Caldwell v. United States

()RIGINAT

llr tbtffittttt\ $tuteg [.ourt of /rlprsl @tuirns

No. 16-357C

Fifed: March 25,2016

FILED

MAR 2 5 ZOIO

KENNETH LESLIECALDWELL, * U.S. COURT OF

FEDERAT CI.AIMS

Plaintiff, *

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant, *

***************

Kenneth Leslie Caldwell, Billings, MT, pro se.

ORDER

HORN. J.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The plaintiff, Kenneth Leslie Caldwell, filed a pro se complaint, in this court on

March 21, 2016. Plaintiffs complaint begins:

Pro se litigant Kenneth Leslie Caldwell presents this complaint against the

United States regarding violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

$ 2000a, violations of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. g 552a, and

violations of the Sth and 8th Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The plaintiff wants money and preliminary injunction(s).

Plaintiff s complaint states that "[t]he plaintiff knows if there is refusal to take notice of

important subject matter because of discrimination, it is contrary to the Anti-Discrimination

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. g 2000a.{ Of note, plaintiff continues: "The plaintiff knows it is

1 Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that:

The plaintiff knows that in 42 U.S.C. g 2000a (d) it is stated that

discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported by State

possible illegal aliens are in place of people who pretend to be citizens. The plaintiff also

knows it is possible illegal aliens do illegal things in different sectors of industry. lf illegal

activities of illegal aliens are ignored, harm is possible."

Plaintiff also alleges that: "The plaintiff knows it is stated that no person shall be

deprived of life, liberty, or property in the Sth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. The plaintiff knows that late responses and/or other events presented in this

complaint are violations of the 5th Amendment."2

In addition to the Civil Right Act and the Fifth Amendment, plaintiff cites to the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, indicating that:

The plaintiff knows it is stated in the 8th Amendment to the United States

Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required and that there should

not be infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. The plaintiff alleges

excessive bail or cruel and unusual punishment was imposed when he was

held in a case of which the plaintiff knows was based on false statements,

where no one was hurt physically, but had charges which if he were

convicted would serve a minimum mandatory of 15 years if convicted. The

plaintiff knows he stated it was of national importance that he be released,

but bail remained at $75,000 and the plaintiff was not released. The plaintift

knows this could be cruel and unusual because the plaintiff has seen more

than one case from the same county that involved a threat or even

successful weapon attack which did not show the oerson arresled to have

the charge of the weapon enhancement charge that carries a minimum of

15 years mandatory upon conviction.

Despite the foregoing, it appears that an allegation in the complaint important to

the plaintiff is that: "The plaintiff knows that in 2015, medical records of the plaintiff were

given to attorneys of a defendant without the plaintiffs consent because he did not sign

anything regarding the release of his health records except possibly in August 2015 if he

signed to receive them himself." Plaintiff also alleges that, "[t]he plaintiff knows that the

action within the meaning of this subchapter if such discrimination or

segregation ( 1) is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, or

regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any custom or usage required

or enforced by officials of the state or political subdivision thereof; or (3) is

required by action of the State or political subdivision thereof. The plaintiff

alleges that this law is relevant because the events that are described in

this complaint involve the courts which might be considered public because

they are used by the public. The plaintiff alleges other provisions of the Civi

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. g 2000a, might also be relevant.

2 lt not clear from the complaint how any late responses would violate the Fifth

Amendment, but plaintiff refers to numerous other lawsuits he filed and alleges the other

party either responded to his filings late or not at all.

documentation of his health information remained public until 112112016. lt might still be

available to the oublic."

Regarding the merits of plaintiffs claims, the complaint states that:

The plaintiff knows that his complaint should not be denied for being

frivolous, lacking merit, not having jurisdiction, having improper venue, or

failure to state a grounds for relief, because the case is important if not for

the life of the plaintiff, or for the life of others, is important because the very

foundation of freedom and liberty in America is at risk of being broke down.

