A plaintiff must establish both “actual knowledge” and that “the prison official ‘recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate[.]’”
How later courts described this case
- A plaintiff must establish both “actual knowledge” and that “the prison official ‘recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate[.]’”
- granting 12 qualified immunity to Warden whose officer sexually abused prisoner, based on Warden’s lack of knowledge
- “Not every injury suffered by a prisoner, however, ‘translates into constitutional liability for prison officials.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6306
JAMEY L. WILKINS,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LIEUTENANT UPTON; GERALD BRANKER,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
OFFICER THOMPSON; EBONY MUZONE,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:12-ct-03050-BO)
Submitted: January 29, 2016 Decided: March 2, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Roy Cooper, North Carolina Attorney General, Kimberly D. Grande,
Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellants. Michele Luecking-Sunman, NCPLS, INC., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Robert Upton and Gerald Branker appeal from the district
court’s order denying their motion for summary judgment premised
on qualified immunity in Jamey Lamont Wilkins’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012) civil rights action. We vacate and remand with instructions
that the district court enter judgment in favor of Branker and
Upton.
I.
Wilkins is an inmate in the custody of the North Carolina
Department of Public Safety and has been in such custody since
July 2000. In 2010 and 2011, Wilkins was housed in a unit for
inmates undergoing inpatient mental health care—Unit Six—at
Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina. From April 2010 until
June 2011, Wilkins was repeatedly sexually abused by Officer
Thompson—who was then employed as a correctional officer and worked
in Unit Six—at Central Prison.
During visits to Wilkins’ cell in Unit Six, Thompson learned
of Wilkins’ concern for his mother—who had been diagnosed with
breast cancer—and his vulnerable state of mind. Thompson wrote
letters to Wilkins and brought them to his cell and asked Wilkins
to masturbate in front of him. Despite Wilkins’ initial refusal
to do so, Thompson brought pornographic materials to Wilkins and
repeatedly asked Wilkins to masturbate so Thompson could watch.
Thompson promised Wilkins money, help to get out of prison, and
3
help for Wilkins’ mother. After repeated instances of sexual
harassment and several gifts from Thompson, Wilkins felt as though
he had no choice but to masturbate in front of Thompson. From
April 2010 to June 2011, Wilkins was repeatedly sexually abused by
Thompson; the abuse consisted of multiple acts of masturbation,
oral sex, and anal sex. Thompson brought contraband to Williams,
including pornographic magazines, an “ecstasy pill,” drugs, money,
and phones. Wilkins used the phones to talk with his mother and
with Thompson and accepted contraband from Thompson because he
would “do anything” to talk with his mother. Wilkins felt he had
no choice but to comply with Thompson’s sexual demands because he
feared losing direct access to his mother, the possibility of going
home, and the gifts from Thompson. Wilkins attempted to report
the abuse to two non-Defendant officials at Central Prison at
unspecified times but was not successful.
Following an internal investigation regarding contraband at
Central Prison, Thompson resigned from employment on June 8, 2011.
The next day, a Prison Rape Elimination Act * (PREA) investigation
was initiated by a non-Defendant unit manager after Wilkins gave
a note to a non-Defendant lieutenant stating that he wished to
speak with her about staff sexual misconduct. During the course
* See Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79,
117 Stat. 972 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-09 (2012)).
4
of the PREA investigation, Wilkins identified Thompson as the
person who offered him money if he masturbated while Thompson
watched, promised him help and gave him a cellular phone number,
and performed oral sex on and masturbated him in Unit Six. After
conducting additional interviews, the unit manager concluded that
Wilkins’ allegations against Thompson could not be substantiated.
Branker served as the warden of Central Prison from July 2007
through November 2011. He became aware of Wilkins’ allegations
against Thompson following Thompson’s resignation. Branker,
however, never witnessed Thompson act “unprofessionally” toward
Wilkins at any time. Upton has been employed as a lieutenant at
Central Prison since 2007. He also became aware of Wilkins’
allegations against Thompson following Thompson’s resignation.
Upton also never witnessed Thompson act “unprofessionally” toward
Wilkins at any time. Branker and Upton also both aver without
contradiction in the evidence that Thompson had never been
investigated for or disciplined for “undue familiarity” with an
inmate or for “PREA related conduct.”
Wilkins filed an amended § 1983 complaint against Thompson,
Branker, and Upton. As relevant here, Wilkins’ complaint asserted
Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims against Branker and Upton for
deliberate indifference to the sexual abuse and harassment
perpetrated by Thompson—an employee under their supervision—and
for facilitating “the violation of his right to be free from cruel
5
and unusual punishment, sexual abuse, unwanted touching, verbal
abuse, threats, and for violations of his rights to privacy and
bodily integrity.” Branker and Upton moved for summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity, and the district court denied
the motion. Branker and Upton noted a timely appeal. We have
jurisdiction to review the district court’s order. See Danser v.
Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 344-45 (4th Cir. 2014).
II.
“We review de novo the denial of a motion for summary judgment
asserting qualified immunity.” Id. at 345. “Summary judgment in
such cases should be granted when, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue
of material fact and judgment for the moving party is warranted as
a matter of law.” Id.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity ‘balances two important
interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009)). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to
liability under § 1983 and shields government officials from
liability for civil damages as long as “their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
6
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
In reviewing a district court’s decision rejecting a
defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity, we apply the analysis
set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194 (2001), as modified by the Court’s later decision in
Pearson. The holding in Saucier requires a two-step approach under
which a court must ask first whether the facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official’s actions
violated a constitutional right, and, second, whether the right
alleged to have been violated was clearly established at the time
the violation occurred, such that a reasonable person would have
known that his conduct was unconstitutional. Saucier, 533 U.S. at
201. As a result of Pearson, courts may consider the steps out of
this order in light of the circumstances of the particular case at
hand. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
In this case, our analysis is focused on the first prong of
this test, namely, whether Wilkins established for summary
judgment purposes that Branker and Upton violated his
constitutional rights.
