suggesting that the MES Act should be interpreted in a manner that results “in the allowance of the claims, rather than their denial”
How later courts described this case
- suggesting that the MES Act should be interpreted in a manner that results “in the allowance of the claims, rather than their denial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by Park v. Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich. 103 (1959)
The Court of Appeals, in interpreting the word “establishment,” reviewed Spielmann v. Industrial Commission, 236 Wis. 240, 295 N.W. 1 (1940), and Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941), overruled in part by Park v. Appeal Board of Michigan Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich. 103, 94 N.W.2d 407 (1959).
The opinion
Boyles, J.
(concurring in part).
I concur in the conclusion reached by Mr. Justice McAllister, adopted from the English rule, that “an employee directly interested in a labor dispute is one whose wages, hours, or conditions of work will be affected by the outcome of the dispute.” Under this rule, the Chrysler employees in all of the various units of the company’s plants were directly interested in the labor dispute under consideration. Whether members of any union or not, the wages, hours, or conditions of work of all alike would be affected favorably or otherwise by the outcome of the dispute. I concede that this construction may appear to work a hardship on some employees who may not be in sympathy with a labor dispute. However, our labor policy now seems to be well established that sole bargaining rights by the majority involves assent to the exercise thereof by individuals who constitute the minority.
During the reargument of this case ordered by this court, it was generally conceded that the several plants referred to in the circuit judge’s opinion were “functionally integrated.” We should not be concerned in technical niceties between the meaning of “functionally integrated” and “interrelated, highly synchronized, or interdependent.” Beginning early in October a labor dispute was actively in progress, resulting in general unemployment in all these
*477
plants. With the merits of the dispute we are not concerned—so far as the act is concerned, it suffices that a labor dispute was actively in progress.
Fundamentally, the foregoing applies to the Chrysler employees in all of the plants of the company that were closed down when no longer fed with parts or material from the main plant or by the transportation system of the company. I am compelled to reach the conclusion that “establishment” includes all of the integrated plants of the company in this operating area. In that respect, I concur in the result reached by Mr. Justice Wiest.
The language of section 29 of the act is quite involved and this case primarily concerns a construction of this section of the statute. It is argued by claimants that under section 34 of the act they are entitled to payment regardless of pending court proceedings, when applications for benefits have been “twice affirmed,”
i. e.,
(1) by the referee, and (2) by the appeal board. The effect of such a construction would render payments a moot question pending court decision. Section 34 cannot be construed to deprive this court of jurisdiction to review questions of law and (within proper limits) questions of fact, especially where a construction of- the meaning of the act is involved. Section 38 expressly provides for review by the courts.
Judgment should be entered in accordance herewith, to include all of the several plants in the same classification, applying equally to claimants herein.