The Matter of Walter E. Carver v. State of New York

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 139

In the Matter of Walter E.

Carver,

Respondent,

v.

State of New York, et al.,

Appellants.

Valerie Figueredo, for appellants.

Susan C. Antos, for respondent.

National Center for Law and Economic Justice, amicus

curiae.

LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:

We hold that petitioner, who performed work for the

City of New York in exchange for cash public assistance and food

stamps, is protected by the federal minimum wage provisions of

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the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

Petitioner Carver is a 69-year-old Vietnam War veteran

who received public assistance from the City of New York, through

the State-funded Safety Net Assistance Program (see Social

Services Law §§ 61, 62, 157 et seq.), beginning in 1993 and

continuing until March 2000. During that time, the City

required, in accordance with the Social Services Law (see Social

Services Law §§ 335-b, 335-c), that he work 35 hours per week in

the "Work Experience Program" (WEP) of the City's Human Resources

Administration (HRA) in order to receive public assistance

benefits. HRA administers the State's public assistance programs

for New York City, with oversight from the New York State Office

of Temporary Disability Assistance (OTDA) (see generally Social

Services Law § 61).

Carver was assigned to the mailroom of Coney Island

Hospital where he sorted and delivered the mail. In 1995, he was

reassigned to the Manhattan Terminal of the Staten Island Ferry,

where he would sweep the floors, spread salt in the winter and

pick up trash. In return for performing these services, Carver

received $176 every two weeks, along with food stamps. His cash

compensation plus the food stamps equaled the minimum wage for

the amount of hours that he worked. If he missed work, his

assistance was reduced. Carver never received any training in

how to perform these jobs, or participated in any vocational

training classes during those years. He participated in only one

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week of classes, which concerned how to write a resume and look

for a job at the end of the program.

In 2000, Carver was told that he would have to leave

WEP, and on March 4, 2000, his benefits were terminated. On

August 10, 2007, Carver won $10,000 in the New York State

Lottery. The New York State Division of Lottery and the New York

State Office of Temporary Disability Assistance (OTDA) invoked

New York Social Services Law § 131-r, which authorizes the State

to appropriate half of any lottery prize over $600 to "reimburse

[itself] . . . for all . . . public assistance benefits paid to

[the prizewinner] during the previous ten years."

In a letter dated September 27, 2007, Carver requested

a review of OTDA's determination. On January 8, 2008, OTDA

notified Carver that it would not refund any of the $5,000.

Carver then filed the underlying CPLR article 78 proceeding in

April 2008 against OTDA, among others, alleging that the

interception of his lottery winnings violated his rights under

the FLSA and the New York State Minimum Wage Act (Labor Law §

652). Specifically, Carver contended that the OTDA required him

to work 35 hours per week in order to receive public assistance

benefits, and that his biweekly cash benefits, plus the value of

the food stamps he received, equaled no more than the federal or

New York State minimum wage. Thus, were OTDA permitted to recoup

a portion of the benefits paid to him through Social Services Law

§ 131-r, then Carver would be paid less than minimum wage, in

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violation of the FLSA. The defendants cross-moved, inter alia,

to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7).

Supreme Court granted the cross motion and dismissed

the proceeding. As relevant here, the court noted that the issue

of whether WEP workers are deprived of minimum wage standards by

the implementation of Social Services Law § 131-r is an issue of

first impression. The court stated that Carver implicitly agreed

to "the statutory requirement of recoupment of previous public

assistance monies [he] had received" because by purchasing the

lottery ticket he "was subject to all of the rules, regulations

and statutes with respect to that lottery ticket." The court

then stated that Carver's public assistance benefits were

determined by "his household size, rent and other eligibility

factors" under the Social Services Law, and not by the number of

hours he worked per week in WEP. Furthermore, the court

determined that although the Social Services Law required Carver

to engage in work activities "in return for [his public

assistance] benefits," he was not an employee who earned wages

because no "employer-employee relationship" existed "as no income

tax W-2 statement was furnished to [him] or deductions made for

FICA or Medicare taxes." Finally, the court determined that

Carver was "not a federally protected worker" as he was not an

employee, and thus the federal minimum wage law does not apply to

him.

The Appellate Division unanimously modified by

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reinstating the FLSA cause of action against OTDA and its

Commissioner and, as so modified, affirmed. The court stated that

the State's interception of Carver's lottery prize winnings did

not violate the State minimum wage law, which specifically

exempts employees of "federal, state or municipal government or

political subdivision thereof," but that it did violate the FLSA

(Matter of Carver v State of New York, 87 AD3d 25 [2d Dept

2011]). Applying the "economic reality test," the Court

concluded that individuals like Carver, who receive public

assistance benefits and participate in WEP, are employees under

the FLSA.

On remand, Supreme Court granted Carver's petition

against OTDA and its Commissioner, and directed defendants to

return his $5,000. The parties then entered into a Stipulation

and Order of Contingent Settlement which resolved all outstanding

issues, including attorney's fees.

This Court then granted OTDA leave to appeal from the

Stipulation and Order of Contingent Settlement, bringing up for

review the prior, nonfinal Appellate Division order. The sole

issue on appeal is whether as a result of his participation in

WEP as a condition of his receipt of public assistance benefits

under Social Services Law § 336 (1)(d), Carver was entitled to

minimum wages under the FLSA.

The FLSA was passed by Congress in 1938, "to lessen, so

far as seemed then practicable, the distribution in commerce of

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goods produced under subnormal labor conditions" and to eliminate

low wages and long hours in an effort to "free commerce from the

interferences arising from production of goods under conditions

that were detrimental to the health and well-being of workers"

(Rutherford Food Corp. v McComb, 331 US 722, 727 [1947]). The

FLSA was also enacted to prevent unfair competition through the

use of underpaid labor (see 29 USC § 202 [a] [3]). The FLSA

provides: "Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who

in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of

goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at

the" rates set forth in the statute (29 USC § 206 [a]). An

"employee" is defined as "any individual employed by an employer"

(29 USC § 203 [e][1]). To "employ" is "to suffer or permit to

work" (29 USC § 203 [5] [g]). An employer includes "any person

acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in

relation to an employee and includes a public agency" (29 USC §

203 [d]). Although the FLSA does explicitly exempt certain

employees from its purview, neither workfare nor public

assistance recipients are included among those exemptions (see 29

USC § 213; Powell v United States Cartridge Co., 339 US 497, 517

[1950] [stating that FLSA's exemptions are "narrow and specific,"

and indicating that "[s]uch specificity in stating exemptions

strengthens the implication that employees not thus exempted . .

