The opinion
Brown, J.
Tbe exceptions to the evidence are, in our opinion, without merit. Tbe defendant could not be permitted to show the' increased value of tbe land a year or more after defendant’s line was constructed.
Tbe enhanced value, it is not claimed, was tbe result of erecting towers on the land and constructing an electric system overhead. Benefits, considered in assessing such damages, must be those in a measure peculiar to tbe landowner and not common to tbe entire community. Tbe exceptions to tbe charge cannot be sustained.
His Honor correctly instructed tbe jury when be charged them that tbe “measure of recovery is tbe difference between tbe fair market value of tbe land before tbe right of way and easement was taken, and its impaired value, directly, materially and proximately resulting to plaintiff’s land by placing defendant’s power line across ber premises in tbe manner and to tbe extent and in respect of tbe uses for which tbe easement is acquired.”
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We
are also of opinion that the alarm of defendant’s counsel, that the jury might consider possible danger from falling wires as an element of damage, should have been allayed when his Honor told'the jury: “You cannot allow anything as damages, based upon unknown or imaginary contingencies or events, or such as may not reasonably and naturally be expected to occur and cause damage to the plaintiff — not other persons — from the construction, operation and maintenance of defendant’s line for the uses for which it is constructed.”
The entire charge is an admirable instruction upon the law governing the assessment of damage in cases of this character. Lewis on Em. Dom. (2 Ed.), 478-462;
Brown v. Power Co.,
140 N. C., 333 ;
Abernethy v. R. R.,
150 N. C., 97 ; 15 Cyc., 684.
No error.