The opinion
J-A35024-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TERRENCE R. WEISHNER, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DEBORAH ANN WEISHNER,
Appellee No. 394 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order February 3, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County
Civil Division at No(s): 12363 CD 2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2016
Appellant, Terrence R. Weishner (“Husband”), appeals from the order
finding him in contempt of an equitable distribution order in this divorce
matter involving Appellee, Deborah Ann Weishner (“Wife”). We affirm.
We summarize the history of this case as follows. Husband and Wife
were married on June 3, 1978. On November 24, 2010, Husband filed a
complaint in divorce. During the divorce proceedings, Husband received a
monthly pension from the Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement
System (“SERS”). Based upon the amount of Husband’s pension, Wife
received monthly alimony pendente lite payments of $2,100.00.
On May 16, 2014, upon agreement of the parties, the trial court
entered an order disposing of the parties’ equitable distribution claims.
Paragraph five of the equitable distribution order addressed Wife’s
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entitlement to a portion of Husband’s SERS pension in the amount of
$2,000.00 per month and the preparation of a qualified domestic relations
order (“QDRO”). The parties’ divorce decree was entered on August 12,
2014.
Because Husband did not make $2,000.00 payments to Wife while the
QDRO was being finalized by SERS, on December 11, 2014, Wife sent a pro
se letter to the court of common pleas seeking to hold Husband in contempt
of the May 16, 2014 equitable distribution order. At a hearing on Wife’s
petition for contempt on January 26, 2015, Husband filed an answer and
new matter alleging that paragraph five of the equitable distribution order
was ambiguous because it did not identify a date upon which the monthly
payments from Husband’s pension to Wife were to begin. Husband claimed
that the parties agreed the payments were to begin once the QDRO was
approved by SERS.
On February 3, 2015, the trial court entered an order finding Husband
in contempt of paragraph five of the May 16, 2014 order. The trial court
concluded that Husband was obligated to pay Wife $2,000.00 per month
from his SERS pension, regardless of whether the amount was deducted
from Husband’s pension pursuant to a QDRO. The trial court also found that
Husband was in arrears $10,000.00 (the equivalent of five monthly
payments), and ordered Husband to pay Wife the sum of $10,000.00 within
thirty days of the February 3, 2015 order.
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Husband filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
denied. This timely appeal followed. Both Husband and the trial court have
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Husband presents the following issues for our review:
[1.] Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Paragraph 5 of
the Order of May 16, 2014 obligated Husband to pay $2,000 per
month to Wife as her share of equitable distribution from his
pension regardless of whether it was deducted from his pension
pursuant to a QDRO or not, and, in making such finding where
the record and evidence showed that neither party intended or
expected that the payments would start prior to being deducted
from Husband’s pension pursuant to a QDRO and where Wife’s
allegations of contempt and request for damages were based on
delay in the receipt of pension distributions because of delay in
the QDRO process rather than because Husband allegedly failed
to make direct distributions to Wife before they were made by
deduction pursuant to the QDRO[?]
[2.] Whether the Trial Court erred in finding Husband in
contempt of Paragraph 5 of the Trial Court’s Order of May 16,
2014 for failure to pay the sum of $2,000 per month from his
pension?
[3.] Whether the Trial Court erred in determining that Husband
was in arrears in the amount of $10,000.00 where the evidence
showed that Wife was to receive a distribution by pension
deduction for January of 2015 and where Husband had overpaid
spousal support to Wife and the Court did not consider a set off
of any or all of the overpayment?
Husband’s Brief at 4-5.
In his first two issues, Husband argues that the trial court erred in
finding him in contempt of paragraph five of the equitable distribution order.
Husband contends that paragraph five is ambiguous, and a consideration of
the parties’ intent and expectations was necessary for the proper
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interpretation of the paragraph. Husband claims that neither party intended
that payments would start prior to their deductions from Husband’s pension
plan pursuant to a QDRO, and that the trial court’s finding of contempt was
improper because Husband did not act with wrongful intent. Rather,
Husband claims that he was merely waiting for the QDRO to be in place for
payments to begin.