. remain within the Act"]).

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To determine whether an individual qualifies as an

employee under FLSA, we must look to the "economic reality," not

the "technical concepts, of the relationship" (Goldberg v

Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 US 28, 33 [1961]; Tony and

Susan Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290, 301

[1985]; see also Bartels v Birmingham, 332 US 126, 130 [1947]).

More specifically,

"[b]ecause [the FLSA] defines employer in

such broad terms, it offers little guidance

on whether a given individual is or is not an

employer. In answering that question, the

overarching concern is whether the alleged

employer possessed the power to control the

workers in question, with an eye to the

'economic reality' presented by the facts of

each case. Under the 'economic reality'

test, the relevant factors include whether

the alleged employer (1) had the power to

hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised

and controlled employee work schedules or

conditions of employment, (3) determined the

rate and method of payment, and (4)

maintained employment records"

(Herman v RSR Security Servs. Ltd., 172 F3d 132, 139 [2d Cir

1999], quoting Bonnette v California Health and Welfare Agency,

704 F2d 1465, 1470 [9th Cir 1983]; see Goldberg, 366 US at 33;

Johns v Stewart, 57 F3d 1544, 1557 [10th Cir 1995] [stating that

the economic reality test is the proper test to determine "the

scope of employee coverage under" the FLSA]).

In Johns v Stewart (57 F3d 1544), the Tenth Circuit,

applying the economic reality test, determined that workers in

Utah's workforce program were not employees within the meaning of

the FLSA. However, two years later, the United States Department

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of Labor (DOL), the federal agency charged with enforcing the

FLSA, issued a guidance letter entitled "How Workplace Laws Apply

to Welfare Recipients," in which it undertook to explain, in

question-answer format, which federal worker-protection laws

applied to public assistance workers. The letter states:

"Do federal employment laws apply to welfare

recipients participating in work activities

under the new welfare law in the same manner

they apply to other workers?

"Yes. Federal employment laws, such as the

Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA], the

Occupational Safety and Health Act [OSHA],

Unemployment Insurance [UI], and anti-

discrimination laws apply to welfare

recipients as they would apply to other

workers. The new welfare law does not exempt

welfare recipients from these laws."

(DOL Guidance Letter, at 40). According to the DOL, "welfare

recipients would probably be considered employees in many, if not

most, of the work activities described in the [federal public

assistance law]" (id.). The FLSA charges the DOL with the duty

of administering and interpreting the FLSA. Accordingly, the

DOL's interpretation of the FLSA is "entitled to considerable

weight in construing the Act" (Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v

Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290, 297 [1985]). A 1997 Conference

report (HR Rep No 105-217 [1997], at 934) leaves no doubt the

Congress was aware of and considered the DOL's guidelines and

accepted them, despite efforts to overturn DOL's interpretation

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of the FLSA.1

To that end, we must apply the economic reality test

and, under that test, the City should be considered Carver's

employer. The City had the power to hire and fire WEP workers,

in that it was the City's responsibility to assign public

assistance recipients to a WEP agency and the City could dismiss

workers from WEP based upon their performance. Additionally, the

City and its WEP agencies supervise and control the work schedule

of the workers. Furthermore, the City and its agencies, such as

HRA, maintain the employment records of the WEP workers. While

the Social Services Law, not the WEP agencies or the City,

determines the rate and method of payment of WEP workers, that is

simply one factor. The economic reality test "encompasses the

totality of the circumstances" (Herman, 172 F3d at 139).

For example, in Alamo (471 US 209), the United States

Supreme Court applied the economic reality test to determine if

certain individuals were "employees" under the FLSA. The Alamo

Foundation was a not-for-profit organization founded to

"'establish, conduct and maintain an Evangelistic Church . . .

1

The United States Department of Health and Human Services

has also concluded that the FLSA applies to public assistance

recipients under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity

Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), also known as the "Welfare Reform

Act" (see 45 CFR 260.35 ["Federal employment laws (such as the

Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA], the Occupational Safety and

Health Act (OSHA) and unemployment insurance [UI]) and

nondiscrimination laws . . . apply to [Temporary Assistance to

Needy Families] beneficiaries in the same manner as they apply to

other workers"]).

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and generally to do those things needful for the promotion of

Christian faith, virtue and charity.'" It supported itself by

operating gas stations, stores and other businesses staffed by

"associates." Associates "receive[d] no cash salaries, but the

Foundation provide[d] them with food, clothing, shelter, and

other benefits" (471 US at 292).

Noting that it "has consistently construed the [FLSA]

'liberally to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with

congressional direction'" (id. at 296, quoting Mitchell v Lublin,

McGaughy & Associates, 358 US 207, 211 [1959]), the Supreme Court

found that the associates were employees" (Alamo, 471 US at 301,

citing Goldberg, 366 US at 33). The Court focused on three

factors: (1) the associates received compensation, albeit

"primarily in the form of benefits rather than cash," a

distinction deemed "immaterial;" (2) they were "entirely

dependent upon the Foundation for long periods, in some cases . .

. years;" and (3) any other result would have undermined the

purposes of the FLSA by giving the Foundation a competitive

advantage and "exert[ing] . . . downward pressure on wages in

competing businesses" (Alamo, 471 US at 301, 302).

The economic reality test, as applied in Alamo, compels

the conclusion that Carver was an "employee" of the City. The

Staten Island Ferry is an enterprise similar to a privately owned

ferry service or the gas stations and stores operated by the

Foundation in Alamo. Carver's work was no different from the

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janitorial services performed by salaried City employees at many

offices and other locations. Like the associates in Alamo,

Carver's benefits were "compensation," given in exchange for his

work -- even if some of those benefits were not paid in cash --

and he was "entirely dependent" on those benefits for years.