The complaint continues, "[t]he plaintiff had difficulty finding citation(s) that apply to this

case. The process of searching for relevant citations was time consuming. lt is a request

to the court that any lack of citations be overlooked because statutes and facts are clearly

legible, the plaintiff knows this case is important, and situations may be unprecedented."3

For damages, "[t]he total amount of money the plaintiff demands for an instant preliminary

injunction is $200,000, because inefutable evidence for violations of the privacy Act of

1976, 5 U.S.C. 552a exists. lt is important to the plaintiff that this be expedited. The

plaintiff wants money and hopes that it can be given by ex parte order."

Plaintiff further indicates "[t]he plaintiff hopes for all the money he is entitled to. A

bank account number of the plaintiff with the routing number is submitted with this

Complaint for the deposit of $100,000 of the $200,000 preliminary injunction. The plaintiff

has no preference on how he receives all remaining funds, as long as they are received

in an expedited manner." In addition, plaintiff states that "[t]he plaintiff endures duress

and sets forth a demand for judgment against the United States to have a permanent

injunction to not be arrested, equivalent to diplomatic immunity. The plaintiff hopes the

injunction can be granted by ex parte order as soon as possible."

DtscussroN

The court recognizes that plaintiff is proceeding pro se, without the assistance of

counsel. When determining whether a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is sufficient to

invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction of their

pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations

contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers"), reh'q denied, 405 U.S. 9a8 (972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Huqhes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gambte, 429

3 Plaintiff also emphasizes in capital lefters: "SOMETHING MUST BE DONE.'

(capitalization in original). Plaintiff also emphasizes that "[t]he plaintiff knows that it is

possible that a complete lack of compassion exists for human life if it involves the plaintiff

having success, which would be contrary to law. The plaintiff knows it is possible that no

matter what, the plaintiff will lose if there exists an enemy that has power to keep him

from success."

U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'q denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v. United States, 750

F.3d 1320, 1322(Fed.Cr.2MQ; Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 516, S24,atf d,

603 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir.2015), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 1909 (201S). "However, "'[t]here

is no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiffl has not spelled

out in his [or her] pleading.""' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl.317,328 (2011)

(alterations in original) (quoting Scoqin v. United States,33 Fed. Ct.285,293 (1995)

(quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co. , 518 F .2d 1167 , 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see

also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aft'd,443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cn.2011);

Minehan v. United states, 75 Fed. cl.249,253 (2007). "while a pro se plaintiff is held to

a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se

plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction by a

preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing

Huqhes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at g and Tavlor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed.

cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence."), reh'o and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofskv v.

United states, '119 Fed. cl. 133, 139 (2014) ("[Mlhile the court may excuse ambiguitiel

in a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures."'

(quoting Henke v. United States,60 F.3d 795,799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United

States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290,292 (2013) ("Although plaintiffs pleadings are hetd t,o a less

stringent standard, such leniency 'with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the

burden to meet jurisdictional requirements."' (quoting Minehan v. United states, 75 Fed.

Cl. at 253).

It is well established that "'subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's

power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived."' Arbauqh v. y & H Corp., 546

ll:9. 5001 514 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, s3S U.S. 625, 630 tnOZ)).

"[F]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the

scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional

questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press." Henderson ex rel.

Henderson v. shinseki, 562 u.s. 428,434 (2011); see also Gonzalez v. Thalei, 132 s.

cr. 641, 648 (2012) ("when a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are

obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not

presented."); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 17,94 (2010) (.Courts have an independent

obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no pany

challenges it." (citing Arbauqh v. Y & H corp., 546 u.s. ats14)); special Devices. Inc. v.

oEA. lnc., 269 F.3d 1340,1342 (Fed. cir. 2001) ('lAl court has a outy to rnquire into its

jurisdiction to hear and decide a case." (citing Johannsen v. pav Less Druo Siores N.w..

hg.,918 F.2d 160, 161 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); View Enq'q. Inc. v. RoboticVision Sys- Inc.

