Opinion

Ramona Hinojosa v. Brad Livingston

  • 807 F.3d 657
  • 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20016
  • 2015 WL 7422990
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Nov 18, 2015
Status
Published
On the bench
Reavley, Jones, Elrod
Nature of suit
Civil Rights
Cited by
134 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.7%

finding that “evidence showing that a substantial risk ... was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to the information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known about it” supports a finding of deliberate indifference

How later courts described this case

  • finding that “evidence showing that a substantial risk ... was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to the information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known about it” supports a finding of deliberate indifference
  • recognizing that the complaint filed by the representative of a deceased inmate who suffered from hypertension, diabetes, depression, and schizophrenia stated an Eighth Amendment claim arising from the inmate’s heat-related death in a Texas prison cell with sealed windows where the inside temperatures consistently exceeded 90 and even 100 degrees
  • explaining our “circuit has made very clear that 15 Case: 24-50605 Document: 86-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/22/2025 No. 24-50605 inmates have a right, under the Eighth Amendment, not to be subjected to extreme temperatures without adequate remedial measures”
  • explaining the Eighth Amendment right "not to be subjected to extreme temperatures without adequate remedial measures” and noting that "the provision of fans, ice water, and daily showers can suffice”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 14-40459 Document: 00513277410 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/18/2015

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 18, 2015

No. 14-40459

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

RAMONA HINOJOSA, Individually as a Wrongful Death Beneficiary and as

the Heir to the Estate of Albert Hinojosa,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

BRAD LIVINGSTON; RICK THALER; WILLIAM STEPHENS,

Defendants – Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

In this interlocutory appeal, Brad Livingston, Rick Thaler, and William

Stephens (collectively “Defendants”) challenge an order of the district court

that deferred ruling on their motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified

immunity and ordered limited discovery. Because the district court correctly

concluded that the complaint was sufficient and that further factual

development was needed to rule on Defendants’ qualified immunity defense,

and because the discovery that the district court ordered was narrowly tailored

to the facts needed to rule on the defense, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal

and dismiss.

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No. 14-40459

I.

On August 29, 2012, Albert Hinojosa died of complications from

heatstroke while he was incarcerated at the Garza West Unit of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). 1 Shortly after midnight, an inmate

reported that Hinojosa had fallen out of his bed and was convulsing. A

correctional officer found Hinojosa on the floor of his cell. He was

unresponsive, and his skin was hot to the touch. The officer’s supervisor called

for an ambulance, but Hinojosa was pronounced dead twenty minutes after it

arrived. An autopsy concluded that he “was vulnerable to the effects of

environmental hyperthermia due to pre-existing natural disease, and likely

suffered a seizure followed by fatal cardiac arrhythmia.”

Hinojosa’s mother and sole heir, Ramona Hinojosa, sued numerous

prison officials and employees, the TDCJ, the University of Texas Medical

Branch (“UTMB”), and an official of UTMB, alleging that they were responsible

for her son’s death. 2 She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the ADA Amendments

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.

§ 794. Only the § 1983 claim is at issue in this appeal. Hinojosa’s mother

premised her § 1983 claim on an asserted Eighth Amendment violation,

alleging that the conditions in which Defendants housed Hinojosa posed a

substantial risk of serious harm, and that Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference toward Hinojosa’s health and safety needs.

1For purposes of this appeal, we take the complaint’s factual allegations as true and

view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp.,

430 F.3d 245, 252 (5th Cir. 2005).

2Ramona Hinojosa passed away during the pendency of this appeal, and Rene Arturo

Hinojosa—Ramona’s grandson and Albert’s nephew—is now pursuing this suit as

representative of Ramona’s estate.

2

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The complaint alleges that at the time of his death, Hinojosa was forty-

four years old and obese, and he suffered from hypertension, diabetes,

depression, and schizophrenia—conditions that made him susceptible to heat-

related illnesses. According to the complaint, Hinojosa took various

medications for his ailments, a common side-effect of which is that they render

patients more vulnerable to the heat. The complaint alleges that, as reflected

in TDCJ policies, Defendants knew that these conditions and medications put

affected prisoners at an increased risk of heat-related illness. Indeed,

according to the complaint, from 2007 until Hinojosa’s death, thirteen other

men had died from heat-related causes in TDCJ prisons. Many of these

individuals allegedly suffered from ailments—and had been prescribed

medications—similar to Hinojosa’s. Moreover, the complaint alleges that like

many of the other deceased prisoners, Hinojosa had recently been moved from

a climate-controlled county jail, 3 and he died shortly after his arrival at a non-

air-conditioned TDCJ transfer facility before he had much time to acclimatize

to the high temperatures of the new environment. The complaint alleges that

TDCJ policies acknowledged the importance of acclimatization to reduce the

risk of heatstroke, but TDCJ did not have any housing assignment policy for

newly arrived inmates to help them acclimatize.