Alamo also establishes that the employer's purposes and

objectives are not relevant in determining a worker's status as

an employee. The State argues that WEP workers are not employees

because its declared goal is to prepare WEP workers for gainful

employment. However, this appears to be no different from the

Foundation's goals of Christian ministry. Had Carver spent most

of his hours receiving training, or education in how to obtain

employment outside of the WEP program, we might have reached a

different conclusion. As the DOL stated, "individuals engaged in

activities such as vocational education, job search assistance,

and secondary school attendance," are likely exempt from the FLSA

"because these programs are not ordinarily considered employment

under the FLSA" (DOL Guidance Letter, at 40). However, based on

the record before us, Carver spent his full-time hours doing work

for the City. The dissent's likening of Carver's 7-year, 35-

hour-work-week engagement through WEP to perform services typical

of any other non-WEP employee, to that of a "student or trainee"

patently ignores the economic reality of Carver's situation (see

dissenting op. at 14). Moreover, contrary to the dissent's

contention, the policies supporting the passage of the FLSA do

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weigh in favor of finding coverage here. Were the City permitted

to hire and engage WEP workers for less than minimum wage, they

could effectively suppress the market and impede the FLSA's goal

of eliminating unfair competition though the use of underpaid

labor.

Furthermore, in United States v City of New York (359

F3d 83 [2d Cir 2004]), the Second Circuit determined that public

assistance recipients obliged to participate in WEP are employees

within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

and were thus entitled to Title VII's protection against sexual

and racial harassment (id. at 86-87). The Court determined that

(1) the receipt of cash payments and food stamps, which equaled

the minimum wage times the number of hours the WEP workers

worked; and (2) the fact that a plaintiff who "refused to work

would lose the portion of the family's grant attributable to her

. . . results in the conclusion that [the plaintiffs] were

employees" (id. at 92). Although the FLSA was not the focus of

the case in City of New York, the Second Circuit distinguished

Johns and stated that even with respect to the FLSA, "the [DOL],

the agency charged with interpreting . . . the FLSA, has rejected

the Johns approach" (id. at 94).

Following City of New York, two New York federal

District Courts have applied the same reasoning to cases

involving minimum wage violation claims by public assistance

recipients participating in WEP, holding that they were employees

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(see Elwell v Weiss, 2007 WL 2994308, 2006 US Dist LEXIS 96934

[WD NY, Sep 29, 2006, No. 03-CV-6121]; Stone v McGowan, 308 F

Supp 2d 79 [ND NY 2004]). Accordingly, as the law stands today,

Carver is correct in asserting that he was an "employee" of the

City under the FLSA when he participated in the WEP program.

It is true that, in Brukhman v Giuliani (94 NY2d 387

[2000]), this Court, holding that the plaintiffs did not qualify

for a prevailing wage, stated that WEP "workers simply are not in

the employ of anyone" (id. at 395-396). This Court, however,

expressly limited the opinion, stating "we decide no more than is

before us" (id. at 397 [limiting its holding to apply to the

requirements of the New York Constitution's wage provision]).

Here, the Appellate Division rejected the State's reliance on

Brukhman because this Court did not apply the economic reality

test, which, under federal law, is the applicable test for

determining who is an employer under the FLSA. Additionally,

Brukhman is distinguishable from this case because the plaintiffs

there argued that they should have been paid at the prevailing

State wage for their participation in WEP, whereas Carver's claim

is under the FLSA's minimum wage standards. Quite simply, we are

now confronted with an issue of federal law.2 The Supreme Court

2

It is mystifying why, on a question of federal law, the

dissent feels compelled to follow a Tenth Circuit decision

predating the adoption of PRWORA and to amplify the import of

Brukhman, while castigating the more recent teaching of the

Second Circuit and the guidelines of the Labor Department (see

dissenting op. at 2-3, 20-22, 22-23 n 6).

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has made clear that the FLSA, which "defines the verb 'employ'

expansively to mean 'suffer or permit to work,' (52 Stat. 1060, §

3, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e), (g)" has "striking breadth"

and "stretches the meaning of 'employee' to cover some parties

who might not qualify as such under a strict application of

traditional agency law principles" (Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v

Darden, 503 US 318, 326 [1992]; see Rutherford Food Corp., 331 US

at 728-729). Thus, Brukhman is not controlling here.

The State contends that WEP workers cannot be employees

because their assistance depends on "economic need," measured by

"specific household expenses," and on "household size," rather

than on the type of work done or the workers' skill. There is no

reason, however, why the formula used to set a worker's pay

should affect whether or not he is an employee. As the United

States Supreme Court stated in Alamo, what matters under the FLSA

is that, like Carver, the associates expected to receive in-kind

benefits in exchange for services and were dependent upon those

benefits (471 US at 301).

The State also relies on language in the State laws and

regulations and the City's Employment Process Manual stating that

"the monetary grant . . . [for] participating in work-experience

activities is not a wage for the performance of such activities"

(and see 18 NYCRR § 385.9 [a][4]). Such State law provisions,

however, cannot override the FLSA. To the extent that any state

or city laws come into conflict with governing provisions of the

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FLSA, they are preempted (Matter of People v Applied Card Sys.,

Inc., 11 NY3d 105, 113 [2008]).

Finally, the State attempts to sidestep two key factors

which indicate that WEP workers can be employees. First, the

State contends that WEP workers' right to workers' compensation

benefits "has little if any significance" because volunteers also

have limited rights to such benefits. Carver, however, is no

volunteer. He worked full-time in the WEP program because he had

to if he wanted to receive his needed benefits. Second, the

State argues that the work performed by Carver does not have true

monetary value because a WEP worker cannot replace the job of an

actual State employee. However, regardless of whether Carver's

duties and responsibilities were identical to that of a non-WEP

State worker, he qualifies as an employee under the economic

realities test for FLSA purposes.

The gist of Carver's argument is that he is entitled to

minimum wage for his hours worked as a participant in the WEP

program, and that the State cannot retroactively deprive him of a

minimum wage by recouping the funds through his lottery prize.

Carver's request is actually consistent with the current

practice. As mandated by Social Services Law § 336-c (2)(b):

"[t]he number of hours a participant in work

experience activities authorized pursuant to

this section shall be required to work in

such assignment shall not exceed a number

which equals the amount of assistance payable

with respect to such individual (inclusive of

the value of food stamps received by such

individual, if any) divided by the higher of

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(a) the federal minimum wage provided that

such hours shall be limited as set forth in

subdivision four of section three hundred

thirty-six of this title, or (b) the state

minimum wage."