To succeed under § 1983 on a claim for a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, an inmate must “show both (1) a serious
deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference
to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.” Strickler
7
v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Not every injury suffered by a prisoner, however,
“translates into constitutional liability for prison officials.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “Only extreme
deprivations are adequate to satisfy” this objective component.
De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). To
demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, the inmate must show “a
serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from
the challenged conditions or demonstrate a substantial risk of
such serious harm resulting from the prisoner’s exposure to the
challenged conditions.” Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d
765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of
mere negligence will not meet it.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v.
Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent to
a substantial risk of harm to an inmate if that official “knows of
and disregards” the risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To be liable
under the deliberate indifference standard, “the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302 (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A prison official’s subjective actual knowledge
can be proven through circumstantial evidence showing, for
8
example, that the substantial risk of [sexual assault] was
longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by
prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that
the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information
concerning the risk and thus must have known about it.” Makdessi
v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Beyond such actual knowledge, the prison official
“must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to
mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d
225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, “[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are
triggered when an individual seeking refuge under the [] Amendment
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place or
the item seized.” Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A legitimate
expectation of privacy exists when the individual seeking Fourth
Amendment protection maintains a subjective expectation of privacy
in the area searched that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks, alteration, and
ellipsis omitted). In this Circuit, an inmate’s right to bodily
privacy in prison encompasses the involuntary exposure of his
genitals in the presence of the opposite sex. See Lee v. Downs,
641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1981). The Eighth Amendment,
however, stands as the primary constitutional limitation
9
associated with an inmate’s bodily integrity beyond this limited
privacy right. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530
(1984).
For supervisory prison officials to be held liable under
§ 1983 for constitutional injuries inflicted by their
subordinates, an inmate must establish that: (1) the supervisor
had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was
engaged in conduct that posed a “pervasive and unreasonable” risk
of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor’s response to this
knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference or
tacit authorization” of the offensive practices; and (3) there was
an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and
the particular constitutional injury suffered. Shaw v. Stroud, 13
F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Supervisory officials may not be
held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 676 (2009).
III.
A.
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude there is no evidence in the record that Branker and Upton
had any personal involvement in the sexual harassment and abuse of
Wilkins or were aware of any substantial risk Thompson posed to
Wilkins, such that they were liable to Wilkins for violations of
10
the Eighth Amendment. The record makes clear that Wilkins did not
identify Branker and Upton has having been “involved in” his sexual
abuse, and it undisputed that no person reported Thompson’s
behavior to or abuse of Wilkins (or any allegations regarding such
behavior or abuse) to Branker or Upton prior to Thompson’s
resignation.
In rejecting Branker’s and Upton’s request for qualified
immunity, the district court relied on Wilkins’ assertions that,
despite his attempts to report the assaults, Branker and Upton
took “no action” to ensure that he had access to an “effective”
reporting system, to forbid Thompson from going into areas of Unit
Six where he was not assigned, or to ensure that Thompson had no
unsupervised access to Wilkins. On the record evidence, however,
we conclude there was no basis for Branker and Upton to take any
steps to prevent Thompson’s unsupervised access to Wilkins on Unit
Six or take unspecified steps to ensure some “effective” system
for reporting his abuse of Wilkins because Branker and Upton had
no knowledge of Thompson’s actions prior to Wilkins’ post-
resignation complaint or any basis to believe that Thompson posed
a risk of harm to Wilkins.
The district court’s order also relies on its conclusion that
there were “considerable and known problems” within the mental
health unit pertaining to supervision and that sexual assaults in
prison are “widely prevalent and well known.” The record evidence,
11
however, provides no support for such conclusions in this case.
There is no indication from the record that sexual assaults or a
risk thereof was prevalent or even extant at Central Prison.
Additionally, although the record contains an undated report
addressing medical and mental health care practices and
operational practices of the mental health unit within Central
Prison, the report does not address sexual assault at Central
Prison, and there further is no indication from the record that
Branker and Upton were aware of the report or its contents.
Further, although the record contains Wilkins’ uncontested
averment that the physical configuration of Unit Six made it
impossible for an officer in the unit’s control booth to see into
his cell, there is no basis in the record from which to conclude
that Branker and Upton actually perceived or had to have known
about any risk Thompson posed to Wilkins in the unit as a
consequence of its physical configuration.
The lack of record evidence establishing that Upton and
Branker had any knowledge regarding Thompson’s actions or any risk
he may have posed to Wilkins prior to his resignation also is fatal
to Wilkins’ claim for supervisory liability under the Eighth
Amendment. In the absence of any knowledge of Thompson’s conduct
prior to his resignation, Branker and Upton could not have been
deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized the same.
Branker and Upton thus were not liable to Wilkins for an Eighth
12
Amendment violation. The district court’s conclusion to the
contrary was erroneous as a matter of law.
B.
We further conclude there is no evidence of record supporting
the conclusion that Branker and Upton violated Wilkins’ rights
under the Fourth Amendment. There is no indication from the record
that Wilkins had his genitals exposed involuntarily to persons of
the opposite sex. In the absence of such an occurrence, there is
no basis to conclude that Branker and Upton are liable to Wilkins
for a Fourth Amendment violation on account of their own conduct
or in a supervisory capacity. The district court’s rejection of
qualified immunity to Branker and Upton on Wilkins’ Fourth
Amendment claims also was error as a matter of law.
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IV.
We therefore vacate the district court’s order and remand
this matter to the district court with instructions that the court
enter an order granting judgment in Branker’s and Upton’s favor on
the ground of qualified immunity. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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