The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WILLIAM PORTER
Plaintiff,
v.
KATHLEEN G. SEBELIUS, Civil Action No. 11-1546 {GK}
Secretary of the United
States Department of Health
and Human Services,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff William Porter ("Plaintiff" or "Porter")
brings this action against Kathleen Sebelius in her official
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Heal th and Human
Services ("Defendant," "Employer" or "Secretary") . 1 Plaintiff
alleges racial discrimination, hostile working environment,
failure to grant reasonable accommodations, and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; discrimination, failure to
provide reasonable accommodation, and hostile work environment in
violation of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973
("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and failure to
1 Mr. Porter completed law school but has not worked as an attorney.
provide a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 2
This matter is . presently before the Court on Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 17, 2014 ("Pl.'s Mot.")
[Dkt. No. 95], and Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s
Mot.") [Dkt. No. 99] filed on Augus.t 28, 28, 2014.
Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, and Replies,
the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below,
,. granted in
Plaintiff's Motion is denied, and Defendant's Motion is
part and denied in part.
I . BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Porter, an African-American male who states that he suffers
from a generalized anxiety disorder, worked as a Program Analyst
in the Administration and Finance branch ("A&F") of the Office of
Finance, Program, and Analysis in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Preparedness and Response ( "ASPR") . ·Second Am. Compl.
("Compl.") ~~ 7, 18 [Dkt. No. 63].
2Mr. Porter's Complaint is less than clear about which claims are
violated under which statute.
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Porter began his employment at the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") in the ASPR in 2007. Def.'s Ex. 1, Porter
Dep. at 14 ("Porter Dep.") [Dkt. No. 95] . When the events in
question occurred, Porter was working as a GS-14 Program Analyst
at the A&F branch of the ASPR. Def.'s Statement of Material Facts
(August 28, 2014) at 1 [Dkt. No. 99-4]. His work involved billings
for disaster relief provided by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA"). Porter Dep. at 17.
David Dolinsky, Deputy Director of Administration and Finance
of ASPR, became Porter's immediate supervisor in August 2009. Id.
at 30. Jay Petillo, Director of the Office of Financial Planning
and Analysis, was Plaintiff's second level supervisor. Def.'s Ex.
3, Petillo Aff. (March 8, 2012) ~ s ("2012 Petillo Aff.) [Dkt. No.
93-3].
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Initially, Plaintiff's working relationship with Dolinsky was
"fine." Porter Dep. at 32. In fact, in early 2010 Dolinsky approved
a promotion for Porter and gave him an "exceptional" evaluation
for 2009. Def.'s Ex. 4, Petillo Aff. (Oct. 27, 2010) ~ 14 ("2010
Petillo Af f.") [Dkt. No. 99-3] ; Def. 's Ex. 5, Dolinsky Af f. (July
21, 2010) ~ 11-12 ("2010 Dolinsky Aff.") [Dkt. No. 99-3].
However, Dolinsky gave Porter an "unacceptable" rating on his
quarterly evaluation for the first quarter of 2010. Dolinsky Aff.
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~ 13. Dolinsky stated that the review was justified because,
although he had tried,
to mentor and guide Mr. Porter in areas such
as interagency payment and collection, Mr.
Porter has recently indicated that he will not
change the way he does things in spite of my
pointing out serious problems. * * * Although
I have tried countless times to show Mr.
Porter the correct way to do things, he shakes
his head and continues to do things the way he
wants to.
Id. ~ 14. See also, Def.'s Ex. 16, Dolinsky Email to Petillo
(April 27, 2010) ("April 21, 2010 Petillo Email") [Dkt. No. 99-
3] .
By April 15, 2010, the relationship between Porter and
Dolinsky had soured badly. Porter was offended when Dolinl:'.kY
expressed his opinion that Louis Farrakhan is an anti-Semite and
stated that he did not like Jesse Jackson because "he is known to
have cheated on his wife and various other things." 2010 Dolinsky
Aff. ~ 21. The following day, Porter initiated the process of
filing an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") Complaint. Pl.'s Ex.