According to the complaint, although certain parts of the Garza West

Unit have air conditioning, those portions used to house inmates do not, and

the Unit’s windows are sealed shut. The complaint alleges that summer

temperatures inside the Unit routinely exceed 90°F, and even 100°F. The

complaint specifically alleges that the day before Hinojosa died, the

temperature at the Unit surpassed 100°F, and in twenty-seven of the twenty-

3By law, the indoor temperature of Texas county jails generally must be kept between

65°F and 85°F. See 37 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 259.160, 260.154.

3

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eight days preceding his death, the temperature rose above 95°F. According to

the complaint, while TDCJ policies dictate that inmates with heat-sensitive

conditions not work or recreate in environments where the apparent air

temperature is 95°F or higher, they do not address housing assignments for

such inmates. In addition, according to the complaint, inmates sometimes wait

up to ten days to receive their intake physical examination after their transfer

to TDCJ custody. These physicals provide the first opportunity to detect and

treat inmates’ heat-sensitive medical problems, and the complaint alleges that

TDCJ will not allow newly arrived inmates to labor outdoors until they have

received an intake physical. But what is true for work is not true for housing,

the complaint asserts. According to the complaint, before they receive their

intake physicals, newly arrived inmates may not labor outdoors in high

temperatures, but they are nonetheless housed in high indoor temperatures

along with the rest of the inmate population.

The complaint alleges that despite their awareness of numerous prior

heat-related fatalities, Defendants took no corrective action. Under policies

that Defendants allegedly implemented and could have changed, no housing

accommodation was made for newly arrived inmates or inmates with heat-

sensitive medical conditions. The complaint asserts that Thaler and Stephens

routinely reviewed reports of heat-related injuries and deaths and regularly

discussed those incidents in meetings with their deputies. According to the

complaint, however, they made no changes to inmates’ accommodations, failed

to ensure that inmates timely received intake physicals, and failed to

implement any other protective procedures. Livingston also took no action, the

complaint alleges, even though he approved cooling measures for barns

housing pigs that TDCJ raises for slaughter. The complaint also alleges that

Livingston took part in the decision not to employ medical staff at the Garza

West Unit during night hours, and that all three supervisory Defendants were

4

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No. 14-40459

responsible for an alleged lack of adequate training that correctional officers

received.

II.

Defendants moved to dismiss the § 1983 claim against them on the basis

of qualified immunity. They argued that as the top three security

administrators of TDCJ, 4 they were not personally responsible for—and did

not personally participate in—any decisions regarding Hinojosa’s housing or

medical needs, and they did not violate clearly established law.

After hearing argument on the motion, the district court orally denied it

from the bench. In its later-issued written order explaining its reasoning, the

district court held that the complaint alleged facts which, if true, would permit

the inference that the defendants were liable for the alleged harm and would

defeat the qualified immunity defense. However, the district court determined

that further factual development was necessary for it to rule on the defense,

because “[t]here remain significant questions to be answered as to the details

of the TDCJ Defendants’ knowledge, actions, omissions and/or policies in

regards to TDCJ prison operations in times of extreme heat.” Therefore, the

district court deferred ruling on the qualified immunity defense and ordered

discovery “limited to the personal knowledge and personal conduct of each

Defendant as it relates to Albert Hinojosa and the circumstances leading to his

death.” Defendants then initiated this interlocutory appeal.

4 As detailed in the complaint, at the time of Hinojosa’s death, Brad Livingston was

the executive director of TDCJ, Rick Thaler was the director of TDCJ’s Correctional

Institutions Division, and William Stephens was the deputy director of the Correctional

Institutions Division. The complaint asserts that in their capacities, Livingston, Thaler, and

Stephens exercised administrative authority over all TDCJ employees working in TDCJ

institutions, including those working in the Garza West Unit.

5

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III.

The parties disagree over whether we have jurisdiction to review the

district court’s order. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to review

“final decisions” of the district courts in our circuit. Generally, this class of

decisions “does not include discovery orders.” Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645,

647–48 (5th Cir. 2012). However, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 1291

to include a grant of authority to review a “small class” of collateral orders

traditionally considered non-final. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,

337 U.S. 541, 545–47 (1949). Under this collateral order doctrine, we have

jurisdiction under § 1291 to entertain appeals from decisions that “[1]

conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [are] effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Texas v. Caremark, Inc., 584

F.3d 655, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Will v.

Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006)). A district court’s order denying qualified

immunity is one such order. Zapata v. Melson, 750 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir.

2014); Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. So too is an order deferring the district court’s

qualified immunity ruling and providing for limited discovery if the order fails

to comply with our precedent, because “[o]ne of the most salient benefits of

qualified immunity is protection from pretrial discovery.” Backe, 691 F.3d at

648. If, however, such an order complies with our precedent, we lack

jurisdiction to review it. Zapata, 750 F.3d at 485; Backe, 691 F.3d at 648.

