The opinion
BROWN, • J.
It is a well-established ■ principle of law, applicable to corporations and individuals alike, that penal statutes are strictly construed, and that he who sues to recover a penalty awarded by the law must bring his case clearly within the language and meaning of the law.
Sears v. Whitaker,
136 N. C., 37 ;
Appenheimer v. Railroad,
64 Ark., 27; 26 Am. and Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.), p. 658.
It is clear, from a perusal of the evidence, that no general tender of the meat for shipment was made by plaintiff’s- agent. Taking it in its best aspect for plaintiff, the evidence shows that the meat arrived too late for the morning train, and,
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finding tbat it could not be shipped by that train, plaintiff’s employees voluntarily and purposely carried it back to plaintiff’s market, and returned with it and shipped it next morning. The defendant incurred no penalty for not shipping by that particular train, for, by section 2632, Eevisal, the carrier is allowed two days at the initial point in which to begin the transportation of freight.
If the evidence is true, the language of the defendant’s employee, refusing to accept the meat for shipment by that particular train, was discourteous and unwarranted, but it does not subject the company to punishment on that account.
We think the Judge below should have allowed the motion to nonsuit and have dismissed the action. It is so ordered.
Error.