“When considering an appeal from an [o]rder holding a
party in contempt for failure to comply with a court [o]rder, our
scope of review is narrow: we will reverse only upon a showing
the court abused its discretion.” Harcar v. Harcar, 982 A.2d
1230, 1234 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Hopkins v. Byes, 954
A.2d 654, 655 (Pa. Super. 2008)). We also must consider that:
Each court is the exclusive judge of contempts
against its process. The contempt power is essential
to the preservation of the court’s authority and
prevents the administration of justice from falling
into disrepute. When reviewing an appeal from a
contempt order, the appellate court must place great
reliance upon the discretion of the trial judge.
Langendorfer v. Spearman, 797 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. Super.
2002) (quoting Garr v. Peters, 773 A.2d 183, 189 (Pa. Super.
2001)). “The court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law
or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason.” Godfrey
v. Godfrey, 894 A.2d 776, 780 (Pa. Super. 2006). Additionally,
“[i]n proceedings for civil contempt of court, the general rule is
that the burden of proof rests with the complaining party to
demonstrate, by [a] preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant is in noncompliance with a court order.” Lachat v.
Hinchcliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 488 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Habjan v. Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 637 (Pa. Super. 2013).
“It is well-established that the law of contracts governs marital
settlement agreements.” Vaccarello v. Vaccarello, 757 A.2d 909, 914
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(2000). Our courts observe the following principles in reviewing a trial
court’s interpretation of a marital settlement agreement:
Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is
not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of
review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent
necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the appellate
court may review the entire record in making its decision.
However, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations.
When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the
trial court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of
discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding
function. On appeal from an order interpreting a marital
settlement agreement, we must decide whether the trial court
committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
We have also reiterated this Court’s limited role in interpreting
contracts such as property settlement agreements between spouses:
A court may construe or interpret a consent decree
as it would a contract, but it has neither the power
nor the authority to modify or vary the decree unless
there has been fraud, accident or mistake.
* * *
It is well-established that the paramount goal of
contract interpretation is to ascertain and give effect
to the parties’ intent. When the trier of fact has
determined the intent of the parties to a contract, an
appellate court will defer to that determination if it is
supported by the evidence.
Lang v. Meske, 850 A.2d 737, 739 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Osial v. Cook, 803 A.2d 209, 213–
214 (Pa. Super. 2002)). Further, where, as here, the words of a
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contract are clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties is
to be ascertained from the express language of the agreement
itself. Brosovic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 841 A.2d 1071 (Pa.
Super. 2004).
Bianchi v. Bianchi, 859 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The text of paragraph five provides as follows:
5. Wife shall be entitled to $2,000.00 per month from Husband’s
SERS pension. Husband’s counsel shall draft a QDRO that has
been approved by SERS. Husband shall receive any and all
remaining amounts from this pension.
Order, 4/16/14, at 1.
The trial court made the following determinations, which we conclude
are supported by the relevant law and certified record:
The [trial c]ourt found that paragraph 5 of the May 16,
2014 Order of Court was unambiguous. The [trial c]ourt
disagrees that in finding Husband in contempt, the [trial c]ourt
substituted its own judgment and interpretation of paragraph 5
over the parties’ intentions when entering into the agreement.
The parties’ interpretation and intent in the formation of the
contract was not relevant as there is no ambiguity. Paragraph 5
clearly states that Wife is entitled to $2,000.00 per month from
Husband’s SERS pension. While the Order instructs Husband’s
counsel to draft a QDRO to be approved by SERS, there is no
language within paragraph 5 or the Order to defer
commencement of the obligation until this was accomplished.
For example, the paragraph does not state that Wife shall be
entitled to $2,000.00 per month from Husband’s SERS pension
after or when the QDRO is drafted and approved by SERS. The
provision merely sets forth that it is Husband’s obligation to draft
the QDRO and seek approval.