Thus, to determine whether we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory

appeal, we must determine whether the district court’s order complied with

our precedent for issuing such orders. “[T]his court has established a careful

procedure under which a district court may defer its qualified immunity ruling

if further factual development is necessary to ascertain the availability of that

defense.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. First, the district court must determine “that

6

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the plaintiff’s pleadings assert facts which, if true, would overcome the defense

of qualified immunity.” Id. (quoting Wicks v. Miss. State Emp’t Servs., 41 F.3d

991, 994 (5th Cir. 1995)). “Thus, a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified

immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged

and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.” Id. When

reviewing a complaint that meets this standard, the district court may defer

its qualified immunity ruling and order limited discovery if “the court remains

‘unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the

facts.’” Id. (quoting Lion Boulos v. Wilson, 834 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1987)).

Such a discovery order must be “narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts

needed to rule on the immunity claim.” Id. (quoting Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at

507–08). “[W]e may review the order under the collateral order doctrine when

a district court fails to find first that the plaintiff’s complaint overcomes a

defendant’s qualified immunity defense, when the court refuses to rule on a

qualified immunity defense, or when the court’s discovery order exceeds the

requisite ‘narrowly tailored’ scope.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also

Zapata, 750 F.3d at 485.

IV.

A.

We first ask whether the complaint pleads facts that, if true, would

permit the inference that Defendants are liable under § 1983 for an Eighth

Amendment violation and would overcome their qualified immunity defense.

We conclude that it does.

i.

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the

infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This

prohibition, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth

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Amendment, 5 see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962), “does

not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones.”

Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 592 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To plead an Eighth Amendment violation based on

the conditions of an inmate’s confinement, a plaintiff must allege conditions

that “pos[e] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The

plaintiff must also allege that the defendant prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. Id. This requires more than an

allegation of mere negligence, but less than an allegation of purpose or

knowledge. Id. at 835–36. Rather, a prison official acts with deliberate

indifference when he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he

must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.

Whether a risk is substantial and the threatened harm is serious

represents an objective test; whether prison officials consciously disregarded

the risk represents a subjective one. Ball, 792 F.3d at 592. Furthermore,

5 In their initial brief, Defendants argue that “[a] prison conditions claim by a prisoner

convicted of a crime is governed by the Eighth and not the Fourteenth Amendment,” and

“[b]ecause the Complaint does not claim that Hinojosa was a pre-trial detainee, the

Fourteenth Amendment claim should have been dismissed.” Defendants misunderstand the

complaint’s invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint invokes the Fourteenth

Amendment simply because it is by that provision—and that provision alone—that the

Eighth Amendment’s guarantee applies against the States; the Eighth Amendment does not

apply of its own force to the States. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666–67 (holding that the

Fourteenth Amendment makes the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee applicable against the

States and concluding that the state law challenged in that case “inflicts a cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment”) (emphasis added); see also McDonald

v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010) (noting that the Court has “held that incorporated

Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth

Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against

federal encroachment’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)).

Indeed, contrary to Defendants’ argument, nothing in the complaint or in Plaintiff’s briefs

suggests any intention to bring a pre-trial detention conditions-of-confinement claim.

8

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“[w]hether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is

a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including

inference from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a

prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was

obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (internal citation omitted). For instance, “if

an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial

risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or

expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest

that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information

concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it, then such evidence

could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official

had actual knowledge of the risk.” Id. at 842–43 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

We have held that exposing an inmate to extreme cell temperatures can

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Ball, 792 F.3d at 592;

Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2004); Blackmon v. Garza, 484

F. App’x 866, 869 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 381

(5th Cir. 1977) (noting that the Eighth Amendment is implicated by “extremes

of temperature that are likely to be injurious to inmates’ health”). In Gates,

we affirmed an injunction requiring state prison officials to provide ice water,

fans, and daily showers when the heat index was 90°F or above. 376 F.3d at

339–40. The evidence in Gates showed that “summer temperatures . . .

average[d] in the nineties with high humidity,” ventilation measures were

inadequate to afford relief from the heat, “[t]he probability of heat-related

illness [was] extreme,” and inmates taking certain medications were especially

susceptible to the heat. Id. at 334. In holding that the district court had

properly identified an Eighth Amendment violation, we noted that an expert

had testified that heat-related deaths were “very likely,” and that a finding of

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deliberate indifference was justified “based on the open and obvious nature of

these conditions and the evidence that inmates had complained of symptoms

of heat-related illness.” Id. at 339–40.