7, Porter Email (April 16, 2010) ("April 16, 2010 Porter Email")
[Dkt. No. 99-3]. On May 24, 2019, Porter officially filed an EEO
Complaint against Dolinsky. Def.'s Ex. 7, EEO Complaint ("EEO
Complaint") [Dkt. No. 99-3].
In a series of emails, Porter complained that he was being
harassed by Dolinksy forcing him to remain in his office at all times,
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by not being assigned any work, and by the way Dolinsky treated him.
See~, Def.'s Ex. 6, Porter Email to Petillo (April 23, 2010)
("April 23, 2010 Porter Email") [Dkt. No. 99-3]; Def. 's Ex. 8, Porter
Email to Dolinsky (May 11, 2010) ("May 11, 2010 Porter Email") [Dkt.
No. 99-3]; Def.' s Ex. 9, Porter Email to Dolinsky (May 13, 2010)
("May 13, 2010 Porter Email") [Dkt. No. 99-3]. Porter stated that the
alleged harassment was causing him to have panic attacks. Id.
As a result, Porter asked to be reassigned and relocated to
another building in order to avoid contact with Dolinsky, and to be
supervised by Petillo instead of Dolinsky. April 23, 2010 Porter
Email. HHS denied this request after determining that Plaintiff was
not entitled to a reasonable accommodation since his condition was
not a disability under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. Def.'s Ex.
14, HHS Mem. (Aug. 6, 2010) ("2010 HHS Mem.") [Dkt. No. 99-3]. Petillo
denied a similar, informal request from Porter, stating that he did
not think a transfer was in the best interest of the agency and,
therefore, could not approve the transfer. Def.'s Ex. 17, Petillo
Email to Porter (April 26, 2010) ("April 26, 2010 Petillo Email")
[Dkt. No. 99-3].
B. Procedural Background
On May 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed an EEO complaint with the EEO
section of the Department of Health and Human Services. EEO Complaint.
He subsequently filed six amended complaints, the last on December
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22, 2010. EEO Complaint Final Decision (June 3, 2011) at 2 n.1 [Dkt.
No. 13-1] . On June 3, 2011, the agency issued its Final Decision
rejecting Plaintiff's claim. Id.
On August 26, 2011, Porter filed a Complaint [Dkt. No. l] in
this Court seeking review of the june 2011 Final Decision. On May
23, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint, which is now
the operative Complaint in this action. Compl.
On June 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary
Judgment. On August 28, 2014, Defendant filed her Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment. On September 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to
Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support
for his Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl. 's Opp. and Reply") [Dkt.
No. 101]. On October 27, 2014, Defendant filed her Reply in Support
of her Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.' s Reply") [Dkt. No. 106] .
The Motions are now ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, the
discovery materials, and affidavits on file show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Arrington v. Urtited States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006). "A
dispute over a material fact is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is such
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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party.'" Arrington, 473 F.3d at 333 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is "material" if it
might affect the outcome of the case under the substantive
governing law. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. In reviewing the
evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Johnson v. Perez, No. 15-5034, 2016 WL 2941965, at *2 (D.C. Cir.
May 2 O, 2 o16 ) .
The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence
of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 31~, 323 (1986). When a moving party successfully does
so, the nonmoving party must show the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact by providing "specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial," and "may not rely on mere
allegations or denials to prevail." Alexis v. District of Columbia,
44 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337 (D.D.C. 1999). The moving party is entitled
to summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to offer
evidence sufficient to establish an essential element of a claim
on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477
U.S. at 322.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Title VII Claims
1. Legal Framework
Plaintiff's claims of discrimination and retaliation under
Title VII are subject to the burden shifting framework set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973);
Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 812. F.3d 1109, 1113-14 (D.C.
