Opinion

State ex rel. Watkins v. St. Clare Retirement Community

  • 2016 Ohio 3136
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
May 24, 2016
Status
Published
On the bench
Klatt
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 54.5%

The opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Watkins v. St. Clare Retirement Community, 2016-Ohio-3136.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio ex rel. :

Gwendolyn Watkins,

:

Relator,

:

v. No. 15AP-175

:

St. Clare Retirement Community (REGULAR CALENDAR)

and Industrial Commission of Ohio, :

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on May 24, 2016

On brief: Lisa M. Clark, for relator.

On brief: Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, and Jacob Dobres, for

respondent St. Clare Retirement Community.

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and

Cheryl J. Nester, for respondent Industrial Commission of

Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS

ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

KLATT, J.

{¶ 1} Relator, Gwendolyn Watkins, commenced this original action in mandamus

seeking an order compelling respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"),

to vacate its order that denied her application for permanent total disability ("PTD")

compensation and to find that she is entitled to said compensation. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53

and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, we referred this matter to a

No. 15AP-175 2

magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which

is appended hereto. The magistrate found that the commission abused its discretion

when it relied on the psychological report of Dr. Manges because Dr. Manges indicated

that relator was capable of work with certain limitations but then failed to identify those

limitations in his report. Because Dr. Manges did not identify the applicable limitations,

his report did not constitute some evidence upon which the commission could rely.

Therefore, the magistrate has recommended that we grant a writ of mandamus and order

the commission to vacate its order that denied relator's application for PTD and, after

either receiving an addendum report from Dr. Manges or having relator examined by

another examiner, determine whether or not she is entitled to said compensation.

{¶ 2} Relator's employer, respondent St. Clare Retirement Community ("St.

Clare"), filed objections to the magistrate's decision. In its first objection, St. Clare

contends that the magistrate ignored Dr. Manges' conclusion that relator's allowed

psychological condition "moderately negatively affected" relator's ability to perform

sustained remunerative employment. In essence, St. Clare argues that the magistrate

improperly substituted her judgment for that of the commission with respect to the

evidentiary impact of Dr. Manges' report. We disagree.

{¶ 3} The magistrate did not substitute her judgment for that of the commission

in weighing the impact of Dr. Manges' report. Rather, the magistrate found that Dr.

Manges' report was not some evidence upon which the commission could rely because the

report expressly referenced limitations but did not identify the limitations under which

relator would be capable of working. Therefore, we overrule St. Clare's first objection.

{¶ 4} In its second objection, St. Clare contends the magistrate improperly shifted

the burden of proof to require the commission to consider why relator made no efforts at

vocational rehabilitation since leaving the workplace in 1995. St. Clare argues that by

requiring the commission on remand to consider whether relator's psychological

condition impacted her ability to participate in vocational rehabilitation, the magistrate

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. Again, we disagree.

{¶ 5} The magistrate's decision does not shift the burden of proof. The

magistrate's decision simply highlights an issue that may need to be addressed if the

commission reexamines the nonmedical factors following a redetermination of whether

No. 15AP-175 3

relator's psychological claim prevents her from sustained remunerative employment.

Therefore, we overrule St. Clare's second objection.

{¶ 6} Following an independent review of this matter, we find that the magistrate

has properly determined the facts and applied the appropriate law. Therefore, we adopt

the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law

contained therein. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we grant relator's

request for a writ of mandamus.

Objections overruled; writ of mandamus granted.

TYACK and BROWN, JJ., concur.

No. 15AP-175 4

APPENDIX

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio ex rel. :

Gwendolyn Watkins,

:

Relator,

:

v. No. 15AP-175

:

St. Clare Retirement Community (REGULAR CALENDAR)

and Industrial Commission of Ohio, :

Respondents. :

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

Rendered on February 17, 2016

Lisa M. Clark, for relator.

Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, and Jacob Dobres, for respondent

St. Clare Retirement Community.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sana Ahmed, for

respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS

{¶ 7} Relator, Gwendolyn Watkins, has filed this original action requesting that

this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio

("commission"), to vacate its order which denied her application for permanent total

disability ("PTD") compensation, and ordering the commission to find that she is entitled

to that compensation.

No. 15AP-175 5

Findings of Fact:

{¶ 8} 1. Relator sustained a work-related injury on June 13, 1993, and her

workers' compensation claim has been allowed for the following conditions:

CERVICAL STRAIN; HERNIATED NUCLEUS PULPOSUS

C4-C5; AGGRAVATION OF PRE-EXISTING SPONDYLITIC

C5-6 AND C6-7; RIGHT CARPAL TUNNEL SYNDROME;

LEFT CARPAL TUNNEL SYNDROME; DEPRESSIVE

MOOD DISORDER; CERVICAL STENOSIS AT C4-5 AND

C5-6.

{¶ 9} 2. On February 28, 2014, relator filed her application for PTD

compensation. According to her application, relator was 40 years of age, had completed

the 12th grade, and had participated in 12 weeks of nurse aide training. Relator indicated

that she had filed for Social Security Disability benefits, but did not indicate whether or

not she was receiving those benefits. Relator indicated that she could read, write, and

perform basic math, that she used a cane and a C-Pap machine, and that she was not

interested in participating in rehabilitation services. Relator also indicated that she last

worked as a nursing assistant in 1998.

{¶ 10} 3. In support of her application, relator submitted the February 13, 2014

report of William C. Melchior, Ed.D., her treating psychologist. Dr. Melchior opined that

relator's allowed psychological condition had reached maximum medical improvement

("MMI") and that psychological testing revealed that her depression was at the high end

of the average range for chronic pain patients. He noted that she would have a number of

restrictions or limitations including impaired cognitive skills, low stress, frustration

tolerance, difficulty remembering and following instructions, difficulty maintaining

attention for extended periods of time, difficulty accepting criticism from a supervisor,

and difficulty maintaining a normal work day or normal work week without an

unreasonable number and length of rest periods. He opined that she was permanently

and totally disabled as a result of the allowed psychological condition.

{¶ 11} 4. Relator's employer had her examined by Jessica Twehues, Psy.D. In her

July 17, 2014 report, Dr. Twehues identified the allowed conditions in relator's claim,

listed and discussed the medical records which she reviewed, opined that she had a 25

percent impairment, and further opined that she would be unable to engage in any type of

sustained remunerative employment, stating:

No. 15AP-175 6

It is my opinion that the [Injured Worker] would be unable

to engage in any type of sustained remunerative employment

based on her allowed psychological condition of Depressive

Disorder NOS. She presents as significantly depressed and

demonstrated poor stress tolerance during testing. She cried

on a few occasions during the evaluation and demonstrated

variable eye contact, sitting on the couch slumped and

looking at the ceiling. Dr. Melchior, her treating

psychologist, opines that the [Injured Worker] would have

difficulty returning to work due to her depressive state. She

has a long history of depressive symptoms which Dr.

Melchior opines have worsened in recent years. I opine that

the [Injured Worker] would be unable to return to work for

these above stated reasons.

{¶ 12} 5. Relator was also examined by Kenneth J. Manges, Ph.D. In his

September 9, 2014 report, Dr. Manges identified the allowed conditions in relator's claim

as well as the medical records which he reviewed. Dr. Manges opined that relator's

allowed psychological condition had reached MMI and discussed her impairments as

follows:

The [Injured Worker] demonstrates a Class 3 moderate

whole person psychological impairment of 35% as a direct

and proximate result of her BWC injury # 93-45400.

Activities of Daily Living: 35% impairment levels are

compatible with some but not all useful functioning for

example, she avoids taking, on any new challenges or

responsibilities and is pre-occupied with her pain and losses.

Social Functioning: 35% impairment level are compatible

with some but not all useful functioning. For example, she

minimally socializes with anyone outside of her immediate

family.