115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. cir. 1997) ("[c]ourts must always took to their;urisoiction,

whether the parties raise the issue or not."). "objections to a tribunal's jurisdiition can be

raised at any time, even by a party that once conceded the tribunal's subject-matter

jurisdiction over the controversy." Sebelius v. Auburn Req'l Med. ctr., 133 s. it. atz gzq

,

(2013); see also Arbauqh v. Y & H corp., 546 u.s. at 506 ("The objection that a federal

court lacks subjeclmatter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a court on its

own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment.");

Cent. Pines Land Co.. L.L.C. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360, 1364 n.1'(Fed. Cirr.2012\

('An objection to a court's subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party or the

court at any stage of litigation, including after trial and the entry of judgment." (citing

Arbauoh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 50G-07)); Rick's Mushroom Serv.. lnc. v. United

States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[A]ny party may challenge, orthe court

may raise sua sponte, subject mafter jurisdiction at any time." (citing Arbauqh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U.S. at 506; Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344,1354 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q

and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cn. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005); and

Fanninq. Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717,720 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); Pikulin v. United

States,97 Fed. Cl. 71,76, aooeal dismissed, 425F. App'x 902 (Fed. Cir.201 1). In fact,

"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is an inquiry that this court must raise sua sponfe, even where

. . . neither party has raised this issue." Metabolite Labs.. Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.

Holdinqs,370 F.3d 1354, 1369 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp.,'134

F.3d 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied and en banc suqqestion declined (Fed. Cir.),

cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998)), reh'o and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert.

qranted inpa!sub. nom Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdinqsv. Metabolite Labs.. Inc.,546 U.S.

975 (2005), cert. dismissed as improvidentlv qranted, 548 U.S. 124 (2006); see also Avid

ldentification Svs.. Inc. v. Crystal lmportCorp.,603 F.3d 967,971(Fed. Cir.) ("Thiscourt

must always determine for itself whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case before it, even

when the parties do not raise or contest the issue."), reh'q and reh'q en banc denied, 614

F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir.2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.909 (2011).

Pursuant to the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) and

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff need only state in the complaint "a short

and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction," and "a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2)

(2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2016); see also Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662,677-

78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 570 (2007)).

"Determination of jurisdiction starts with the complaint, which must be well-pleaded in that

it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiffs claim, independent of any defense

that may be interposed." Hollev v. United States , 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing

Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'q denied

(Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 97 Fed. C|.203,

2OB (2011); Gonzalez-McCaullev Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. C|.710,713

(2010). "Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice

to support a claim." Bradlev v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317,1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see

also McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Ct.2007) (Dyk, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure S 1286 (3d ed. 2004)). "A plaintiffs factual allegations must 'raise a right

to relief above the speculative level' and cross 'the line from conceivable to olausible."'

Three S Consultinq v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell Afl. Corp.

v. Twomblv, 550 U.S. at 555), aff'd, 562 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir.

2014). As stated in Ashcroft v. lqbal, "[a] pleading that offers'labels and conclusions' or

'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' 550 U.S. at 555.

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual

enhancement."'Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomblv,

550 U.S. at 555).

The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render

judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States

or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a)(1) (2012). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the

Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United

States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking

a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal

constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal

government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navaio Nation, 556 U.S. 287,

289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. 206,216 (1983); see also Greenlee

Cntv., Ariz. v. United States,487 F.3d 871,875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q and reh'q en bancdenied

(Fed. Cir.20O7),cprl. denied,552 U.S. 1142(2008); Palmerv. United States, 168 F.3d

1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

"Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is

cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the

United States . . . ." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see also United States v.

White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smith v. United States, 709

F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 259 (2013); RadioShack Corp. v.

United States,566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir.2009); Rick's Mushroom Serv.. Inc. v.