Similarly, in Blackmon, we held that prison officials were not entitled to

judgment as a matter of law where the evidence showed extreme temperatures

in the facility, the plaintiff inmate was particularly susceptible to heat-related

injury because of his age and medication, and the prison officials were aware

of the danger but took arguably inadequate remedial measures. 484 F. App’x

at 870–73. Most recently, in Ball, we held that an injunction requiring heat-

reduction measures was supported by an Eighth Amendment violation where

an expert testified that the plaintiff inmates were particularly susceptible to

the heat because of their medical conditions and treatments, and the evidence

showed that during a monitoring period, the heat index at the facility ranged

from 81.5°F to 107.79°F, with temperatures ranging from 78.26°F to 92.66°F.

792 F.3d at 596. Prison officials had violated the Eighth Amendment even

though they argued that no inmate at the subject facility “ha[d] ever suffered

a heat-related incident” and the plaintiffs’ “medical records show[ed] no signs

of heat-related illness.” Id. at 593. This is because, “[t]o prove unconstitutional

prison conditions, inmates need not show that death or serious injury has

already occurred. They need only show that there is a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

ii.

Here, the complaint alleges an Eighth Amendment violation. The

complaint alleges that Defendants subjected Hinojosa to dangerous heat

conditions in conscious disregard of the serious risk that the heat posed for

prisoners who, like Hinojosa, suffered from certain medical conditions, took

certain medications, and had recently been transferred from air-conditioned

jails to non-climate-controlled facilities. As to conditions posing a substantial

10

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risk of serious harm, the complaint alleges that temperatures in the Garza

West Unit routinely exceeded 90°F, and even 100°F, and that Defendants’

policies subjected inmates to these dangerous temperatures. It asserts that

Hinojosa died in his cell in the early morning due to complications following a

heatstroke, and that the temperature had risen above 100°F during the

previous day. The complaint also alleges that inmates are provided “grossly

inadequate amounts of water” to cope with the heat. These allegations plainly

suffice to set forth conditions constituting a substantial risk of serious harm to

inmates with medical conditions and prescriptions like Hinojosa’s. See Ball,

792 F.3d at 594; Gates, 376 F.3d at 339–40; Blackmon, 484 F. App’x at 870–71.

Moreover, to support its claim that Defendants were aware of the heat

risk and consciously disregarded it, the complaint alleges that from 2007 until

Hinojosa’s death, thirteen other men had died from heat-related causes in

TDCJ prisons under similar circumstances, and TDCJ had previously been

sued by inmates complaining of the heat. 6 Ten of these thirteen deaths

occurred in 2011, the year before Hinojosa’s. Furthermore, the complaint

alleges that Defendants took no action despite their knowledge of these deaths,

of the extreme temperatures in TDCJ facilities, of the vulnerability of recently

transferred inmates with conditions and medications similar to Hinojosa’s, and

of the importance of timely intake physicals. It also alleges that TDCJ policies

themselves recognized the risk of heat to inmates like Hinojosa, and

6 The complaint refers to the following heat-condition cases brought by inmates: Ruiz

v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ruiz v. United

States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001); Valigura v. Mendoza, 265 F. App’x 232 (5th Cir. 2008);

Blackmon v. Kukua, 758 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D. Tex. 2010), rev’d and remanded sub nom.

Blackmon v. Garza, 484 F. App’x 866 (5th Cir. 2012). It also refers to a pending lawsuit,

McCollum v. Livingston, No. 3:12-cv-2037 (N.D. Tex.), which arose from one of the deaths

described in the complaint. In its order, the district court took notice that additional wrongful

death lawsuits similar to the present one have been filed against TDCJ and Defendants, and

it cited one of them, Webb v. Livingston, No. 6:13-cv-711 (E.D. Tex.).

11

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Defendants provided training (albeit inadequate training) regarding extreme

temperatures, suggesting their awareness of the risk.

The complaint specifically asserts that Thaler and Stephens routinely

reviewed reports of heat-related injuries and deaths, discussing them in

meetings with their deputies. According to the complaint, while Thaler and

Stephens maintain that they remind regional directors and wardens to take

heat-safety precautions, Thaler and Stephens in fact do no such thing. The

complaint also asserts that Livingston personally approved cooling measures

to protect the swine that TDCJ raises for slaughter, and Plaintiff argues that

this allegation shows that Livingston was aware of the heat risk to inmates.

The complaint also describes a letter that a state representative sent to

Livingston, expressing concern about the high temperatures and asking that

TDCJ take preventative measures.

These allegations, if true, would establish that Defendants were “aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and . . . also dr[ew] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837; see also id. at 842–43 (observing that deliberate indifference can be

inferred merely from the obviousness of the risk, such as when prior incidents

are pervasive or well-documented and circumstances suggest that the

defendant was aware of them); cf. also Ball, 792 F.3d at 594–95 (holding that

the defendants were aware of the risk posed by high temperatures even though

they argued no inmate had ever suffered a heat-related incident at the subject

facility). In any event, the open and obvious nature of the dangerously hot

conditions would also support an inference of deliberate indifference. See

Gates, 376 F.3d at 340.

