State of Tennessee v. William Anthony McDaniel

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 15, 2015

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM ANTHONY MCDANIEL

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

No. 237830 Rebecca Stern, Judge

No. E2015-00680-CCA-R3-CD – Filed December 16, 2015

The Appellant, William Anthony McDaniel, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court

a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure

36.1. The motion was summarily denied, and the Appellant timely appealed the ruling.

Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. GLENN

and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

William Anthony McDaniel, Pikeville, Tennessee, Pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M. Todd Ridley, Assistant

Attorney General; and M. Neal Pinkston, District Attorney General, for the Appellee,

State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

This court previously summarized the procedural history of the Appellant‟s case

as follows:

In April 2001, the [Appellant] engaged in anal, oral,

and vaginal intercourse with a female under the age of

thirteen, the daughter of his live-in girlfriend. He was

subsequently indicted for three counts of rape of a child as a

Range III offender. In May 2002, the [Appellant] pled guilty

to the offenses as charged but was sentenced as a Range I

offender to [con]current sentences of twenty-five years. The

[judgments] reflect that the term would be served at 100%

because the [Appellant] was a child rapist.

On July 16 and September 12, 2002, the [Appellant]

filed pro se Motions for Reduction of Sentence. The two

motions were virtually identical in language, except one

state[d] it [wa]s pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules

of Criminal Procedure. On September 27, 2002, the trial

court entered an order overruling the Motion for Reduction of

Sentence. No appeal was taken of that denial.

Next, on September 12, 2012, the [Appellant] filed [a]

pro se “Motion to Correct Judgment/Sentence or in the

Alternative Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.” Thereafter, on

September 17, 2012, the trial court entered an order

overruling the motion, which the [Appellant] never received a

copy of. He later filed a pro se motion for delayed appeal in

the trial court alleging his failure to receive notice of the

ruling, and the trial court granted the motion for delayed

appeal on January 28, 2013. In an order noting that the trial

court was without authority to grant that motion, this court,

nonetheless, waived the untimely filing of the notice of

appeal in the interests of justice.

State v. William Anthony McDaniel, No. E2013-00353-CCA-MR3-CD, 2013 WL

5874706, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, Oct. 31, 2013). On appeal, the Appellant

challenged “the denial of his „Motion to Correct Judgment/Sentence or in the Alternative

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,‟” arguing “that his sentence should be reduced to reflect

service of the sentence at 30%, as a standard Range I offender, or in the alternative that

his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because the 100% service

requirement for child rape was never explained to him.” Id. at *1. This court determined

that the Appellant was not entitled to relief because reduction of his sentence was not

warranted and because a post-conviction petition was the proper avenue to pursue relief

from a guilty plea that was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, noting that the statute

of limitations to file such a petition had long expired. Id. at *4.

Thereafter, on February 17, 2015, the Appellant filed the instant motion to correct

an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. In the

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motion, the Appellant alleged that his sentences were illegal because the trial court

should have imposed consecutive sentencing and because he pled guilty while believing

that he would be subject to release eligibility after serving thirty percent of his sentence,

which rendered his guilty pleas not knowing or voluntary. The trial court denied the

motion, finding that the Appellant failed to state a colorable claim for relief. On appeal,

the Appellant challenges the trial court‟s ruling.

II. Analysis

Historically, “two distinct procedural avenues [were] available [in Tennessee] to

collaterally attack a final judgment in a criminal case - habeas corpus and post-conviction

petitions.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 19 (Tenn. 2004); see also State v. Donald

Terrell, No. W2014-00340-CCA-R3-CO, 2014 WL 6883706, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

Jackson, Dec. 8, 2014). However, “Rule 36.1 was adopted, effective July 1, 2013, with

its express purpose „to provide a mechanism for the defendant or the State to seek to

correct an illegal sentence.‟” State v. Adrian R. Brown, __ S.W.3d __, No. E2014-

00673-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL 7748275, at *6 (Tenn. at Knoxville, Dec. 2, 2015) (quoting

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1, Advisory Comm‟n Cmt.). Rule 36.1, provides, in part:

Either the defendant or the state may, at any time, seek the

correction of an illegal sentence by filing a motion to correct

an illegal sentence in the trial court in which the judgment of

conviction was entered. For purposes of this rule, an illegal

sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable

statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36(a); see Secdrick L. Booker v. State, No. M2014-00846-CCA-R3-

CD, 2014 WL 7191041, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Dec. 18, 2014).

If the motion states a “colorable claim that the sentence is illegal,” the trial court

shall appoint counsel and hold a hearing on the motion. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b).

Our supreme court recently recognized that “Rule 36.1 does not define „colorable claim.”

