State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Daniel E. Blandford v. Tanya L. Blandford

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

December 11, 2015 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE EX REL. DANIEL E. BLANDFORD v.

TANYA L. BLANDFORD

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Knox County

No. G-6502 Timothy E. Irwin, Judge

No. E2015-00357-COA-R3-JV-FILED-MARCH 24, 2016

This appeal involves a juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction to address a post-

divorce matter of child support. The parties were divorced through judgment entered by

the Knox County Fourth Circuit Court. Although the Circuit Court initially ordered the

mother to pay child support for the parties’ three children, the Circuit Court subsequently

entered an agreed order in 2008, directing that neither party would be obligated to pay

child support from that date forward. The father commenced the instant action on June 7,

2010, by filing a petition in the Knox County Juvenile Court, alleging dependency and

neglect as to the mother. Following a hearing conducted on February 14, 2011, the

Juvenile Court entered an agreed order awarding “custody” to the father and finding the

children dependent and neglected as to the mother. The father subsequently filed a

petition to set child support. Following a hearing conducted on June 1, 2012, the Juvenile

Court magistrate entered findings and recommendations, setting the mother’s child

support obligation. Meanwhile, upon an adjudicatory hearing, the Juvenile Court judge

dismissed the father’s dependency and neglect petition on September 24, 2012. The

mother then filed a motion to “set” the father’s child support obligation. Following a

hearing conducted on July 16, 2013, the magistrate found that the mother owed no

current child support but did owe an arrearage. At each of the hearings before the

magistrate, the mother raised the issue of whether the Juvenile Court could properly

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over child support in light of the previous orders

entered by the Fourth Circuit Court. On April 1, 2013, the mother filed a motion to set

aside the magistrate’s child support orders. Following a hearing, the Juvenile Court

judge found that the magistrate had properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction only so

long as the dependency and neglect action was pending. The Juvenile Court therefore

affirmed the magistrate’s June 1, 2012 findings and recommendations but set aside the

July 16, 2013 findings and recommendations. The Juvenile Court further found that all

issues arising subsequent to dismissal of the dependency and neglect petition should be

decided by the Circuit Court. Mother has appealed to this Court. Having determined

that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-159(a), the Circuit Court has sole

jurisdiction to hear this appeal flowing from a dependency and neglect action, we transfer

this appeal to the Knox County Fourth Circuit Court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Transferred to Circuit Court

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JJ., joined.

David L. Valone, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tanya L. Blandford.

R. Deno Cole, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Daniel E. Blandford.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts underlying the issues on appeal are essentially undisputed. The plaintiff,

Daniel E. Blandford (“Father”), and the defendant, Tanya L. Blandford (“Mother”), were

married in 1995 and divorced through judgment entered by the Knox County Fourth

Circuit Court on January 29, 2003.1 Three children (“the Children”) were born of the

marriage. Regarding the Children, the final judgment for divorce provided for the

parties’ co-parenting responsibilities and set a child support obligation to be paid by

Mother. Upon Mother’s petition to modify child support, the Circuit Court entered an

agreed order on July 14, 2008, terminating Mother’s child support obligation and

directing that “neither party will owe child support from one party to another effective

immediately upon the entering of this Order.”2

1

The divorce judgment is not in the record on appeal. The parties’ pleadings and briefs contain several

date discrepancies in regard to when documents not in the record were filed or entered. Inasmuch as

these discrepancies do not affect the issues on appeal, we rely throughout this opinion on dates provided

in the statement of the evidence when the document itself is not in the record or the date stamp is

illegible. We note, however, that while Mother filed the statement of the evidence without objection from

Father, the record contains no order demonstrating the Juvenile Court’s approval of the statement of the

evidence. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(f), we deem the statement of the

evidence approved by the Juvenile Court and consider it in this opinion. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(f)

(explaining that in the absence of the trial court’s approval within the prescribed time, “the transcript or

statement of the evidence and the exhibits shall be deemed to have been approved and shall be so

considered by the appellate court, except in cases where such approval did not occur by reason of the

death or inability to act of the trial judge.”).

