In the Matter of the New Jersey Firemen's Association

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2810-13T2

IN THE MATTER OF THE NEW

JERSEY FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION

OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE RELIEF APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

APPLICATIONS UNDER THE OPEN

PUBLIC RECORDS ACT December 18, 2015

___________________________________

APPELLATE DIVISION

JEFF CARTER,

Third-Party

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN DOE,

Third-Party Defendant.

___________________________________

Argued June 2, 2015 – Decided December 18, 2015

Before Judges Messano, Ostrer and Tassini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New

Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket

No. L-2932-13.

Jeff Carter, appellant pro se.

John C. Gillespie argued the cause for

respondent New Jersey State Firemen's

Association (Parker McCay P.A., attorneys;

George M. Morris, of counsel; Stacy L.

Moore, Jr., on the brief).

Thomas J. Cafferty argued the cause for

amicus curiae New Jersey Press Association

(Gibbons P.C., attorneys; Mr. Cafferty, of

counsel and on the brief; Nomi I. Lowy and

Lauren E. James-Weir, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OSTRER, J.A.D.

This appeal involves the Open Public Records Act (OPRA),

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA),

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to -62, and records of the New Jersey State

Firemen's Association (Association), a public agency under OPRA.

See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. We must resolve two principal issues

affecting the public's right to access government records.

First, we must decide, as a procedural matter, whether a

government records custodian — in this case, the Association —

may bring an action pursuant to the DJA to secure a declaratory

judgment that it properly denied access to a record under OPRA

and the common law right of access. With respect to OPRA, we

conclude that a records custodian may not bring a declaratory

judgment action against a record requestor to enforce its right

to withhold records, because OPRA does not provide the records

custodian an independent right of action. As to both OPRA and

the common law, declaratory relief was inappropriate in this

case because the declaratory judgment action was essentially an

effort to preempt an imminent claim by the records requestor;

and allowing a declaratory judgment action solely with respect

to the common law would unnecessarily fragment claims.

2 A-2810-13T2

Second, we are asked to determine, as a substantive matter,

whether the requestor in this case, under OPRA or the common

law, has a right to access records pertaining to a relief award

made by the Association. We conclude that both OPRA and the

common law require disclosure of documents containing the name

of the applicant and the amount of the award.

I.

This dispute arose out of the records request of defendant

Jeff Carter.1 On July 15, 2013, Carter electronically filed a

request, under OPRA and the common law, for records pertaining

to an application for relief by John Doe,2 a man associated with

the Millstone Valley Fire Department. Carter sought the

following documents:

1. Copies of record(s) (including

attachments) submitted by [John Doe],

Local 501 agent(s), and/or NJSFA

agent(s) seeking financial benefits

described in the "BACKGROUND" section

above from January 1, 2008 through July

15, 2013.

1

The Association improperly captioned its verified complaint for

declaratory judgment against Jeff Carter as "In the Matter of

the New Jersey State Firemen's Association Obligation to Provide

Relief Applications Under the Open Public Records Act." See R.

1:4-1 (stating that the title of a complaint shall include the

names of all parties).

2

Although the records request identified the person by name, the

name is redacted in the public record on appeal.

3 A-2810-13T2

2. Copies of record(s) (including

attachments) sent to [John Doe], Local

501 agent(s), and/or NJSFA agent(s)

disbursing financial benefits described

in the "BACKGROUND" section above from

January 1, 2008 through July 15, 2013.

3. If no record(s) are responsive to Items

No. 1 or 2 above, then copies of the

front and back of every check providing

relief and/or similar benefits, both

State and Local, paid to [John Doe]

between January 1, 2008 through July

15, 2013. (Note that checks are not

required if responsive records are

provided for Items No. 1 and 2 above.)

Association vice president Fred Gunson denied Carter's

request in a July 22, 2013 email. Gunson stated that applicants

for relief through a local firemen's relief association or the

Association "have a reasonable expectation of privacy"; release

would constitute an "unwarranted invasion" of those rights; and

"[a]ccordingly, the New Jersey State Firemen's Association

cannot release those documents."

On August 3, 2013, Carter responded that he did "not seek

any legitimately defined privileged or exempt information," but

he insisted that "certain records regarding financial matters

(e.g., payroll records) must be provided with appropriate

redactions." He asked for an index of any withheld or redacted

documents, with explanations. Carter also stated, "Because I

was unable to respond sooner, I understand that the timeframe

4 A-2810-13T2

for my original request will resume on the next business day

(i.e. August 5, 2013)."

Carter included an additional document request. He sought

"a copy of the policy and/or procedures governing how 'relief'

applications/requests are processed by the State and local

associations."

On August 15, 2013, the Association filed its verified

complaint for declaratory judgment, along with a proposed order

to show cause, to compel Carter to show cause why the final

relief sought in the verified complaint should not be entered.

Although served only upon Carter, the Association sought an

order:

a. Declaring that individual relief

applications are of such a private

nature that the New Jersey State

Firemen's Association or the local

relief association shall be prevented

from acknowledging the existence of

individual applications and prohibited

from releasing the same under . . . the

Open Public Records Act;

b. Declaring that a Requestor, in order to

determine whether the New Jersey State

Firemen's Association or the local

relief association is performing its

duties appropriately, may request a

series or date range of applications,

but said applications may only be

released upon the redaction of all

personal information including the

requestors' names, addresses, account

numbers.

5 A-2810-13T2

The Association sought identical relief with respect to the

common law right of access.

The Association argued that under OPRA the information

Carter requested should not be subject to disclosure under OPRA

because it would violate an applicant's reasonable expectation

of privacy under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. The Association asserted

that upon applying the factors in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88

(1995), disclosure of applicant-specific documents should be

denied.

The Association disclosed documents entitled "Rules and

Guidelines Governing Relief Form 101"; "Instruction for

Investigation of Relief Applicants by Local Relief Boards";

"Application for Local Relief [-] New Jersey State Firemen's

Association"; and "Instructions for the Board of Trustees and

Board of Representatives for Review of Relief Application."

Although there is no competent evidence before us authenticating

or explaining the documents, we assume for the sake of the

appeal that the Association uses these documents when reviewing

applications for relief.3

3

The documents were attached as exhibits to the Association's

brief, contrary to R. 1:6-6. See Pressler & Verniero, Current

N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 1:6-6 (2015); Sellers v.

Schonfeld, 270 N.J. Super. 424, 427 (1993) ("[O]nly [an]

affidavit together with properly certified depositions, answers

(continued)

6 A-2810-13T2

The application forms generally require the submission of

detailed personal financial information, and a personal

statement of the applicant, to demonstrate the need for

financial assistance from a local association or the

Association. The "Rules and Guidelines" document, and the

respective instructions to the apparent decision-makers, do not

include detailed criteria for determining whether to award

relief and for what amount. The "Rules and Guidelines" document

describes the information applicants must submit. It states,

"Relief Assistance is not automatic and will only be considered

on merit, documentation and determination by the local

association." The instructions to the local relief boards

state:

The intended use of this form, is to provide

the respective boards with information

pertaining to the applicant's request for

supplementary financial assistance, and in

determining the "NEED."

