State of Tennessee v. Joseph Thomas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs January 5, 2016

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSEPH THOMAS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 11-01736 James C. Beasley, Jr., Judge

No. W2015-00157-CCA-R3-CD - Filed February 22, 2016

The defendant, Joseph Thomas, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury

convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and

employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial

court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and by instructing

the jury on criminal responsibility, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

convictions, and that the trial court erred by classifying the defendant as a career

offender. We affirm the convictions and sentences but remand for correction of a clerical

error in one of the judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed; Remanded

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E.

GLENN and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Mitchell Wood, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal); and Jake Erwin, Memphis, Tennessee

(at trial), for the appellant, Joseph Thomas.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Caitlin Smith, Assistant Attorney

General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Stacy McEndree and Josh

Corman, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

In March 2011, the Shelby County Criminal Court grand jury charged the

defendant with one count each of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated

burglary, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arising

out of the home invasion of the residence of Sheila Clemmons and Antonio Wheeler.

The trial court conducted a jury trial in December 2013.

The State‟s proof at trial showed that at approximately 8:45 a.m. on August

17, 2010, Ms. Clemmons and her fiancé, Mr. Wheeler, were eating breakfast in their

apartment when Ms. Clemmons heard a knock on the front door. She asked who was

there and heard a male respond, “Big Daddy.” Ms. Clemmons replied, “Big Daddy

who?” Having received no response, Ms. Clemmons looked through the blinds and the

front door‟s peephole and saw no one. She then opened the front door and a large man

forced his way into the apartment. Neither Ms. Clemmons nor Mr. Wheeler had ever

seen the man before, and Ms. Clemmons described the man as “big” and “[t]all” with a

dark complexion and wearing eyeglasses with black frames, a blue hat, a white t-shirt,

and blue jogging pants. The man was brandishing a large firearm, which Ms. Clemmons

described as black and approximately 12 inches long with a blue laser.

The intruder pushed Ms. Clemmons and Mr. Wheeler back into the

apartment and stated, “„[B]****, where‟s the m*****f****** dope, where‟s the kilo,

where‟s the money, and where‟s the children. Where they at? Bring they a** out.‟” Ms.

Clemmons insisted that she and Mr. Wheeler were the only people in the apartment, but

the intruder accused her of lying and hit Mr. Wheeler in the back of the head with the

handgun. The intruder dragged Mr. Wheeler into the apartment‟s bathroom and hit him

twice more with the handgun. A second man, whom Ms. Clemmons identified in court as

the defendant, then entered the apartment. Ms. Clemmons recognized the defendant, who

was wearing a brown hat and who she described as “short.” She testified that he was

from her aunt‟s neighborhood and that she knew him only as “Kokomo.” Shortly after he

entered the apartment, the defendant pulled his shirt up over his nose and mouth to

conceal his face.

The first intruder then forced Ms. Clemmons into the bathroom and

demanded to know where “the dope and the money at.” Ms. Clemmons insisted that she

had nothing but an unemployment check, and Mr. Wheeler told the intruders to take their

Plymouth automobile. The intruder then repeatedly hit Ms. Clemmons over the head

with the handgun. Meanwhile, Ms. Clemmons could hear the defendant ransacking her

bedroom and speaking in a strange, unidentifiable accent.

The intruder demanded that Ms. Clemmons remove her clothing and lie

down on the floor next to Mr. Wheeler, who had a pillowcase over his head. The intruder

told Ms. Clemmons not to talk, and he left the bathroom. Ms. Clemmons told Mr.

Wheeler “that‟s Kokomo in there.” The intruder reentered the bathroom and said

“„b****, didn‟t I tell you not to say nothing. I ought to kill you.‟” The intruder then

proceeded to urinate on Ms. Clemmons‟ face. The intruder told Mr. Wheeler to hug Ms.

Clemmons and instructed Ms. Clemmons to count to one hundred. Mr. Wheeler

eventually got up to check the apartment and discovered that the men had left. Ms.

Clemmons rapidly dressed and found her apartment manager, who contacted the police.

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Ms. Clemmons later discovered that her flat-screen television, her son‟s computer, and a

cordless telephone were missing from her apartment.

After law enforcement officers arrived, Ms. Clemmons and Mr. Wheeler

were transported by ambulance to the hospital. Ms. Clemmons‟ injuries required four

staples in her head, and Mr. Wheeler needed five to six stitches in his head. After Ms.

Clemmons and Mr. Wheeler returned home, Mr. Wheeler‟s mother and brother cleaned

the apartment and discovered a hat in the bedroom that Ms. Clemmons had seen the

defendant wearing during the home invasion. Ms. Clemmons delivered the hat to the

police department.