Carver's particular situation compels the conclusion that he is

entitled to minimum wage. While participating in the WEP

program, Carver worked 35 hours per week, and the State concedes

that this is not the norm. Additionally, the State's actions

here led to a particularly unfair result in that Carver was taxed

on the full amount of his $10,000 lottery winnings, while being

forced to surrender half of those winnings to the State.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court appealed

from and the order of the Appellate Division insofar as sought to

be reviewed, should be affirmed, without costs.

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Matter of Walter E. Carver v State of New York et al.

No. 139

ABDUS-SALAAM, J.(dissenting):

The majority holds that petitioner Walter E. Carver,

who received government assistance under the City of New York's

work experience program ("WEP"), was an "employee" of the City

within the meaning of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act

("FLSA") (see 29 USC §§ 201 et seq.), and that therefore the

minimum wage provisions of that statute entitle him to withhold a

portion of his lottery winnings that would otherwise be owed to

the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance

("OTDA") pursuant to Social Services Law § 131-r. Tellingly, the

majority does not dispute that FLSA and the Personal

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA")

(see Pub L 104-193) do not expressly declare that public

assistance recipients who must meet work requirements are

employees of the government for FLSA purposes. Nor does the

majority contend that the legislative history of those statutes

reveals that Congress viewed petitioner and other such public

assistance or "workfare" recipients as government "employees" who

could obtain the benefits of FLSA. Rather, in the absence of

clear textual or historical support for its conclusion that WEP

participants are City "employees" within the meaning of FLSA, the

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majority maintains that an evaluation of petitioner's

relationship with the City under the "economic reality" test,

which the United States Supreme Court has adopted to determine

whether an individual is the type of "employee" that Congress

meant to protect via FLSA (see Goldberg v Whitaker House

Cooperative, Inc., 366 US 28, 33 [1961]), reveals that he is

protected by FLSA.

However, while courts should employ the economic

reality test to ensure FLSA coverage for the broad class of

individuals whom Congress truly meant to protect under the

statute, the test cannot be used as a mere device to skip over

the glaring lack of any legislative support for the extension of

the statute's minimum wage provisions to public assistance or

workfare recipients. Indeed, the economic reality test "does

have its limits," and chief among them is the principle that the

application of the test must be "consistent with congressional

direction" (Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor,

471 US 290, 295-296 [1985], quoting Mitchell v Lublin, McGaughy &

Associates, 358 US 207, 211 [1959]). Consonant with that most

important limitation, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit has concluded that Congress did not intend to

confer the protections of FLSA upon public assistance recipients

simply because those individuals must meet certain conditions and

engage in work activities in order to continue receiving

government benefits (see Johns v Stewart, 57 F3d 1544, 1558 [10th

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Cir 1995]). Thus, as the Tenth Circuit's analysis demonstrates,

and as the text and history of the relevant statutes show,

petitioner and other similarly situated individuals are not

"employees" within the meaning of FLSA, but instead receive

government benefits in exchange for performing tasks relevant to

the goals of PRWORA. Because the majority's contrary holding

runs afoul of that persuasive authority and does not comport with

any sort of reality, economic or otherwise, I respectfully

dissent.

I.

The text and history of FLSA and PRWORA refute the

majority's conclusion that, in enacting those statutes, Congress

placed local governments and beneficiaries of government

assistance in an employee-employer relationship that falls within

the scope of FLSA. Regarding FLSA, that statute establishes,

among other things, a minimum wage and a maximum number of work

hours for any covered "employee," and the statute unhelpfully

defines that critical term as "any individual employed" -- that

is, "suffer[ed] or permit[ted] to work" -- by "an employer" (29

USC §§ 203 [e] [1]; 203 [g]; see 29 USC §§ 206 [a] [1]; 207 [a]).

In adding context to the vague term "employee," the statute

specifies that some people who perform work for the government

are protected "employees," but, significantly, it does not list

public assistance recipients among them; rather, the statute

lists a variety of traditional government positions which would

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entitle their occupants to the protections of FLSA, and nothing

on that list mentions, applies to, or describes public assistance

recipients in a manner that would qualify them as statutory

"employees" (see 29 USC §§ 203 [e] [2] [A] - [e] [2] [C]). In

fact, the statute does not refer to the recipients of government

assistance at all, belying the majority's contention that the

statute sets the wages and working conditions of those to whom

the government gives benefits in exchange for their satisfaction

of work-related requirements.

Nor does it seem that Congress had recipients of

government benefits in mind when it passed and then amended FLSA

over the years, for Congress appears to have focused primarily on

rooting out abusive labor practices in traditional employment

relationships established by commercial enterprises and their

non-profit or governmental equivalents. In its official

declaration of the policy behind FLSA and its amendments,

Congress expressed concern that "industries engaged in commerce

or in the production of goods for commerce" had established

"labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum

standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general

well-being of workers," which conditions were harmful to, and

spread via the abuse of, interstate commerce (29 USC § 202 [a]

[emphases added]). As a result, FLSA made it the policy of the

federal government "to correct and as rapidly as practicable to

eliminate the conditions above referred to in such industries

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without substantially curtailing employment or earning power" (29

USC § 202 [b] [emphasis added]).

Upon the initial passage of FLSA in 1938, President

Roosevelt likewise suggested that FLSA was intended to address

the abuse of laborers who had been hired by commercial

enterprises to produce goods in exchange for a wage, rather than

assistance recipients, for he described FLSA as necessary

legislation to combat "the evil of child labor" and "the

exploitation of unorganized labor," which were incompatible with

[e]nlightened business" and would allow "[g]oods produced under

conditions which do not meet rudimentary standards of decency" to

"pollute the channels of interstate trade" (HR Rep 93-913 at 2818

[1974] [quoting the 1938 speech without attribution]).

Subsequent amendments to FLSA also reflected Congress's desire to

protect traditional commercial workers, not public assistance

recipients, as Congress increased the minimum wage and expanded

FLSA's coverage to student workers, retail workers and domestic

service workers (see 88 Stat 62; HR Rep 93-913). Along those

lines, upon debating the 1974 amendments to FLSA, Senators did

not once mention public assistance recipients or similar

individuals, instead focusing on the plight of child laborers on

farms, domestic workers, firemen and the like (see 120 Cong Rec

S4691-4702 [daily ed March 28, 1974] at 43-45).