WHAT IS "NEED"

"NEED" IS: Imperative Demand ***** Time of

great difficulty ***** Crisis ***** Urgency

"NEED" is a state of circumstances requiring

something!

(continued)

to interrogatories, or admissions can supply facts outside the

record that are not judicially noticeable.").

7 A-2810-13T2

It is important to remember, while a

financial loss may be shown, there may not

be the "NEED." "NEED" and financial loss do

not necessarily go hand in hand. (Example:

The person may have a financial loss, but

have financial means and can afford to cover

the financial loss without the use of local

relief, thus no "NEED" would then exist.

Apparently, there are other rules or regulations not in the

record before us, as the "Rules and Guidelines" document

includes a paragraph authorizing and consenting to the release

of financial documents to the local association and the

Association "for the purpose of determining eligibility for

relief benefits . . . in accordance with the requirements of

N.J.S.A. 43:17-24 and Article VII of the General Relief Fund

Rules." (emphasis added).

The documents indicate that the application process is

intended to be confidential. The instructions to local relief

boards include the statement: "All information given must be

held in strict confidence." The Rules and Guidelines Document

states, "The New Jersey State Firemen's Association is required

to protect the confidentiality of information. All Officers are

required to comply with our policies."

The trial court entered the order to show cause, required

Carter to file a response to the order by September 16, 2013,

and set a return date of September 27, 2013. The order also

8 A-2810-13T2

advised Carter that he was required to answer the verified

complaint within thirty-five days.

Carter retained counsel and timely filed a verified answer

and counterclaim, a third-party complaint against John Doe, and

a letter brief in opposition to the Association's application

for declaratory relief. Carter narrowed his document request,

stating he only sought disclosure of the checks paid to John Doe

and did not seek the applications Doe may have filed. He argued

he was entitled to the checks under both OPRA and the common

law. He sought dismissal of the Association's verified

complaint and an award of attorney's fees.

In a supporting certification, Carter asserted that John

Doe served as an elected fire commissioner and volunteer

firefighter in Franklin Township. Carter stated that Doe was

also a full-time municipal employee.4 Carter alleged that John

Doe was found to have viewed pornographic images on a fire

district computer. Although criminal charges were filed, a

grand jury returned a no-bill, according to Carter. However,

Doe was later discharged from his public employment for conduct

unbecoming of a township employee. Carter attached newspaper

articles to support his assertions. Carter also discussed a

4

Carter apparently served as elected fire commissioner from 1987

through 1997.

9 A-2810-13T2

suit, filed by his sister and later settled, alleging a

violation of the Law Against Discrimination by the fire district

and Doe. Carter maintained that there was a public interest in

learning whether a person who was discharged under the

circumstances Carter described had received financial assistance

through the Association. He disputed the Association's claim

that Doe in particular had an expectation of privacy, given past

publicity.

In a responsive certification, Gunson explained that

members are often eligible for financial assistance from local

associations; and if this assistance "is not adequate to address

that member's needs, the member can then approach the . . .

Association, which can award up[] to three (3) times the amount

of the local contribution." Gunson did not disclose the

criteria utilized for the financial assistance decisions, nor

did he disclose the rules or regulations governing the decision

process. However, he stated that the Association and local

associations have specific procedures to treat members'

applications anonymously, eliminating the possibility of

discrimination in responding to the request for financial

relief. These procedures include converting the applicant's

name to a control number.

10 A-2810-13T2

In its answer to Carter's counterclaim, the Association

asserted, among other defenses, that Carter's counterclaim was

time-barred as it was filed more than forty-five days after the

Association's denial of his document request.

The trial court heard argument on the return date in

September 2013. The court also reviewed in camera Doe's

application for assistance, which apparently had been submitted

to the court in August, but was later sealed.

In an order filed January 15, 2014, the court denied

Carter's requests for dismissal of the verified complaint,

disclosure of the checks paid to Doe, and attorney's fees. The

court did not enter a separate order granting declaratory relief

to the Association. However, in an accompanying letter opinion,

the court found that the names of relief recipients, the amounts

paid through the Association's financial assistance programs,

and their applications need not be released.

The court addressed the subject of applications,

notwithstanding that Carter had limited his request to checks

paid to John Doe and expressly stated he was not seeking

information in the relief applications. The court applied the

seven factors outlined in Doe, supra:

(1) the type of record requested; (2) the

information it does or might contain; (3)

the potential for harm in any subsequent

nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury

11 A-2810-13T2

from disclosure to the relationship in which

the record was generated; (5) the adequacy

of safeguards to prevent unauthorized

disclosure; (6) the degree of need for

access; and (7) whether there is an express

statutory mandate, articulated public

policy, or other recognized public interest

militating toward access.

[142 N.J. at 88 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).]

Based on that analysis, the court held that OPRA's privacy

clause, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, barred release:

Applying the Doe factors to the present

case, the application is a public record as

a document kept, made or maintained in the

course of official business of the

Association. The second factor weighs in

favor of non-disclosure because the

information is an individual's complete and

personal financial history, including but

not limited to tax returns, credit card

bills, mortgage payments and, hospital

bills. Applying the third factor, revealing

this information has the potential to lead

to great harm created by the release of said

information because it has the potential to

lead to identity theft and public

embarrassment. Defendant's argument that

John Doe has already sustained great public

embarrassment is not without merit being

that the incident for which he was fired was

disclosed in the newspaper. A significant

harm exists if individual relief

applications are released. Applying the

fourth factor, the release of the

information may cause an applicant to

hesitate before [he or she] seeks assistance

and may chill the disclosure of critical

information regarding the need for

assistance for fear that the knowledge will

be subject to public scrutiny. The fifth

factor, speaks to the adequacy of safeguards

12 A-2810-13T2

to prevent disclosure. The Association has

established a system to convert the

individual's name into a unique

identification number for each applicant to

ensure the confidentiality of the

information and to protect the interests of

the applicant. While the Association has

not directed this Court towards a statute

mandating non-disclosure the seventh factor

weighs in favor of non-disclosure because

there is no policy or statute which mandates

access.

Citing Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986), the

trial court concluded that the common law did not require

disclosure.

This appeal followed. Carter now represents himself pro

se. He renews his argument that the Association should not have

been permitted to seek a declaratory judgment. Although he

limited his request before the trial court to the checks paid to

John Doe, he now renews his request for John Doe's applications,

redacted as appropriate. We subsequently granted permission to

the New Jersey Press Association (NJPA) to appear as amicus

curiae. NJPA participates solely to argue that a records

custodian may not seek a declaratory judgment under OPRA.

II.

We turn first to defendant's argument that the Association

was not entitled to seek a declaratory judgment confirming its

denial of access under both OPRA and the common law right of

13 A-2810-13T2

access. We begin with an overview of the law on declaratory

judgments.

A.

The DJA is based on the 1922 Uniform Declaratory Judgments

Act. 12 U.L.A. 331 (2008). The DJA provides that "a person

. . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are

affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of

construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . .

and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal

relations thereunder." N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53. See Williams v.

Borough of Clayton, ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2015)

(slip op. at 10-11) (approving resort to declaratory relief

regarding interpretation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-129 and -130). The

purpose of the Act "is to settle and afford relief from

uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and

other legal relations." N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51; N.J. Ass'n for

Retarded Citizens v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 89 N.J. 234,

242 (1982) ("[The purpose of the Act] is to end uncertainty

about the legal rights and duties of the parties to litigation

in controversies which have not yet reached the stage at which

the parties seek a coercive remedy.")