On August 19, Ms. Clemmons went to the Memphis Police Department

(“MPD”) and viewed a photographic lineup, from which she identified the defendant as

the second man who entered her apartment. Approximately one week later, the defendant

called Ms. Clemmons and instructed her not to press charges against him.

On cross-examination, Ms. Clemmons admitted that, prior to the home

invasion, she had seen the defendant “just two or three times.” Ms. Clemmons and Mr.

Wheeler both denied that they had ever purchased drugs from or used drugs with the

defendant. Ms. Clemmons acknowledged that the defendant‟s mother had contacted her

three to four times following the home invasion and that she eventually visited Ms.

Clemmons at her home and asked Ms. Clemmons and Mr. Wheeler to sign documents.

According to Ms. Clemmons, she had consumed “about three” glasses of wine at the

time, and she and Mr. Wheeler both signed the documents without reading them so that

the defendant‟s mother would “stop bothering her.” Ms. Clemmons acknowledged that

the documents, both entititled “Sworn Affidavit,” stated that the defendant was not

involved in the home invasion, but Ms. Clemmons denied that a notary was present when

she signed the documents and insisted that the documents were notarized at a later date

outside of her presence. Ms. Clemmons conceded that she had missed a prior court date

for the trial in the instant case because someone dressed all in black with an obscured

face had knocked on her door and frightened her.

Charles Glen Willis with Mack Pest Control was working at Ms.

Clemmons‟ apartment complex on August 17 when he noticed three African-American

men walking rapidly out of an apartment. One of the three men, the largest of the three,

was carrying something under his arm inside a bag or pillowcase. Mr. Willis saw the

three men get into a brown vehicle with “rust on the hood” and flee from the scene. Mr.

Willis was unable to identify the defendant as one of the three men he saw that day.

MPD Officer Newton Morgan responded to the scene of the home invasion

on August 17. The victims had already been transported to the hospital when Officer

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Morgan arrived, and he photographed the scene. Through Officer Morgan‟s testimony,

the State introduced into evidence photographs of the victims‟ apartment, which depicted

several rooms in complete disarray and showed a significant amount of blood on the floor

of the apartment. Officer Morgan attempted to obtain fingerprints from the scene but was

unsuccessful.

MPD Sergeant Joseph Johnson spoke with the victims at the hospital on

August 17. Ms. Clemmons gave Sergeant Johnson “the street name” of Kokomo, and

Sergeant Johnson‟s investigation revealed that Kokomo was the defendant‟s street name.

Sergeant Johnson then prepared a photographic lineup, from which Ms. Clemmons

positively identified the defendant as one of the intruders in the home invasion. Sergeant

Johnson confirmed that Ms. Clemmons had provided him with a hat that had been found

in her apartment following the August 17 incident. On cross-examination, Sergeant

Johnson admitted that he did not request any deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing on

the hat and explained that he felt it unnecessary because Ms. Clemmons had already

identified the defendant as the perpetrator who had worn the hat.

Through the testimomy of Officer Juaquatta Harris with the Shelby County

Sheriff‟s Department, the State introduced into evidence audio recordings of telephone

calls the defendant placed from jail.

With this evidence, the State rested. Following the denial of the

defendant‟s motion for judgments of acquittal, the defendant elected to present proof.

Donna Guy testified that the defendant was her former boyfriend and that

she had known Ms. Clemmons all of her life because Ms. Guy‟s father had previously

dated Ms. Clemmons‟ sister. According to Ms. Guy, Ms. Clemmons had frequently

socialized with both Ms. Guy and the defendant at Ms. Clemmons‟ apartment and that the

trio had used drugs together in the past. Ms. Guy insisted that she and the defendant had

spent the night at Ms. Clemmons‟ apartment “[t]hree nights a week for six months,” but

she could not recall “per se how [the apartment] look[ed].”

Following a Momon colloquy, the defendant elected not to testify.

Based on this evidence, the jury convicted the defendant as charged of the

aggravated robbery of Ms. Clemmons, the aggravated assault of Mr. Wheeler, the

aggravated burglary of Ms. Clemmons‟ residence, and employing a firearm during the

commission of a dangerous felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court found

the defendant to be a career offender and imposed a 30-year sentence for the aggravated

robbery, to be served at 100 percent based on the defendant‟s prior aggravated robbery

conviction. The court imposed a 15-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction,

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to be served consecutively to the 30-year sentence. With respect to the convictions of

aggravated burglary and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous

felony, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 15 years each and ordered that

those two sentences be served concurrently with the sentences for aggravated robbery and

aggravated assault, for an effective sentence of 45 years.