Concentration: 15% impairment levels are compatible with

some but not all useful functioning. For example, she was

capable of performing a short term auditory memory task

and relies on [sic] does her own decision making.

Adaptation: 35% impairment levels are compatible with

some but not all useful functioning. For example, she is

preoccupied with her losses and stays away from most new

experiences.

No. 15AP-175 7

***

Overall, Ms. Watkins's activities of daily living, social

functioning, concentration and adaptation are moderately

negatively affected by her allowed psychological condition

from the industrial injury.

{¶ 13} On the occupational activity assessment form, Dr. Manges indicated that

relator was capable of performing work within the limitations/modifications noted in his

attached report.

{¶ 14} 6. There are two medical reports in the stipulation of evidence addressing

relator's impairment due to the allowed physical conditions in her claim. In his July 11,

2014 report, Paul T. Hogya, M.D., opined that relator could perform low-level, light-duty

work, stating:

[B]ased on the allowed physical conditions in the 1993

industrial injury claim, the objective medical evidence and

examination findings support Ms. Watkins to be readily

capable of functioning in a low-level, light industrial demand

capacity. That means exerting up to 15 pounds occasionally;

and or up to 10 pounds of force frequently; and/or a

negligible amount of force constantly in the course of lifting,

carrying, pushing and pulling various objects Overhead

reaching may be occasional and under five pounds. She

should avoid overhead climbing and crawling. Based on the

allowed conditions alone, she may squat and kneel as

needed. She may occasionally climb stairs and ramps such as

entering and exiting buildings. She is capable of using step

stools and small ladders up to four feet. Based on the allowed

conditions alone, sitting may be up to two hours at a time

and standing and walking up to one hour at a time with the

opportunity to change positions. She is capable of driving

automobiles and small pickup trucks with automatic

transmission up to 45 minutes at a time with an opportunity

to exit the vehicle and stretch. She has no restrictions with

regard to hearing, seeing or speaking. She is capable of

operating a telephone, headset, keyboard and mouse. She is

capable of using the hands as needed for gripping, grasping,

pinching, squeezing, writing, fine manipulation and light

assembly within the weight limits outlined above. She should

avoid use of vibrating tools and hammers Any keyboard and

mouse work should be accommodated with an ergonomic set

up.

No. 15AP-175 8

{¶ 15} Relator was also examined by Gary L. Ray, M.D. In his August 27, 2014

report, Dr. Ray opined that relator's allowed physical conditions had reached MMI,

assessed a 28 percent whole person impairment, and concluded that she was capable of

performing sedentary work.

{¶ 16} 7. The stipulation of evidence contains two vocational reports. In a report

dated October 20, 2014, Janet Chapman concluded that relator presented with a very

limited vocational profile. Considering her physical and mental limitations, Ms. Chapman

opined that relator would be unable to return to work in the competitive labor market.

{¶ 17} In his November 2, 2014 report, Mark A. Pinti opined that relator was

capable of performing some sustained remunerative employment and should avoid work

that is stressful in nature or that involves making judgments or working in tandem with

others. Mr. Pinti provided a partial list of unskilled, sedentary jobs, which he believed

relator could perform.

{¶ 18} 8. Relator's application for PTD compensation was heard before a staff

hearing officer ("SHO") on November 12, 2014. The SHO relied on the medical report of

Dr. Ray to conclude that relator was capable of performing sedentary employment.

Thereafter, the SHO relied on the report of Dr. Manges to conclude that relator's

psychological condition did not preclude her from performing some sustained

remunerative employment, stating:

Kenneth Manges, Ph.D., examined the Injured Worker on

08/20/2014 at the request of the Industrial Commission. Dr.

Manges examined the Injured Worker on the allowed

psychological condition and concludes that the allowed

psychological [condition] has reached maximum medical

improvement.

Dr. Manges further opines that the Injured Worker retains

the functional capacity to perform sustained remunerative

employment when the impairments arising from the allowed

psychological condition are considered. Dr. Manges does

find that the Injured Worker suffers moderate limitations in

activities of daily living, social functioning and adaptation as

well as a mild impairment in concentration.