Defendants argue that the complaint fails to plead deliberate

indifference because it does not allege that they were aware of Hinojosa’s

specific medical history and needs. However, their lack of knowledge of

12

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Hinojosa’s individual susceptibility to heat-related dangers cannot defeat an

Eighth Amendment claim. The complaint alleges that Defendants were aware

of the risk to recently transferred inmates with conditions and medications like

Hinojosa’s and yet took no action. Prison officials cannot escape liability in a

conditions-of-confinement case like this one by arguing that, while they

allegedly were aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of

serious harm to a discrete class of vulnerable inmates, they were not aware

that the particular inmate involved in the case belonged to that class. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (in a case alleging prison conditions that created a risk

of violence, holding that “it does not matter whether the risk comes from a

single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner

faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all

prisoners in his situation face such a risk”) (emphasis added); id. at 844

(observing that where prison violence is widespread, “it would obviously be

irrelevant to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely

who would attack whom”); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (noting

that the Eighth Amendment is implicated—and § 1983 liability may be

triggered—when prison officials allow inmates to be exposed to infectious

disease, “even though the possible infection might not affect all of those

exposed”). Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that Defendants’ ignorance

of Hinojosa’s medical history could be relevant, the complaint alleges

dangerous conditions that we have previously held to be unconstitutional for

general inmate populations. See Gates, 376 F.3d at 339–40.

In sum, then, the complaint adequately alleges an Eighth Amendment

violation based on Hinojosa’s conditions of confinement. Nevertheless,

Defendants contend that the complaint does not properly allege their

responsibility for the asserted constitutional violation because § 1983 does not

contemplate supervisory liability. They argue that they cannot be held liable

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for the alleged failures of medical personnel and subordinate corrections

officers because they did not personally participate in those failures.

The premise of Defendants’ argument is undoubtedly correct. In Monell

v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court held that claims against

local governments premised on a theory of respondeat superior liability are not

cognizable under § 1983. 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). Relying on Monell, “we

have held that supervisory officials may not be found vicariously liable for the

actions of their subordinates under § 1983.” Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15

F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d

381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Monell for the proposition that “§ 1983 does not

give a cause of action based on the conduct of subordinates,” and observing that

“[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of

action”). Indeed, the Supreme Court squarely held in Ashcroft v. Iqbal that

§ 1983 claims against supervisory officials cannot be premised merely upon

their knowledge of subordinates’ actions. 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). Instead,

under § 1983, “each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is

only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Id.

But Defendants misread the complaint. The complaint does not seek to

hold Defendants vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates.

Rather, it seeks to hold them liable for their own actions in promulgating—and

failing to correct—intake and housing policies that exposed Hinojosa and other

inmates like him to extreme temperatures without adequate remedial

measures. “A supervisory official may be held liable . . . if . . . he implements

unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.”

Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks

omitted). To the extent that Defendants appear to argue they had no hand in

the formation of the intake and housing policies described in the complaint,

they raise a factual dispute inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

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The complaint specifically alleges that Defendants promulgated and had the

power to change the policies that allegedly caused Hinojosa’s death. Moreover,

while it is true that the complaint contains allegations regarding the conduct

of Defendants’ subordinates, these allegations seek only to establish direct

liability against those subordinates who were also named as defendants in the

complaint, not vicarious liability against Livingston, Thaler, and Stephens.

iii.

The complaint alleges facts that, if true, not only would establish

Defendants’ liability for an Eighth Amendment violation, but also would be

sufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense. “A public official is

entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates that (1) the

defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and (2) the defendant’s

actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the

time of the violation.” Porter, 659 F.3d at 445. “A Government official’s

conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged

conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every

‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right.’” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Our precedent clearly establishes that

the Eighth Amendment guarantees inmates a right to be free from exposure to

extremely dangerous temperatures without adequate remedial measures. See,

e.g., Gates, 376 F.3d at 339–40; Blackmon, 484 F. App’x at 869; see also Smith,

553 F.2d at 381. In light of this precedent, a prison official acts unreasonably

when he, either directly or through his policy, subjects an inmate to extremely

dangerous temperatures without adequate remedial measures in conscious

disregard of the risk posed by those temperatures.