Cir. 2016). That framework requires Plaintiff to first establish
a prima f acie case of racial discrimination or retaliation under
Title VII. Wheeler, 812 F.3d at 1113-14. 3
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under
Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that 1) he suffered an adverse
employment action, 2) because of his race. Gladden v. Solis, 926
F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Gladden v.
Perez, No. 13-5125, 2013 WL 6222904 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 19, 2013). To
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII,
Plaintiff must show that he 1) suffered a materially adverse
action, 2) because he had brought or threatened to bring a
discriminat.ion claim. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F. 3d 1191, 1198
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
3 While the Plaintiff sometimes seems to refer to "failure to
obtain a reasonable accommodation" as a separate claim, the term
is clearly included in his claim of retaliation.
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After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. If the
employer provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the employer's stated reason was merely a pretext for
discrimination. Id.
In .Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 495
(D.C. Cir. 2008), our Court of Appeals also held that" [i]n a Title
VII disparate-treatment suit where an employee has suffered an
adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision, the
district court need not-and should not-decide whether the
plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas." Id., at 494. Instead, the Court must resolve one central
question: "[h]as the employee produced sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-
discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the
employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on tne
basis of race. " Id.
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2. Plaintiff's Motion
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his claims of race-based
discrimination under Title VII (Claim 1), retaliation under Title
VII (Claim 3), failure to provide reasonable accommodation under
Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA (Claim 5). He claims
to have suffered a decrease in his level of responsibility, as
well as a lower bonus and lower performance rating than he had
achieved in the past, and disparate racial treatment with regard
to reassignments and in retaliation for his EEO Complaint. Pl.'s
Mot. at 14-17; Pl.' s Reply at 18-26. Porter also claims that
Dolinsky threatened to fire him because he filed the EEO Complaint
(Claim 3) and hostile environment under Claim 4. Pl.'s Mot. at 34-
37.
In response, Defendant provides a number of non-
discriminatory and non-retaliatory r~asons for these alleged
adverse actions. Defendant argues that Porter's responsibilities
decreased only because he refused to carry out his professional
responsibilities, and admitted that he was "not mentally able to
do anymore work . . . " Def.'s Mot. at 15-16.; Def.'s Ex. 20, Porter
Email (June 30, 2010) ("June 30, 2010 Porter Email") [Dkt. No.
99-3] . Defendant also points out that Porter could have continued
to perform what he described as "self-generated" work if he had
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not let his password to the billing system expire. Def.'s Mot. at
17; Porter Dep. at 45: 1-11; 2010 Dolinsky Aff. ~ 14. Dolinsky
explained that it is up to employees to maintain access to the
agency's billing system, but Porter failed to do so. Id.
As to Porter's decrease in his bonus and performance ratings,
Defendant argues that they were due to poor performance, including
using erroneous billing practices and refusing to correct those
errors when Dolinsky brought them to. his attention. Def.'s Mot. at
16; Def.'s Reply Ex. 1, Dolinsky Deel. (April 7, 2014) ~~ 6-8
(''2014 Dolinsky Deel.") [Dkt. No. 106].
Porter also cited the fact that he was denied a transfer out
of the building when a Caucasian employee was allowed to transfer.
Defendant replies that the Caucasian employee's transfer was not
race-based because, according to Dolinsky's testimony, that
employee pref erred to perform work that Dolinksy could not provide
her in ASPR. Def.'s Reply Ex. 3, Dolinsky Dep. Tr. at 138:7-11
("Dolinsky Dep.") [Dkt. No. 106] Porter did not provide any
evidence to contradict this testimony.
Finally, Defendant explains that Dolinksy did not threaten to
fire Porter because he filed the EEO suit, as Plaintiff alleges.
Rather, the EEO Complaint caused Dolinsky to review Porter's
position description and realized that Porter did not have the
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•.
security clearance required for that position. Pl.' s Ex. 19,
Dolinsky Aff. (August 1, 2011) ~ 21 ("2011 Dolinksy Aff.") [Dkt.
