Com. v. Stough, R.

J-S05021-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RICHARD SYLVESTER STOUGH,

Appellant No. 1198 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 20, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001263-2014, CP-67-CR-0005333-

2013, CP-67-CR-0007299-2013, CP-67-CR-0007301-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and PLATT,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2016

Appellant, Richard Sylvester Stough, appeals nunc pro tunc from the

October 20, 2014 judgment of sentence of twenty-five to fifty-five months of

imprisonment, following his conviction at a bench trial of indecent assault,

stalking, and intimidation of a witness or victim. Appellate counsel has filed

a petition to withdraw his representation and a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), which govern a petition to withdraw from

representation on direct appeal. After review, we grant counsel’s petition to

withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.

____________________________________________

*

Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S05021-16

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history as follows:

On June 27, 2013, Kristen Stambaugh was recovering from

a recent surgery in her home in York County, Pennsylvania when

she heard a knock at her door. She answered the door and it

was her neighbor, the Appellant. He stated that he and his wife

had an argument and that he was going to leave the house, but

that he wanted to exchange numbers with Ms. Stambaugh. The

Appellant stated his reason for wanting to exchange numbers

was so Ms. Stambaugh could watch his house while he was

away. Ms. Stambaugh agreed, but instead of letting the

Appellant inside her home, she closed the door while she went

into the kitchen to get pen and paper. She heard her front door

open and the Appellant entered her kitchen. He pinned her

against her sliding glass door and began touching her buttocks

and kissing her neck. During the entire encounter, Ms.

Stambaugh was attempting to push the Appellant off of her and

was screaming “no.”

Eventually, Ms. Stambaugh was able to get her arms free

and she pushed the Appellant out of the door. She called her

friend Karen, who came over and encouraged Ms. Stambaugh to

call the police. Officers responded to Ms. Stambaugh’s house

and took a report. Over the next three months the Appellant left

notes on Ms. Stambaugh’s door or car, stood outside watching

her, and even showed up at her place of employment. All of

these incidents were reported to police who repeatedly told the

Appellant to stay away from Ms. Stambaugh. It is this behavior

that led to the charges in the Appellant’s other cases.

Eventually the Appellant was incarcerated on these

charges. In November of 2013, Ms. Stambaugh received a letter

from York County Prison. Ms. Stambaugh immediately took the

letter to the police department; she did not even open it. It was

this letter that led to the witness intimidation charge. In the

letter, the Appellant offers the victim an invitation to

Thanksgiving dinner and food in exchange for her dropping the

charges against him.

Due to all of the events that had transpired after the June

27, 2013, incident, Ms. Stambaugh testified that she no longer

felt safe and this led her to move. Ms. Stambaugh testified that

she and the Appellant had always been friendly, typical

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neighborly chitchat, but she never thought there were any issues

between the two.

The Appellant did testify, however, his testimony was

essentially denial of all charges. He began his testimony by

stating that he was “here on false charges.” With respect to the

initial incident with Ms. Stambaugh, the Appellant stated that he

did go to her house to exchange numbers, but nothing

inappropriate occurred; they exchanged numbers and that was

it. In fact, the Appellant denied ever being in Ms. Stambaugh’s

house. He denied writing notes and leaving them on Ms.

Stambaugh’s car or front door. However, he did admit to writing

her the note from the prison. Although he was aware that he

was not supposed to have any contact with Ms. Stambaugh he

did not know that also included letters.

After hearing all of the testimony, we found the Appellant

guilty on most of the charges against him. The only evidence

the defense offered to discredit Ms. Stambaugh was the

Appellant himself, and quite frankly, we did not believe much of

his testimony. We sentenced the Appellant on October 20,

2014, and this timely appeal followed.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/15, at 2–4 (internal citations to the record

omitted).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 19, 2014. Both

the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On May 1, 2015,

this Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief. On May 14, 2015,

Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA court held a hearing on June 25, 2015,

and on July 9, 2015, granted Appellant permission to appeal nunc pro tunc.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on July 13, 2015. Both the trial court and

Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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Before we address the questions raised on appeal, we must resolve

appellate counsel’s request to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83

A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). There are procedural and

briefing requirements imposed upon an attorney who seeks to withdraw on

appeal. The procedural mandates are that counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy

of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that

he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise

additional arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the

court’s attention.

Id. at 1032 (citation omitted).

