The opinion
Filed 4/1/16; part. pub. order 4/21/16 (see end of opn.)
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JESSICA L. BROOKS, D067491
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2012-00097107-CU-BC-CTL)
CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES
CALIFORNIA, LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Judith F.
Hayes, Judge. Affirmed.
Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, Hallen D. Rosner and Kendra J. Woods for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Schlichter & Shonack, Kurt A. Schlichter, Steven C. Shonack and Jamie L.
Keeton for Defendant and Respondent.
Defendant CarMax Auto Superstores California LLC (CarMax) advertises and
sells cars as "certified" used vehicles. It sold a certain 2008 used Jeep Wrangler (the
Jeep) to plaintiff Jessica Brooks. CarMax had promoted the Jeep as a certified used
vehicle, inspected the Jeep, conducted some repairs, and ultimately placed a signed
Certified Quality Inspection document (the CQI Certificate) for the Jeep in the Jeep's
glove box. The CQI Certificate remained in the glove box at all relevant times.
Several months after Brooks purchased the Jeep, she drove it through a deep
puddle and the engine was so severely damaged that it had to be replaced. She thereafter
demanded (among other things) that CarMax rescind the purchase agreement and buy the
Jeep back. When CarMax rejected her demands, she filed this action alleging it violated
Vehicle Code section 11713.18 (section 11713.18) in connection with her purchase of the
Jeep, because neither the content of the CQI Certificate nor its method of delivery to her
complied with CarMax's duties under section 11713.18. Brooks pleaded claims against
CarMax under California's Consumer's Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.
(CLRA)) and Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq. (UCL)).
After a court trial on stipulated facts, the court ruled Brooks had suffered no
damage from CarMax's alleged violations of section 11713.18, and therefore concluded
she did not have standing to pursue claims under the CLRA or the UCL. The court
entered judgment for CarMax. Brooks asserts on appeal that reversal is required because
she adequately demonstrated the type of damage necessary to prosecute a claim under the
CLRA or the UCL or, alternatively, she was entitled to prosecute her claims under the
CLRA or the UCL without showing any injury.
2
I
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Context1
CarMax advertises and sells cars as "certified" used vehicles. Brooks was
searching for a used vehicle and, on November 11, 2011, she bought the Jeep, which was
a "certified" used vehicle, from CarMax. She would not have purchased the Jeep had it
not been a "certified" vehicle.
CarMax performs a Certified Quality Inspection (CQI) on every vehicle it sells to
consumers, and performed that inspection on the Jeep. CarMax expended at least 15.7
man hours and over $1,000 in conducting the CQI for the Jeep, not including the
additional time spent on repairs it sublet to other shops. When CarMax technicians
conduct a CQI, the technicians use a document (the CQI/VQI checklist) that lists
components and observations concerning the vehicle, and information from the CQI/VQI
checklist is entered into CarMax vehicle repair order history database, but the physical
CQI/VQI checklist is not retained by CarMax. Upon completion of the CQI, a signed
CQI Certificate is placed into the glove box of the inspected vehicle. The signed CQI
1 Our factual statement reviews the facts most favorably in support of the judgment
because, although this case was tried on stipulated facts, we nevertheless must review the
court's findings under the substantial evidence standard of review when, as here, the court
makes additional inferences based on those stipulated facts. (Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v.
Glencoe Ins. Ltd. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222.) Our review must view the
evidence most favorably to the prevailing party, including both express and implied
findings of fact made by the court in its statement of decision rendered after a nonjury
trial. (See, e.g., SFPP v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 452, 461-462.)
3
Certificate for the Jeep, which listed the Jeep's stock number, was placed in its glove box
at the time the inspection was completed and remained in the glove box until after Brooks
purchased the Jeep.
Brooks drove the Jeep for over 3000 miles without any problems. However, on
February 11, 2012, she drove it through a 6" to 12" deep puddle and the engine seized.
She used a third party repair shop to replace the engine, but the Jeep thereafter had
occasional problems with the starter and with warning light activations.