United States, 521 F .3d at 1343 ("[P]laintiff must . . . identify a substantive source of law

that creates the right to recovery of money damages againstthe United States."); Golden

v. United States, 118 Fed. C|,764,768(2014). In Ontario PowerGeneration. lnc. v.

United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified three

types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in the united states court of

Federal Claims. The court wrote:

The underlying monetary claims are of three types. . . . First, claims alleging

the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall

within the Tucker Act's waiver. Second, the Tucker Act's waiver

encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over to the

Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum."

Eastport S.S. lCorp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Ct. S99, 605-06,] 3l2F.2d

[1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims ,,in

which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"' (quoting

Clapp v. United States,127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, S8O (19S4)) . . . .

Third, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over those claims where

"money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless

entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007.

Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the

government, either directly or in effect, require that the "particular provision

of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to

be paid a certain sum." ld.; see also ]United States v. lTestan, 424 U.S.

1392,1 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the defendant and the

plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of

the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation-

does not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court

of Claims has stated, that basis'in itself .. can fairly be interpreted as

mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage

sustained."' (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009)). This category is

commonly referred to as claims brought under a "money-mandating"

statute.

Ontario Power Generation. Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, '1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004);

see also Twp. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 1 01, 106 (2012).

To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon "'can fairly be

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v.

Navaio Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 lJ.S. 392, 4OO

(1976)); see also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. a|472:united

States v. Mitchell,463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co., LLC v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374,

1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting

monetary relief must be distinct from the Tucker Act itself. See United States v. Navaio

Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (The Tucker Act does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply

al jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims

premised on other sources of law (e.9., statutes or contracts)."). "'lf the statute is not

money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal

should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' Jan's Helicopter Serv.. Inc. v. Fed.

Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, '1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greentee Cntv.. Ariz. v.

United States, 487 F.3d at 876); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir.

2005) (The absence of a money-mandating source is "fatal to the court's jurisdiction under

the TuckerAct."); Peoples v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009).

From the complaint, it appears that plaintiff has asserted violations of his

constitutional rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, violations of the Civil Rights Act, and violations of the Privacy Act. Insofar as

plaintiff alleges a violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United states

Constitution for "late responses and/or other events presented in this complaint," the

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that this court does not

possess jurisdiction to consider claims arising under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. See Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed.

Cir. 1997) (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. i995)) (no

jurisdiction over a due process violation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments);

see also Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.) ("The law is well setfled

that the Due Process clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not

mandate the payment of money and thus do not provide a cause of action under the

TuckerAct." (citing LeBlancv. United States,50 F.3d at 1028), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.

259 (2013)); In re United States, 463 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.5 (Fed. Cir.) ("[B]ecause the Due

Process Clause is not money-mandating, it may not provide the basis for jurisdiction

underthe Tucker Act."), reh'q and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub

nom. Scholl v. United States, 552 U.S. 940 (2007); Acadia Tech.. Inc. & GlobalWin Tech..

Ltd. v. United States,458 F.3d 1327,1334 (Fed. Cir.2006); Collinsv. United States,67

F.3d 284,288 (Fed. Cir.) ("[Tjhe due process clause does not obligate the government to

pay money damages."), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir. 1995); Mullenberq v. United States, 857

F.2d 770,773 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that the Due Process clauses "do not trigger

TuckerAct jurisdiction in the courts"); Murrav v. United States,817 F.2d 1580, 1583 (Fed.

Cir. 1987) (noting that the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause does not include

language mandating the payment of money damages); Harper v. United States, 104 Fed.

Cl.287,291 n.5 (2012); Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 235, 238, aff d,429 F. App'x

995 (Fed. Cit.2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 'l1OS (2012); McCullouqh v. United States,

76 Fed. Cl. 1 , 4 (2006), apoeal dismissed, 236 F. App'x 615 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied (Fed.

Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050 (2007) ("[N]either the Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause . . . nor the Privileges and lmmunities Clause provides a basis for jurisdiction in

this court because the Fifth Amendment is not a source that mandates the payment of

moneyto plaintiff."). Due process claims "must be heard in District Court." Kam-Almaz v.

United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 84, 89 (2011) (citing Acadia Tech.. Inc. & Globat Win Tech..

Ltd. v. United States,458 F.3d at 1334), affd,682 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.2012); see atso

Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. at 238. Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff is

attempting to allege violations of his Fifth Amendment rights, no such cause of action can

be brought in this court.

Similarly, insofar as plaintiff s claims allege a violation of his rights under the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution for when he was "held in a case of which

the plaintiff knows was based on false statements, where no one was hurt physically, but

had charges which if he were convicted would serve a minimum mandatory of 15 years if

convicted, this Amendment is not money-mandating and, therefore, jurisdiction to review

these claims does not lie in this court. See Trafnv v. United States, S03 F.3d 1339, 1340

(Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over claims

arising under the Eighth Amendment, as the Eighth Amendment 'is not a money-

mandating provision."') (citations omitted); see also Jiron v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl.

190, 199 (2014) ("Nor does the United States Court of Federal Claims have jurisdiction

to adjudicate claims under the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution."); Sellers v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl.

62, 66 (2013); Tasby v. United States, 91 Fed. C1.344,346 (2010) ("[T]he Eighth

Amendment prohibitions of excessive bail or fines, as well as cruel and unusual

punishment, are not money-mandating.") (citation omitted).

To the extent plaintiff is generally trying to allege a violation of his civil rights, the

United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging deprivation

of civil rights under color of law. See Elkins v. United States , 229 Ct. Cl. 607, 608 (1981)

("[Wle do not have jurisdiction over claims based upon alleged violations of the civil rights

laws.") (citation omitted); see also Waqstaff v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 99, 109 (2012);

May v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 278,284 (2012), affd, 534 F. App'x 930 (Fed. Cir.

2013); Hanes v. United States,44 Fed. Cl. 441,449 (1999), affd,243 F.3d 562 (Fed.

Cir.), reh'q denied (2000); Sanders v. United States , 34 Fed. Cl. 75, 80 (1995), affd, 104

F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied, in banc suqqestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1996) (the

general civil rights claims alleged are not based on any money-mandating provisions, and

do not give rise to liability for the United States), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 831, reh'q denied,

522 U.S. 1036 (1997); Blassinqame v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 504, 505, affd, 73 F .3d

379 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reh'q denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,517 U.S. 1237 (1996)

Moreover, regarding plaintiff's contention that "[t]he plaintiff alleges other

provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. g 2000a, might also be relevant, this

court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising under sections of the

Civil RightsActs, including 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 , 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. See Pikutin

v. United States,97 Fed. CL71,77 (2011) ("Plaintiff also citesvarious provisions of the

Civil Rights Acts, including 51981 , 51983, 91985, and 51986, as bases for his claim. The

court does not possess jurisdiction to entertain clalms based on these statutes." (citing

Marlin v. United States. 63 Fed. Cl.475,476 ("[T]he Courtdoes not have jurisdiction to

consider civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1981 , 1983, or 1985 because

jurisdiction over claims arising under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district

courts.'), appeal dismissed, 14O F. App'x 256 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and Anderson v. United

States. 22 Cl. Ct. 178, 179 n. 2 (1 990) (noting that the United States Ctaims Court lacked

jurisdiction to entertain claims under g 1983, S 1985(3), and g 1986), affd. 937 F .2d 623

(Fed. Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision)), apoeal dismissed , 425 F . App'x 902 (Fed.