2

By agreement during oral argument before this Court, the parties submitted a copy of the July 2008

agreed order as a supplement to the record on appeal.

2

On June 7, 2010, Father filed a petition in the Knox County Juvenile Court (“trial

court”), alleging that the Children were dependent and neglected as to Mother.3

Following a hearing conducted on February 14, 2011, the trial court awarded “custody”

to Father and found the Children to be dependent and neglected as to Mother in an

“Agreed Final Order” entered March 31, 2011, nunc pro tunc to the date of the hearing.

The court also ordered, inter alia, that Mother would enjoy unsupervised visitation with

the Children for twenty-four hours on alternate weekends. The court provided for an

extension of visitation upon Mother’s filing an affidavit demonstrating that she had, inter

alia, established a suitable primary residence.

Acting through the State of Tennessee,4 Father subsequently filed a petition to set

child support on September 20, 2011. The trial court magistrate conducted a hearing on

June 1, 2012. During the hearing, Mother’s former counsel objected to the trial court’s

exercising subject matter jurisdiction over child support due to the previous exercise of

jurisdiction by the Circuit Court. The magistrate determined jurisdiction to be proper,

stating specifically in written findings and recommendations that the Juvenile Court had

“assumed jurisdiction over these children in the custody order entered on Feb. 14, 2011.”

The magistrate found Mother’s child support obligation to be $725.00 monthly and

reserved the issue of any child support arrearage. As Father acknowledges, the trial court

judge ostensibly did not enter an order of confirmation of the magistrate’s June 1, 2012

order.

Meanwhile, the Juvenile Court conducted an adjudicatory hearing on September

24, 2012, finding that the Children were not dependent and neglected as to Mother and

dismissing the petition. According to the statement of the evidence, the court

subsequently entered a written order to this effect on June 29, 2013, nunc pro tunc to

September 24, 2012.5 Mother subsequently filed a motion to set child support on April 1,

2013, asserting that under the court’s September 2012 decision, she was the primary

residential parent for the two younger children and shared co-parenting time equally with

Father for the eldest child, who was by then seventeen years old.

Following a hearing conducted on July 16, 2013, the magistrate found that Mother

had no current child support obligation “beginning July 2012 due to the change in

physical custody” of the two younger children. The magistrate also found, however, that

Mother owed an arrearage in the amount of $13,502.00 and ordered Mother to pay

$200.00 per month toward the arrearage. Upon consideration of the jurisdictional

3

The dependency and neglect petition is not in the record on appeal.

4

The State is not participating in this appeal.

5

The order dismissing the dependency and neglect petition is not in the record on appeal, but it is

referenced by the trial court in a subsequent order.

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argument again raised by Mother’s former counsel, the magistrate stated in findings and

recommendations in pertinent part:

The Court finds despite the argument of counsel for [Mother] to the

contrary, that it is appropriate to grant retroactive support to [Father] back

to June 2010 as the setting of retroactive support in this case does not serve

as a modification of the parties’ Divorce Order of Support. The Juvenile

Court assumed jurisdiction over the children when the Dependency and

Neglect finding was made, and the filing of the Petition to Set Support in

this matter subsequent to the D & N finding entitles [Father] to a retroactive

support award given the change of physical custody. The parties agree that

the Juvenile Court of Knox County Child Support Division shall retain

jurisdiction over matters of child support and medical support for their

children as between these parties.

On September 22, 2014, Mother, by then represented by her current counsel, filed

a motion to set aside child support orders, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure

60.02(3) and (5), requesting that the child support magistrate’s prior orders be set aside

due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She concomitantly filed a notice of appeal to

the trial court judge from the magistrate’s June 1, 2012 and July 16, 2013 findings and

recommendations.

