trial courts are experts as to the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees
How later courts described this case
- trial courts are experts as to the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PER CURIAM:
Defendants assert in their petition for rehearing that under
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
5 Cir., 1974, 488 F.2d 714 , we should withdraw that part of our opinion which fixes the amount of attorneys’ fees and that we should remand this matter to the district court for it to establish reasonable counsel fees pursuant to the guidelines set by this court.
We are aware that an award of attorney fees normally falls within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
See Johnson
v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra,
at 716-17;
Weeks
v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
5 Cir., 1972, 467 F.2d 95, 97 ;
Culpepper
v.
Reynolds Metals Co.,
5 Cir., 1971, 442 F.2d 1078, 1081 ; 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker,
Moore’s Federal Practice
¶ 54.77[3], at 1716 (2d ed. 1976). However, “appellate courts, as trial courts, are themselves experts as to the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, and may, in the interest of justice, fix the fees of counsel albeit in disagreement on the
*1178
evidence with the views of the trial court.”
B-M-G Investment Co. v. Continental/Moss Gordin, Inc.,
5 Cir., 437 F.2d 892, 893 ,
cert. denied,
402 U.S. 989 , 91 S.Ct. 1668 , 29 L.Ed.2d 154 (1971),
citing Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Southeast Arkansas Levee District,
5 Cir., 1939, 106 F.2d 966, 972-73 .
Accord, Campbell
v.
Green,
5 Cir., 1940, 112 F.2d 143, 144 .
The petition for rehearing is DENIED.