adopting the general rule but distinguishing the cases then decided by this Court on the ground that they apply only when a timely motion for return of the property seized has been made
How later courts described this case
- adopting the general rule but distinguishing the cases then decided by this Court on the ground that they apply only when a timely motion for return of the property seized has been made
- overruled on other grounds in People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 445 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513], and People v. Matteson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 466, 470 [39 Cal.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161]
- also affirming judgment because of lack of prejudice
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part by People v. Matteson, 61 Cal. 2d 466 (1964)
Insofar as they are inconsistent with this opinion, People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 256-257 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383], and People v. Andrus, 159 Cal.App.2d 673, 681-682 [324 P.2d 617], are overruled and disapproved.
Overruled by People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434 (1955)
People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535 [102 P. 517]; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383], and the cases based thereon are therefore overruled.† We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to seeureremnpliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constant…
The opinion
WILBUR, J., Concurring.
I concur.
In regard to the question of whether or not the conduct of the district attorney resulted in a miscarriage of justice, I think it should be stated that in imposing sentence the trial judge provided that the terms should run concurrently, so that the conviction upon the Weiss count does not in
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crease the term of imprisonment, and I am somewhat influenced in my conclusion that there has been no prejudicial error by this fact in addition to those stated by Justice Sloane.