Opinion

Milton O. Cheatham v. Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board

  • 501 F.2d 1346
  • 21 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 970
  • 1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 7360
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Aug 1, 1974
Status
Published
Author
Craven
On the bench
Haynsworth, Winter, Craven
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 47.8%

The opinion

CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:

Milton O. Cheatham brought suit versus the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that his discharge from employment for failure to make reasonable provision for payment of his just debts was in violation of Section 304(a) of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (a).

1

The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the Board, an agency of the state, was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of a showing that it had consented to suit. Cheatham has appealed.

While appellant raises interesting questions as to whether the state has waived either explicitly

2

or

eonstructively

3

its Eleventh Amendment immunity and whether a private cause of action should be implied under the Consumer Credit Protection Act,

4

we find decision of these questions unnecessary to the disposition of the case.

Even if we assume that the Act created a cause of action for private parties and the Board was amenable to suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment the complaint is defective on its face. Section 304(a) of the Act protects an employee from discharge where his earnings have been garnished “for any one indebtedness.” It does not protect him where there have been, as here, multiple garnishments based on more than a single indebtedness. Nor does the Act purport to wipe the slate clean by defining “garnishments” to mean “garnishments after July 1,1970.”

5

Brennan v. General Telephone Co. of Florida, 488 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1973). Since the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the district court’s dismissal was proper.

Affirmed.

1

. Section 304(a) provides:

No emj)loyer may discharge any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.

2

.

See

Va.Code §§ 4-12, 2.1-223.1 and 8-752.

See also

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 , 94 S.Ct. 1347 , 39 L.Ed.2d 662 , 681 n.19 (1974).

3

.

Compare

Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 , 84 S.Ct. 1207 , 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964)

with

Employees of the Dep’t. of Public Health & Welfare v. Dep’t. of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 , 93 S.Ct. 1614 , 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973).

See also

Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1973).

4

.

See

Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F.Supp. 1057, 1059 (W.D.La.1972),

vacated

488 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1973). We specifically left the question open. Western v. Hodgson, 494 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1974).

See generally

Note, The Implication of a Private Cause of Action Under Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 47 So.Cal.L.Rev. 383 (1974).

5

. Such an interpretation, here applied, would mean that Cheatham could not be discharged since the two garnishments after July 1, 1970, against his earnings were apparently for the same $150 debt. The Wage-Hour Administrator has adopted this interpretation. Opinion Letter No. 1136 (No. WH-89), Oct. 26, 1970, CCII Lab.L.Rep. 1f 30,703, but we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in the

General Telephone Co.

case,

supra.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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