The DJA constitutes "remedial legislation entitled to

liberal construction and administration." N.J. Ass'n for

14 A-2810-13T2

Retarded Citizens, supra, 89 N.J. at 241-42; N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.

The DJA must be "interpreted and construed as to effectuate its

general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which

enact it, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal

laws, rules and regulations on the subject of declaratory

judgments." N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.

The decision to grant or deny declaratory relief lies

within the court's discretion. See In re Resolution of State

Comm. of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35, 46 (1987); see also State

v. Eatontown Borough, 366 N.J. Super. 626, 637 (App. Div. 2004)

("Generally, it rests in the sound discretion of the trial court

whether declaratory relief under the Act should be granted.").

"Declaratory relief is not to be denied simply because other

relief is available." Nat'l – Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v.

Camden Trust Co., 21 N.J. 16, 22 (1956); see also R. 4:42-3 ("A

judgment for declaratory relief, if appropriate, is not

precluded by the existence of another appropriate remedy.").

On the other hand, "a court might in the proper exercise of

its discretion, deny such [declaratory] relief if it

satisfactorily appeared that the other relief would be more

effective." Nat'l – Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co., supra, 21 N.J.

at 22. For example, a court may decline to award relief "where

only fragmentary redress will be awarded . . . ." Utility Blade

15 A-2810-13T2

& Razor Co. v. Donovan, 33 N.J. Super. 566, 572 (App. Div.

1955). "The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory

judgment, when, if rendered or entered, it would not terminate

the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-61; see also Nat'l – Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co.,

supra, 21 N.J. at 23. A court may also decline to render a

declaratory judgment if "convinced that the public interest and

an enlightened use of the judicial function" require restraint.

The Proprietary Ass'n v. Bd. of Pharmacy, 16 N.J. 62, 71 (1954).

The right to relief under the DJA is procedural in nature;

it does not create substantive rights to relief. "A declaratory

judgment act merely provides a procedural device to accelerate

the resolution of a dispute; the procedural right does not alter

the substance of the dispute." Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 149 N.J. 278, 302 (1997) (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see

Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 25

N.J. Tax 607, 621 (2011). The United States Supreme Court has

adopted a similar view of the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,

26 U.S.C.A. § 2201. See Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677,

80 S. Ct. 1288, 1296, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1478, 1485-86 (1960) (stating

that the availability of relief under the federal Declaratory

Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, "presupposes the existence of

a judicially remediable right"); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips

16 A-2810-13T2

Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S. Ct. 876, 879, 94 L. Ed.

1194, 1199 (1950) ("The operation of the Declaratory Judgment

Act is procedural only. Congress enlarged the range of remedies

available in the federal courts but did not extend their

jurisdiction.") (citation omitted).

Put another way, if there is no private right of action

under a particular statute, a party may not secure a declaration

of its statutory rights by seeking relief under the DJA. This

general principle is implied by the Court's decision in In re

Resolution of State Comm. of Investigation, supra, 108 N.J. at

46. The Court declined to render a declaratory judgment on the

question whether the State Commission on Investigation (SCI)

unlawfully disclosed information about the plaintiffs. The

Court held that plaintiffs lacked a private right of action to

secure injunctive relief against the SCI arising out of the

alleged disclosures. Ibid. ("[O]ur decision that the plaintiffs

may not obtain the injunctive relief they sought undermines

their need for a declaratory judgment."); see also In re A.N.,

430 N.J. Super. 235, 244-45 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that the

Chancery Division lacked jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-55 to

determine Medicaid eligibility, where the authority to do so was

vested in the Division of Medical Assistance and Health

Services); Med. Soc. of N.J. v. AmeriHealth HMO, Inc., 376 N.J.

17 A-2810-13T2

Super. 48, 59 (App. Div. 2005) (denying Medical Society's claim

for declaratory and injunctive relief under L. 1989, c. 154, as

it lacked a private right of action).5

Courts in other jurisdictions applying comparable

provisions of their declaratory judgment acts have clearly

stated the principle that declaratory relief is unavailable when

there is no private right of action. See Pono v. Molokai Ranch,

Ltd., 194 P.3d 1126, 1148 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008) ("[I]n order for

a private citizen to seek a declaratory judgment that a statute

has been violated, the private citizen must, as a threshold

matter, have a private right of action to enforce the

statute."), certif. denied, 208 Haw. LEXIS 304 (2008); Gore v.

Indiana Ins. Co., 876 N.E.2d 156, 165-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)

(finding plaintiff lacked standing to bring declaratory judgment

action because statute at issue did not confer private right of

action); Nichols v. Kansas PAC, 11 P.3d 1134, 1146-47 (Kan.

2000) (refusing to grant declaratory relief under consumer fraud

5

Bergen Cty. Improvement Auth. v. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc.,

370 N.J. Super. 504 (App. Div. 2004), cited by the Association,

does not support the contrary view. Although the plaintiff in

that case sought declaratory relief, the court did not address

the issue of the plaintiff's right to do so. In Chamber of

Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131 (1982), and N.L. Industries,

Inc., v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 397

N.J. Super. 127 (App. Div. 2007), certif. denied, 195 N.J. 418

(2008), cited in the concurring opinion, infra, the parties did

not raise, nor did the court address, the plaintiff's right of

action, express or implied, under the statute at issue.

18 A-2810-13T2

statute because it contained no private right of action);

Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905,

916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that where "there was no

private right to enforce" the statute, the "Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act cannot create a cause of action that does not

otherwise exist"); Delgado v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 888 N.Y.S.2d

19, 21 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that petitioners did not

possess "a private right of action for injunctive and

declaratory relief sought" because only the city's housing

official could enforce the city's housing maintenance code).

See also Boston Med. Ctr. v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of HHS,

974 N.E.2d 1114, 1134 (Mass. 2012) (where "the Legislature has

declined to give the plaintiff providers any private right of

action and what is at issue is the reasonableness . . . and the

methodology" of payment rates, "[a] declaratory judgment cannot

be used to circumvent a legislative judgment denying a provider

the opportunity to seek administrative or judicial review of the

reasonableness of payment rates.").6

6

Cf. Serv. Emp. Int'l. Union, Local 509 v. Dep't of Mental

Health, 14 N.E.3d 216, 227 (Mass. 2014) (citing Boston Med.

Ctr., supra, 974 N.E.2d at 1134) (confirming principle that

declaratory relief shall be denied in the absence of a private

right of action where Legislature intended to "foreclose certain

remedies," but awarding declaratory relief where a party

"suffered a cognizable injury," lacked other means to assure

agency's compliance with statute, "[n]o other party [was]

(continued)

19 A-2810-13T2

Federal courts applying the federal Declaratory Judgment

Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, likewise have determined that the

federal act does not provide a right to declaratory relief where

no private right of action exists. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm.,

Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (barring

declaratory relief because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic

Act did not provide plaintiff a private cause of action), cert.

denied, 537 U.S. 941, 123 S. Ct. 340, 154 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2002);

Dallas Cty. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 3d 938, 947 (N.D.Tex.