In this case, counsel has satisfied those directives. Within the petition

to withdraw, counsel averred that he conducted a conscientious examination

of the record, including all notes of testimony. Following that review,

counsel concluded that the present appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel sent

to Appellant a copy of the Anders brief and petition to withdraw, as well as

a letter, a copy of which is attached to the motion. In the letter, counsel

advised Appellant that he could represent himself or retain private counsel.

We now examine whether the brief satisfies the Supreme Court’s

dictates in Santiago, which provide that:

in the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s

petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of

the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2)

refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably

supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the

appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for

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concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate

the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes

on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is

frivolous.

Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032 (quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361).

Counsel’s brief is compliant with Santiago. It sets forth the factual

and procedural history of this case and outlines pertinent case authority.

Counsel identifies four issues, as follows:

1. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence of Indecent Assault that Appellant’s unwanted

touching of the victim was for the purpose of sexual

gratification?

2. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence of Stalking that Appellant intended to place the

victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause

substantial emotional distress by his communications?

3. Whether the Commonwealth presented insufficient

evidence of Appellant’s intent to intimidate the victim into

withdrawing charges?

4. Whether an offer of de minimis pecuniary gain is sufficient

to trigger culpability under the intimidation of witness

statute?

Anders Brief at 5.

The issues identified in the Anders brief are all related to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting Appellant’s convictions. In reviewing

a sufficiency challenge, “we must decide whether the evidence admitted at

trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the

Commonwealth, as verdict winner,” are sufficient to support all elements of

the offense. Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731, 746 (Pa. 2015).

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The trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, is free to believe some, all, or

none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025 (Pa.

2007); Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792–793 (Pa. Super.

2015). Moreover, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by

wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873

(Pa. 2008); Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717 (Pa. Super.

2014), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we

may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the

fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Rogal, 120 A.3d 994 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Appellant first asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him

of indecent assault. Appellant was convicted of indecent assault pursuant to

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1). A person is guilty of indecent assault if he “has

indecent contact with the complainant . . . without the complainant’s

consent.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1). The Crimes Code defines indecent

contact as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the

person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in either

person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

After review, we conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence of indecent assault. Kristen Stambaugh [also “the victim”] testified

that after Appellant entered her home and pinned her against a sliding glass

door, he began touching her buttocks and kissing her neck. N.T., 6/13/14,

at 10. The victim further testified that while Appellant was touching her, she

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was resisting and screaming, “No, stop, get off, get out, yelling at him the

entire time.” Id. at 11. The testimony of the victim, standing alone, is

sufficient to convict in sex offense prosecutions. In Interest of J.R., 648

A.2d 28 (Pa. Super. 1994).

Further, Ms. Stambaugh stated that Appellant told her, "You know you

want this.” N.T., 6/13/14, at 11. This comment clearly encompasses an

element of sexual desire or gratification that is sufficient to establish a

sexual component to Appellant’s actions. See Commonwealth v. Evans,

901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006) (factfinder is free to infer defendant’s

comments that victim was sexy and “he would like to do some things to her”

revealed that his intimate touching was done for purpose of arousing or

gratifying sexual desire such that evidence was sufficient to support

conviction for indecent assault). There was sufficient evidence at trial to

support the conviction for indecent assault.

Appellant also assails the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction of stalking. In order to sustain a conviction for stalking under 18

Pa.C.S. § 2709.1, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct, repeatedly

committed acts toward another person, or repeatedly communicated to

another person under circumstances which demonstrate or communicate an

intent to either place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or cause

substantial emotional distress to the person. Appellant argues that his

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conviction is infirm because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he

intended to cause substantial emotional distress to the victim.

Appellant was convicted of two counts of stalking. The trial court

explained as follows:

With respect to case CR-7299-2013, the testimony

presented at trial showed the following: The victim testified that

after the incident and after she had spoken with the police, the

Appellant came back to her house. N.T. 6/13/2014 at 12. She

said that he knocked on the door, but she refused to open it;

however, she could hear him apologizing. Id. at 12-13. She

advised the Appellant that she was calling the police again and

he left. Id. at 13. The victim testified that in days after the

incident she began receiving notes on her front door and car.

Id. at 14. The victim testified that every time she would leave

her house the Appellant would be standing outside of his house.

Id. at 16-17. In one particular incident she observed the

Appellant sitting in his truck staring at her residence; she called

the police and Officer Shaun Goodman arrived. Id. at 16-17.