No. 95]. When Dolinksy told Porter to obtain the necessary security
clearance, Porter refused. Id. Dolinsky denied that he was
threatening to fire Porter if he pursued the EEO Complaint, but
rather was pointing out that the EEO Complaint would disclose
Porter's lack of the requisite security clearance for his position.
Id.
Plaintiff responds that Defendant's non-discriminatory and
non-retaliatory reasons are merely pretextual. However, most of
his responses are simply conclusory allegations rather than
specific provable facts. For example, he argues that the emails
upon which Defendant relies could be "read in a different light."
Pl.'s Opp. and Reply at 6.
Porter also points out that Defendant has not produced any
documentation to substantiate her claims about Plaintiff's
erroneous billing practices. Id. at 4-5. Defendant explained that
upon learning that Porter was preparing a bill incorrectly,
Dolinsky prevented him from completing the bill. Dolinksy Aff. ~~
6-7 (April 14, 2014) ("2014 Dolinsky Aff.") [Dkt. No. 84-1].
Porter argues that Dolinsky "did not keep copies of those incorrect
documents because [he] prevented them from going forward and
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keeping incorrectly prepared billing documents around could have
resulted in their being inadvertently submitted at a later date."
Id. ~ 8. While the lack of documentation may be a relevant
consideration for a trier of fact, it does not, on its own, support
the entry of summary judgment where there is other admissible
evidence in support of the Defendant's position. See Sharma v.
District of Columbia, 65 F. Supp. 3d 108, 117 (D.D.C. 2014).
Even though Plaintiff has presented "sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to find that the employer's asserted non-
discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the
employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the
basis of race. .," Brady, 520 F.3d at 494, his Motion for
Summary Judgment on his claim of discrimination must be denied,
given that both parties have provided inconsistent evidence on
material issues of fact.
Thus, the conflicting testimony of Porter and Dolinsky on the
issue of race-based discrimination and retaliation precludes
summary.judgment on that claim.
3. Defendant's Motion
Defendant argues tha.t summary judgment should be granted in
her favor because Porter has not presented evidence that
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Defendant's non-discriminatory reasons for the alleged adverse
employment actions were pretextual.
However, as already mentioned, Plaintiff has pointed to the
following evidence from which a jury could find that Defendant
discriminated and/o~ retaliated against him.
First, it is undisputed that a number of Caucasian employees
were transferred to other departments, while Porter's request was
denied. See, Pl.'s Opp. and Reply at 18-26; Def.'s Reply at 6-7.
Defendant asserts, without citing any evidence, that the
situations of two of those employees were different than Porter's.
However, one such employee, Brian Sparry, did request a
transfer for reasons similar to Porter's. In a letter to Petillo,
Sparry wrote that, "your style of micro-management is adversely
affecting my health, causing more than an inordinate amount of
stress. I am therefore requesting accommodation due to my
medical condition be [ing] adversely affected by you and to be
transferred out of RPE." Pl.'s Opp. and Reply Ex. 68, Sparry Email
(June 25, 2009) ("2009 Sparry Email") [Dkt. No. 101]. This evidence
showing that the Defendant granted Sparry's transfer request but
did not grant Porter's similar request supports Plaintiff's
assertion that Defendant's reasons for the disparate treatment of
Porter are pretextual.
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•.
Second, it is also undisputed that one employee, Linda Reeder,
made some of the same billing mistakes that Porter made. Pl.'s
Mot. at 14-17; Pl.'s Opp. and Reply at 25-26; Def.'s Reply at 7.
Defendant asserts that Reeder was more receptive to Dolinsky's
corrections than Porter, but does not cite any evidence in support
of that assertion. Def.'s Reply at 7. Mere allegations, without
specific facts to support them, are not enough to refute
Plaintiff's claims of disparate treatment and discrimination.
Alexis v. District of Columbia, 44 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337 (D.D.C.