Following the denial of his timely motion for new trial, the defendant filed

a timely notice of appeal. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred

by denying his motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and by improperly instructing

the jury on criminal responsibility, that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to

sustain his convictions, and that the trial court erred by classifying him as a career

offender for sentencing purposes. We will address each issue in turn.

I. Failure to Prosecute

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred by denying his oral

motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which the defendant allegedly made on August

27, 2013, when Ms. Clemmons and Mr. Wheeler failed to appear for the start of trial.

According to the defendant, the trial court denied the motion, granted the State a

continuance, and subpoenaed the victims to appear. The case then proceeded to trial in

December 2013, less than four months later.

The record on appeal, however, is utterly devoid of the defendant‟s motion

to dismiss, the trial court‟s order denying the same, or a transcript of the August 27, 2013

court proceedings, rendering a meaningful review of this issue impossible. The appellant

bears the burden of preparing an adequate record on appeal, see State v. Ballard, 855

S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993), which includes the duty to “have prepared a transcript of

such part of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair, accurate and

complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of

appeal,” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). If the appellant fails to prepare an adequate record, this

court must presume the trial court‟s ruling was correct. See State v. Richardson, 875

S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

Moreover, the defendant‟s argument on this issue contains no citation to

authority or references to the record. “Issues which are not supported by argument,

citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in

this court.” Tenn. R. Ct. Crim. App. 10(b); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) (stating

that the appellant‟s brief must contain an argument “setting forth . . . the contentions of

the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor . . . with

citations to the authorities . . . relied on”). Because the petitioner failed to comply with

these rules, he has waived our consideration of this issue.

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II. Jury Instruction on Criminal Responsibility

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by “failing to include

complete instruction to the jury regarding criminal responsibility.” The defendant failed

to raise an objection to this jury instruction in his motion for new trial or his amended

motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e) (“[I]n all cases tried by a jury, no issue

presented for review shall be predicated upon error in . . . [any] ground upon which a new

trial is sought, unless the same was specifically stated in a motion for a new trial;

otherwise such issues will be treated as waived.”); see also State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d

567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (holding that a defendant relinquishes the right to argue on appeal

any issues that should have been presented in a motion for new trial but were not raised

in the motion); State v. Dodson, 780 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). “Issues

raised for the first time on appeal are considered waived.” State v. Johnson, 970 S.W.2d

500, 508 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); see also Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); State v. Killebrew,

760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Rhoden, 739 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1987); State v. Jenkins, 733 S.W.2d 528, 532 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

Because he raises this issue for the first time on appeal, it is waived. In any event, the

criminal responsibility instruction provided by the trial court tracked the language of the

pattern jury instruction and was a correct statement of the law.

III. Sufficiency

Next, the defendant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was

insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree.

We review the defendant‟s claim of insufficient evidence mindful that our

standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979); State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). This

standard applies to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence,

or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d

370, 379 (Tenn. 2011).

When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court should neither

re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Id.

Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the

evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of

fact. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Significantly, this court must

afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record as

well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.

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Id.

As charged in this case, aggravated robbery is “robbery as defined in § 39-

13-401 . . . [a]ccomplished with a deadly weapon or by display of any article used or

fashioned to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon.” T.C.A. §

39-13-402(a)(1). “Robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property from the

person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” Id. § 39-13-401(a). “A

person commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, the

person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner‟s

effective consent.” Id. § 39-14-103(a). A deadly weapon is defined as “[a] firearm or

anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or

serious bodily injury; or [a]nything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable

of causing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(5).

Aggravated assault is an intentional or knowing “assault as defined in § 39-

13-101(a)(1)” that is committed via the use or display of a deadly weapon. T.C.A. § 39-

13-102(a)(1)(B). Assault, as is relevant to this case, occurs when one “[i]ntentionally or

knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury.” Id. § 39-13-

101(a)(2).

Aggravated burglary is “burglary of a habitation,” T.C.A. § 39-14-403(a),

and “[a] person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property

owner . . . [e]nters a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to

the public, with intent to commit a felony.” Id. § 39-14-402(a)(1).

As charged in count four of the indictment, “it is an offense to employ a

firearm during the . . . [c]ommission of a dangerous felony.” T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(b)(1).

Aggravated burglary is one of the enumerated dangerous felonies contemplated by this

statute. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(i)(1)(H).

Moreover, “[a] person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense, if

the offense is committed by the person‟s own conduct, by the conduct of another for

which the person is criminally responsible, or by both.” T.C.A. § 39-11-401(a).