Defendants argue, however, that the complaint cannot surmount the

qualified immunity hurdle because there is no clearly established right to an

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air-conditioned cell or to around-the-clock medical care. Defendants’ argument

again misreads the complaint and confuses right with remedy. While the

complaint does allege that TDCJ cells are not air-conditioned and that TDCJ

fails to employ medical staff during nighttime hours, it does not claim that the

Eighth Amendment requires such accommodations. Rather, the right that it

asserts is the right to be free from exposure to extremely dangerous

temperatures without adequate remedial measures. The complaint’s

description of the lack of remedial measures does not purport to be an

exhaustive list of the Eighth Amendment’s basic requirements. It is simply a

description of several ways in which Defendants could have addressed the risk,

but instead chose not to do so. The right that it asserts, however, is the well-

established Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to extremely

dangerous temperatures without adequate ameliorative measures.

Defendants also contend that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015), bolsters their qualified immunity

argument. It does not. In Barkes, survivors of an inmate who committed

suicide brought suit against, inter alia, the commissioner of the Delaware

Department of Corrections and the institution’s warden. Id. at 2043. When

the inmate had arrived at the facility, a nurse administered an intake mental

health evaluation, which revealed only two out of seventeen possible suicide

risk factors. Id. Following established protocol, the nurse gave the inmate a

routine referral to mental health services but did not activate any special

suicide-prevention measures. Id. The inmate was placed alone in a cell and

hanged himself the next day. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the commissioner

and warden violated the inmate’s Eighth Amendment right “by failing to

supervise and monitor the private contractor that provided the medical

treatment—including the intake screening—at the Institution.” Id. The

Supreme Court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity

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because no decision of the Court “even discusses suicide screening or

prevention protocols,” the Third Circuit’s own case law did not clearly recognize

such a right, and other circuits had generally “suggested that such a right

did not exist.” Id. at 2044–45. In sum, the Court found, even if the alleged

shortcomings existed, “no precedent on the books . . . would have made clear to

petitioners that they were overseeing a system that violated the Constitution.”

Id. at 2045.

Here, by contrast, assuming Hinojosa’s allegations to be true, our

precedent put Defendants on notice that they were “overseeing a system that

violated the Constitution.” Id. Our circuit has made very clear that inmates

have a right, under the Eighth Amendment, not to be subjected to extreme

temperatures without adequate remedial measures, and Defendants have not

alerted us to any contrary authority. See, e.g., Gates, 376 F.3d at 339–40; see

also Smith, 553 F.2d at 381; Blackmon, 484 F. App’x at 869. While we have

not had occasion to give an exhaustive list of acceptable remedial measures,

we have held that the provision of fans, ice water, and daily showers can

suffice. See Gates, 376 F.3d at 339–40; see also Ball, 792 F.3d at 599 (approving

remedies short of full air-conditioning such as the diversion of cool air from

prison staff areas into inmate areas, allowing inmates to access air

conditioning during specified times, and the provision of cool daily showers,

cold ice water, personal ice containers, and individual fans).

A reasonable prison official in our circuit knows that during times of

extreme heat, he must afford these remedies—or remedies like them—to

satisfactorily address the risk of heat-related illnesses and fatalities. However,

the complaint alleges that TDCJ did not provide enough drinking water or

personal fans during times of extreme heat, and that the water that was

provided was only lukewarm. The complaint also alleges that Defendants

knew that prisoners such as Hinojosa were particularly vulnerable to the heat,

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and that through the intake and housing policies that they promulgated, they

failed to ensure that such prisoners received any meaningful relief. If true,

this would defeat a qualified immunity defense, because it would establish that

Defendants subjected Hinojosa to extreme temperatures without adequate

remedial measures, in violation of our circuit’s clearly established law.

B.

Having determined that the complaint’s factual allegations, if true,

would establish Defendants’ liability for an Eighth Amendment violation and

overcome a qualified immunity defense, we next ask whether further

clarification of the facts was necessary for the district court to rule on the

qualified immunity defense. We easily conclude that it was.

When reviewing a well-pleaded complaint and a defendant’s motion to

dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, a district court may defer its

qualified immunity ruling and order limited discovery when “the court remains

‘unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the

facts.’” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648 (quoting Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507). In other

words, a district court may elect the defer-and-discover approach “when the

defendant’s immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual question” that

must be answered before a ruling can issue. Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507.

Here, the district court held that it was unable to rule on Defendants’

qualified immunity claim because factual development was needed as to their

“knowledge, actions, omissions and/or policies in regards to TDCJ prison

operations in times of extreme heat.” In particular, the district court concluded

that:

[I]t is necessary to know when and how the TDCJ Defendants

learned about specific prisoner deaths, including the death of

Albert Hinojosa, and/or serious injury related to extreme heat;

whether the TDCJ Defendants ordered that conditions be

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monitored or a study conducted regarding extreme heat and

inmate safety; their familiarity with Fifth Circuit case law

addressing the dangers of heat within the context of the Eighth

Amendment and whether or not policies were implemented or

changed in accordance with such direction; whether the TDCJ has

performed any studies into the costs of reducing extreme

temperatures within the dorms via more efficient systems,

engineering modifications, or other facility upgrades; whether the

TDCJ Defendants personally consulted with UTMB officials in

regards to the transportation and housing of at-risk inmates

during the summer months; whether the TDCJ Defendants

considered that at-risk inmates be maintained in air-conditioned

facilities when in transport; and whether the TDCJ Defendants

received copies of notes, memoranda, emails, or other

correspondence from TDCJ wardens concerning heat-related

issues at their units and any administrative responses thereto.