1999). In fact, Reeder stated that Dolinksy never trained her in
proper billing practices, nor admonished her for improper
practices. Pl.'s Opp. and.Reply Ex. 2, Reeder Aff. (January 27,
2012) ·~~ 7, 9, 11 ("Reeder Aff.") [Dkt. No. 101] .
·Third, Plaintiff asserts that many of the emails on which
both parties rely can be interpreted differently by the two
parties. See, e.g., Pl.'s Opp. and Reply at 6. For example, Porter
claims that the email in which he stated that he was "not mentally
able to do anymore work . . . ," (June 30, 2010 Porter Email), was
"a misunderstanding." Pl.'s Opp. and Reply at 6. He also states
that he never intended that email to be construed as a statement
that he would no longer process disaster relief bills. Id.
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Taken in the light most favorable to Porter, the Court agrees
that a fact finder could, on the basis of these emails, find a
discriminatory or retaliatory intent. As material factual disputes
remain over whether Defendant's reasons for·any alleged adverse
actions were pretextual, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
shall be denied with respect to Plaintiff's Title VII claims.
B. Rehabilitation Act Claims
Plaintiff has brought claims of discrimination (Claim II),
failure to provide reasonable accommodation (Claim V) , and
hostile work environment (Claims IV and VI) under the
Rehabilitation Act.
1. Legal Framework
Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims are also subject to the
burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas. See
Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F. 3d 521, 528-29 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As
already noted under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff has the initial
burden of proving a prima facie case for each claim. McGill v. ·
Munoz, 203 F.3d 843, 845 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2000). If a plaintiff
succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
See id. If the employer provides such a reason, the plaintiff must
then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
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evidence that the reason offered was,. in fact, a pretext for
discrimination. , Id.
--
Although the Brady modification to the McDonnell Douglas
burden shifting framework applies in Rehabilitation Act cases, it
only applies if a defendant answers a plaintiff's claims by
providing a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Woodruff
v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 528-29 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Here, the
Defendant attacked Plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act
by arguing that Plaintiff had not satisfied a prerequisite to all
claims brought under that Act -- namely, that the Plaintiff must
be "disabled" within the meaning of the statute. Def.'s Mot. at
29-32.
2. Plaintiff Is Not "Disabled" Within the Meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act
"To sustain a disability claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
a plaintiff must as a threshold matter establish that he or she
has a disability". Klute v. Shinseki, 840 F. Supp. 2d 209, 215
(D.D.C. 2012). Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims fail because
the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff was not "disabled" within
the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and therefore not entitled
to its protections. See Id.
The standards used to determine whether a person is disabled
under the Rehabilitation Act are identical to the standards applied
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under the ADA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9) (B), 794(d). Under those
-
standards, a person is "disabled" if he or she has "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)·. The statute
defines "major life activities" to include working. 42 U.S.C. §
12102 (2) (A) .
Although the definition of "disability" "shall be construed
in favor of broad coverage of individuals" under the Rehabilitation
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4) (A), impairments that are developed or
exacerbated because of a particular supervisor or work environment
do not constitute a disability under the Act. Klute, 840 F. Supp.
at 215-17; see Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 482-83 (D.C. Cir.
2004) ("if the symptoms of an impairment are brought on by a single
workplace, such an impairment is not substantially limiting"). In
particular, an impairment that can be alleviated by changing
supervisors does not constitute a "disability" under the Act. See
Rand v. Geithner, 609 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103-04 (D.D.C. 2009)
(dismissing Rehabilitation Act claims of plaintiff who alleged
that supervisors' micromanagement and harassment inhibited her
ability to work because the "evidence on which she [had] relie[d]
show[ed], at most, that to the extent her impairment interfere[d]
I
with her ability to work, it only limit[ed] her ability to work in
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her particular office environment") ; Stroman v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Assoc., 966 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1997) (noting that
the plaintiff's "alleged inability to perform a particular job or
work for a particular supervisor will not, without more, qualify
her as disabled").
