defining interrogation in Miranda context
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- defining interrogation in Miranda context
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The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4278
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAROD A. BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cr-01096-PMD-1)
Submitted: December 21, 2015 Decided: January 5, 2016
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher L. Murphy, MURPHY LAW OFFICES, LLC, Mt. Pleasant,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Nick Bianchi, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jarod A. Brown appeals his conviction and 180-month
sentence imposed following his conditional guilty plea to
possession of firearms by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012). On appeal, Brown raises
several challenges to the district court’s denial of his
suppression motion and argues that the district court erred in
declining to sentence him below the statutory minimum. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
In evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal determinations de novo. United States v. Green, 740 F.3d
275, 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 207 (2014). We
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, the prevailing party. United States v. Davis, 690
F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012). Generally, we “defer to a
district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role
of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their
credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United
States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Brown first asserts that his initial incriminating
statement to officers, made during his arrest, was taken in
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violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Our
review of the record reveals no clear error in the district
court’s finding that Brown’s statement was a spontaneous
utterance not prompted by custodial interrogation. See Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-31 (1980) (defining
interrogation in Miranda context).
Brown also argues that his incriminating statements were
involuntary because they were made in response to officers’
threats that his loved ones would be sent to jail and that a
baby present during his arrest would be taken into the custody
of the Department of Social Services. We find no clear error in
the district court’s finding that officers never made such
statements.
Brown next asserts that the district court should have
found that the officers’ search exceeded the scope of the
consent they were given to search for Brown and his clothing in
his girlfriend’s home. Because Brown did not raise this
challenge in the district court, we review the issue for plain
error. United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 509 (4th Cir.
2013); see Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27
(2013) (defining plain error standard).
Given Brown’s testimony during the suppression hearing, it
is questionable, at best, whether Brown could establish the
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“legitimate expectation of privacy” in his girlfriend’s
apartment needed to demonstrate standing to challenge its
search. United State v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir.
2007); see United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828, 846 (4th
Cir. 2013) (listing relevant factors). Additionally, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the
guns were found under the mattress on which Brown attempted to
hide, and they were discovered during the search for Brown’s
clothing. The district court committed no plain error in
declining to conclude, sua sponte, that the search exceeded the
scope of consent.
Brown also asserts that the district court erred in not
sentencing him below the statutory mandatory minimum established
by the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). We
review a sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness,
applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007). We review questions
of statutory interpretation related to the ACCA enhancement de
novo. United States v. Carr, 592 F.3d 636, 639 n.4 (4th Cir.
2010).
We find no error in Brown’s sentence. Because the
Government did not move for a substantial assistance departure
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012), and the safety valve
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provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012) did not apply, the court
was not authorized to sentence Brown below the statutory
minimum. United States v. Allen, 450 F.3d 565, 568 (4th Cir.
2006). While Brown cites the recent decision in Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2010), that case has no impact
on Brown’s predicate serious drug offenses, which we previously
affirmed as valid ACCA predicates. See United States v. Brown,
494 F. App’x 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-4073); see also
United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283-84 (4th Cir. 2012)
(addressing mandate rule in sentencing context). Finally,
although Brown claims that the Sentencing Commission exercises
an excessive delegation of lawmaking authority that violates the
separation of powers principle, Brown’s sentence resulted from a
statutory floor established by Congress itself.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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