Officer Shaun Goodman testified that he was dispatched to

the victim’s house on June 28, 2013, the day after the indecent

assault. N.T. 6/13/2014 at 39. When he arrived he saw the

Appellant sitting in his truck looking at the victim’s residence.

Id. at 40. Officer Goodman approached the Appellant and

reminded him that he was to have no contact with the victim;

the Appellant acknowledged that he was not supposed to have

contact with her. Id. Later that same day Officer Goodman was

called back to the residence because the Appellant had left a

voicemail on the victim’s phone. Id. at 41.

As we stated at the time we found the Appellant guilty of

Stalking in case CR-7299-2013, one incident standing alone

would not be sufficient to convict the Appellant; however, the

combination of the voicemail, staring at the victim from across

the street, and the fact that the Appellant returned to the

victim’s house after the June 27th incident did establish a course

of conduct as defined in the statute. N.T. 6/13/2014 at 73-74.

Based on the timing of these incidents we determined that the

Appellant did intend to cause the victim substantial emotional

distress. Id. at 74.

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In case CR-7301-2013, the Appellant showed up to the

victim’s place of employment[1] and attempted to gain

information about her bus route. Terry Mundy, the victim’s co-

worker, testified that when she pulled into work on September

10, 2013, she noticed a blue PT Cruiser in the parking lot. N.T.

6/13/2014 at 43. She thought this was strange because she is

always the first person at work. Id. Ms. Mundy testified that

she saw a man, who she identified as the Appellant, sitting in the

car writing on a tablet. Id. at 43-44. After opening the office

Ms. Mundy decided to go out and ask the Appellant if he needed

help. Id. at 44. The Appellant said he was looking for Kristen

and that he needed to talk to her because he and his wife had

split up. Id. at 44-45. Ms. Mundy told the Appellant she would

not give out the victim’s bus route, and the Appellant drove

away a short time later. Id. at 45. Ms. Mundy was aware of

what was going on with the victim, and after her encounter with

the Appellant she called the police. Id. at 46.

Billie Jo Caudill, another one of the victim’s co-workers,

testified that on September 2013, she was driving her normal

bus route when she noticed a blue PT Cruiser following her. N.T.

6/13/2014 at 47-48. When she was at a stop sign she noticed

the Appellant waving his arms in an effort to get her attention.

Id. at 48. She was also aware of what was going on between

the Appellant and victim, so she immediately reported the

incident; shortly thereafter the police arrived. Id. at 48-49.

When we found the Appellant guilty of Count 1 Stalking in

7301–2013, we noted that the Appellant’s appearance at the

victim’s place of employment and his attempt to gain information

about her and follow her was just “another act or course of

conduct constituting the crime of stalking.” N.T. 6/13/2014 at

75. Although the Appellant ended up following the wrong

person, he clearly intended to follow the victim and he made

substantial steps in doing so. Id. at 76. Thus, we found him

guilty of Count 1 Stalking.

We think that the evidence presented by the

Commonwealth was sufficient to prove that the Appellant

____________________________________________

1

Ms. Staubaugh testified that she drove a school bus. N.T., 6/13/14, at 14.

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intended to place the victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury or

to cause substantial emotional distress. When asked what effect

this entire series of events has taken on her the victim

responded, “I watch my back when [I] come out of the house

now. I since have—have moved from my residence. I’m no

longer there as of last week. I just—don’t feel safe anymore.”

N.T. 6/13/2014 at 26. She was asked why she moved and she

responded that she knew the Appellant would not be

incarcerated forever, and that he would eventually get out of

prison. Id. The victim stated, “I just want it [sic] to be left

alone.” Id.

On the other hand, the Appellant did admit to being at the

victim’s home on June 27th and to exchanging phone numbers,

but he denied everything else. N.T. 6/13/2014 at 57-58. He

denied ever being in the victim’s home. Id. at 58. He denied

coming back to the victim’s house later on the day of June 27 th.

Id. at 59. He denied leaving handwritten notes on the victim’s

front door or car. Id. at 59-60. However, the Appellant did

admit to sending the victim a letter from the prison. Id. at 60.

The Appellant denied leaving a voicemail on the victim’s

answering machine. Id. at 62. He denied staring at the victim’s

home from his truck. Id. at 63. He denied showing up at the

victim’s place of employment and trying to get information about

her bus route. Id. at 64. Finally, the Appellant denied following

[the] school bus. Id. at 64-65.