The district court considered these factual issues to be “particularly important

when evaluating the second prong of the qualified immunity test—the

reasonableness of the TDCJ Defendants’ actions in light of the clearly

established constitutional right to be free from extreme temperatures.”

The factual questions of what Defendants knew, when they knew it, and

whether they investigated and considered possible remedial measures, are

undoubtedly necessary to answer before determining whether Defendants

acted reasonably in light of clearly established law. Of course, as detailed

above, Defendants’ knowledge is central to the deliberate indifference element

of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. However, their knowledge is also

highly relevant to qualified immunity, because it bears heavily on the

reasonableness of their actions.

As we recently observed in a similar interlocutory appeal from a district

court’s discovery order, the qualified immunity inquiry requires the district

court to “evaluate whether [the defendants] acted with deliberate indifference

by subjectively disregarding a known risk, and whether [their] actions were

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objectively reasonable despite the alleged deliberate indifference.” Webb v.

Livingston, No. 14-40579, 2015 WL 4385287, at *5 (5th Cir. July 17, 2015)

(unpublished) (internal citation omitted) (holding that a district court’s defer-

and-discover order in a similar wrongful death case against Livingston, Thaler,

and Stephens complied with our precedent for issuing such orders, and

dismissing for lack of jurisdiction). Furthermore, Defendants’ “subjective

knowledge is a question of fact, which this court has recognized is peculiarly

within [their] knowledge and possession.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Gates, 376 F.3d at 333 (“Whether a prison official had the

requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact . . . .”); Schultea

v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1431 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the establishment

of qualified immunity “depend[s] on facts peculiarly within the knowledge and

control of the defendant” (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980)).

The qualified immunity defense requires the district court to determine

whether Defendants acted reasonably at the time of the alleged constitutional

violation, and “[t]his determination is complicated when, as here, the

deliberate indifference standard must be reconciled with the second prong’s

objective reasonableness standard.” Webb, 2015 WL 4385287, at *6. The

reasonableness analysis must be different from the deliberate-indifference

analysis, because “[o]therwise, a successful claim of qualified immunity in this

context would require defendants to demonstrate that they prevail on the

merits, thus rendering qualified immunity an empty doctrine.” Id. (quoting

Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 1998). “In light of these

complexities, we have observed that ‘[a]dditional facts . . . are particularly

important when evaluating the [reasonableness] prong of the qualified

immunity test.’” Id. (quoting Morgan v. Hubert, 335 F. App’x 466, 473 (5th Cir.

2009). That holds true in this case. The district court did not err in

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determining that factual development was needed to rule on Defendants’

qualified immunity defense.

C.

Our foregoing discussion establishes that the district court was

empowered to defer its qualified immunity ruling and issue a discovery order.

However, the breadth of the ordered discovery is critically important.

Qualified immunity is immunity not only from judgment, but also from suit;

“[o]ne of the most salient benefits of qualified immunity is protection from

pretrial discovery.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. We therefore must determine

whether the discovery that the district court ordered was “narrowly tailored to

uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim.” Id. (quoting

Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507–08). While this presents a somewhat close

question, we conclude that the district court’s discovery order was

appropriately tailored.

The district court ordered discovery “limited to the personal knowledge

and personal conduct of each Defendant as it relates to Albert Hinojosa and

the circumstances leading to his death.” The district court elaborated that:

Such discovery may include Defendants’ knowledge of extreme

temperatures at the Garza West Unit, including knowledge of any

prisoner complaints to prison officials about the temperature in

the dorms or cells for the months of May through September for

the years of 2010, 2011, and 2012. Plaintiff may inquire as to each

Defendant’s personal knowledge, if any, in regards to the effects of

extreme heat on pre-existing medical conditions of hypertension,

diabetes, depression, and schizophrenia, whether Defendants are

familiar with the medications generally prescribed to treat such

conditions, and whether Defendants have knowledge or training

concerning medications and extreme heat. Plaintiff may inquire

as to any policies and procedures in place at the Garza West Unit,

as well as TDCJ system-wide policies or procedures, adopted or in

place to address prison operations when temperatures are

considered to constitute extreme heat.