In Klute, the court found that the plaintiff suffered from
adjustment disorder, anxiety and depression, along with a number
of physical infirmities. Klute, 840 F. Supp. at 212-13. The
plaintiff argued that he was therefore substantially limited in
his ability to work. Id. However, both the plaintiff and his doctor
admitted that the plaintiff could be successful at his job if he
was given a different supervisor. Id. at 217. The court found that
mental .impairments that could be rectified by a change in
supervisors did not qualify as "disabiliti~s" within the meaning
of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 217-18
Here too, the undisputed facts show that Porter's impairments
do not qualify as "disabilities" within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Ac~ because he admits that they would be alleviated
by a change irt supervisor and/or office. See April, 23, 2010
Petillo Email; Def.'s Ex. 26, Answers for Reasonable Accommodation
Request ~ Sb (November 5, 2010) ("2010 Answers for Reasonable
Accommodation Request") [Dkt. No. 99-3].
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Plaintiff claims that he is disabled because he suffers from
panic attacks, a generalized anxiety disorder, depression and
post-traumatic stress disorder. Pl.'s Mot. at 18-20. Plaintiff has
shown, and Defendant does not dispute, that these conditions
predated April 2010 when Porter received his "unacceptable" rating
on his performance review. See Pl.'s Ex. 39, Wang, M.D. Letter
(Sept. 9, 2010) [Dkt. No. 95]; Porter Dep. at 107:7-23; Def.'s
Reply at 12.
Thus, by Plaintiff's own admission, these impairments did not
limit his ability to work before April 2010. Porter Dep. at 193:5-
8 {"Q. So before April of 2010, none of these conditions prevented
you from doing your job successful? A. At work? No. No."). Porter's
"impairments" have only inhibited him from working for one
supervisor, Dolinsky. A doctor's evaluation upon which both
Plaintiff and Defendant rely states that, "[a] ccording to Mr.
Porter his symptoms at work are specific to his supervisor." 2010
Answers for Reasonable Accommodation Request ~5.
Furthermore, Porter's requests for accommodation were simply
to relocate to another building away from Dolinsky and to work for
a different supervisor. See e.g. April 23, 2010 Porter Email. An
impairment such as Porter's that only limited his ability to work
for and near a certain supervisor is not, as a matter of law, a
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"disability" under the Rehabilitation Act. See e.g., Haynes, 392
F.3d at 482-83.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff's claims of discrimination (Claim II), failure to
provide reasonable accommodation (Claim V), and hostile work
environment harassment (Claims IV and VI) under the Rehabilitation
Act are granted.
C. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA
It is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff asserts his claim
of failure to provide reasonable accommodation under the
Rehabilitation Act or under the ADA. See Pl.'s Mot. at 21-30. To
the extent that Plaintiff asserts this claim under the ADA, it
fails for the same reason that his Rehabilitation Act claims fail-
i. e. he was not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA.
To establish a reasonable.accommodation cause of action under
the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: 1) he was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA; 2) his employer was aware of his disability;
3) he could have done his job with reasonable accommodation; and
4) he was denied such accommodations. See McNair v. District of
Columbia, 11 F. Supp. 3d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2014).
The standards used to determine whether a person is disabled
under the Rehabilitation Act are identical to the standards applied
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under the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705(9) (B), 794(d). Therefore, if
a person is not "disabled" under the Rehabilitation Act he cannot
be "disabled" under the ADA. See id. Since the undisputed facts
show that Porter was not disabled within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act, for the reasons already articulated in Section
III.B.2, he cannot be considered "disabled" under the ADA.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary· Judgment on
Plaintiff's claims of failure to provide reasonable accommodation
(Claim V) under the ADA are granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff.' s Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied in its entirety, and Defendant's Motion is
granted in part and denied in part. Claims II, IV, V and VI shall
be dismissed with prejudice. 4 An Order shall accompany this
Memorandum Opinion.
June 14, 2016 Gladys Kessie
United States District Judge
4 Plaintiff is strongly urged to retain a qualified attorney,
should this case proceed to trial.
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