As we noted at the Appellant’s bench trial, we simply did

not believe his version of events. Furthermore, there was no

reason for this [c]ourt to reject any of the victim’s testimony or

the testimony of her co-workers. Based on the evidence, we

concluded that the Appellant’s actions after the June 27 th

physical assault were intended to cause the victim substantial

emotional distress.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/15, at 8–11 (footnote omitted).

Contrary to Appellant’s position, this evidence was clearly sufficient to

support a finding that he intended to place the victim in reasonable fear of

bodily injury and to cause her substantial emotional distress. Appellant

repeatedly appeared at her home and place of business against her wishes,

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making it clear that he was watching her. Given these facts, the factfinder

was free to infer that Appellant possessed the requisite state of mind for the

offense charged and to reject his self-serving testimony that he never

intended to frighten Ms. Stambaugh. Accordingly, no relief is due on this

issue.

We address the third and fourth issues in tandem. These claims aver

that the evidence was insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of

intimidation of a witness or victim. Appellant was convicted of violating 18

Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(3), which provides as follows:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if, with the

intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct will obstruct,

impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the administration of

criminal justice, he intimidates or attempts to intimidate any

witness or victim to:

* * *

(3) Withhold any testimony, information, document

or thing relating to the commission of a crime from

any law enforcement officer, prosecuting official or

judge.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(3).

The offense was graded as a felony in the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S. §

4952(b)(1)(ii). Under section 4952(b)(4), the offense of intimidation of a

witness is a felony of the third degree “in any other case in which the actor

sought to influence or intimidate a witness or victim as specified in this

subsection.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(b)(4). The predicates for grading under this

section are set forth in section 4952(b)(1), which states “[t]he actor

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employs force, violence or deception or threatens to employ force or

violence, upon the witness or victim or, with the requisite intent or

knowledge upon any other person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(b)(1)(i).

We consider Appellant’s assertion that the Commonwealth failed to

present sufficient evidence of Appellant’s intent to intimidate the victim as

well as his claim that the evidence of a de minimis pecuniary gain does not

permit culpability under the statute. Anders Brief at 19. The basis for this

charge was a letter Appellant sent from prison to Ms. Stambaugh. The letter

read as follows:

Hi neighbor,

I have been wanting to write this letter to you for weeks,

But have been putting it off because of how you might react to it

& turn me in again. But [G]od’s Big Bible says in Matthew 5:43-

48 Love they neighbor & help them. You are the 5th neighbor

my Dear wife Marie & I have helped out in Food since we moved

in our House Memorial Day 2002 I guess you just don’t

appreciate help from [G]od’s people and servants. It is because

of you I am sitting in jail. If I did anything wrong by doing what

[G]od’s Bible says to do for your neighbor, then I guess I am

wrong. But if you go to the cops again Read your Bible & do me

a favor & take the Bible & this letter with you & tell the truth &

Please do yourself [a] favor also Don’t lie about me. Please do

me & my Dear wife a Bigger favor go to cops & have charges

dropped against me so [I] could be with my Dear Family for

Thanksgiving weekend for Big Dinner we will even invite you &

those 2 Boys over for Turkey Dinner. Please OK. We will also

give you more food for Boys & you. Thank you & may [G]od

Bless all of you.

Thanks neighbor

Dick Stough Jr. & wife Marie

for

45 years and we plan to be

together for 45 more years.

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P.S. also please Read in your

Bible & if you don't have a Bible

go over to our House and my Dear wife

will give you a Holy Bible to Read

Commonwealth Exhibit 6 (emphasis in original); N.T., 6/13/14, at 25, 56.

The trial court stated the following regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction of intimidation of a witness or

victim:

The above letter clearly does not threaten the victim, Ms.

Stambaugh, with bodily harm; however, a threat is not required

under the statute. Commonwealth Brachbill, 555 A.2d 82, 84-86

(Pa. 1989) (superseded by statute on other grounds).[2] As the

Brachbill Court noted, it was not the legislature’s intent to have

the word “intimidate” have its ordinary meaning.9 Id. at 85-86.

The legislature’s inclusion of subsection (b) clearly shows that

the word intimidate as used in the statute includes “any offers of

benefit with the intent to “obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or

interfere with the administration of criminal justice,” and that

such conduct would constitute a felony of the third degree.” Id.

at 86; see also Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). By

____________________________________________

2

The holding in Commonwealth Brachbill, 555 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1989), was

recently clarified in Commonwealth v. Doughty, 126 A.3d 951 (Pa. 2015).