2014) ("[A] plaintiff may not obtain a declaratory judgment

under a statute . . . that provides no private right of

action."); Reid v. Aransas Cty., 805 F. Supp. 2d 322, 339

(S.D.Tex. 2011) (noting that because the federal act does not

create a substantive cause of action, but can only be invoked to

address a controversy arising under other substantive law,

plaintiff could not seek relief to which he would otherwise not

be entitled); Jones v. Hobbs, 745 F. Supp. 2d 886, 893 (E.D.Ark.

2010) ("[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act does not authorize

actions to decide whether federal statutes have been or will be

violated when no private right of action to enforce the statutes

(continued)

entitled to challenge the alleged violation," and denial of

declaratory relief would "contravene the Legislature's

intent.").

20 A-2810-13T2

has been created by Congress."); Glen v. Club Mediterranee S.A.,

365 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (S.D.Fla. 2005) ("[J]udicial review is

unavailable where no express provision for judicial relief

exists . . . . For this Court to create a private right of

action for declaratory relief [where none exists] would be

contrary to legislative intent."), aff’d, 450 F.3d 1251 (11th

Cir. 2006). We construe our DJA in harmony with the foregoing

state and federal decisions. See N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.

As the federal court in Jones observed, where enforcement

of a law is vested solely in the executive branch, allowing

declaratory relief "would circumvent the discretion entrusted to

the executive branch in deciding how and when to enforce those

statutes." Jones, supra, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 893. Likewise,

where no private right of action exists, allowing parties to

obtain declaratory relief would "evade the intent of Congress

not to create private rights of action." Ibid.

A related principle of the law of declaratory judgments is

that "where a special statutory procedure has been provided as

an exclusive remedy for a particular type of case in hand . . .

that specific recourse must be followed," to the exclusion of

declaratory relief. Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d

ed. 1941) at 342. "So, when the statute provides that an appeal

from an administrative determination may be taken only in a

21 A-2810-13T2

certain way and to a certain court . . . it would have been

wrong for another court . . . to interfere and entertain a suit

for a declaration . . . ." Id. at 343-44.

We adopt the same reasoning here. To do otherwise would

allow records custodians to evade the Legislature's intent with

respect to enforcement of rights under OPRA, which we discuss

below. We recognize that the phrase "private right of action"

may appear to be a misnomer when used to define the rights of

the Association, which is a public agency under OPRA. Yet, the

governing principle is the same. A party that lacks a statutory

right of action under OPRA may not obtain declaratory relief

regarding its rights or obligations under OPRA.

B.

We conclude that OPRA does not vest a right of action in a

records custodian. Consequently, a records custodian has no

right to declaratory relief. Put another way, the Legislature

intended that only requestors may seek review of OPRA decisions,

by resort to the Government Records Council (GRC) or the court.

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

OPRA expressly grants a right of action exclusively to

requestors. A requestor may elect to bring an action in

Superior Court, or before the GRC, to challenge a denial of

access:

22 A-2810-13T2

A person who is denied access to a

government record by the custodian of the

record, at the option of the requestor, may:

institute a proceeding to challenge the

custodian's decision by filing an action in

Superior Court which shall be heard in the

vicinage where it is filed by a Superior

Court Judge who has been designated to hear

such cases because of that judge's knowledge

and expertise in matters relating to access

to government records; or

in lieu of filing an action in Superior

Court, file a complaint with the Government

Records Council established pursuant to

section 8 of P.L. 2001, c. 404 (C. 47:1A-7).

The right to institute any proceeding under

this section shall be solely that of the

requestor. Any such proceeding shall

proceed in a summary or expedited manner.

The public agency shall have the burden of

proving that the denial of access is

authorized by law. If it is determined that

access has been improperly denied, the court

or agency head shall order that access be

allowed. A requestor who prevails in any

proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable

attorney's fee.

[N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 (emphasis added).]

Even assuming for argument's sake that N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6

does not grant a right of action exclusively to a requestor,7

any other party's right of action would have to be inferred,

given the absence of an explicit grant. However, our courts

7

The Association argues that the right "solely" granted the

requestor is the right to commence "proceedings under this

section," which the Association contends is limited to

challenges by a requestor denied access.

23 A-2810-13T2

"have been reluctant to infer a statutory private right of

action where the Legislature has not expressly provided for such

action." R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Nat'l Consumer Ins.

Co., 168 N.J. 255, 271 (2001). The Court has adopted a three-

part test for determining whether a statute implies a private

right of action:

To determine if a statute confers an implied

private right of action, courts consider

whether: (1) plaintiff is a member of the

class for whose special benefit the statute

was enacted; (2) there is any evidence that

the Legislature intended to create a private

right of action under the statute; and (3)

it is consistent with the underlying

purposes of the legislative scheme to infer

the existence of such a remedy.

[Id. at 272.]

A court's primary mission is to determine legislative intent.

Id. at 272-73.

Applying this test, we conclude the Legislature did not

intend for records custodians to bring actions against record

requestors to enforce their asserted right to withhold records.

OPRA was enacted to promote the public's right of access to

government records, and to enable the public to monitor the

activities of government. See, e.g., Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J.

Dep't of Educ., 198 N.J. 274, 284 (2009) ("OPRA's clear purpose

. . . is 'to maximize public knowledge about public affairs in

order to ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils

24 A-2810-13T2

inherent in a secluded process.'") (quoting Mason v. City of

Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008)). Having reviewed OPRA's

legislative history, we find no evidence of legislative intent

to grant a right of action to records custodians. OPRA provides

a broad right of access to government records. The statute

"shall be construed in favor of the public's right of access."

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.

Recognizing such a right of action would be contrary to

legislative design. A right of action would enable records

custodians to hale into court requestors who have no interest in

pursuing any review of a records custodian's denial, subjecting

requestors to the emotional turmoil and burdens attendant to

being sued. Such a right of action would also undermine

requestors' express right under OPRA to choose whether to

challenge the denial of access before the GRC or in court, by

empowering records custodians to choose the forum. Just the

threat of suit may deter some citizens from exercising their

rights under OPRA.

C.

Although the foregoing analysis does not address the right

to declaratory relief regarding the Association's obligations

under the common law right of access, we conclude that such

25 A-2810-13T2

relief would have been inappropriate in this case. We do so for

two reasons.

First, the Association's evident intent was to preempt an

action by Carter. We long ago held that judicial discretion to

grant relief under the declaratory judgment statute should be

withheld from a party whose clear purpose was "to have the court

adjudicate in advance the validity of its possible defense to

defendants' imminent law suit." Rego Indus., Inc. v. Am. Modern

Metals Corp., 91 N.J. Super. 447, 453 (App. Div. 1966); see also

Donadio v. Cunningham, 58 N.J. 309, 325 (1971) (stating that

"relief by way of a declaratory judgment should be withheld,

when the request is in effect an attempt to have the court

adjudicate in advance the validity of a possible defense in some

expected future law suit"); Utility Blade & Razor, supra, 31

N.J. Super. at 572-73 ("In the usual case where an action by one

party is imminent, it would serve no sensible purpose to permit

his adversary to sue first for a declaration that he has a good

defense to the action.").8

8

We recognize that where a lawsuit is not imminent, but the

parties' rights and responsibilities in an ongoing relationship

are subject to uncertainty, declaratory relief may be

appropriate, as was found in Utility Blade & Razor, supra, 33

N.J. Super. at 573 ("On the other hand, under some

circumstances, if the suit is not imminent and the declaratory

proceeding will relieve a party of a burden and would seem -- in

any event, through the interposition of a counterclaim -- to

(continued)

26 A-2810-13T2

Second, allowing a declaratory judgment action to proceed

to clarify duties under the common law right of access, when

relief under OPRA is precluded, would result in "fragmentary

redress." Id. at 571. As noted above, a court is empowered to

refuse declaratory relief when it "would not terminate the

uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-61.9

In sum, we conclude that the court erred in granting the

Association declaratory relief.