Following a hearing conducted January 12, 2015, the trial court found that,

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-151(a), the court had properly assumed

jurisdiction over child support during the dependency and neglect proceedings. The court

further found, however, that “upon the entry of the Order dismissing the dependency and

neglect action on or about September 24, 2012, jurisdiction reverted back to the Fourth

Circuit Court of Knox County, Tennessee; . . .” The court thereby found that the

magistrate had properly exercised jurisdiction when setting Mother’s child support

obligation in June 2012 but not when ending that obligation and determining the amount

of arrearage in July 2013. The court therefore set aside the July 2013 findings and

recommendations. Rather than ruling on the magistrate’s prior findings and

recommendations, the court reserved review of the “correctness” of the June 1, 2012

order “pending further hearing before the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County,

Tennessee.” The trial court entered an order incorporating its findings on February 9,

2015. Mother filed a notice of appeal to this Court on February 17, 2015.

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II. Issues Presented

On appeal, Mother presents two issues, which we have restated as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by assuming subject matter jurisdiction

over child support when the Fourth Circuit Court previously had

addressed child support within the divorce action.

2. Whether the trial court erred by exercising subject matter jurisdiction

over child support following dismissal of the dependency and

neglect action.

Father presents two additional issues, which we have similarly restated as follows:

3. Whether this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the

child support judgment arose from a dependency and neglect action.

4. Whether the trial court magistrate’s July 16, 2013 findings and

recommendations remain valid and enforceable in the absence of a

final order regarding child support.

III. Standard of Review

Whether a court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over an action is a matter of

law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Estate of

Brown, 402 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Tenn. 2013); Williams v. State, 139 S.W.3d 308, 311

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). To the extent that we need also review the factual findings of the

trial court, we presume those findings to be correct and will not overturn them unless the

evidence preponderates against them. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Morrison v. Allen, 338

S.W.3d 417, 425-26 (Tenn. 2011). “In order for the evidence to preponderate against the

trial court’s findings of fact, the evidence must support another finding of fact with

greater convincing effect.” Wood v. Starko, 197 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).

Determinations regarding child support are reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard. See Mayfield v. Mayfield, 395 S.W.3d 108, 114-15 (Tenn. 2012); Richardson v.

Spanos, 189 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). “This standard requires us to

consider (1) whether the decision has a sufficient evidentiary foundation, (2) whether the

court correctly identified and properly applied the appropriate legal principles, and (3)

whether the decision is within the range of acceptable alternatives.” State ex rel. Vaughn

v. Kaatrude, 21 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). A trial court’s grant or denial of

a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion is also reviewed under an abuse of

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discretion standard. See Spruce v. Spruce, 2 S.W.3d 192, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)

(citing Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co., 854 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tenn. 1993)).

IV. This Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Determining the issue to be dispositive, we first address Father’s threshold issue of

whether this Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal. Father

contends that because the appeal flowed from a dependency and neglect action, it should

have been brought before the Circuit Court. Upon careful review, we agree with Father

on this issue.

Our Supreme Court has succinctly described subject matter jurisdiction and how it

is conferred on a tribunal:

The concept of subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s lawful

authority to adjudicate a controversy brought before it. See Meighan v.

U.S. Sprint Communications Co., 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn. 1996);

Standard Sur. & Casualty Co. v. Sloan, 180 Tenn. 220, 230, 173 S.W.2d

436, 440 (1943). Subject matter jurisdiction involves the nature of the

cause of action and the relief sought, see Landers v. Jones, 872 S.W.2d

674, 675 (Tenn. 1994), and can only be conferred on a court by

constitutional or legislative act. See Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, 560

(Tenn. 1977); Computer Shoppe, Inc. v. State, 780 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 1989).

Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000). See also Osborn v. Marr,

127 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tenn. 2004) (“Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s lawful

authority to adjudicate a particular controversy.”).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-159(a) (2014) provides that a juvenile court’s

final judgment in a dependency and neglect action is appealable to circuit court. See

Clark v. Cooper, No. E2012-00684-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1097773 at *3 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Mar. 18, 2013) (“A dependency and neglect action heard in juvenile court is

appealable to the circuit court, while a custody matter heard by the juvenile court is

appealable to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.”) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-159 states in pertinent part:

(a) The juvenile court shall be a court of record; . . . and any appeal

from any final order or judgment in an unruly child proceeding or

dependent and neglect proceeding, filed under this chapter, may be

made to the circuit court that shall hear the testimony of witnesses

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and try the case de novo. The appeal shall be perfected within ten

(10) days, excluding nonjudicial days, following the juvenile court’s

disposition.