The Doughty Court noted that Brachbill did not vitiate the need to prove

intimidation but stated, “Where Brachbill goes awry is in suggesting a

pecuniary benefit, in and of itself, comprises intimidation. Such an

inducement may or may not intimidate, but the legislature replaced the

element of inducement with the element of intimidation.” Doughty, 126

A.3d at 957. Our Supreme Court explained that, “[w]hether an offer of a

pecuniary or other benefit contains sufficient indicia of intimidation is to be

determined by the fact finder and assessed under the totality of the

circumstances, cognizant that proof of manifest threats is not required.” Id.

Finally, the Doughty Court admonished, “Insofar as Brachbill is read to

mean pecuniary inducement alone will suffice without proof of intimidation,

it is disapproved.” Id. (emphasis added). Herein, the trial court’s analysis

comports with the Doughty clarification.

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the Appellant’s own admission he had the required intent. He

testified that he wrote the letter from prison “Because I wanted

her to drop the charges . . . Because was not guilty of it.” N.T.

6/13/2014 at 60. In an effort to get the victim to drop the

charges, the Appellant offered her a benefit—food. Id. at 61.

9

Typical synonyms for “intimidate” include: frighten,

scare, coerce, bully, and threaten.

Although food may not be the customary way of

intimidating a victim, it is offering the victim a benefit in return

for dropping the charges. The Appellant argues that the offer of

food was a “de minimus pecuniary gain” and is therefore not

“sufficient to trigger culpability under the intimidation of witness

statute.” Def. 1925(b), 2/9/2015. We do not agree. First, the

statute does not limit itself to only pecuniary, or financial, gain;

it also includes other benefits. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 4952(b)(1)(ii).

Further, as previously stated, 4952(b)(1)(ii) does require any

level of pecuniary gain or benefit—it qualifies both pecuniary

gain and other benefit with the word “any.” In our mind this

means that even the slightest benefit, financial or otherwise,

would be enough to trigger culpability as long as the requisite

intent was present.

Therefore, we believe the Commonwealth did present

sufficient evidence to prove that the Appellant intended to offer

the victim a benefit in order to get her to drop the charges

against him, which would have prevented or interfered with the

administration of justice.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/15, at 12–13.

All that was required here was an attempt to intimidate.3

Commonwealth v. Doughty, 126 A.3d 951 (Pa. 2015) (holding evidence

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3

In addition, in Commonwealth v. Felder, 75 A.3d 513 (Pa. Super.

2013), this Court explained that the grading of the crime of intimidation of a

witness is based upon the highest degree of the offense charged in the case.

Id. at 517. Instantly, the court convicted Appellant under section 18 Pa.C.S.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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was sufficient to support conviction of intimidation of spouse-witness where

defendant told wife not to testify, and if she failed to do so, he would go to

jail for two years, starve, and lose everything); Commonwealth v. Lynch,

72 A.3d 706, 711 (Pa. Super. 2013) (sufficient evidence supported

intimidation-of-witness conviction where defendant “sought to frustrate the

administration of justice by offering to give the Commonwealth’s chief

witness pecuniary and other benefits if she agreed to refrain from testifying

against him.”). Here, Appellant admonished the victim, “It is because of you

I am sitting in jail,” and he instructed her to go to the police and drop the

charges so that he could get out of jail and enjoy Thanksgiving dinner with

his family. Commonwealth Exhibit 6 (emphasis in original); N.T., 6/13/14,

at 25, 56. The trier of fact could find that Appellant attempted to intimidate

his accuser, Ms. Stambaugh, and that he did so intending “or, at least,

having knowledge that his conduct was likely to, impede, impair or interfere

with the administration of criminal justice.” Commonwealth v. Collington,

615 A.2d 769, 770 (Pa. Super. 1992). This issue lacks merit.

We have independently reviewed the record in order to determine if

counsel’s assessment about the frivolity of the present appeal is correct.

See Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(after determining that counsel has satisfied the technical requirements of

_______________________

(Footnote Continued)

§ 4952, graded as a third-degree felony. Thus, the grading of his offense

also complied with the rule announced in Felder.

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Anders and Santiago, this Court must conduct an independent review of

the record to determine if there are additional, non-frivolous issues

overlooked by counsel). After review of the issues raised by counsel and our

independent review of the record, we conclude that an appeal in this matter

is frivolous. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm

the judgment of sentence.

Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of sentence

affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2016

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