The [trial c]ourt disagrees with Husband that there is a
“lack of evidence” to support the [trial c]ourt’s finding. To the
contrary, the [trial c]ourt finds no evidence to support Husband’s
contention that his obligation was only to start after a QDRO was
accepted by SERS. In making this argument, Husband
acknowledges that the timeframe in which the QDRO would be
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approved and implemented was uncertain. Husband contends
that this was considered by the parties and Wife was aware of a
possible delay. [The trial c]ourt disagrees. As stated above, the
[trial c]ourt finds paragraph 5 to be clear and unambiguous,
providing Wife a payment of $2,000 per month from Husband’s
pension. The [trial c]ourt found no contingencies in paragraph 5
or the Order to indicate that the parties had meant for there to
be a delay in when the payments were to commence.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/15, at 7-8 (emphasis in original).
Likewise, upon review of the language of paragraph five, we are
constrained to agree with the trial court that there is no ambiguity and that
Wife was entitled to $2,000.00 per month from Husband’s SERS pension,
regardless of when a QDRO was drafted and approved. Thus, Wife’s
entitlement to $2,000.00 from Husband’s SERS pension began when the
order was signed by the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that Husband
has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him
in contempt of paragraph five of the court order, and his contrary claims in
this regard lack merit.
In his final argument, Husband asserts that the trial court erred in
calculating the amount of his arrears. Husband’s Brief at 37-39. Husband
notes that Wife was due to be paid by SERS under the QDRO at the end of
January 2015. Basically, Husband contends that he should have been given
a credit due to his overpayment of spousal support.
However, Husband’s request for a credit on his alleged overpayment of
alimony pendente lite to Wife was not properly before the trial court in
relation to Wife’s petition for contempt. Rather, as Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1 states,
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“the rules of this chapter govern all civil actions or proceedings brought in
the court of common pleas to enforce a duty of support, or an obligation to
pay alimony pendente lite.” In addition, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(g)(2) specifies
how a party is to seek recovery from an over payment of support once an
order of support is terminated.1
The trial court correctly noted Husband’s procedural misstep as
follows:
The [trial c]ourt further finds Husband’s argument that
Wife filed a petition with “unclean hands” and that Husband had
overpaid spousal support, which was not considered by the [trial
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1
The pertinent text of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19 provides as follows:
Rule 1910.19. Support. Modification. Termination.
Guidelines as Substantial Change in Circumstances.
Overpayments
***
(g) Overpayments.
***
(2) Order Terminated. If there is an overpayment in any
amount and there is no charging order in effect, within one year
of the termination of the charging order, the former obligor may
file a petition with the domestic relations section seeking
recovery of the overpayment. A copy shall be served upon the
former obligee as original process. The domestic relations
section shall schedule a conference on the petition, which shall
be conducted consistent with the rules governing support
actions. The domestic relations section shall have the authority
to enter an order against the former obligee for the amount of
the overpayment in a monthly amount to be determined by the
trier of fact after consideration of the former obligee’s ability to
pay.
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c]ourt as an offset to Husband’s arrears, is not pertinent to the
issue at hand or properly raised during the proceeding. While
Husband did respond to Wife’s contempt petition with an answer
and new matter, in which he alleged he had overpaid spousal
support, [the trial c]ourt was never requested to offset the
alleged arrears owed by Husband nor was the contempt
proceeding the appropriate forum for this request to
establish an overpayment of a Domestic Relations support
order.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/15, at 9 (emphasis added).
We agree with the trial court that Husband’s attempt to recapture any
alleged overpayment of alimony pendente lite as a credit to the amount due
to Wife for failure to pay her according to paragraph five of the equitable
distribution order was not appropriate. Therefore, we dismiss Husband’s
claim of trial court error without prejudice to Husband’s ability to seek
recovery for any alleged overpayment of alimony pendente lite via the
correct methods set forth under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/26/2016
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