Even when congressional reports condemned those who

sought to use misleading labels or hidden arrangements to

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disguise the type of employer-employee relationship to which FLSA

would obviously apply, they did not make any reference to public

assistance recipients, either in general or in the context of

state programs that feature work-related requirements for the

acquisition of assistance. Instead, Congress sought to remedy

situations where commercial employers established labor

arrangements with students and minors, who would otherwise be

covered by the statute, and yet improperly tried to hide the true

nature of those employer-employee relationships to avoid

complying with the statute (see 120 Cong Rec S4691-4702 [daily ed

March 28, 1974] at 37-42). Therefore, the text and history of

FLSA reveal that, in general, the statute covers only ordinary

wage earners hired by private and public employers to send goods

and provide services via the channels of interstate commerce, and

that public assistance beneficiaries are not covered.

In the same vein, PRWORA does not apply the provisions

of FLSA to participants in workfare programs administered under

the statute. Although PRWORA does expressly grant the

protections of some other federal statutes to participants in

programs funded pursuant to that law, FLSA is not among them (see

42 USC § 608 [d]; Pub L 104-193, tit IV, § 408 [c]), and

consequently, PRWORA does not bring workfare recipients within

the ambit of FLSA. In fact, PRWORA distinguishes between

workfare participants and the sort of "employees" who might

qualify for the protections of FLSA in several notable ways.

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In that regard, while PRWORA compels individuals

receiving temporary assistance for needy families to

"participat[e] in work activities," such as unsubsidized

employment, subsidized employment, job training or work

experience (42 USC §§ 607 [d] - [d] [12]; Pub L 104-193, tit IV,

§§ 407 [d] - [d] [12]), the Act does not treat this "work

activities" requirement as some form of public sector employment

that might trigger the provisions of FLSA. PRWORA neither labels

program participants as "employees" nor the state as their

"employer," and it contains measures crafted to place program

participants in actual "employment" in the private sector, as

distinct from the participants' existing positions as the

recipients of government benefits (see e.g. 42 USC § 604 [f]

[allowing states to use PRWORA funds to pay for agencies that

provide "employment placement services" to people who are not

employees but rather are "individuals who receive assistance

under the State program funded under this part"]; 42 USC § 608

[b] [2] [A] [i] [states must prepare individual responsibility

plan that "sets forth an employment goal for the individual and a

plan for moving the individual immediately into private sector

employment"]; 42 USC § 607 [d] [4] ["work experience" in

repairing public housing and similar roles qualifies as requisite

"work activities" only "if sufficient private sector employment

is not available"]; Pub L 104-93, tit IV, § 404 [f]; Pub L 104-

193, tit IV, § 408 [b] [2] [A] [i]; Pub L 104-193, tit IV, § 407

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[d] [4]). In addition, PRWORA refers to payments to program

participants as "assistance" (see 42 USC §§ 604 [f]; 607 [e]) or

"benefits" (42 USC § 601 [a] [2]) rather than wages paid to an

employee, and in imposing a penalty upon any participant who

fails to meet the mandatory work requirements, the statute

declares that such a penalty "shall not be construed to be a

reduction in any wage paid to the individual" (42 USC § 608 [c]

[emphases added]; see Pub L 104-193, tit IV, § 408 [c]), thereby

clarifying that participants are not employees who receive a wage

from the government.

Moreover, the application of FLSA's minimum wage,

overtime and other provisions to workfare participants is

incompatible with PRWORA's primary goal of moving people off the

public assistance rolls and into unsubsidized regular jobs,

instead of making public assistance recipients state "employees"

who are guaranteed a minimum wage subsidized by the federal

government.1 As the Act's official statement of purpose puts it,

PRWORA is meant to "increase the flexibility of States in

operating a program designed to . . . end the dependence of needy

parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work

and marriage" (42 USC §§ 601 [a] - [a] [2]; see PL 104-193, §§

1

In passing similar legislation prior to PWRORA, the New

York Legislature also expressed a desire to reduce the number of

public assistance recipients in the State and encourage them to

transition to genuine full-time employment in the private sector

(see generally Bill Jacket, L 1990, ch 453; see also Bill Jacket,

L 1997, ch 436).

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401 [a] - [a] [2]), and thus, Congress could not have intended to

limit states' flexibility in cutting benefits and incentivizing

departure from the public assistance rolls by forcing the states

to guarantee beneficiaries assistance in the amounts of the

minimum wages specified by FLSA. Indeed, far from seeking to

make a generous offer of state "employment" to workfare

participants at a "wage" equivalent to FLSA's minimum wage, the

House members who supported PRWORA bemoaned the fact that, prior

to the Act's passage, public assistance recipients were allegedly

receiving benefits in excessive amounts far greater than the

salary of many regularly employed individuals, and they wished to

make the new workfare programs less generous, not more, than the

sort of ordinary employment to which FLSA's minimum wage

provisions would apply (see House Committee on the Budget Rep on

HR 3734 of 1996 at 4). In short, the express terms of FLSA and

PRWORA do not apply FLSA's protections to workfare recipients,

and Congress plainly intended to establish the kind of

arrangement between the government and workfare beneficiaries

that would remove them from the ambit of FLSA.

II.

The majority does not seriously contest the clear

evidence that Congress had no intention of turning participants

in PRWORA programs into government "employees" covered by FLSA,

but it insists that WEP participants qualify as government

"employees" within the meaning of FLSA under the economic reality

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test (see majority op. at 8-15). However, where, as here,

Congress's intent to exempt a class of individuals from the reach

of FLSA is plain from the text and history of relevant statutes,

the judge-made economic reality test cannot serve to confer

FLSA's protections upon those who Congress thought should not

receive the statute's benefits because, as previously noted, a

court must apply the test in a manner consistent with Congress's

intent (see Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, 471 US at 295-296; cf.

O'Connor v Davis, 126 F3d 112, 115 [2d Cir 1997]). Indeed, as

will be explained herein, when the economic reality test is

properly applied in light of the legislative scheme, it leads to

the inescapable conclusion that petitioner is not a City

"employee" for FLSA purposes.

A.

The Supreme Court has not exhaustively defined the

parameters of the economic reality test or set forth any

particular list of factors to be considered in every case.

