Opinion

State v. Glasure

  • 132 Ohio App. 3d 227
  • 724 N.E.2d 1165
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Feb 2, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Cox
On the bench
Vukovich, Waite, Cox
Cited by
70 cases

suggesting that a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel should not be inferred unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the possible defenses, and the evidence the state would present

How later courts described this case

  • suggesting that a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel should not be inferred unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that the defendant understood the nature of the charges, the possible defenses, and the evidence the state would present

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Cox, Judge,

concurring.

I concur in the decision reached by the majority in this case but write separately to emphasize the tension between appellant’s failure to cooperate with the trial court and his constitutional right to counsel. The trial court in this case did “bend over backwards” to be patient and accommodate appellant. Conversely, appellant failed to attend scheduled appointments with .his second court-appointed counsel, failed to appear at a hearing regarding said appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, and failed to complete the affidavit of indigency and

*240

financial statement as ordered by the trial court. After the trial court granted the motion to withdraw presented by appellant’s second court-appointed counsel, appellant appeared at trial unrepresented and stated on the record that he was not waiving his right to counsel.

I can certainly appreciate the trial court’s frustration over the actions of a vexatious litigant such as appellant. It appears to me that a judge must almost assume the responsibility of acting as an attorney, as well as a judge, for a litigant who has no counsel present at the time of trial, which frustrates the judicial process in itself. Notwithstanding all that the trial court did in this case to assist appellant, the law is clear and I am compelled to agree with the majority that the trial court must nonetheless adhere to the strict requirements and rights afforded a defendant by the Constitution.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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