{¶ 19} Thereafter, the SHO considered relator's non-disability factors. First, the

SHO found that her age of 60 years did constitute a barrier to her ability to become re-

No. 15AP-175 9

employed. The SHO determined that relator's high school education and her satisfactory

completion of vocational training to become a nurse aide in conjunction with her ability to

read, write, and perform basic math, qualified her to perform semi-skilled to skilled

employment. As such, the SHO considered relator's education to be a positive vocational

factor. The SHO noted that relator had worked for 25 years as a nurse aide where she

learned to perform her job duties through on-the-job training and was ultimately able to

supervise 8 to 12 people. The SHO concluded that relator's job history provided her with

numerous transferrable skills and, as such, found her work history to be a positive

vocational factor.

{¶ 20} The SHO noted that relator had not participated in vocational rehabilitation

services nor had she made any other attempts to improve her skills since she last worked

in 1995 when she was 40 years of age. Specifically, the SHO stated:

Additionally, the Staff Hearing Officer finds that the Injured

Worker has not participated in vocational rehabilitation or

made any other attempts to improve her skills in order to

enhance her ability to gain re-employment since she last

worked in 1995 when she was only 40 years of age.

State ex rel. Cunningham v. Industrial Commission (2001)

91 Ohio St.3d 250 sets forth the proposition that the

Commission may consider all possible skills which may

reasonably be developed to enhance the Injured Worker's

ability to return to the work force. In the case at hand, the

Staff Hearing Officer finds this particularly significant

because the Injured Worker has not worked in any capacity

since she was only 40 years of age.

Further, State ex rel. Wilson v. Industrial Commission (1997)

80 Ohio St.3d 261 sets forth the proposition that permanent

total disability compensation is an award of last resort which

should only be awarded when all avenues of returning to

sustained remunerative employment having been exhausted.

In the case at hand, the Staff Hearing Officer finds that the

Injured Worker has not exhausted all avenues of returning to

sustained remunerative employment because she never

participated in vocational rehabilitation or made any other

attempts to enhance her skills. Additionally, the Injured

Worker testified at hearing that she has made no attempt to

return to the work force since she last worked in 1995.

No. 15AP-175 10

Based upon these factors, the Staff Hearing Officer finds that

the Injured Worker has failed to establish that her non-

medical disability factors render her permanently incapable

of engaging in sustained remunerative employment.

{¶ 21} The SHO concluded by stating that relator's non-medical disability factors,

in conjunction with her impairments, that she retained the functional capacity to perform

sustained remunerative employment and was not permanently and totally disabled.

{¶ 22} 9. Relator's request for reconsideration was denied by order of the

commission mailed January 8, 2015.

{¶ 23} 10. Thereafter, relator filed the instant mandamus action in this court.

Conclusions of Law:

{¶ 24} For the reasons that follow, it is this magistrate's decision that this court

should issue a writ of mandamus.

{¶ 25} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth three requirements which must be

met in establishing a right to a writ of mandamus: (1) that relator has a clear legal right to

the relief prayed for; (2) that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the act

requested; and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course

of the law. State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle, 6 Ohio St.3d 28 (1983).

{¶ 26} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a

determination of the commission, relator must show a clear legal right to the relief sought

and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. State ex rel.

Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of

mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by

entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel.

Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). On the other hand, where the record

contains some evidence to support the commission's findings, there has been no abuse of

discretion and mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry

Co., 29 Ohio St.3d 56 (1987). Furthermore, questions of credibility and the weight to be

given evidence are clearly within the discretion of the commission as fact finder. State ex

rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio St.2d 165 (1981).