However, the Court has indicated that one must look at "the

circumstances of the whole activity" of the parties to discern

the economic reality of a person's status under FLSA (Rutherford

Food Corp. v McComb, 331 US 722, 730 [1947]). In conducting that

practical and comprehensive analysis, the Supreme Court has

focused on the individual's expectation of wages or in-kind

remuneration beyond what one might expect as a trainee or student

(see Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, 471 US at 299-300; Walling v

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Portland Terminal Co., 330 US 148, 150-153 [1947]), the

employer's ability to "expel [workers] for substandard work or

for failure to obey [workplace rules]" (Goldberg, 366 US at 33),

and the employer's arrangement of its enterprise as a "device"

which is "transparent[ly]" designed to evade FLSA's strictures

(id.). Similarly, the United States Courts of Appeals have

attempted to distill the Supreme Court's precedents and

Department of Labor regulations regarding the economic reality

test into a multi-factor framework, concluding that "the relevant

factors include 'whether the alleged employer (1) had the power

to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled

employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3)

determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained

employment records.'" (Herman v RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F3d 132, 139

[2d Cir 1999], quoting Bonnette v California Health & Welfare

Agency, 704 F2d 1465, 1469 [9th Cir 1983]; see also Hodgson v

Griffin & Brand, Inc., 471 F2d 235, 237-238 [5th Cir 1973]).

In Johns v Stewart (57 F3d at 1544), the Tenth Circuit

concluded that, under the economic reality test, workfare

participants in Utah were not the State's "employees" for FLSA

purposes (see id. at 1556-1559). The court determined that,

because the workfare participants had to meet financial, training

and other criteria beyond the performance of work in order to

receive benefits, the participants were not receiving benefits as

a form of wage solely in exchange for work, and in light of the

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unusual tax and payroll treatment of the participants' benefits

payments, Utah had not established a typical employment

relationship with those individuals (see id. at 1558-1559).

While the court recognized that not every aspect of the workfare

program differed from employment, the court eschewed reliance on

such isolated factors or any rigid application of a multi-factor

test, instead following "the Supreme Court's direction to focus

upon the circumstances of the whole activity and the economic

reality of the relationship" (id. at 1559). Thus, observing that

"[t]he work component of [Utah's workfare programs] [wa]s just

one requirement of the comprehensive assistance programs," the

court concluded that, under the circumstances of the whole

activity of the State and the beneficiaries, "[t]he overall

nature of the relationship between [the workfare participants]

and [the State] [wa]s assistance, not employment" (id. at 1558).

Johns persuasively shows that a workfare participant

generally cannot avail him- or herself of FLSA's minimum wage

specifications. As Johns recognizes, under most workfare

programs, a state does not hire, fire and supervise employees or

pay them a wage in a traditional sense, but instead makes public

assistance beneficiaries meet many different criteria, such as

financial, family-related and work requirements, to obtain

government assistance and job training so that they can

transition into actual employment in the public or private

sector. In addition, Johns makes the commonsense point that "the

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circumstances of the whole activity" of workfare participants and

the government are fundamentally different from those of

employers and employees whose relationship is governed by FLSA,

notwithstanding that the two arrangements may share some

"isolated factors" in common (Rutherford Food Corp., 331 US at

730).2

Under the rationale of Johns and the relevant

considerations identified by the Supreme Court and the lower

federal courts, petitioner here was not an "employee" of the City

and hence was not entitled to collect a minimum wage under FLSA.

In particular, the City did not have the power to "hire"

petitioner to fill an existing position left vacant by layoffs or

other circumstances, as the law specifically forbids the City to

replace an actual City employee with a WEP participant (see

Social Services Law § 336-c [2] [e]; 42 USC § 607 [f] [2]). And,

although the City had the power to reduce petitioner's benefits

based on his complete failure to participate in work activities

(see Social Services Law §§ 131 [5]; 336), the City could not

"fire" him in the sense of "expelling" him from the program based

solely on "substandard work or for failure to obey [workplace

rules]," as opposed to a complete refusal to work (Goldberg, 366

2

To be sure, Johns pre-dates PRWORA, but that is of no

moment because, as explained above, PRWORA actually strengthens

the rationale of Johns by revealing Congress's intent to place

workfare participants in a very different position than that of

an "employee" under FLSA.

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US at 33).

Furthermore, petitioner could not have had any

expectation of remuneration of the kind that would make him a

City "employee," as he was more akin to a student or trainee who

trained for full-time employment in the ordinary workforce by

engaging in work activities as one of the conditions of receiving

government assistance (see Walling, 330 US at 150-153). Indeed,

both federal and New York law establish the clear expectation and

reality that petitioner was not earning a wage in exchange for

his work because the law declares that his benefits were not the

equivalent of wages (see 42 USC § 608 [c]; 18 NYCRR § 385.9 [a]

[4]; see also 42 USC §§ 604 [f]; 607 [e]), and the amount of his

benefits was not only based on the number of hours he worked, but

also on his needs and family size, which were matters unrelated

to his work activities (see Social Security Law §§ 131 [4],

131-a).3 Moreover, the City did not structure the WEP program as

a "device" to skirt FLSA's requirements and flood the channels of

interstate commerce with goods and services unfairly generated at

below-market rates in substandard labor conditions (Goldberg, 366

US at 33). Instead, the City makes petitioner and other WEP

participants perform job-related tasks in order to develop

3

In fact, unlike wages that can be freely spent by an

employee and taxed by the government, state and federal law place

significant restrictions on the taxation and expenditure of

workfare benefits (see 42 USC § [a] [12] [A]; 18 NYCRR 381.1; see

also 20 CFR 416.1124 [c] [2]; IRS Publication No. 525: Taxable

& Nontaxable Income [1995–2013 eds.]).

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valuable skills for their planned departure from the program and

entry into genuine employment.

B.

The majority posits that, since petitioner did not

learn any skills in a classroom or participate in a formal and

systematic apprenticeship, the City used its professed desire to

train and educate petitioner as a charade to disguise an ordinary

employment situation subject to FLSA requirements (see majority

op. at 10-11). However, petitioner's work experience in a

professional setting was no less educational than the process of

obtaining job skills via class work. By taking part in the WEP

program, petitioner learned how to meet workplace expectations

such as timely arrival at a job site, how to interact

productively with colleagues, and how to complete his assignments

properly -- among the most essential and universal job skills.