III.

We turn to the issue whether Carter was entitled under OPRA

to obtain access to records of relief payments to John Doe. 10

(continued)

settle the entire controversy, it may be unjust not to permit

him to sue immediately to free himself of liability.").

9

We also note that the Association's request for declaratory

relief, and the court's declaration, were overly broad. The

relief sought and granted pertained not just to Carter, but any

prospective requestor of relief applications and payments. Yet,

only Carter was named and served. "When declaratory relief is

sought, all persons having . . . any interest which would be

affected by the declaration shall be made parties to the

proceeding." N.J.S.A. 2A:16-56. "The court cannot adjudicate

the rights of parties who are not before the court." Gotlib v.

Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 313 (App. Div. 2008).

10

We decline to address Carter's additional requests because he

abandoned those in his brief to the trial court. "[O]ur

appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues

not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity

for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so

(continued)

27 A-2810-13T2

Before doing so, we review briefly the role of the Association

and local relief associations.

A.

We have previously discussed at some length the history of

the Association, the local relief associations, and their

statutory authority to grant relief payments and burial benefits

to their members and members' families. Paff v. N.J. State

Firemen's Ass'n, 431 N.J. Super. 278 (App. Div. 2013). Among

their purposes, local relief associations shall

maintain a fund for the relief, support or

burial of:

(1) needy firefighters and their families;

(2) any persons and the families of any

persons who are injured or die in the course

of doing public fire duty, or who may become

needy or disabled or die as the result of

doing such duty or be prevented by the

injury or by illness arising from doing such

duty, from attending to their usual

occupation or calling; and

(continued)

raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or

concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal

Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). However, we note that Executive

Order 26 (McGreevey), issued pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1,

exempts from disclosure under OPRA "[i]nformation describing a

natural person's finances, income, assets, liabilities, net

worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or

creditworthiness, except as otherwise required by law to be

disclosed." Ibid. The Order also exempts "information related

to medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis,

treatment or evaluation . . . ." Ibid.

28 A-2810-13T2

(3) the families of any persons doing

public fire duty who die as the result of an

act of terrorism committed against the

United States of America while such persons

were serving as federal, State or local law

enforcement officers.

[N.J.S.A. 43:17-3.]

The Association "shall have the same rights, powers and

privileges as the local firemen's relief associations, including

providing for the distribution of any fund for the relief of

disabled or needy firefighters and their families." N.J.S.A.

43:17-41.

Awards of relief shall be made pursuant to rules and

regulations adopted by the Association. N.J.S.A. 43:17-3(c)

("The relief, support or burial benefit shall be granted in

accordance with the rules and regulations adopted by the New

Jersey State Firemen's Association."); see also N.J.S.A. 43:17-

24, -35. However, the Association's rules and regulations have

not been promulgated with notice and allowing comment. See N.J.

Const., Art. V, § 4, para. 6; N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4.

The statute also authorizes consideration of why a person

is in need.

No person shall be given assistance if the

cause of the need or the reason for the

disability or the nature or cause of the

injury or sickness is not in the opinion of

the board of representatives such as to

entitle the applicant to assistance, or if

29 A-2810-13T2

the applicant is deemed financially unworthy

of assistance.

[N.J.S.A. 43:17-24.]

The Department of Banking and Insurance (DOBI) requires

local relief associations to file annual reports including the

names of relief beneficiaries and the amounts paid.11 The

applicable regulations provide:

(a) All local relief associations shall

file with the Commissioner, the Secretary of

State, and the secretary of the State

Association, no later than April 1 of each

year, a sworn statement, which shall contain

the following information:

1. The names of its representatives,

visitors or trustees and other officers,

with the amount of their respective fees or

salaries, if any;

2. The names of its beneficiaries during or

within the year next preceding the

statement;

3. The amount of money paid to each

beneficiary; . . . .

[N.J.A.C. 11:1-38.3.]

The regulations do not expressly require a similar report

by the Association, notwithstanding that it has the power,

comparable to the local associations, to award relief benefits.

11

The Association and local associations are funded through a

tax on fire insurance premiums of insurers not organized under

New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 54:18-1, -2; and fire insurance

premiums of surplus lines fire insurers, N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.59.

30 A-2810-13T2

B.

The issue presented is whether the payment records are

shielded by OPRA's "privacy clause," which states: "[A] public

agency has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguard from

public access a citizen's personal information with which it has

been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the

citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy . . . ." N.J.S.A.

47:1A-1. We have previously determined that the Association is

a public agency subject to OPRA. Paff, supra, 431 N.J. Super.

at 279. Also, it is undisputed that relief payment records are

government records. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Although numerous

categories of documents are exempt from the definition of

government records, see Educ. Law Ctr., supra, 198 N.J. at 284

("OPRA excludes twenty-one categories of information, making the

public right of access not absolute.") (citation omitted), none

of the exemptions apply here. Furthermore, the Association does

not invoke any regulation or executive order that arguably

removes the payment records from the scope of its disclosure

obligations under OPRA.12

12

In particular, we note that an agency may exempt certain

documents by regulation authorized by law. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1

(stating that public agencies may exempt documents from

disclosure by "regulation promulgated under the authority of any

statute or Executive Order of the Governor"). The exemption

power is not "unlimited" and must "be exercised only when

(continued)

31 A-2810-13T2

The privacy clause is a substantive counterweight to the

right to access under OPRA. Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 198 N.J.

408, 422-23 (2009). Courts must balance OPRA's mandate of

disclosure with its protection of privacy. Id. at 425-26. To

do so, the Court determined it was appropriate to consider the

seven factors identified in Doe, supra:

(1) the type of record requested; (2) the

information it does or might contain; (3)

the potential for harm in any subsequent

nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury

from disclosure to the relationship in which

the record was generated; (5) the adequacy

of safeguards to prevent unauthorized

disclosure; (6) the degree of need for

access; and (7) whether there is an express

statutory mandate, articulated public

policy, or other recognized public interest

militating toward access.

[Id. at 427 (quoting Doe, supra, 142 N.J. at

88).]

(continued)

necessary for the protection of the public interest." Irval

Realty, Inc. v. Bd. of Public Util. Commrs., 61 N.J. 366, 374

(1972) (applying identical language in pre-OPRA Right to Know

Law). We express no opinion as to whether the Association,

pursuant to its power to adopt rules or regulations governing

the grant of relief, may exempt documents from OPRA. The

regulations are not before us, and have not been adopted

pursuant to public notice and comment under the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4; nor are they available

for public viewing in accord with the APA. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-

3(3).