State v. James D. Wooden, __ S.W.3d __, No. E2014-01069-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL

7748034, at *5 (Tenn. at Knoxville, Dec. 2, 2015). Nevertheless, the court explained that

“for purposes of Rule 36.1, . . . „colorable claim‟ means a claim that, if taken as true and

viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party, would entitle the moving party to

relief under Rule 36.1.” Id. at *6.

Further, our supreme court noted that “mistakes in sentencing are inevitable, but

few sentencing errors render sentences illegal.” Id. at *7 (citing Cantrell v. Easterling,

346 S.W.3d 445, 448-49 (Tenn. 2011)). “Sentencing errors fall into three categories—

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clerical errors, appealable errors, and fatal errors. Only fatal errors render sentences

illegal.” Id. (citing Cantrell, 346 S.W.3d at 449-52). Fatal errors

are “so profound as to render the sentence illegal and void.”

This category consists of any sentence “that is not authorized

by the applicable statutes or that directly contravenes an

applicable statute.” Included in this category are sentences

imposed pursuant to an inapplicable statutory scheme,

sentences designating release eligibility dates where early

release is statutorily prohibited, sentences that are ordered to

be served concurrently where statutorily required to be served

consecutively, and sentences not authorized by any statute for

the offenses.

Id. (citations omitted).

First, the Appellant‟s contends that consecutive sentencing was mandatory under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115. The Appellant notes that Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-35-115(a) provides that “[i]f a defendant is convicted of more than

one (1) criminal offense, the court shall order sentences to run consecutively or

concurrently as provided by the criteria in this section[.]” The Appellant maintains that

“the use of the word „shall‟ in a statute is indicative of mandatory intent.” The Appellant

alleges that because of the use of the word “shall” in subsection (a), the trial court was

required to impose consecutive sentencing for the Appellant‟s three convictions of rape

of a child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(5). He also

alleges that the use of the word “shall” in subsection (a) required the trial court to impose

consecutive sentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(6)

because the Appellant committed the rape of a child offenses while on probation for

sexual battery.

The trial court found that while consecutive sentencing was permitted under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115, it was not required. We agree. Tennessee

Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) (emphasis added) provides that a “court may order

sentences to run consecutively if the court finds” by a preponderance of the evidence the

existence of any one of the listed criteria, which leaves the imposition of consecutive

sentencing to the trial court‟s discretion. See State v. Bruce Lamont Smith, No. M2014-

02092-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1868492, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Apr. 9,

2015). Accordingly, the trial court‟s failure to impose consecutive sentencing based upon

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115 did not render the Appellant‟s sentences

illegal.

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The Appellant next argues that consecutive sentencing was mandatory under

Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2)(A)(ii), which provides that

[w]hen prior unserved Tennessee sentences are not called to

the attention of the trial judge by or on behalf of the

defendant at the time of sentencing and are not included in the

judgment setting the new sentence, the new sentence is

deemed to be consecutive to any such undisclosed prior

unserved sentence or sentences.

The Appellant complains that his sentences for rape of a child were illegal because the

judgments of conviction were silent as to whether the sentences were to be served

concurrently or consecutively to his prior unserved sentence for sexual battery. The trial

court found that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(2)(A)(ii) “provides that a

new sentence is deemed consecutive to a prior, undisclosed, unserved sentence” even

when the judgment of conviction is silent regarding the prior unserved sentence. We

agree. Because the judgments of conviction are silent regarding the Appellant‟s prior

unserved sentence for sexual battery, the sentences for rape of a child are deemed to be

consecutive to the sentence for sexual battery. The Appellant‟s sentences are not illegal

in this regard.

Finally, the Appellant complains that his trial counsel advised him that he would

be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and that he would be eligible for release

after serving thirty percent of his sentence. He contends, therefore, that the trial court

erred by sentencing him to serve 100% of his sentences in confinement. The trial court

found that generally Range I, standard offenders were subject to release eligibility after

serving thirty percent of the sentence in confinement; however, an offender convicted of

rape of a child was required to serve 100% of the sentence in confinement. Tenn. Code

Ann. ' 40-35-501(c), (i)(1) and (2)(I). We agree. Because service of 100% of the

sentences for rape of a child in confinement is statutorily mandated, the Appellant‟s

sentences are not illegal and subject to correction under Rule 36.1.

Moreover, as this court previously explained:

Once judgment has become final, the only avenue of

relief available to a defendant to have a guilty plea set aside is

a collateral proceeding under the Post-Conviction Procedure

Act. To do so entails a claim that the guilty plea was not

entered voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly or was

obtained through the abridgment of some other constitutional

right, such as the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

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However, in the [Appellant‟s] case, the one-year post-

conviction statute of limitations forecloses this avenue for

seeking relief.

McDaniel, No. E2013-00353-CCA-MR3-CD, 2013 WL 5874706, at *4 (citations

omitted).

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

_________________________________

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE

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