Cn.2O11)); Hubbard v. United States,80 Fed. Cl.282,283 (noting thatthe Civil Rights

Act encompasses 42 U.S.C. S 1988), affd, 315 F. App'x 307 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Schweitzer

v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 592, 595 (2008) ("Likewise, this court does not have

jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983, '198S

or 1986 (2000), because it is well-settled that jurisdiction over such claims lies exclusively

in the district courts." (citing Stamps v. United States. 73 Fed. Cl. 603, 609-10 (2006)

(citing Anderson v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. at 179)); Salman v. United States, 69 Fed.

Cl. 36, 39 n.3 (2005) ("Plaintiff has also alleged unlawful prosecution on the part of the

government, but has cited no money-mandating source of law that would afford him

compensation for this alleged behavior of the government. Inasmuch as plaintiffs

allegation might refer to the civil rights violations proscribed by 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (2000),

this court has no jurisdiction over section 1983 claims." (citing Berdick v. united States.

222 Ct. Cl. 94,612 F.2d 533, 536 (1979); Marlin v. United States. 63 Fed. Ct. at 476

(stating that this "[c]ourt does not have jurisdiction to consider civil rights claims brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. SS 1981, 1983, or 1985 because jurisdiction over claims arising

under the Civil Rights Act resides exclusively in the district courts") (citations omitted)).

Likewise, this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims under the

Privacy Act. The Privacy Act, at 5 U.S.C. g 552a(gx1) (2012), provides "the district courts

of the United States shall have jurisdiction" over civil actions concerning the relevant

statute.5 U.S.C. S 552a(gx1); seealso Rebish v. United States,l2OFed. Cl. 184, 188

(2016) ("To the extent that Mr. Rebish intended to allege that the Bureau committed

violations of the Privacy Act, jurisdiction over such a claim would lie in district court, not

the Court of Federal Claims." (citing 5 U.S.C. S 552a(gx1))); see also Madison v. United

States, 98 Fed. Cl. 393, 395 (201 1), Treece v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 226,232 (2010);

Stephanatos v. United States, 81 Fed. C|.440,44445 (2008); Parker v. United States,

77 Fed. Cl. 279,291-92 (2007), afi'd,280 F. App'x 957 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

To the extent plaintiff cites the Privacy Act because, as he alleges, "the medical

records of the plaintiff were given to attorneys of a defendant without the plaintiffs

consent, this court does not possess jurisdiction over claims that sound in tort. See 28

U.S.C. S 1491(a) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to

render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."); see also Keene Corp. v. United

States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993); Rick's Mushroom Serv.. Inc. v. United States,521 F.3d

at 1343; Alves v. United States, "133 F.3d '1454,1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brown v. United

States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir.), reh'o denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); Golden Pac. Bancorp

v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.8 (Fed. Cir.), reh'o denied, en banc suqqestion

declined (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,513 U.S.961 (1994); Hampel v. United States,97 Fed.

Cl. at 238; Woodson v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 640, 650 (2009); McCullouoh v. United

States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 3; Aqee v. United States,72Fed. Cl.284,290 (2006); Zhenoxinq

v. United States,71 Fed. C!.732,739, affld,204 F. App'x 885 (Fed. Cir.), reh'q denied

(Fed. Cir. 2006). Therefore, to the extent any of plaintiff's claims sound in tort, those

claims must be dismissed.

As noted above, "[t]he total amount of money the plaintiff demands for an instant

preliminary injunction is $200,000, because irrefutable evidence for violations of the

privacy Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C. 552a exist," and "[t]he plaintiff endures duress and sets forth

a demand for judgment against the United States to have a permanent injunction to not

be arrested, equivalent to diplomatic immunity. The plaintiff hopes the injunction can be

granted by ex parte order as soon as possible." The Federal Circuit has explained that

the Court of Federal Claims "does not have general equity jurisdiction to grant injunctive

relief." Shemonskv v. United States, 215 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (upholding decision

of the Court of Federal Claims that the court's jurisdiction did not extend to injunctive or

declaratory relief); see also Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1331 (Fed.

