inmate did not have constitutionally protected interest in using and maintaining Facebook account, largely due to threat to institutional safety that would be imposed by allowing unmonitored communication via social media and the monitoring burdens that would be imposed upon prison staff
How later courts described this case
- inmate did not have constitutionally protected interest in using and maintaining Facebook account, largely due to threat to institutional safety that would be imposed by allowing unmonitored communication via social media and the monitoring burdens that would be imposed upon prison staff
- applying Turner to decide whether an inmate had “a constitutionally protected interest in the use and maintenance of his Facebook account”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-1236
___________
STEPHEN AGUIAR,
Appellant
v.
WARDEN M. RECKTENWALD, Warden; JEFF BUTLER, Associate Warden;
C. BERGEN, Captain; JIM LYONS, Special Investigations Supervisor ('SIS"),
Federal Bureau of Prisons; MARGIE COOK, "SIS" Technician, FBOP;
JOHN DOE, Facebook Incorporated
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-13-cv-02616)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 5, 2016
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 23, 2016)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant Stephen Aguiar appeals from an order of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania awarding summary judgment in his
§ 1983 action. As the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the decision of the District Court.
I.
Aguiar initiated this action in 20131 alleging that the Defendants, prison officials
at FCI Allenwood and a John Doe employee of Facebook, violated unspecified
constitutional rights by deactivating, or facilitating the deactivation of, his Facebook
account. Prison investigators discovered that Aguiar was using his sister to update his
Facebook account and to send messages to others on his behalf – a violation of Bureau of
Prisons policy and of Facebook’s terms and conditions. Investigators subsequently
requested that Facebook deactivate Aguiar’s profile, and his account was promptly
disabled.
In a July 28, 2015 Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the Court grant the Corrections Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, finding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because Aguiar failed to
allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. On January 11, 2016, the District Court
1
Aguiar initially filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, where he is currently incarcerated. It was subsequently transferred to the
Middle District of Pennsylvania.
2
adopted this Report and Recommendation in full over Aguiar’s objections2 and directed
the Clerk to close this case. This timely appeal ensued.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s award of summary judgment, applying the same test the District Court
should have utilized – whether the record “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Giles
v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). In applying this test, we must accept
evidence presented by the non-movant as true and draw all justifiable factual inferences
in his favor. Id. We may summarily affirm any decision of the District Court where “it
clearly appears that no substantial question is presented or that subsequent precedent or a
change in circumstances warrants such action.” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2015).
Aguiar’s claim is premised on the existence of a constitutionally protected interest
in the use and maintenance of his Facebook account. Even if he enjoys such an interest,
we have no doubt that Defendants’ decision to exclude Aguiar from this activity – when
his specific use violated BOP policies – was “reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests,” and thus constitutionally permissible. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987).
2
The District Court previously adopted the Report and Recommendation on July 2, 2015,
but vacated its order after Aguiar filed a motion to alter the judgment based on his non-
receipt of the report.
3
Turner requires the consideration of four factors in determining the reasonableness
of a prison regulation: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it;”3 (2)
“whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates;” (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally;” (4) the
availability of other alternatives to effectuate the objective. Id. at 89-90 (internal
quotations omitted).
As to the first factor, prison officials facilitated the deactivation of Aguiar’s
account to prevent him from communicating, through his sister, with unmonitored
contacts – a legitimate interest related to the security and order of the facility. 4
Secondly, despite the deactivation of his account, Aguiar still retained traditional
methods of communication, including phone calls, postal mail, and prison visitation. As
to the third factor, permitting inmates to maintain Facebook accounts through their
agents, and to send unmonitored messages through these accounts, would impose a
massive burden on prison administrators to keep themselves apprised of inmate
3
In Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 532 (2006), the Supreme Court acknowledged the
particular importance of the first factor, explaining that in some cases the second, third,
and fourth factors can “add little, one way or another, to the first factor's basic logical
rationale.”
4 See generally Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Turner) (“[I]n
recognition of the acute security problems of modern American prisons, the courts have
upheld restrictions on [] communications that would be intolerable if both sender and
recipient were free persons.”). As the District Court noted, Aguiar could have been
communicating with other inmates or gang members.
4
communications. Finally, no other feasible less restrictive alternative exists – aside from
continuously monitoring Aguiar’s account – that would allow prison administrators to
maintain the security of inmate communications while allowing Aguiar to maintain his
account.
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the decision of the District Court.
Aguiar’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.
5