In fact, petitioner's hands-on training may have been more

valuable to him than any academic discourse on professional

development.

The majority also believes that, because the Social

Services Law calculates a WEP participant's work hours by

dividing the amount of his or her benefits by the minimum wage

(see Social Security Law § 336-c [2] [b]), the statute deems a

WEP participant's benefits to be wages, akin to the minimum wage,

which must be paid as part of an employer-employee relationship

covered by FLSA (see majority op. at 8). But the New York

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statute's use of the minimum wage as a numerical factor to be

considered in setting the work hours of WEP participants does not

remotely indicate that WEP benefits are wages or that the

Legislature meant to give participants the minimum wage. To the

contrary, the Legislature may have simply sought to use the

number of hours that a minimum wage earner might work in exchange

for a particular amount of money as a convenient pre-existing

benchmark of a standard, fair number of working hours for WEP

participants, who need to adjust to such conditions that prevail

in the regular workforce which they hope to enter. Surely, the

Legislature did not transform WEP participants into government

employees by choosing the expedient of a maximum hours formula

based on a familiar metric of appropriate working conditions,

rather than inventing a new formula from scratch. Beyond that,

as the majority concedes (see majority op. at 9), this statutory

formula weighs against a finding that petitioner was a City

"employee" under FLSA because the statute, and not the City,

"determined the rate and method of payment" of petitioner's

benefits (Herman, 172 F3d at 139 [internal quotation marks

omitted]).

The majority insists that WEP is akin to the thinly

disguised commercial enterprise at issue in Tony & Susan Alamo

Foundation v Secretary of Labor (471 US at 290), which enterprise

was found by the Supreme Court to be subject to FLSA (see id. at

295-303). But, that case is readily distinguishable from the one

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before us. In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, a non-profit

organization with an avowed religious purpose operated a plethora

of "commercial businesses, which include[d] service stations,

retail clothing and grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing and

electrical construction companies, a recordkeeping company, a

motel, and companies engaged in the production and distribution

of candy" (id. at 292). The workers at those businesses, called

"associates," were needy, homeless or drug-addicted individuals

ostensibly aided and rehabilitated by the organization (id.).

The organization gave the associates in-kind benefits, but not

cash, in return for their labors (see id.). The Secretary of

Labor commenced a regulatory action against the organization,

asserting that, among other things, it "employed" the associates

within the meaning of FLSA and yet had not complied with FLSA's

minimum wage and overtime provisions (see id. at 293). The

organization countered that: it was not an "enterprise engaged in

commerce" to which FLSA applied; FLSA coverage would violate its

rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; and

it was exempt from FLSA's strictures because the associates were

"volunteers," not "employees" within the meaning of FLSA (id. at

293-295).

The Supreme Court held that the organization had to

comply with FLSA (see id. at 293-295, 299-303, 306). First, the

Court concluded that, because the lower courts had appropriately

found that the organization ran commercial enterprises in

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competition with other ordinary businesses, the organization was

a "commercial enterprise" subject to FLSA (see id. at 295-299).

Noting that it had "consistently construed the Act liberally to

apply to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional

direction," the Court determined that neither the organization's

expressed religious purpose nor its offer of services and food to

the associates removed it from the ambit of the statute because

both formal Department of Labor regulations and federal judicial

decisions had established that the religious or charitable nature

of an otherwise commercial enterprise did not serve to remove it

from the reach of the statute (id. at 296-299 [internal quotation

marks and citation omitted]). Importantly, the Court observed

that "[t]he legislative history of the Act support[ed] this

administrative and judicial gloss," and the Court relied on

extensive legislative history showing that Congress intended to

regulate enterprises like the organization under FLSA (id. at

297-298).

Furthermore, in the Court's view, the organization's

associates were "employees" under FLSA based on the overall

economic reality of their relationship with the organization (see

id. at 299-303). The Court noted that, unlike students or

trainees, the associates "must have expected to receive in-kind

benefits -- and expected them in exchange for their services"

such that those benefits were "wages in another form" (id. at 301

[emphasis added]). In addition to that expectation of wages, the

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Court relied on a number of factors that supported its

determination that the associates were statutory "employees,"

including their many years of service and near-total dependency

on the organization, their long work hours, their payment "on a

'commission' basis," and their having been "'fined'" severely

"for poor job performance" (id. at 301 n 22). Furthermore, the

Court rejected the notion that the associates could opt out of

the statute's coverage, declaring that a supposedly voluntary

waiver of the statute's protections would undermine the statute's

goal by ultimately driving down "wages" in "competing businesses"

(id. at 302). Finally, the Court rebuffed the organization's

First Amendment argument and held that the associates could

receive the protections of FLSA (see id. at 303-306).

Unlike the enterprise at issue in Tony & Susan Alamo

Foundation, WEP is not the sort of commercial enterprise that

FLSA seeks to regulate, as WEP does not compete with other

businesses in the production of goods or supply of services in

the channels of interstate commerce. And, as discussed, WEP

participants like petitioner are not employees of the City

because, while they may expect to obtain government assistance

upon meeting a combination of work-related and other criteria,

they do not expect those benefits solely "in exchange for their

services" (id. at 301), as did the associates in Tony & Susan

Alamo Foundation. Furthermore, although the City may penalize

WEP participants for failure to meet minimal requirements of

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attendance and hours at work, the City does not, unlike the

organization in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, reward or punish

participants based on the quality of their work, as an ordinary

commercial employer might, by giving them benefits on a

"'commission' basis" or "'fin[ing]'" [them] heavily for poor job

performance" (id. at 301 n 22). More fundamentally, in Tony &

Susan Alamo Foundation, the text and history of FLSA supported

the conclusion that the entity in question had to comply with

FLSA, whereas those authorities support the opposite conclusion

here. It is not surprising, then, that the Tenth Circuit in

Johns observed that Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation was fully

consistent with the conclusion that workfare participants cannot

obtain the protections of FLSA (see Johns, 57 F3d at 1557, citing

Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation, 471 US at 295).