32 A-2810-13T2

A court must engage in a case-specific analysis. Id. at 437

("This balancing of interests must be applied case by case, and

under different facts, another result might be proper.").

Although the trial court applied the Doe factors, we

consider them de novo. See K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd. of Educ.,

423 N.J. Super. 337, 349 (App. Div. 2011) (stating that an

appellate court exercises de novo review of a trial court

decision regarding whether OPRA requires disclosure of publicly

held records), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 108 (2012). In so

doing, we part company with the trial court, given its

determination that the privacy clause shields relief payment

records.

We consider together the first two factors — the record

type and information contained. Carter seeks copies of checks,

which would confirm the identity of a relief applicant, state

the amounts of relief received, and state when they were

received from a public agency empowered to make discretionary

relief decisions. However, if Carter is able to confirm that

Doe received relief, additional information may be inferred;

even without his application documents, Carter may infer that

Doe was in financial distress, although cause and extent were

not disclosed.

33 A-2810-13T2

Personal financial information in the possession of public

agencies — which is what Carter seeks — has not been treated

uniformly under OPRA and implementing regulations and executive

orders. OPRA exempts "the pension or personnel records of any

individual in the possession of a public agency" from the

definition of government records, but does not exempt a public

employee's "name, title, position, salary, payroll record,13

length of service, date of separation and the reason therefor,

and the amount and type of any pension received." N.J.S.A.

47:1A-10. Also, Executive Order No. 26 (McGreevey), ¶ 4(b)(3)

(2002) exempts "[i]nformation describing a natural person's

finances, income, assets, liabilities, net worth, bank balances,

financial history or activities, or creditworthiness, except as

otherwise required by law to be disclosed."14

13

Although "payroll record" is not defined in OPRA, it elsewhere

has been defined to include more than salary. For example, to

comply with The Unemployment Compensation Law, N.J.S.A. 43:21-1

to -24, and the Temporary Disability Benefits Law, N.J.S.A.

43:21-25 to -71, among others, employers must maintain "payroll

records" that include: "[t]otal remuneration paid in each pay

period showing separately cash, including commissions and

bonuses . . . gratuities received regularly . . . [and] special

payments, such as bonuses and gifts . . . ." N.J.A.C. 12:2

Appx. A; see also N.J.A.C. 12:16-2.1.

14

Also exempt is "[i]nformation relating to medical, psychiatric

or psychological history, diagnosis, treatment or evaluation."

Id. at ¶ 4(b)(1).

34 A-2810-13T2

None of these sources directly address Association relief

payments, although both parties seek support from N.J.S.A. 47:1-

10. The payments are not salary or remuneration for employment,

although they are a benefit for qualified firefighters —

including, notably, volunteer firefighters — in return for

service. Relief payments are discretionary, like bonuses and

gifts that are reported on payroll records, but relief

recipients are not on the Association's payroll. The

Association argues the payments should be withheld as a "pension

record" exempt under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10, and Carter argues the

payments should be disclosed as "the amount and type of any

pension received," which are not exempt under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10.

In our view, neither interpretation is correct.

Although one might argue that a relief award is

"information describing a natural person's . . . income" under

Executive Order No. 26,15 the Order was apparently intended to

address personal financial information that a citizen entrusts

to the government. See Executive Order No. 21 (McGreevey) ¶ 4

(which Executive Order No. 26 was intended to clarify). It was

not intended to bar release of records pertaining to outlays by

a public agency to a citizen. Further, any ambiguity in the

Executive Order should be resolved in favor of disclosure. See

15

We note that the Association has not presented this argument.

35 A-2810-13T2

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 ("[L]imitations on the right of access accorded

by [OPRA] . . . shall be construed in favor of the public's

right of access.").

Although the relief payments do not fall neatly into the

statutory categories found in N.J.S.A. 47:1-10, their similarity

to forms of payment that are subject to disclosure arguably

strengthens the case for access. However, there is an important

difference between relief awards and salary, pension payments,

or even bonuses and gifts reported in payroll records. Bonuses

are awarded generally for a job well done — which is unlikely to

embarrass the recipient. Relief benefits are awarded upon proof

that someone is in financial distress, which may subject the

recipient to embarrassment. A similar distinction can be drawn

between disability insurance payments, which the GRC has found

to be disclosable, see, e.g., Gordon v. City of Orange, GRC

Complaint No. 2013-255 (2014), and relief benefits. We conclude

factors one and two weigh slightly in favor of non-disclosure

based on this distinction between relief awards and other forms

of remuneration or compensation that are subject to disclosure

under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10.

Doe factors three and four relate to the potential for

harm. The Association's vice president asserts that John Doe,

and other beneficiaries whose records would be released, will

36 A-2810-13T2

suffer public embarrassment. The Association also speculates

that future applicants for relief would be deterred from seeking

benefits to avoid public embarrassment.16 We note that release

would also arguably have the effect of upsetting the reasonable

expectations of applicants, inasmuch as the application forms

state that the "Association is required to protect the

confidentiality of information." While that may be read to

refer only to an applicant's submission, it would be reasonable

for an applicant to expect that any benefits received would also

be confidential. Upsetting these expectations may affect "the

relationship in which the record was generated." On the other

hand, disclosure may empower Association members to assess the

Association's process for deciding such applications, thereby

ultimately enhancing their relationship with the organization.

We conclude factors three and four slightly favor non-

disclosure.

Factor five refers to "the adequacy of safeguards to

prevent unauthorized disclosure." This concerns the extent to

which the requested documents are otherwise protected from

disclosure. The Association's vice president asserted that

16

The Association also discusses the harm that would result from

the release of the personal financial information included in

the applications. As noted, we deem Carter's request for that

information to have been abandoned in the trial court.

37 A-2810-13T2

consideration of applications is performed without attaching the

applicant's name, to assure unbiased consideration. On the

other hand, Carter maintained that existing safeguards were

inadequate, because he learned through some unnamed source that

Doe had received benefits. Given the apparent leak, this factor

neither favors nor disfavors disclosure.

It is also reasonable to discuss factors six and seven

together. Carter's need for access is based on an interest in

the Association's exercise of its authority to grant relief in

Doe's case. Carter questions whether it is appropriate to award

benefits to a person who was charged with crimes and allegedly

terminated for conduct related to those charges. We need not

take a position on whether the circumstances of Doe's

termination should be a factor in the Association's decision-

making to conclude that Carter's expressed interest relates to

the Association's governance. For example, Carter does not seek

disclosure for financial gain, as a finance company might, in

seeking the names of beneficiaries because they are in financial

distress and may be worth soliciting. Carter's request is

instead grounded in an interest in the Association's authority

to grant Doe a relief award given the allegations of impropriety

that led to Doe's termination from public employment.

