The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 30 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NATHALEE EVANS; et al., No. 14-56274
Plaintiffs - Appellants, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00285-R-PLA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JERRY BROWN, in his individual and
Official Capacity as Governor of the State
of California; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, MURGUIA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Appellants Nathalee Evans and Dorian Carter appeal from the district court’s
dismissal of their action arising from state court probate proceedings. We review
de novo a dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Bell v. City of Boise, 709
F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2013). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not
recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court properly dismissed this action as barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of state court
decisions, and raises issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with those decisions.
See id. at 897 (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a federal plaintiff
from asserting as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court,
and seeking relief from the state court decision, as well as any issue “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court decision); Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779
(9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that an issue is “inextricably intertwined” where “the
relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court
decision or void its ruling” (citation omitted)).
2. We affirm the denial of Appellants’ motions to disqualify the district
judge. Appellants made their motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, and 455 and the
Due Process Clause. With respect to §§ 144 and 455, the record does not support
that “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the
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judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543
F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). For the same reason, “the
record does not suggest that ‘the probability of actual bias’ on [the district judge’s]
part was ‘too high to be constitutionally tolerable[,]’ so as to mandate his recusal
on due process grounds.” In re Marshall, 721 F.3d 1032, 1045 n.17 (9th Cir.
2013) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). Finally, § 47, which
bars a judge from “hear[ing] or determin[ing] an appeal from the decision of a case
or issue tried by him,” is plainly inapplicable to this case. We therefore affirm the
district court.
3. Similarly, contrary to Appellants’ contention, the record does not
support that reassignment to an out-of-state district judge was warranted under 28
U.S.C. § 292(b), (d). See United States v. Claiborne, 870 F.2d 1463, 1466 (9th
Cir. 1989) (reassignment under § 292 is discretionary).
AFFIRMED.
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