Brooks demanded (among other things) that CarMax rescind the purchase
agreement and buy the Jeep back. When it rejected her demands, she filed this action
alleging CarMax violated section 11713.18 in connection with her purchase of the Jeep,
because neither the content of the CQI Certificate nor its method of delivery to her
complied with CarMax's obligations under section 11713.18.
B. Contentions and Ruling Below
Brooks argued CarMax violated the mandates of section 11713.18: (1) the content
of the CQI Certificate was inadequate because it failed to " 'indicat[e] all components
inspected,' " and (2) the placement of the CQI Certificate in the Jeep's glove compartment
did not comply with CarMax duty to provide it " 'prior to sale.' " She asserted those
violations of section 11713.18 were adequate to support her claims under the CLRA and
UCL. The court concluded that, even assuming the content or mode of delivery of the
CQI Certificate did not strictly comply with section 11713.18, Brooks did not have
standing to pursue claims under the CLRA and UCL for noncompliance unless she also
showed she suffered some tangible injury from noncompliance, and there was no
4
evidence she was actually damaged by either the content of CarMax's CQI Certificate or
by the mode it was delivered to her. The court noted it was undisputed the Jeep was
actually inspected pursuant to the terms of CarMax's used vehicle certification program,
and a certificate memorializing its compliance with the terms of that program was issued
by CarMax. The court reasoned that because this was the product Brooks wanted to
purchase and actually received on November 11, 2011, the fact the paperwork
memorializing CarMax's certification (i.e. the CQI Certificate) was "provided" to her in
her glove box (rather than in some other fashion) caused no actual injury to her.
II
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two distinct standards of review applicable to our resolution of Brooks's
claims in this appeal. Because this case was tried on stipulated facts, the stipulated facts
are conclusive and may not be contradicted. (Linsk v. Linsk (1969) 70 Cal.2d 272, 276.)
However, because the trial court made inferences based on those stipulated facts, we
must review those additional factual findings based on those inferences under the
substantial evidence standard of review. (Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Glencoe Ins. Ltd.,
supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222.) Our review of these additional factual findings
" ' " 'begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial
evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.'
[Citations.]" ' " (Ibid.)
When reviewing the trial court's legal conclusions, including its construction of a
statutory scheme, we apply de novo review. (Penner v. County of Santa Barbara (1995)
5
37 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1676; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24
Cal.4th 415, 432.) "In construing statutes, our goal is to ascertain the intent of the
Legislature in order to effectuate the law's purpose." (Martinez v. Kia Motors America,
Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 187, 192.) We begin with the words of the statute and "give
them 'their usual and ordinary meaning.' [Citation.] 'The statute's plain meaning controls
the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous.' [Citations.] 'If the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids,
such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.' " (Imperial Merchant
Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 387-388.)2
On appeal, we must affirm the judgment if it is correct on any theory, even if the
trial court's reasoning was erroneous (Muller v. Fresno Community Hospital & Medical
Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887, 906-907) because " 'we review the trial court's result
for error, and not its legal reasoning.' " (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445,
478.) Even if the statement of decision reveals the legal basis for the ruling was
incorrect, we "cannot undo the effect of the ruling or the ensuing judgment on the ground
2 CarMax has requested that we take judicial notice of certain legislative history
surrounding the bill that ultimately enacted section 11713.18, along with numerous
decisions by federal trial judges addressing claims analogous to the claims raised by
Brooks in this action. We grant the motion insofar as it asks this court to take judicial
notice of the legislative history appended to CarMax's motion (Kaufman & Broad
Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 31) but
deny the motion insofar as it requests that we take judicial notice of nonbinding federal
trial court decisions. (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 418.)
6
that the court may have misapplied [the law] as long as any other correct legal reason
exists to sustain [the judgment]." (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981.)
III
ANALYSIS
A. Brooks's Claims Under Kwikset 3
Brooks argues the court erred in ruling she did not have standing to pursue her
claims based on the trial court's finding she suffered no injury from the alleged violations.