38 A-2810-13T2

We noted above that the statute authorizes consideration of

the cause of a person's financial need. N.J.S.A. 43:17-24. The

relief decisions must be made according to the Association's

rules and regulations. N.J.S.A. 43:17-3(c). However, the lack

of transparency in the Association's decision-making process,

including the lack of publicly available rules and regulations

adopted after notice and comment, heightens the need for

disclosure of documents related to individual cases. Cf. Mason,

supra, 196 N.J. at 64 (stating that OPRA is designed "to

maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to

ensure an informed citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent

in a secluded process.") (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The need for disclosure is also heightened by the

fact that, apparently, only local relief associations'

beneficiaries and amounts of grants are subject to DOBI's

outside review. N.J.A.C. 11:1-38.3. We conclude that factors

six and seven weigh heavily in favor of disclosure.

Upon balancing the Doe factors, in view of the

circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that the

privacy clause does not bar plaintiff's right under OPRA to the

records of the relief payments made to Doe.

We briefly address the Association's contention that a

contrary result is compelled by Michelson v. Watt, 379 N.J.

39 A-2810-13T2

Super. 611 (App. Div. 2005). We disagree. In Michelson, supra,

plaintiff sought disclosure of documents and information

pertaining to the health insurance benefits enjoyed by public

employees of the city in which he lived. Id. at 614. The court

held that plaintiff's request was "not subject to access and

disclosure pursuant to OPRA." Id. at 623. The court deemed the

detailed health insurance information requested to be personnel

records that fell outside of government records as defined in

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-10. Also, disclosure was barred by Executive

Order No. 26, which established that "information regarding an

individual's health history is not a government record subject

to public access." Id. at 619-20; Executive Order No. 26

(McGreevey), ¶ 4(b)(1) (2002). Finally, disclosure was barred

by N.J.A.C. 17:9-1.2(b), which "treats all personal health

information as confidential information in accordance with

HIPAA." Michelson, supra, 379 N.J. Super. at 620.

Michelson does not compel non-disclosure in this case.

Relief payments are not personnel records under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-

10. Furthermore, disclosure is not shielded by Executive Order

No. 26 or any duly adopted regulation.

In sum, plaintiff is entitled to the limited disclosure of

Doe's relief payment checks under OPRA.

40 A-2810-13T2

IV.

We also conclude that Carter is entitled to Doe's payment

records under the common law right of access. See Mason, supra,

196 N.J. at 67 (noting that OPRA does not limit the common law

right of access) (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-8). There is no

question that Carter seeks a public record, subject to the

common law right of access. See Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213,

222 (1978) ("The elements essential to constitute a public

record are . . . that it be a written memorial, that it be made

by a public officer, and that the officer be authorized by law

to make it.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

There also is no question that Carter has standing; he is an

Association member interested in the criteria applied to relief

decisions. See Irval, supra, 61 N.J. at 372 (stating that some

showing of interest is required to enforce the common law right

to inspect).

An access request under the common law is subject to an

"exquisite weighing process" that balances the requestor's

interest in disclosure and the government's interest in

confidentiality. Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 108 (1986).

The balancing process must be "concretely focused upon the

relative interests of the parties in relation to the specific

materials in question." Piniero v. N.J. Div. of State Police,

41 A-2810-13T2

404 N.J. Super. 194, 206-07 (App. Div. 2008) (citing McClain v.

Coll. Hosp., 99 N.J. 346, 361 (1985)). The Court has identified

several factors that may be considered:

(1) the extent to which disclosure will

impede agency functions by discouraging

citizens from providing information to the

government; (2) the effect disclosure may

have upon persons who have given such

information, and whether they did so in

reliance that their identities would not be

disclosed; (3) the extent to which agency

self-evaluation, program improvement, or

other decisionmaking will be chilled by

disclosure; (4) the degree to which the

information sought includes factual data as

opposed to evaluative reports of

policymakers; (5) whether any findings of

public misconduct have been insufficiently

corrected by remedial measures instituted by

the investigative agency; and (6) whether

any agency disciplinary or investigatory

proceedings have arisen that may

circumscribe the individual's asserted need

for the materials. Against these and any

other relevant factors should be balanced

the importance of the information sought to

the plaintiff's vindication of the public

interest.

[Loigman, supra, 102 N.J. at 113 (citation

omitted).]

The requestor's motivation is also a relevant consideration.

Loigman, supra, 102 N.J. at 104 ("Somewhat different but related

considerations arise when the citizen seeks access to

information to further a public good" as opposed to a private

interest.).

42 A-2810-13T2

Loigman factors one and two slightly favor confidentiality.

As discussed above, the Association contends disclosure of Doe's

records may discourage members from applying for benefits in the

future; however, this fear is speculative. In any event,

Carter's request is confined to a single recipient, limiting any

chilling effect of disclosure. However, as noted above, an

applicant may reasonably have relied on the reference to

confidentiality in the application form.

Turning to factor three, we discern no threat that

disclosure would chill the ability of the Association or local

associations to render their decisions, or to engage in self-

evaluation and improvement. If anything, disclosure may

encourage self-criticism and internal oversight. Carter seeks

factual data, not evaluative reports (factor four). Moreover,

there is no evidence that alternative remedial measures or

outside oversight have addressed the issue of concern to Carter

— that is, whether benefits are granted to persons whose

financial distress is allegedly the result of their misconduct.

As Loigman provides, other relevant factors may be

considered. In this case, weight may be given to the fact that

Doe has already been placed in the public eye. His arrest and

his termination received publicity in the local newspapers.

Thus, to some extent, his personal travails are already in the

43 A-2810-13T2

public domain. What is not disclosed is whether he has received

assistance from a local association or the Association. This

distinguishes Carter's request from a request for payments made

to any and all beneficiaries.

Carter's professed need is not based on personal curiosity,

or personal financial interest. Rather, it is based on his

interest in determining the criteria for relief awards,

specifically, whether the local association or Association deems

it appropriate to consider the cause of a person's financial

need. The lack of transparency in the Association's decision-

making, the lack of rules adopted pursuant to the APA, and the

lack of oversight by DOBI of Association awards, heightens the

interest in disclosure.

In sum, we conclude that the public interest in disclosure

in this case outweighs the interest in confidentiality.

V.

We briefly address the Association's argument that Carter's

counterclaim for disclosure was time-barred, as it was filed

more than forty-five days after the denial. OPRA actions have a

forty-five-day statute of limitations, as do actions in lieu of

prerogative writs. Mason, supra, 196 N.J. at 57. However, that

time frame may be enlarged "in the interest of justice." Id. at

70. The time period should be enlarged here because the

44 A-2810-13T2

Association's declaratory judgment action effectively preempted

Carter's option to resort to the GRC, which has no specified

limitations period. Id. at 70. Carter was compelled to respond

to a lawsuit that, as discussed above, the Association was not

entitled to bring in the first place.

We also note that because Carter has prevailed, in that he

has secured access to Doe's relief payment records, he is

entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. We

remand for the trial court's fee determination.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

45 A-2810-13T2

MESSANO, P.J.A.D, concurring.

For the reasons compellingly presented by Judge Ostrer in

Parts III and IV of his opinion, I agree that Carter was

entitled to obtain copies of the relief payments made by the

Association to John Doe under both OPRA and the common law right

of access to public records. I further agree with the

conclusions that OPRA "grants a right of action exclusively to

requestors," and that "the Legislature did not intend for

records custodians to bring actions against record requestors to

enforce their asserted right to withhold records." Ante at 22,

24.

