of [a plaintiffs] emotional distress.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Ford, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur in the judgment, and most of the analysis set forth' in the majority opinion, I believe that the portion of the opinion concerning the agent’s unauthorized signature as an intervening cause is unnecessary in the context of the intentional misrepresentation claim at issue in the case.
As a general rule, intervening causation is typically raised in the context of a negligent tort and has limited application in the intentional tort setting. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that if an intentional tort was committed with malice, and if that intentional tort was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs damage, then the negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense.
Schellhouse v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 520, 524 , 575 N.E.2d 453, 456 . The court further held that actions committed with intent “constitute behavior qualitatively different from that which may be characterized as merely negligent.”
Id.
Intentional acts, by their very nature, presuppose the occurrence of the results they bring about,
i.e.,
the ultimate injury is basically inevitable. See
Harasyn v. Normandy Metals, Inc.
(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 173, 175 , 551 N.E.2d 962, 964-965 , quoting 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A;
Rose v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.
(June 10, 1991), Butler App. No. CA90-07-139, unreported, at 3, 1991 WL 99500 . Consequently, the occurrence of an intervening act by the plaintiff is usually irrelevant because it does not cut off the liability of the actor who originally committed the intentional tort. See
Schellhouse,
61 Ohio St.3d at 524, 525 , 575 N.E.2d at 456, 456-457 . Thus, generally an intervening act is not a defense to an intentional tort. Foreseeability, however, is inherently part of the proximate cause analysis, and I do not take issue with that portion of the majority’s analysis.
Regarding the evidential issue, I am of the opinion that the New York Life application was admissible to show conduct consistent with a scheme and/or plan to defraud. Again, in my opinion, the analysis concerning Evid.R. 403 is not applicable to the facts in this case.