Her first specification of error, apparently raised for the first time on appeal, is that the
absence of injury is irrelevant to her standing to pursue her claims under the CLRA and
UCL. Instead, she argues the Legislature intended a violation of section 11713.18 would
be actionable under the CLRA and the UCL even without any showing of actual injury
from the alleged violation.
Brooks alternatively argues that, under the rationale of Kwikset, she adequately
demonstrated actual injury. She asserts she would not have purchased the Jeep had it not
qualified as a "certified" vehicle, regardless of whether the Jeep was as mechanically
sound as a Jeep that did qualify as a "certified" vehicle. She argues no vehicle can
qualify as a "certified" vehicle under section 11713.18, subdivision (a), regardless of
whether it was actually inspected and approved by CarMax under its inspection program,
unless (among other things) the vendor provides the buyer with a "completed inspection
report indicating all the components inspected," and "provides" that report "prior to sale."
3 Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310 (Kwikset).
7
She asserts (1) the CQI Certificate provided by CarMax in connection with her purchase
does not satisfy the statutory mandate of a "completed inspection report indicating all the
components inspected," and (2) CarMax did not "provide" that report "prior to sale."
Because Brooks contends the content of the CQI Certificate did not satisfy the statutory
mandate, and (even assuming its content was adequate) the mode of delivery of the CQI
Certificate did not satisfy the statutory mandate, the Jeep did not qualify to be labeled as
a "certified" vehicle (even if its intrinsic mechanical condition was equivalent to a
"certified" vehicle), and therefore she suffered actual injury within the rationale of
Kwikset by purchasing something that was mislabeled. Because these arguments rest on
Kwikset, we summarize that case and its holdings.
In Kwikset, the plaintiffs alleged Kwikset falsely marketed and sold locksets
labeled as "Made in U.S.A.," arguing the locksets were mislabeled because they in fact
contained foreign-made parts or involved foreign manufacture. The appellate court,
evaluating the newly adopted requirements of Proposition 64 depriving a plaintiff of
standing to bring a UCL claim absent actual injury, concluded the plaintiffs had not
alleged any loss of money or property because they received locksets in return that were
neither overpriced nor defective and therefore did not have standing to bring a UCL
claim. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 319.) The Supreme Court, after recognizing that
"the core" of the appellate court's ruling was that "plaintiffs should not be accorded
standing because they received the benefit of their bargain . . . [by] receiv[ing] a fully
functioning product . . . even if the product label contains misrepresentations that may
have been relied upon by a particular class of consumers" (id. at p. 332), rejected the
8
Court of Appeal's conclusion there was an absence of economic injury. Instead, the
Supreme Court reasoned, in the context of labels designed to induce a consumer to select
among competing products, "labels matter." (Id. at p. 328.) Kwikset noted standing
requires that a party "(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or property sufficient to
qualify as injury in fact, i.e. economic injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was
the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising that is the
gravamen of the claim." (Id. at p. 322.) The Kwikset court reasoned that when a
consumer alleges purchase of a product based on the information imparted by its label,
and the information was false, and he or she would not have purchased it absent that
misrepresentation, the consumer has satisfied the "actual injury" requirements for
standing even if the product he or she actually obtained was functionally equivalent to the
product the consumer thought he or she was buying. (Id. at pp. 332-337.) Against this
background, we turn to Brooks's claims.
B. A Violation of Section 11713.18 Is Not "Per Se" Actionable Under the CLRA
or the UCL
Brooks first claims a violation of section 11713.18 is "per se" actionable under the
CLRA and UCL, regardless of any injury. Section 11713.18, subdivision (b), provides
that "[a] violation of [section 11713.18] is actionable under [the CLRA], [the UCL] . . . or
any other applicable state or federal law. The rights and remedies provided by [section
11713.18] are cumulative and shall not be construed as restricting any right or remedy
that is otherwise available." Brooks contends the trial court's conclusion she lacked
standing to pursue her claims under the CLRA and UCL was error because the text of
9
section 11713.18 shows it was intended to make actionable any violation of that section
without any showing the plaintiff was actually injured from the alleged violation.
Ordinarily, "under the CLRA, relief is limited to consumers who have suffered, in
fact, damage as a result of an illegal practice." (Davis-Miller v. Automobile Club of
Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 106, 122.) Similarly, although the UCL did
not predicate standing on a showing of injury or damage prior to the 2004 enactment of
Proposition 64, that lacuna rendered the UCL "subject to abuse by attorneys who used it
as the basis for legal ' "shakedown" ' schemes" (Buckland v. Threshold Enterprises, Ltd.
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 798, 812, disapproved on other grounds in Kwikset, supra, 51
Cal.4th at p. 337) and frivolous lawsuits (Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's,
LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 228). "To address this problem, Proposition 64 amended
[the UCL] to accord standing only to certain specified public officials and to any person
who ' " 'has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such
unfair competition.' " ' " (Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583,
1590, quoting Buckland, at p. 812.) "Thus, in the aftermath of Proposition 64, only
plaintiffs who have suffered actual damage may pursue a private UCL action." (Ibid.)
Brooks argues that section 11713.18, subdivision (b), by providing that a violation
of section 11713.18 "is actionable under [the CLRA or the UCL]," was intended to
exempt her from showing the "actual injury" predicate ordinarily necessary to making a
claim "actionable" under the CLRA and the UCL. She cites no pertinent authority for
this reading of section 11713.18, subdivision (b), and instead relies solely on Rojas v.
Platinum Auto Group, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 997 (Rojas). Although Rojas did
10
conclude a specific remedy provided under the so-called Rees–Levering Act (Civ. Code,
§ 2981 et seq.) could be invoked even if the plaintiff suffered no actual harm (Rojas, at
p. 1005), it did not hold the CLRA and UCL claims asserted by the plaintiff in that action
(id. at p. 1006) could also be pursued without actual injury.4 Moreover, Rojas's
conclusion rested on two important factors not present here. First, Rojas examined a
statutory scheme that included an express additional statutory remedy for its violation,5
and no similar additional remedy is expressly appended to section 11713.18. (Cf. County
of San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 825 ["Where statutes
involving similar issues contain language demonstrating the Legislature knows how to
express its intent, ' "the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a
related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with
reference to the different statutes." ' ") Moreover, Rojas's conclusion as to the intent of
the express statutory remedy was confirmed by the clear legislative history declaring the
Legislature intended the remedy provided by the Rees–Levering Act to be available
" 'regardless of the nature of the disclosure violation or any consumer harm' " (Rojas,
4 To the contrary, in Rojas, the plaintiff pleaded causes of action for violation of the
CLRA and UCL and on appeal the court ordered demurrers to those claims be sustained,
albeit with leave to amend. (Rojas, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.)
5 The statute provided that, if the seller violated certain disclosure requirements,
"the conditional sale contract shall not be enforceable . . . until after the violation is
corrected as provided in Section 2984, and, if the violation is not corrected, the buyer
may recover from the seller the total amount paid . . . by the buyer . . . ." (Civ. Code,
§ 2983, subd. (a).) Thus, the Rees–Levering Act contained an internal remedy (i.e.,
declaring the contract unenforceable) absent from section 11713.18.
11
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005), and no similar language can be found in the
legislative history accompanying section 11713.18.
There is no basis for concluding section 11713.18, subdivision (b), by providing
that a violation of section 11713.18 is "actionable" under the CLRA or the UCL, was
intended to dispense with the "actual injury" predicate ordinarily necessary before a claim
for a violation of that section can be "actionable" by a private party under the CLRA and
the UCL. We must evaluate whether Brooks's claims were viable under principles
generally applicable to claims under the CLRA and the UCL.
C. The "Content of the CQI Certificate" Claim
Brooks's principal contentions seek to bring her action under the ambit of Kwikset.
Her first contention is that section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6), requires a "completed
inspection report indicating all the components inspected" in order to label the vehicle as
"certified," and she claims that document effectively was never provided because the CQI
Certificate provided by CarMax to Brooks does not satisfy this statutory requirement and
was therefore a nullity. Because this violation of section 11713.18, subdivision (a),
precluded CarMax from promoting or selling the Jeep as a "certified" vehicle, Brooks
argues her action falls within the ambit of Kwikset.
We agree with Brooks that the legislative scheme contemplates certain minimal
standards must be met before a dealer may promote or sell a vehicle as certified, among
which is that a dealer must provide a "completed inspection report indicating all the
components inspected" to the buyer. We also agree that, if those standards are not
satisfied, a vehicle marketed and sold as certified has been mislabeled, and a buyer who
12
establishes they would not have purchased the vehicle absent that "certified" label has
standing to pursue claims for violation of the CLRA and UCL under the rationale of
Kwikset, regardless of whether the particular vehicle purchased might be as mechanically
sound or intrinsically valuable as a certified vehicle.
However, we conclude the trial court correctly entered judgment against Brooks
(Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 981) because we reject Brooks's claim that
the CQI Certificate was deficient in its content. The plain language of the statute requires
only a "report indicating all the components inspected," and we conclude CarMax's CQI
Certificate does satisfy the minimal obligations imposed by section 11713.18, subdivision
(a)(6). We begin by noting that our role in statutory construction starts with the words of
the statute, "because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative
intent." (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871.) A court " 'may not provide words or
language which are not found in a statute in order to accommodate a litigant' " (Mocek v.
Alfa Leisure, Inc. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 402, 408), and "our own views concerning the
theoretical desirability or value of such [language is] beside the point. In construing this,
or any, statute, our office is simply to ascertain and declare what the statute contains, not
to change its scope by reading into it language it does not contain or by reading out of it
language it does. We may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention that
does not appear in its language." (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243,
253.)
We find it significant that the statutory language employed by section 11713.18,
subdivision (a)(6), imposes no minimum amount of inspection a dealer must perform
13
before a vehicle may be labeled as a "certified" vehicle,6 other than perhaps such
inspection as can be implied from subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(6), thus leaving to each
dealer the election of conducting either a more rigorous inspection or a less rigorous
inspection. We construe the requirement imposed by section 11713.18, subdivision
(a)(6)—of providing a buyer with a report listing "all the components inspected"—as
intended to provide the buyer with a report illuminating the relative rigorousness of the
inspection the dealer has elected to conduct, and nothing more. We believe CarMax's
CQI Certificate satisfies that obligation, because it indicates the scope of the inspection
program CarMax has elected to perform (by stating the program "check[s] over 125
points including (but not limited to)" the items listed on CarMax's CQI Certificate) and
certifies the vehicle "passed" the inspection program used by CarMax.
We are unpersuaded by Brooks's arguments that section 11713.18, subdivision
(a)(6), requires "something more" than is provided by CarMax's CQI Certificate. For
example, Brooks contended below that the actual results of the inspection, such as the
CQI/VQI checklist used by CarMax technicians that lists the order in which the various
parts and systems are to be inspected and notates their observations concerning the
specific vehicle, would be necessary to satisfy the "report" requirement imposed by
section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6). Although the CQI/VQI checklist certainly would
6 Indeed, the statute does not facially impose any explicit obligation for a dealer
even to repair any problems revealed by the inspection the dealer elects to perform.
14
satisfy the "report" requirement, we cannot conclude the CQI/VQI checklist is the
minimum required to satisfy section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6).
Although the legislative history provides little insight into the precise claims
asserted by Brooks, we have taken judicial notice of documents (see fn. 2, ante) showing
that, as originally written, section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6) provided "[p]rior to sale,
the dealer provides the buyer with a completed inspection report indicating all the
components inspected pursuant to the vehicle certification program and certifies that all
of the inspected components meet the express written standards of the vehicle
certification program." (Assem. Bill No. 68 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 3,
2005, § 7.) However, both the "pursuant to the vehicle certification program" language
and the "certifies that all the inspected components meet the express written standards of
the vehicle certification program" language was deleted from the enactment, which
deletion is persuasive that the enactment " 'should not be interpreted to include what was
left out.' " (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1107.)
Thus, the Legislature originally contemplated requiring more than a report "indicating all
components inspected," both by language that would have tied that report to the entirety
of the dealer's inspection program (i.e. by requiring the report to indicate "all the
components inspected pursuant to the vehicle certification program") and by language
that would have required the report to guarantee the postinspection condition of these
components (by requiring the report "certif[y] that all the inspected components meet the
express written standards of the vehicle certification program"). The deletion of those
clauses suggests the Legislature did not intend to impose either requirement, but Brooks's
15
construction of the language would resurrect these clauses by mandating that everything
actually inspected by the dealer during the dealer's certification program be listed on the
report.
Brooks also suggests the requirement for a report "indicating all the components
inspected" renders CarMax's CQI Certificate inadequate because the CQI Certificate lists
only "125 points" when in fact more than the listed 125 points were inspected. We reject
her claim, for two reasons. First, the CQI Certificate states CarMax "check[s] over 125
points including (but not limited to)" the 125 specifically listed items (italics added), and
therefore the CQI Certificate is an accurate portrayal of the inspection CarMax chose to
conduct. More importantly, Brooks's claim under Kwikset rests not on the precise
parameters of CarMax's inspection, but instead rests solely on whether the Jeep was
qualified to carry the label of "certified." Her argument contains the unstated predicate
that, had CarMax conducted its inspection of only the 125 points described in the CQI
Certificate and immediately ceased inspecting the Jeep once those 125 points had been
inspected, CarMax would at that moment have been entitled to append the label
"certified" to the Jeep and would have been free from any liability under section
11713.18 or under Kwikset. However, Brooks's construction of section 11713.18 posits
that, once CarMax conducted any additional inspection, the right to append the label
"certified" to the Jeep evaporated and CarMax would become exposed to liability under
section 11713.18. We decline to adopt her interpretation of section 11713.18 because we
cannot ascribe to the Legislature the intent that a consumer protection statute would
protect a dealer who limits its inspection to the minimal amount required but
16
concomitantly exposes to liability a dealer who "goes the extra mile" when inspecting a
vehicle. (Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 [" ' "[i]t is a settled
principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal
meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not
intend" ' "].) We are convinced Brooks's interpretation of this consumer protection
statute—as penalizing businesses that do more to protect a consumer while protecting
businesses that do less to protect a consumer—is an " ' "absurd consequence[] which the
Legislature did not intend." ' " (Ibid.)
D. The "Mode of Delivery" Claim
Brooks alternatively asserts that, even assuming the content of the CQI Certificate
satisfied section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6), CarMax's chosen mode of delivering that
document to Brooks—placing it in the glove box of the Jeep after the inspection was
completed—violated section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6). Specifically, the statute states
it is a violation of section 11713.18 to sell a vehicle as "certified" if the dealer fails
"[p]rior to sale . . . to provide the buyer with [the CQI Certificate]." (Id., subd. (a)(6).)
Brooks argues that, because she did not discover the certificate until weeks after she had
purchased the Jeep, CarMax violated the statute even though it placed the CQI Certificate
in the glove box of the Jeep once the inspection had been completed and it remained there
until found by Brooks.7
7 Although we noted Brooks's claim of actual injury under Kwikset would have been
tenable had CarMax been precluded from labeling the Jeep as "certified" because
CarMax's CQI Certificate was too deficient in its content to qualify as a "report" for
17
The statute does not regulate the precise manner in which this obligation must be
discharged, and we must therefore determine whether the mode chosen by CarMax
comports with the meaning of the statute. In discerning the scope and meaning of that
provision, " '[w]e begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the
provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context,
because the language employed in the Legislature's enactment generally is the most
reliable indicator of legislative intent.' " (People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261,
1265.) When interpreting statutory language according to the usual, ordinary import of
the language employed by the Legislature, we may "start with the words themselves" as
defined by the dictionary. (People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d
30, 43; People v. Whitlock (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 456, 462 [when interpreting a statute,
"[t]o ascertain the common meaning of a word, 'a court typically looks to dictionaries' "].)
purposes of section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6), we are substantially less certain about
the tenability of her Kwikset argument of actual injury based on her "mode of delivery"
claim. Kwikset is distinguishable because the product there could never have qualified
for the label "Made in America," and the injury was that the plaintiff relied on that label
to choose to purchase the Kwikset lockset rather than a different lockset. In contrast,
under Brooks's argument, the Jeep did qualify to be advertised with the "certified" label
(because it had not yet been sold without providing the report), and it was this
representation on which she detrimentally relied in her decision-making process. Indeed,
under her argument, the "certified" label remained accurate until the moment the Jeep
was sold because (up until that moment) CarMax had not yet defaulted on the obligation
Brooks claims CarMax owed, and therefore the Jeep was mislabeled because it was sold
with the CQI Certificate in the glove compartment. Although we need not evaluate this
conundrum because of our conclusion CarMax adequately "provided" the report prior to
sale, it appears Kwikset's analysis of actual injury creates logical difficulties when
extended to Brooks's "mode of delivery" claim.
18
We believe the key to construing CarMax's obligation under section 11713.18,
subdivision (a)(6), is the verb "provide."8 The verb "provide," as defined by various
dictionaries, is "1. to make available; furnish . . . 2. to supply or equip" (Random House
Dict. (2d ed. 1987) (1987) p. 1556), or "1. To furnish; supply . . . 3. to make available;
afford" (American Heritage Dict. (2d college ed. 1985) p. 997), or similar usages. The
statute thus contemplates that a dealer satisfies its obligation under section 11713.18,
subdivision (a)(6), as long as the dealer has made available or furnished the requisite
report to the buyer sometime before the sale. The evidence that the CQI Certificate was
placed in the glove box at the conclusion of CarMax's inspection and was still there
weeks after Brooks purchased the Jeep permits the inference (Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v.
Glencoe Ins. Ltd., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222) that the CQI Certificate was in the
Jeep when she arrived at CarMax's San Diego lot, and remained there as she considered
8 Brooks's appellate argument focuses solely on the clause "prior to sale" and
rhetorically asks, "Is there really any doubt that 'prior to sale' means before a consumer
signs [his or her] sales contract?" We agree the clause admits of little ambiguity because
it specifies the required conduct occur before the "sale," although it does not impose any
minimum temporal separation between the required conduct and the "sale." However,
her claim—that there can be no doubt it means the CQI Certificate must be provided
"before the sales contract is signed"—is at least murky. Certainly, the Legislature
showed (in the same bill that enacted § 11713.18, subd. (a)(6)) that it was fully capable of
expressing such a temporal relationship to execution of a sales contract when that was its
intent (see, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2982, subd. (h) [requiring conditional sales contract to
include language advising buyer, "After this contract is signed, the seller may not change
the financing"]), which militates against Brooks's claim that the language "prior to sale"
clearly was intended to signify "prior to signing the sales contract." (Cf. County of San
Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 825 ["Where statutes
involving similar issues contain language demonstrating the Legislature knows how to
express its intent, ' "the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a
related subject is significant to show that a different legislative intent existed with
reference to the different statutes." ' "].)
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whether to purchase the Jeep. Although she may have conducted only a cursory
examination of the Jeep before deciding to buy it, and therefore ignored the paperwork
contained in the vehicle that was "available" to her, this did not detract from the fact that
CarMax did "make available" the CQI Certificate to Brooks "prior to sale" of the Jeep.
E. Conclusion
Although the trial court premised its judgment on Brooks's lack of actual injury,
we affirm the judgment as correct (Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 981)
because we conclude both the content of the CQI Certificate and the mode it was
provided to Brooks satisfied the requirements of section 11713.18, subdivision (a)(6).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. CarMax is entitled to costs on appeal.
McDONALD, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
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Filed 4/21/16
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
JESSICA L. BROOKS, D067491
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2012-00097107-CU-BC-CTL)
CARMAX AUTO SUPERSTORES
CALIFORNIA, LLC, ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed April 1, 2016, was not certified for publication. It
appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a)
for publication is GRANTED, with the exception of Part III.A.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in Official Reports" appearing on
page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official
Reports, with the exception of Part III.A.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
Copies to: All parties
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