Cir.) reh'q and reh'q en banc denied (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 561 U.S. 1006 (2010);

Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Choate v. United States,

60 F.3d 840 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that "[t]he Tucker Act does not provide a means by

which the Court of Federal Claims may grant injunctive or declaratory relief where the suit

does not involve a pre-award protest or the application of section 7 428 of the Internal

Revenue Code"). As stated by the Federal Circuit:

The Court of Federal Claims has never been granted general authority to

issue declaratory judgments, and to hold that the Court of Federal Claims

may issue a declaratory judgment in this case, unrelated to any money

claim pending before it, would effectively override Congress's decision not

10

to make the Declaratory Judgment Act applicable to the Court of Federal

Claims.

Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n v. United States, 160 F.3d 714,716-17 (Fed. Cir.1998);

see also United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307 (2011) (The United

States Court of Federal Claims "has no general power to provide equitable relief against

the Government or its officers."). Moreover, in an action brought under 28 U.S.C.

$ 1491(a), this court can only provide declaratory or injunctive relief "as an incident of and

collateral to" a judgment for money damages. 28 U.S.C. S 1492(a)(2); see also Tavlor v.

United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 171,173 (2013) (holding that the TuckerAct does not provide

independent jurisdiction over claims for injunctive relief in contractual dispute cases). For

example, in a case brought under the Tucker Act that did not involve a pre-award protest,

once the Court of Federal Claims determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a

plaintiffs claims for money damages, it necessarily followed that the court did not have

authority to hear that plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief. See Kanemoto v. Reno, 41

F.3d 641,645 (Fed. Gir. 1994); see also Tavlorv. United States, 113 Fed. Ct. at 173.

Accordingly, plaintiff's demands for declaratory relief are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Finally, plaintiff did not pay the filing fee, nor did he file a motion to proceed in

forma pauperis. Plaintiff may have realized that a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

may not have been successful, as a 2016 decision in the District Court for the District of

Montana concluded, "Caldwell has failed to provide sufficient financial information, his

Complaint is frivolous, and venue is improper. The motions to proceed in forma pauperis

should therefore be denied and this matter dismissed." Caldwell v. United States, Case

No. 15-132, Dkt. 1 1 (D. Mont. Jan. 26, 2016).4 Before plaintiff may file suit again in this

a Plaintiff refers to this decision in hls complaint before this court indicating that:

The plaintiff has knowledge of a notice being "dismissed", although it was

typed .Notice of Genocide" on page 2 of document 11 of case # 1:i5-cv-

00132-SPW-CSO of the United States District Court for the District of

Montana. The plaintiff does not know how there is justice in dismissing the

Notice of Genocide". The plaintiff has an African-American relative that died

in the later part of February 2016 (breathing problems), after Notice of

Genocide was not granted. The plaintiff suffers from breathing problems

himself.

The court notes that, in addition to the District court of Montana case. five other case

plaintiff filed in federal court have been dismissed. see caldwell v. Bonneville cntv.,

Case No.4:13-cv-00004 (D. ldaho Oct. 11,2013) (dismissing amended complaintwith

prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim); Caldwell v. post Co., Case No.

4:12-cv-00621 (D. ldaho Aug. 12, 2019); Caldwell v. Sessions, Case ruo. a:12-cv-00635

(D. ldaho June 7, 2013); Caldwell v. Post Co., Case No. 4:12-cv-00596 (D. ldaho Feb.

14,2013); Caldwell v. ldaho, Case No. 4:09-cv-00561 (D. tdaho June 3, 2010), dismissed

(9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2010), cert. denied (U.S. Oct. 11, 2011). Additionaily, ptaintiff has a

11

court, plaintiff shall pay the filing fee for this case or any other case, or file a proper motion

to proceed in forma pauperis.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the

Court shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

- . f4^ ,{/

MARIAN BLANK HORN

Judge

pending suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of lllinois, filed on

December 18,2015, See Caldwell v. United States, Case No. 15-11444 (N.D. lll. Dec.

18,2015),

12