***

(g) Appeals in all other civil matters heard by the juvenile court shall be

governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

(Emphasis added.) See also In re D.Y.H., 226 S.W.3d 327, 328 (Tenn. 2007) (concluding

that a juvenile court’s “subsequent custody decision was a part of the [prior] dependency

and neglect proceeding so that it is properly appealable to circuit court for a de novo

hearing.”).

Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-103(a)(1) (2014), “[t]he juvenile

court has exclusive original jurisdiction of . . . [p]roceedings in which a child is alleged to

be delinquent, unruly or dependent and neglected . . . .” In the case at bar, the trial court

assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the Children upon the filing of Father’s

dependency and neglect petition. The record demonstrates that the child support orders

from which Mother seeks relief flowed directly from the trial court’s February 2011

agreed order finding the Children dependent and neglected as to Mother and awarding

custody to Father.

We determine that the February 9, 2015 order from which Mother appeals also

flows from the dependency and neglect proceedings. The trial court concluded that it had

lost subject matter jurisdiction over the Child on September 24, 2012, with the dismissal

of Father’s dependency and neglect petition. Our Supreme Court has explained that

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-103(c),

when a juvenile court acquires jurisdiction from a dependency and neglect

proceeding, its exclusive original jurisdiction continues until one of

following events occur:

(1) the case is dismissed;

(2) the custody determination is transferred to another court;

(3) a petition for adoption is filed; or

(4) the child reaches the age of eighteen.

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In re D.Y.H., 226 S.W.3d at 330. See Toms v. Toms, 98 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tenn. 2003)

(“We conclude that the juvenile court lost jurisdiction of the case upon the dismissal of

the dependency and neglect petition . . . .) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-103(c)).

Upon concluding that it had lost subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court vacated

the magistrate’s July 16, 2013 findings and recommendations, which had been entered

subsequent to dismissal of the dependency and neglect petition. Although the court ruled

that the magistrate had properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction when entering the

earlier June 1, 2012 findings and recommendations, the court did not affirm those

findings and recommendations. Instead, the trial court “reserved pending further hearing

before the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County” review of the “correctness” of the

magistrate’s June 1, 2012 findings and recommendations. The trial court thus effectively

decided that the appeal of the magistrate’s findings and recommendations should be

heard by the Circuit Court. The trial court did not, however, enter an order of transfer to

the Circuit Court.

Upon our careful and thorough review of the record, we determine that this Court

does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal because jurisdiction lies with

the Circuit Court. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-4-108(a)(2) (2009), a

case appealed to the wrong court “shall by that court be transferred to the court having

jurisdiction of the case, direct.” See Clark, 2013 WL 1097773 at *3 (“When a case has

been appealed to the wrong court, the appropriate course of action is for the court lacking

jurisdiction to transfer the case to the correct court.”) (citing In re Estate of White, 77

S.W.3d 765, 769 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); see, e.g., In re D.L.D., Jr., E2009-00706-COA-

R3-JV, 2010 WL 653252 at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2010) (transferring appeal of a

dependency and neglect order entered by a juvenile court to circuit court); In re C.M.C.,

No. M2008-00329-COA-R3-JV, 2008 WL 4426885 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30,

2008) (transferring the appeal to circuit court upon determining that the mother’s appeal

of a juvenile court’s decision involved a dependency and neglect proceeding). We note

that Mother’s notice of appeal was timely filed within the ten-day period provided by

Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-159(a) for appeals from juvenile court to circuit court.

V. Remaining Issues

Having determined that this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction in this case,

we further determine that the parties’ remaining issues are pretermitted as moot. Pending

appeal to the Circuit Court, the trial court’s February 9, 2015 order remains in effect. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(b) (“An appeal does not suspend the order of the juvenile

court . . . .”).

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VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we transfer this case to the Fourth Circuit Court for

Knox County, Tennessee. We note that pursuant to the trial court’s February 9, 2015

order, no costs were to be taxed in this matter in the trial court. Costs on appeal to this

Court are taxed one-half to the appellant, Tanya L. Blandford, and one-half to the

appellee, Daniel E. Blandford.

_________________________________

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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