The opinion
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
HOLLY JULIAN, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D15-3072
BAY COUNTY DISTRICT
SCHOOL BOARD,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed April 14, 2016.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
Michael C. Overstreet, Judge.
Cecile M. Scoon of Peters & Scoon, Panama City, for Appellant.
Gwendolyn P. Adkins and Scott J. Seagle of Coppins Monroe Adkins & Dincman,
P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Holly Julian, appeals the final summary judgment entered against
her and in favor of Appellee, the Bay County District School Board, on her
whistleblower (Count I) and negligent retention (Count II) claims, raising three
issues. We affirm the summary judgment as to both counts and write only to address
the disputed issue of whether Appellee created administrative procedures by
“ordinance” under section 112.3187(8)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), through its
adoption of a school board policy.
Section 112.3187(8)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), the “Remedies” portion of
Florida’s public-sector Whistleblower’s Act, provides in pertinent part:
Within 60 days after the action prohibited by this section, any local
public employee protected by this section may file a complaint with the
appropriate local governmental authority, if that authority has
established by ordinance an administrative procedure for handling such
complaints or has contracted with the Division of Administrative
Hearings under s. 120.65 to conduct hearings under this section.
(Emphasis added.) The term “ordinance” is not defined in the statute, or anywhere
else in the Act, and neither the parties nor we located any case law interpreting that
term in the context of section 112.3187(8)(b). As such, we must look to the word’s
plain and ordinary meaning. See Dudley v. State, 139 So. 3d 273, 279 (Fla. 2014)
(“‘When considering the meaning of terms used in a statute, this Court looks first to
the terms’ ordinary definitions[, which] . . . may be derived from dictionaries.’”)
(Internal citation omitted); W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1, 9 (Fla.
2012). “Ordinance” is defined as “[a]n authoritative law or decree; specif., a
municipal regulation, esp. one that forbids or restricts an activity.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2015)
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(defining “ordinance” in part as “[a]n authoritative command or order” or “[a] statute
or regulation, especially one enacted by a municipal government”); Merriam-
Webster Dictionary (defining “ordinance” in part as “an authoritative decree or
direction: order,” “a law set forth by a governmental authority; specifically: a
municipal regulation,” or “prescribed usage, practice, or ceremony”).
In a 1993 advisory opinion, the Office of the Attorney General concluded that
a school board “has the authority to adopt an ‘ordinance,’ that is, take official
legislative action of a general and permanent nature . . . .” Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 93-
43 (1993). The Attorney General reasoned in part that “ordinance” “has been
generally defined as a ‘rule established by authority; a permanent rule of action,’ or
as ‘an authoritative decree or direction . . . a public enactment, rule, or law.’” Id.
(internal citations omitted). Indeed, section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2011), which
governs municipalities, defines “ordinance” as “an official legislative action of a
governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and
enforceable as a local law.” School boards are authorized to take such legislative
type actions “for the more orderly and efficient operation of the district school
system.” Fla. Att’y Gen. Op. 93-43.
Based on the foregoing authorities, we agree with the trial court that the school
board policy Appellee had adopted qualifies as an ordinance under section
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112.3187(8)(b), which specifically defines “local governmental authority” to
include school districts. Therefore, we affirm the final summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
LEWIS, OSTERHAUS, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
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