Additionally, criminal responsibility for the actions of another arises when the defendant,

“[a]cting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in

the proceeds or results of the offense, . . . solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another

person to commit the offense.” Id. § 39-11-402(2); see State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d

166, 170 (Tenn. 1999) (“As reflected in this case, criminal responsibility is not a separate,

distinct crime. It is solely a theory by which the State may prove the defendant‟s guilt of

the alleged offense . . . based upon the conduct of another person.”).

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In the instant case, the proof at trial established that the assailant known

only as “Big Daddy” forcibly entered Ms. Clemmons‟ residence on August 17, 2010, by

use of a firearm and with the intent to rob her of drugs and money. Big Daddy beat Mr.

Wheeler over the head with the firearm numerous times, and Big Daddy, who brandished

the firearm throughout the home invasion, robbed Ms. Clemmons of a television, a

computer, and a telephone. Shortly after Big Daddy forced his way into the residence,

the defendant entered, and Ms. Clemmons immediately recognized him. While Big

Daddy was holding the victims in the bathroom at gunpoint, Ms. Clemmons could hear

the defendant ransacking her bedroom while attempting to disguise his voice. Ms.

Clemmons positively identified the defendant from a photographic lineup a few days

after the incident.

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we

find the evidence adduced at trial more than sufficiently established that the defendant

assisted Big Daddy in the commission of these offenses and was thus criminally

responsible for Big Daddy‟s actions. As such, the defendant is guilty of aggravated

robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm during the

commission of a dangerous felony.

IV. Sentencing

Finally, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by classifying him

as a career offender for sentencing purposes. Again, we disagree.

Our supreme court has adopted an abuse of discretion standard of review

for sentencing and has prescribed “a presumption of reasonableness to within-range

sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles of our

Sentencing Act.” State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012) (stating that “although

the statutory language continues to describe appellate review as de novo with a

presumption of correctness,” the 2005 revisions to the Sentencing Act “effectively

abrogated the de novo standard of appellate review”). The application of the purposes

and principles of sentencing involves a consideration of “[t]he potential or lack of

potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant . . . in determining the

sentence alternative or length of a term to be imposed.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103(5). The

supreme court cautioned that, despite the wide discretion afforded the trial court under

the revised Sentencing Act, trial courts are “still required under the 2005 amendments to

„place on the record, either orally or in writing, what enhancement or mitigating factors

were considered, if any, as well as the reasons for the sentence, in order to ensure fair and

consistent sentencing.‟” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706 n.41 (quoting T.C.A. § 40-35-210(e)).

Under the holding in Bise, “[a] sentence should be upheld so long as it is within the

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appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise in

compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Id. at 709.

In the instant case, the jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery,

a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and employing a firearm

during the commission of a dangerous felony, all Class C felonies. The presentence

investigation report established that the defendant had three prior Class B felony

convictions of aggravated robbery, one prior Class C felony conviction of aggravated

assault, and one prior Class C felony drug conviction. In addition, the defendant had four

convictions of the Class B felony of attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, three

convictions of aggravated robbery, one conviction of the Class C felony of attempted

aggravated robbery, and one Class B felony conviction of attempted second degree

murder, all arising out of incidents that occurred on August 14, 1995. Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-35-108 provides that a career offender includes a defendant “who

has received . . . [a]ny combination of six (6) or more Class A, B or C prior felony

convictions, and the defendant‟s conviction offense is a Class A, B or C felony.” T.C.A.

§ 40-35-108(a)(1).

The defendant urges this court to consider the convictions that arose out of

the August 14, 1995 incident as a single conviction pursuant to the 24-hour merger rule.

See T.C.A. § 40-35-108(a)(4). This, however, avails the defendant nothing because, even

if we treat these nine Class B and C felony convictions as a single conviction, the

defendant still has six qualifying prior Class B and C felony convictions, which clearly

classify him as a career offender. Consequently, the trial court did not err by finding the

defendant to be a career offender. Moreover, because the trial court considered all

relevant principles associated with sentencing, no error attends the imposition of these

within-range sentences.

V. Correction of Clerical Error

Although not raised by either party, we detect an error that requires

correction in the judgment for the conviction of employing a firearm during the

commission of a dangerous felony. Based on the transcript of the sentencing hearing and

the defendant‟s criminal history, it is clear that the defendant must serve the mandatory

minimum sentence of 10 years for this conviction. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1324(h)(2). In

the judgment form, however, the trial court, in the “Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Length” section, merely placed a check mark on the line by “Employment of Firearm”

where the number of years of minimum service should have been. Accordingly, on

remand, the trial court shall enter an amended judgment to reflect the mandatory

minimum sentence length of 10 years.

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Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgments of the trial

court but remand for correction of the employing a firearm judgment as outlined in this

opinion.

_________________________________

JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE

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