noting, in a case involving reckless driving and driving under the influence, “[a] conviction of one would not be a bar to a prosecution for committing the other offense[,]” and that “[w]hile the evidence of intoxication might bear upon the question of whether the defendant was guilty of reckless driving, it does not necessarily prove it; but is a circumstance to be considered by the jury in deciding the issue”
How later courts described this case
- noting, in a case involving reckless driving and driving under the influence, “[a] conviction of one would not be a bar to a prosecution for committing the other offense[,]” and that “[w]hile the evidence of intoxication might bear upon the question of whether the defendant was guilty of reckless driving, it does not necessarily prove it; but is a circumstance to be considered by the jury in deciding the issue”
- discussing the precursor to 13 the current vehicular homicide statute and stating, “If the defendant killed [victim] 14 while committing the unlawful act of driving an automobile while under the influence 15 of intoxicating liquor, he is not guilty of manslaughter unless the commission of that 16 unlawful act was the proximate cause of the death of [victim].”
- indicating in dictum that, in a vehicular homicide case, the victim’s asserted negligence “should have been taken into consideration by the jury in determining the proximate cause of the death,” but ultimately reversing because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant acted with criminal negligence
- holding involuntary manslaughter in the context of a car accident requires “the conduct of the driver of the [vehicle to be] so reckless, wanton, and willful as to show an utter disregard for the safety of pedestrians”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZINN, Justice
(specially concurring).
My primary reason for concurring in the majority opinion is based on my deep-grounded belief in the theory enunciated by us in our opinion in the case of State v. Harris, 41 N.M. 426, 427 , 70 P.2d 757 , wherein we laid down a definite rule by which the guilt or the innocence of a driver of an automobile, who accidentally kills a person is to be measured.
Mere negligence is not sufficient. It may be sufficient to compel the driver to respond in damages. However, when it comes to responding to' an accusation of involuntary manslaughter, with the possibility of a penitentiary sentence, a different rule is called into play.
In the instant case I can not find from the evidence where the appellant was guilty of reckless, wanton and wilful negligence. State v. Harris, supra.