The majority's reliance on a Department of Labor

document expressing the view that workfare recipients are

"employees" within the meaning of FLSA is equally misplaced (see

majority op. at 8). While the Department of Labor's views are

entitled to significant consideration based on its role as the

agency charged with administering FLSA (see Tony & Susan Alamo

Foundation, 471 US at 297), the deference owed to the agency's

interpretation of the statute depends primarily on its "power to

persuade" (Christensen v Harris County, 529 US 576, 587 [2000]),

and in this instance, the persuasive power of the Department's

document pales in comparison to the clear language, history and

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case law demonstrating that workfare participants are not

government employees.4 So, too, administrative guidance carries

considerably less weight where, as here, it comes in the form of

a document that has not been issued as "a formal adjudication or

notice-and-comment rulemaking" (id.).5

United States v City of New York (359 F3d 83 [2d Cir

2004]), cited by the majority (see majority op. at 11-12), is

inapposite. There, the Second Circuit held that WEP participants

are covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see id.

at 86-87), and in dictum, the court signaled that it might

4

Citing a Congressional conference report on 1997 budget

legislation, the majority claims that Congress "considered the

DOL's guidelines and accepted them" (majority op. at 8). But, in

the cited report, Congress merely mentioned the existence of the

Department's opinion on the subject of FLSA coverage for workfare

participants, noted the House's view that workfare participants

were not entitled to wages or a salary in any traditional sense,

and declined to pass any legislation addressing that specific

issue (see HR Rep No 105-217 [1997] at 434). Congress certainly

did not agree to enact the Department's guidance on this issue

into law, and its failure to invalidate the Department's

document, unlike the failure to overrule a binding Supreme Court

decision on the subject, is hardly a sign that the agency's

guidance has become the law of the land.

5

As the majority observes (see majority op. at 8 n 1), the

Department of Health and Human Services has issued a formal

regulation indicating that participants in programs governed by

PRWORA are protected by FLSA (see 45 CFR 260.35). But, the

Department of Health and Human Services is charged with joint

responsibility for interpreting PRWORA, not FLSA, and hence its

opinion on the meaning of FLSA is entitled to even less respect

than that of the Department of Labor. In any event, as

previously noted, the views of administrative agencies simply

cannot override the text, history and judicial interpretations of

FLSA.

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endorse the Department of Labor's view that FLSA covers workfare

participants (see id. at 94). Obviously, the dictum in City of

New York does not supply binding authority on the issue at hand,

nor is it even persuasive, as it merely restates the Department

of Labor's informal guidance without supplying significant

analysis of the text and history of FLSA and PRWORA relating to

this issue. In addition, while Title VII, like FLSA, is not

among the statutes explicitly referenced by PRWORA, the Second

Circuit's determination that Title VII nonetheless applies to

workfare participants does not compel a similar conclusion with

respect to FLSA. After all, some provisions of PRWORA reflect

Congress's desire to administer workfare programs on a non-

discriminatory basis (see e.g. 42 USC § 608 [d]), and as a

result, the application of Title VII protections to workfare

participants would not offend against the legislative intent

behind PRWORA in the same manner as the coverage of such

individuals under FLSA. Indeed, given Congress's broad desire to

ensure that all assistance recipients would receive the job

skills they needed via work experience programs under PRWORA, it

is hard to imagine that Congress wished to leave the states free

to offer the benefits and responsibilities of PRWORA only to

certain people on a piecemeal, discriminatory basis.6

6

To the extent cases dealing with employment issues

outside the FLSA context are relevant, we should follow the logic

of our own decision in Brukhman v Giuliani (94 NY2d 387 [2000])

instead of the Second Circuit's decision in City of New York. In

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Finally, the majority's holding, in addition to lacking

any legal basis, may raise serious practical problems. Under the

majority's rationale for deeming WEP participants to be City

employees, taxpayers may ultimately have to foot the bill for an

array of new expenses, including overtime, annual leave and sick

leave. Collective bargaining rules may soon apply to all

workfare recipients, not just those who participate in a

subsidized public employment program with an outside employer

(see Social Services Law § 336-e), thereby stymieing the orderly

administration of WEP. And, the City, State and federal

governments may have to reconcile the ordinarily tax-exempt

status of WEP participants' assistance payments with the

implication of today's decision that WEP participants essentially

earn those payments as the sort of "wages" that are generally

taxed in a regular employment context. The majority may protest

that its holding can be confined in one way or another, but given

the majority's imaginative characterization of workfare and

Brukhman, we decided that WEP participants are not government

employees protected by the prevailing wage provision of the state

constitution (see Brukhman, 94 NY2d at 391-397). Although we

were careful to limit our holding to the interpretation of that

constitutional provision (see id. at 397), we reached the

conclusion that WEP participants are not City "employees" under

the constitution based on many of the same factors which

demonstrate that they are not City "employees" under FLSA,

including the lack of any salary paid to participants in direct

exchange for their services and WEP's goal of moving participants

from a government assistance program into genuine employment (see

id. at 395-396). In light of those factors and the others listed

above, petitioner and other WEP participants are not "employees"

of the City within the meaning of FLSA.

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invocation of legal authorities from clearly distinguishable

contexts, attempts to limit the impact of the majority's decision

to this case and this minimum wage statute will prove difficult

at best and futile at worst. I would avoid this mess and follow

existing law.7

III.

In its effort to fit the square peg of assistance into

the round hole of employment under FLSA, the majority defies the

will of Congress, ignores the teachings of the Supreme Court and

needlessly creates a split in authority between this Court and

the Tenth Circuit. Because the majority's decision sows

confusion in this important area of federal law, courts

throughout New York and, potentially, the Nation must now

struggle in vain to reconcile the majority's illogical holding

with the relevant legislative scheme and common sense, and thus

the majority's opinion will likely reverberate in unfortunate

ways throughout the legal system. Since the plain language of

FLSA and PRWORA, as well as the legislative purpose behind those

statutes, show that WEP participants are not City "employees"

entitled to the protections of FLSA, I dissent and vote to

reverse the order of the Appellate Division.

7

It is unclear under the majority's decision whether the

government would ever be able to recoup lottery winnings from a

WEP participant, since the government does not recover wages that

it pays to employees. Presumably, even if petitioner had won a

multi-million dollar lottery prize, the majority would let him

keep every penny.

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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Supreme Court judgment appealed from and Appellate Division order

insofar as sought to be reviewed affirmed, without costs. Opinion

by Chief Judge Lippman. Judges Rivera, Stein and Fahey concur.

Judge Abdus-Salaam dissents in an opinion in which Judge Pigott

concurs.

Decided November 19, 2015

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