{¶ 27} The relevant inquiry in a determination of permanent total disability is

claimant's ability to do any sustained remunerative employment. State ex rel. Domjancic

No. 15AP-175 11

v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 693 (1994). Generally, in making this determination, the

commission must consider not only medical impairments but also the claimant's age,

education, work record and other relevant non-medical factors. State ex rel. Stephenson

v. Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167 (1987). Thus, a claimant's medical capacity to work is

not dispositive if the claimant's non-medical factors foreclose employability. State ex rel.

Gay v. Mihm, 68 Ohio St.3d 315 (1994). The commission must also specify in its order

what evidence has been relied upon and briefly explain the reasoning for its decision.

State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d 203 (1991).

{¶ 28} In this mandamus action, relator challenges the commission's reliance on

the report of Dr. Manges. Specifically, relator argues that Dr. Manges neglected to list the

limitations/modifications under which she would be able to perform some sustained

remunerative employment.

{¶ 29} As noted in the findings of fact, Dr. Manges found that relator was

moderately, negatively affected by her allowed psychological condition, stating:

Activities of Daily Living: 35% impairment levels are

compatible with some but not all useful functioning for

example, she avoids taking, on any new challenges or

responsibilities and is pre-occupied with her pain and losses.

Social Functioning: 35% impairment level are compatible

with some but not all useful functioning. For example, she

minimally socializes with anyone outside of her immediate

family.

Concentration: 15% impairment levels are compatible with

some but not all useful functioning. For example, she was

capable of performing a short term auditory memory task

and relies on [sic] does her own decision making.

Adaptation: 35% impairment levels are compatible with

some but not all useful functioning. For example, she is

preoccupied with her losses and stays away from most new

experiences.

{¶ 30} Thereafter, on his occupational activity assessment form, Dr. Manges

checked the box indicating that relator was capable of work within the

limitations/modifications noted below, where he handwrote "[p]lease see attached

report." Relator asserts that Dr. Manges failed to identify any limitations or restrictions in

No. 15AP-175 12

the body of his report. In response, both the commission and relator's employer argue

that Dr. Manges' report does constitute some evidence upon which the commission could

rely and that his report does specify limitations. Specifically:

[S]he avoids taking, on any new challenges or

responsibilities and is pre-occupied with her pain and losses.

* * * [S]he minimally socializes with anyone outside of her

immediate family.

* * * [S]he was capable of performing a short term auditory

memory task and relies on [sic] does her own decision

making.

[S]he is preoccupied with her losses and stays' way from

most new experiences.

{¶ 31} The magistrate agrees with relator that Dr. Manges did not identify the

limitations under which relator would be capable of working. For example, Dr. Manges

could have noted that relator should avoid undue stress, working with others, and

complex tasks; however, he did not. To the extent respondents assert that the above-

noted statements constitute limitations on her ability to work, the magistrate disagrees.

Without having provided any limitations, the magistrate finds that Dr. Manges' report

does not constitute some evidence upon which the commission could rely.

{¶ 32} The magistrate is cognizant that the commission specifically noted that

relator had not pursued any vocational rehabilitation since she left work in 1995. Relator

noted that, at some point, she was found not to be a feasible candidate for rehabilitation;

however, there is no indication of the reason or timing of this finding. While it could be

said that the commission provided an alternative basis upon which it denied her PTD

compensation, it must be remembered that one can only participate in vocational

rehabilitation if they have the ability to do so. Because the commission relied on the

psychological report of Dr. Manges, which the magistrate finds does not constitute some

evidence, the SHO did not consider whether or not, from a psychological standpoint,

relator could have participated in vocational rehabilitation. As such, to the extent that

this might be considered an alternative basis upon which PTD compensation was denied,

it is not supported by the evidence.

No. 15AP-175 13

{¶ 33} Based on the foregoing, it is this magistrate's decision that this court should

issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio, to vacate

its order which denied relator's application for permanent total disability compensation

and, after either receiving an addendum report from Dr. Manges or having relator

examined by another examiner, determine whether or not she is entitled to that

compensation.

/S/ MAGISTRATE

STEPHANIE BISCA

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as

error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.

53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects

to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.

53(D)(3)(b).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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