continuance beyond speedy trial deadline reasonable in order to await results of DNA testing
How later courts described this case
- continuance beyond speedy trial deadline reasonable in order to await results of DNA testing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Gene Donofrio, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects but I am compelled to respectfully address some characterizations made in the dissenting opinion. The dissent states that the majority limits the case of
State v. Mincy
(1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 6 , 2 OBR 282, 441 N.E.2d 571 , and its progeny to situations where a trial court
sua sponte
issues a continuance. The dissenting opinion goes on to claim that this approach is a novel one.
Mincy
clearly states in its syllabus:
“When
sua sponte
granting a continuance under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to trial.”
It is clear from a reading of
Mincy
that the Ohio Supreme Court has set these limits for us to follow.
The dissent is misguided in its view that the reasons for a continuance must be enumerated by the trial court in all cases. When a trial court upholds a motion of a moving party it is implicit that the court finds support in the reasons given by the moving party unless the trial court states otherwise, in its order. This is obviously not the case when a
sua sponte
order is granted due to the fact that no motion is filed. Thus, the reason for
Mincy .
A reason for the continuance must be given by the prosecutor and/or .trial court so the reasonableness standard can be determined on review of the motion filed. The motion in question that the prosecutor filed clearly stated the reason for the requested continuance.