noting that a party’s claims are not intertwined simply because they are “dependent upon” an agreement
How later courts described this case
- noting that a party’s claims are not intertwined simply because they are “dependent upon” an agreement
- outlining the circumstances under which “[a] nonsignatory may compel arbitration against a party to an arbitration agreement”
- noting that other federal and state courts have adopted the theory
- “The second circumstance under which equitable estoppel is applied arises when the signatory to the contract alleges substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.” (internal citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Anthony 0. Calabrese Jr., Judge,
dissenting.
.{¶ 38} I respectfully dissent. Based on the facts presented, I would have affirmed the trial court’s decision.
{¶ 39} Appellants’ claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the consultancy agreement between APE and appellant. The
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appellees can compel arbitration because of the agency relationship between appellees and APE. In addition, I find I Sports’ claims to be sufficiently intertwined with the agreement to justify the imposition of arbitration under an equitable estoppel theory. I would have upheld the lower court’s granting of appellees’ motion to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration.