affirming fee award to prevailing defendants where plaintiff “did not, and could not, establish a prima facie case against the [d]efendants for his federal civil rights claims, nor any basis to sue [the town manager] and [chief of police] individually under state law”
How later courts described this case
- affirming fee award to prevailing defendants where plaintiff “did not, and could not, establish a prima facie case against the [d]efendants for his federal civil rights claims, nor any basis to sue [the town manager] and [chief of police] individually under state law”
- affirming the trial court's award of attorney's fees to a defendant where the trial court had previously dismissed the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims with prejudice, finding the plaintiff's factual allegations were insufficient to state a claim
- upholding district court’s determination of frivolity in part because the allegations were so insufficient that the district court found addressing qualified immunity unnecessary
- noting the Sullivan factors are “general guidelines only…not hard and fast rules”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 15-13698 Date Filed: 04/12/2016 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13698
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cv-81248-DTKH
MARTIN O'BOYLE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
WILLIAM H. THRASHER,
individually,
GARRET WARD,
individually,
TOWN OF GULF STREAM,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 12, 2016)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-13698 Date Filed: 04/12/2016 Page: 2 of 5
Plaintiff-Appellant Martin O’Boyle appeals from the district court’s final
order awarding attorney’s fees to the Defendants-Appellees, William Thrasher,
Garret Ward, and the Town of Gulf Stream, Florida (collectively, the
“Defendants”), in a suit he brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his action,
O’Boyle alleged Fourth Amendment and state law assault and battery claims
against the Defendants stemming from two separate interactions he had with Gulf
Stream Town Manager Thrasher and Gulf Stream Chief of Police Ward,
respectively. We previously affirmed the district court’s dismissal of O’Boyle’s
claims, and described the allegations in detail, in O’Boyle v. Thrasher, ___ F.
App’x __, 2016 WL 158757, at *1-*2 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016). On appeal,
O’Boyle argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the
Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees because his claims were not frivolous.
After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s order on attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.
Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 779 (11th Cir. 1994). We also review for
abuse of discretion the determination that a plaintiff’s claims are frivolous.
Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing for
abuse of discretion whether a plaintiff’s Americans with Disabilities Act claims
were frivolous). The abuse-of-discretion standard of review is “extremely limited
and highly deferential.” In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007)
2
Case: 15-13698 Date Filed: 04/12/2016 Page: 3 of 5
(quotation omitted). When employing the abuse-of-discretion standard, “we must
affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or
has applied the wrong legal standard.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244,
1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
In a § 1983 case, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party
. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Section
1988 authorizes a fee award to a prevailing defendant, since Congress intended “to
protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis.”
Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, __, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (quotation omitted).
Thus, a prevailing defendant may be awarded attorney’s fees if the plaintiff’s case
was “meritless” in the sense that it was “groundless, . . . frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.”
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S.
412, 421 (1978).
Factors considered important in determining whether a claim is frivolous
include: (1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the
defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior
to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of
Pinellas Cty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985). While these general
guidelines can be discerned from the case law, they are general guidelines only, not
3
Case: 15-13698 Date Filed: 04/12/2016 Page: 4 of 5
hard and fast rules. Id. Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a
case-by-case basis. Id. Furthermore, when determining whether a suit is frivolous,
“a district court must focus on the question whether the case is so lacking in
arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the
claim was ultimately successful.” Id. (quotations omitted). A claim is not
frivolous when it is “meritorious enough to receive careful attention and review.”
Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 787 (11th Cir.1991).
On the record here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that O’Boyle’s § 1983 and state law claims against the Defendants were frivolous.
For starters, the district court determined that O’Boyle did not, and could not,
establish a prima facie case against the Defendants for his federal civil rights
claims, nor any basis to sue Thrasher and Ward individually under state law. In
addition, the district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. We
affirmed on appeal, concluding that the district court had not erred in dismissing
O’Boyle’s claims. O’Boyle, 2016 WL 158757, at *2-*6.
Indeed, not only were the factual allegations in the amended complaint
insufficient to state a claim, but they were not “meritorious enough to receive
careful attention and review.” Busby, 931 F.2d at 787. As our opinion explained,
his Fourth Amendment and state law claims arose out of allegations that: (1) once,
when O’Boyle went to Gulf Stream Town Hall to take air samples and videotape,
4
Case: 15-13698 Date Filed: 04/12/2016 Page: 5 of 5
O’Boyle handed town officials a New Jersey court order purportedly granting him
permission to videotape while in public buildings -- and he then immediately
changed his mind and wanted the order back when the Chief of Police sought to
photocopy it; (2) during his interaction with the Chief of Police, he was escorted to
leave; and (3) once, when O’Boyle went to Town Hall to retrieve public records,
and again videotape, he got into an argument with the Town Manager, who “stuck
his nose” in the camera. O’Boyle, 2016 WL 158757, at *1-*2. These allegations
do not begin to state a Fourth Amendment or state law assault and battery claim.
In fact, when the district court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims it found it
unnecessary to address whether the town officials were protected by qualified
immunity.
Moreover, the Defendants never offered to settle the case. See Sayers v.
Stewart Sleep Center, Inc., 140 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir. 1998). Nor did the case
come anywhere close to trial. Rather, the district court dismissed the amended
complaint well before trial when it granted the Defendants’ motion for dismiss --
even before the Defendants had filed their reply in support of the motion to
dismiss. On this record, we simply cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in finding O’Boyle’s amended complaint to be frivolous, or in deciding
to award fees.
AFFFIRMED.
5