The opinion
ANGELLOTTI, J., concurring.
While I have concurred in the foregoing, I deem it proper to add that I am satisfied that the effect of the charter provision declaring that an office “becomes vacant when the incumbent thereof dies, resigns, is adjudged insane, convicted of a felony,” etc., was to create a vacancy in the office of mayor upon the rendition and entry of the verdict of conviction against the then incumbent. One is “convicted” of a crime when a verdict of guilty has been so given and entered against him, or when a plea of guilty has been given and entered. This is the well-settled meaning of the term as ordinarily used in our constitutional and statutory provisions, and I can see no warrant for concluding that it was used in any other sense in the charter provision under discussion. Under this view, it is entirely immaterial whether or not judgment has been given upon the . conviction, or whether or not the execution of any judgment so given has been stayed by an appeal. The vacancy in the office is in no way dependent upon any judgment given on the conviction, but was fully and 'finally created by the happening of the event specified,—viz. the rendition and entry of the verdict of conviction.
There can of course be no question as to the power of the people of the city and county of San Francisco to make such provision in their charter as to purely municipal offices. As is shown in the opinion of the chief justice, the provision for the ouster of the incumbent in the contingency named is in no degree by way of punishment for any offense alleged to have been committed by him, but is solely for the purpose of securing an efficient, orderly, and decent discharge of the duties of the office, which doubtless it was deemed could not be had during the incumbency of one under a verdict of conviction of felony.
Sloss, J., and Shaw, J., concurred.