I also agree that the Legislature did not intend to permit

any "public agency," like the Association, to commence an action

under OPRA seeking to pre-emptively establish a defense that is

expressly provided by the statute. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-5(g)

(permitting the custodian of a government record to "assert[]

that part of a particular record is exempt from public access").

Finally, I agree that permitting a public agency to initiate a

lawsuit asserting a defense to the production of particular

public records under the common law would result in "fragmentary

redress," ante at 27, and should be avoided in furtherance of

the salutary goal of judicial economy.

I write separately, however, to state my respectful

disagreement with my colleagues' expansive conclusion in Part

II-A of their opinion that "if there is no private right of

action under a particular statute, a party may not secure a

declaration of its statutory rights by seeking relief under the

DJA." Ante at 17. In my opinion, that conclusion is not

supported by the clear and unambiguous language of the DJA,

which is the clearest indication of the Legislature's intent.

Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76, 98 (2013).

As noted by my colleagues, the DJA is remedial in nature

and entitled to liberal interpretation. Ante at 14-15. The DJA

provides that "[a]ll courts of record . . . shall . . . have

power to declare rights, status and other legal relations,

whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." N.J.S.A.

2A:16-52 (emphasis added). Seemingly, the Legislature did not

intend to foreclose a party from seeking relief under the DJA

even if "further relief" could not be claimed by that party.

Id.

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53, in turn, provides that "[a] person . . .

whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a

statute, . . . may have determined any question of construction

or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a

declaration of rights, status or other legal relations

2 A-2810-13T2

thereunder." (Emphasis added). As noted, I agree that a public

agency cannot initiate a lawsuit under OPRA to determine whether

a specific record is exempt from production under OPRA. In my

mind, the highly discretionary remedy of declaratory relief

cannot be invoked to settle such a dispute, because that issue

has little to do with the "rights, status or other legal

relation[]" of and between, in this case, the Association and

Carter.

However, the Association is undoubtedly a person "whose

rights, status and other legal relations are affected" by OPRA.

N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 (emphasis added). In a different context, I

believe the Association could initiate a lawsuit seeking relief

under the DJA. For example, in Paff, supra, 431 N.J. Super. at

285, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint,

finding the Association was not a public agency subject to OPRA.

After thoroughly reviewing the Association's "formation,

structure, and function," we concluded that it was a public

agency under OPRA and reversed. Id. at 289-90.

In Paff, the issue arose in the context of an OPRA suit

already initiated by a "requestor." Given the Association's

unusual status, however, I doubt that we would have dismissed an

action initiated by the Association pursuant to the DJA seeking

a declaration as to whether or not it was public agency. Even

3 A-2810-13T2

though OPRA provides no right of action to a public agency, I

believe the Association's complaint in that context — whether

the association was subject to OPRA — would have been cognizable

under the DJA.1

I find support for this conclusion not only through

application of the plain language of the DJA, but also in cases

that have long-recognized the appropriateness of such relief

under the DJA. See, e.g., N.J. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,

supra, 89 N.J. at 242 (resort to the DJA is appropriate "to end

uncertainty about the legal rights and duties of the parties

. . . in controversies which have not yet reached the stage at

which the parties seek a coercive remedy," and where "there is

an actual controversy . . . which involves differing views on

the meaning of applicable statutory provisions").2

1

In Paff, we cited three other cases that involved public

agencies that, given their unusual circumstances, challenged

whether they were subject to OPRA. Id. at 287 (citing Sussex

Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, the State Univ., 210 N.J. 531

(2012); Fair Share Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. N.J. State League of

Municipalities, 207 N.J. 489 (2011); The Times of Trenton Publ'g

Corp. v. Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 183 N.J. 519 (2005)).

Although in those cases the issue arose in the context of a

pending prerogative writ lawsuit brought by a requestor, I

believe the Court would have resolved the issue had the public

agency initiated the suit for declaratory relief.

2

I recognize that there must be an "actual controversy" before

the DJA can be invoked. Finkel v. Twp. of Hopewell, 434 N.J.

Super. 303, 318 (App. Div. 2013). However, that predicate could

(continued)

4 A-2810-13T2

In this regard, while the out-of-state and federal cases

cited by my colleagues provide support for their conclusion —

"if there is no private right of action under a particular

statute, a party may not secure a declaration of its statutory

rights" — I do not believe any of the cited New Jersey cases do.

Moreover, it strikes me as anomalous that a statute like OPRA

that provides a specific unilateral cause of action to a

requestor could nonetheless provide the rationale for barring a

clearly "affected" party — here, the Association — from seeking

relief under the DJA.

Moreover, our courts have considered requests for

declaratory relief under the DJA even though the particular

statute at issue provided no right of action to a litigant. For

example, in Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 138-39

(1982), the Court considered whether the plaintiff trade

association was entitled to relief under the DJA declaring the

Strikebreakers Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1 to -6, unconstitutional.

The Court ultimately concluded that portions of the statute were

preempted by federal labor law, but other sections were not.

Id. at 163. The Court did not predicate the relief upon the

plaintiff, or for that matter, any person, having a private

(continued)

be easily satisfied, for example, if a request has been made,

but the litigation has not commenced, as was the case here.

5 A-2810-13T2

right of action under the Strikebreakers Act. Indeed, the

statute was essentially penal in nature, and presumably could

not be invoked by anyone other than the State. See N.J.S.A.

34:13C-5 (making any violation of the act a misdemeanor).

In NL Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl.

Protection, 397 N.J. Super. 127, 133 (App. Div. 2007), certif.

denied, 195 N.J. 418 (2008), we considered the "rights and

responsibilities" of the parties under N.J.S.A. 58:10B-3.1,

which permitted a local government unit that condemned property

to replace – with the Department's approval – a person

performing remediation at the contaminated site. Before

considering the merits, we concluded that the plaintiff's

complaint was cognizable under the DJA, specifically rejecting

the Department's argument that jurisdiction lay in the Appellate

Division and not the trial court. Id. at 131-32. Notably,

neither the statute at issue, nor the legislation of which it

was a part, provided the remediating party with a specific cause

of action by which to challenge the Department's or the public

entity's decision.

Finally, although I agree with much of my colleagues'

opinion, I believe it unnecessary to paint with such a broad

brush. Whether the DJA means what it says, or, whether its

remedies are available only to those whom the Legislature has

6 A-2810-13T2

provided a specific cause of action, is an issue of some import.

Resolving that issue in a manner that I believe departs from

existing precedent is more appropriately the province of our

Supreme Court. See, e.g., Riley v. Keenan, 406 N.J. Super. 281,

297 (App. Div.) (noting that an appellate court "should normally

defer to the Supreme Court with respect to the creation of a new

cause of action") (citing Tynan v. Curzi, 332 N.J. Super. 267,

277 (App. Div. 2000)), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 207 (2009);

Proske v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 313 N.J. Super. 311, 316 (App.

Div. 1998) (declining to find damages for personal injuries

based on a failure to perform a contractual term "'in the

absence of [any] precedent, or . . . clear direction by dictum

from our Supreme Court'" authorizing such action) (quoting Coyle

v. Englander's, 199 N.J. Super. 212, 226 (App. Div. 1985)),

certif. denied, 158 N.J. 685 (1999).

I therefore respectfully concur in the judgment.

7 A-2810-13T2