State of Tennessee v. Sammie Lee Taylor

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2016

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SAMMIE LEE TAYLOR

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. P-19190 James Lammey, Judge

No. W2015-01831-CCA-R3-CD - Filed June 6, 2016

The Defendant, Sammie Lee Taylor, was convicted in 1994 of first degree felony murder,

especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual

battery and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole plus sixty-two years. In 2015, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee

Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of the judgment. The trial court

summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T.

WOODALL, P.J., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., joined.

Sammie Lee Taylor, Clifton, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Senior Counsel; and

Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Glenn Baity, Assistant District Attorney

Genera, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On February 17, 1994, the Defendant, a juvenile at the time of the offenses, was

indicted for three counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated

kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and especially aggravated robbery. The

Defendant‟s case originated in the juvenile court but was transferred to criminal court.

Following the jury‟s finding the Defendant guilty of first degree felony murder, especially

aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual battery, the

jury imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the felony

murder conviction. The trial court imposed an effective sixty-two-year sentence for the

remaining convictions and ordered consecutive service with the life sentence. See State v.

Sammie Lee Taylor, No. 02C01-9501-CR-00029, 1996 WL 580997, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Oct. 10, 1996), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 3, 1997). The Defendant unsuccessfully

sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. See Sammie Lee

Taylor v. State, No. W1999-00977-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 714387 (Tenn. Crim. App. May

26, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 4, 2000). The Defendant also sought habeas

corpus relief relative to his especially aggravated robbery conviction. The Defendant

attacked only the validity of the sentence but was still serving his life sentence at the time he

filed his petition, rendering any attack on the especially aggravated robbery conviction

premature. See Sammie L. Taylor v. State, No. M2003-02954-CCA-R3-HC, 2004 WL

2636716, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 28,

2005).

On June 10, 2015, the Defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an

illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The Defendant‟s

primary focus was his life without the possibility of parole sentence and argued his sentence

was illegal on multiple grounds. He argued his life sentence was illegal because (1) he was

denied a fair juvenile court transfer hearing in that the juvenile court abused its discretion by

improperly relying upon a single psychologist‟s opinion of the Defendant‟s competency and

by not permitting another psychologist to perform an evaluation, (2) his juvenile court

counsel provided ineffective assistance, (3) his statements to the police were obtained

without counsel, without being advised of his Miranda rights, and in violation of his

privilege against self-incrimination, (4) his life sentence offends Miller v. Alabama, --- U.S. -

--, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2016), because life without parole and life are equivalent to life without

parole and because life without parole was imposed without consideration for his age,

characteristics, and circumstances, (5) trial counsel provided the ineffective assistance by

failing to present evidence of his mens rea for first degree felony murder and by failing to

present a mental health expert to rebut the State‟s expert witness, (6) he was diagnosed as

“borderline intellectually disabled,” (7) his life sentence offends principles of double

jeopardy, (8) the jury was provided vague and confusing instructions as it relates to release

from confinement when sentenced to life imprisonment, (9) the jury and trial court failed

consider mitigating factors during sentencing, (10) the trial court improperly refused to

instruct the jury on facilitation of felony murder, (11) Tennessee Code Annotated sections

39-13-204(e)(2) and 39-13-208(b) are unconstitutional, (12) principles of due process were

violated by the juvenile court‟s transferring his case without sufficient information, by this

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court‟s failure to review the appropriateness of his life sentence, and by trial counsel‟s failure

to request a jury instruction regarding “borderline mental retardation” at the sentencing

phase, and (13) his life sentence is the result of prosecutorial punishment and selective

prosecution in response to exercising his right to a jury trial. The Defendant also argued that

(14) consecutive service violates principles of due process and equal protection and (15) he

was improperly sentenced for aggravated sexual battery because the proof showed his

conduct was not sexual battery.

The trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the motion on the grounds that

the motion raised issues previously adjudicated and that the Defendant failed to state any

colorable claim for which relief could be granted. This appeal followed.

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion

for a corrected sentence, arguing that (1) the Defendant‟s sentence to life without the

possibility of parole was rendered illegal by Miller v. Alabama, CITE, (2) due to the jury‟s

lack of discretion in sentencing the Defendant to life without the possibility of parole, the

trial court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction, (3) his allegations of ineffective

assistance were not previously determined, (4) the juvenile court transfer hearing violated the

Defendant‟s due process rights because the juvenile referee did not have sufficient

information to justify the transfer, (5) he was denied a fair and impartial jury verdict resulting

in an illegal sentence, (6) that the evidence was insufficient to support his first degree murder

and aggravated sexual battery convictions, (7) Code section 39-13-202 was not effective at

the time he was charged with the offenses and was inapplicable to juveniles, (8) he was

denied a fair and impartial jury verdict, (9) his confession was illegally obtained, (10) the

court retaliated against him for exercising his right to a jury trial by sentencing him more

harshly than the other codefendants, (11) consecutive sentencing was not justified, (12)

prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing arguments, (13) the trial court violated

double jeopardy by instructing the jury relative to an aggravating factor that was an element

of felony murder, (14) Code section 39-13-204 violates the single-subject and caption rules

of the Tennessee Consitution, (15) Code section 39-13-204 is unconstitutionally vague, and

(16) the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses of felony murder. The

State responds that the trial court properly dismissed the motion.

Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 states, in relevant part, that

(a) Either the defendant or the state may, at any time, seek the correction of an

illegal sentence by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence in the trial

court in which the judgment of conviction was entered. For purposes of this

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rule, an illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable statutes

or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a). A defendant is entitled to a hearing and the appointment of

counsel if the motion states a colorable claim for relief. Id. at 36.1(b). Further, the trial court

is required to file an order denying the motion if it determines that the sentence is not illegal.

Id. at 36.1(c)(1).

Whether a defendant states a colorable claim is a question of law and is reviewed de

novo. State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Tenn. 2015). A colorable claim is defined as

“a claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party, would

entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1.” Id. at 593. A motion filed pursuant to

Rule 36.1 “must state with particularity the factual allegations on which the claim for relief

from an illegal sentence is based.” Id. at 594. A trial court “may consult the record of the

proceeding from which the allegedly illegal sentence emanated” when determining whether a

motion states a colorable claim for relief. Id.

Only fatal errors result in an illegal sentence and “are „so profound as to render the

sentence illegal and void.‟” Id. at 595 (quoting Cantrell, 346 S.W.2d 445, 452 (Tenn. 2011)).

Fatal errors include sentences imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme,

sentences that designate release eligibility dates when early release is prohibited, sentences

that are ordered to be served concurrently when consecutive service is required, and

sentences that not authorized by statute. Id. at 595. Appealable errors, however, do not

render a sentence illegal and include “„those errors for which the Sentencing Act specially

provides a right of direct appeal.‟” Id. at 595 (quoting Cantrell, 346 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tenn.

2011)). Appealable errors are “claims „akin to . . . challenge[s] to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting a conviction‟ and “involve attacks on the correctness of the

methodology by which a trial court imposed sentence.” Id. at 595 (quoting Cantrell, 346

S.W.2d at 450-52.

The record reflects that the trial court properly denied the motion for a corrected

sentence. Relative to the Defendant‟s issues regarding whether counsel provided ineffective

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assistance, whether he received a fair and impartial jury verdict, whether he lacked the mens

rea to commit first degree murder, whether he was properly sentenced as a adult, and whether

his pretrial statements to the police were lawfully obtained, the record reflects that these

issues have been previously determined. See Sammie Lee Taylor, No. W1999-00977-CCA-

R3-CD, 2000 WL 714387, *2-5; see also Sammie Lee Taylor, 1996 WL 580997, at *7-9, 11-

15. We note, too, that these issues, even if true would not entitle the Defendant to relief

because they are not fatal errors rendering a sentence illegal and void See State, 478 S.W.3d

at 595.

Relative to the issues regarding whether the juvenile court transfer hearing was a farce

and a mockery rendering his sentence unlawful pursuant to Miller, whether Code section 39-

13-202 was effective at the time the Defendant was charged, and whether the juvenile court

acknowledged the Defendant received ineffective assistance are not colorable claims

pursuant to Rule 36.1. These allegations, taken as true, would not result in an illegal sentnct

In the appeal of the Defendant‟s conviction, this court reviewed the sufficiency of the

evidence, the aggravating factors found by the jury and the basis for the life without the

possibility of parole sentence and whether the Defendant‟s pretrial statements to the police

was obtained lawfully.

Relative to

Relative to the Defendant‟s allegations regarding the juvenile court transfer hearing,

the ineffectiveness of juvenile court counsel,

Relative to the Defendant‟s pretrial statement, this court previously determined in the

appeal of the Defendant‟s conviction that the statement provided by the Defendant was made

after being advised of his Miranda rights and in the presence of his twenty-year-old sister,

who was the Defendant‟s temporary guardian while their mother was out of town. Likewise,

the Defendant and his sister read, signed and initialed the Defendant‟s written statement and

the advice of rights form. The Defendant‟s second statement was provided after being

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advised of his Miranda rights but in the absence of his sister. This court concluded that the

statements and the subsequent search of his home conducted pursuant to consent were lawful.

Sammie Lee Taylor, 1996 WL 580997, at *12-13

Based upon the record before this court, it is unclear what transpired in the trial court.

This court is concerned that the trial court‟s order dismissing the Defendant‟s May 28, 2015

filing, which requests a file-stamped copy of the previously filed motion for a corrected

judgment, is based upon a May 5 letter that is not contained in the trial court record and does

not relate to pretrial jail credits. As a result, we conclude that the case must be remanded to

the trial court for relevant findings of fact regarding what documents, if any, were filed with

the Shelby County Court Clerk‟s Office, including the May 5 letter referenced in the trial

court‟s dismissal order. If the court determines that the Defendant‟s motion for a corrected

judgment relative to pretrial jail credits was provided to prison mailroom officials on May 6

and that the motion was sent to the Shelby County Court Clerk‟s Office and to the District

Attorney General‟s Office as reflected by the certificate of service, the Defendant‟s motion

should be considered filed with trial court. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(d)(1) (“If a paper . . .

permitted to be filed pursuant to the rules of criminal procedure is prepared by . . . a pro se

litigant incarcerated in a correctional facility . . . , the filing is timely if the paper was

delivered to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility within the time set for

filing.”) If, however, the court determines that the Defendant‟s motion was not submitted to

the prison mailroom officials and that the motion is not deemed to have been filed, the matter

should be dismissed, and the Defendant is free to file his motion for a corrected judgment

related to pretrial jail credits. We note, though, that our supreme court recently concluded

that the “failure to award pretrial jail credits does not render the sentence illegal and is

insufficient, therefore, to establish a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1.” State v.

Adrian R. Brown, ___ S.W.3d ___, ____, No. E2014-00673-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL

7748275, at *9 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2015).

Based upon the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial court is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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____________________________________

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE

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