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Defendants contend that this discovery is overbroad because it relates to

a three-year period, encompasses system-wide TDCJ policies and conditions

rather than those only at the Garza West Unit, and covers complaints by

inmates without medical conditions like Hinojosa’s. Defendants also seize on

the discovery order’s observation that factual development was necessary as to

“whether the TDCJ Defendants considered that at-risk inmates be maintained

in air-conditioned facilities when in transport,” apparently interpreting this

line to authorize discovery as to whether TDCJ inmate-transportation vehicles

are equipped with air conditioning. Defendants also dismiss as “irrelevant”

their general knowledge about prison heat, whether they conducted studies or

consulted with UTMB officials, TDCJ policies regarding operations during

extreme temperatures, when and how they learned of other inmate deaths,

their familiarity with our precedent, their receipt of correspondence from

wardens regarding heat-related issues, and whether policies were

implemented or changed. Finally, Defendants contend that they have already

provided “extensive discovery” in other similar cases, making the district

court’s discovery order unnecessary.

As a preliminary matter, we do not agree that the district court’s order

authorizes discovery regarding inmate transportation in TDCJ vehicles. The

district court observed that discovery was needed to determine “whether the

TDCJ Defendants personally consulted with UTMB officials in regards to the

transportation and housing of at-risk inmates during the summer months,”

and “whether the TDCJ Defendants considered that at-risk inmates be

maintained in air-conditioned facilities when in transport.” In making this

observation, the district court appears to have used the words “transportation”

and “transport” to mean the movement of inmates into a transfer facility, such

as the Garza West Unit, and then through the prison system. The

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transportation of inmates in non-air-conditioned TDCJ vehicles has never been

at issue in this case, and in any event, the district court’s order never discusses

the matter. Moreover, the complaint specifically alleges that inmates are most

vulnerable when moved from air-conditioned county jails into non-climate-

controlled transfer facilities, like the Garza West Unit, because of the

temperature change and lack of opportunity to acclimatize. Viewed alongside

the nature of the complaint’s allegations, Defendants’ strained reading of the

district court’s use of the words “transportation” and “transport” is mistaken.

We also disagree with Defendants’ assertion that much of the ordered

discovery was “irrelevant.” The complaint sets out an Eighth Amendment

claim by alleging deliberate indifference to dangerous heat conditions in TDCJ

facilities. Assuming that the complaint’s allegations are true, to be entitled to

qualified immunity, Defendants must show either that they were not

deliberately indifferent to the heat risk, or that their actions were reasonable

in light of clearly established law. What Defendants knew about prison heat

and its risks (especially for vulnerable inmates with medical conditions like

Hinojosa’s), when and how Defendants acquired such knowledge, whether

Defendants investigated the risk and explored possible remedial measures,

and whether Defendants adopted policies to respond to the heat risk are

factual issues highly relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of Defendants’

actions. In addition, we reject Defendants’ contention that their provision of

extensive discovery in other similar cases renders superfluous any discovery

in the instant case. If anything, this fact cuts in the other direction, suggesting

that the plaintiff in this case will similarly be able to discover a great deal of

relevant material. Regardless, discovery for one plaintiff in one case is not

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superfluous simply because other plaintiffs in other cases have had an

opportunity to conduct it. 7

Defendants’ strongest argument concerns the discovery order’s breadth

and timeframe, inasmuch as it allows discovery regarding TDCJ system-wide

policies or procedures and Defendants’ knowledge of any inmates’ heat-related

complaints during a three-year period. Hinojosa died in the summer of 2012.

With the exception of two inmate deaths dating back to 2007 and one other

death in 2012, the other alleged inmate deaths all took place during the

summer of 2011. In addition, the complaint focuses its allegations on TDCJ

transfer facilities, like the Garza West Unit, where inmates typically arrive

from air-conditioned county jails. However, the district court’s order permits

discovery not only into Defendants’ knowledge of policies and procedures in

place at the Garza West Unit and other similar transfer facilities, but also

system-wide TDCJ policies and procedures. Furthermore, while the complaint

focuses on Hinojosa’s vulnerability to the heat due to his conditions and

medications, the district court’s order allows discovery regarding Defendants’

knowledge of all inmates’ heat-related complaints, not simply those of

vulnerable inmates like Hinojosa.

Defendants advance a colorable argument that these discovery items are

broader than necessary, but ultimately we are not persuaded. In a vacuum,

the most relevant time period for discovery would seem to begin with the

summer of 2011, during which ten TDCJ inmates allegedly perished from heat-

related causes. However, we cannot say with any certainty that discovery into

Defendants’ knowledge of inmate complaints dating back to the summer of

2010 would be unnecessary. According to the complaint, by the summer of

7 Nothing in our opinion should be construed to prevent Defendants from asking the

district court to consolidate discovery proceedings with the discovery proceedings in other

related cases.

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2010, two inmates had already died from heat-related causes. Whether

Defendants knew about inmate complaints during the summer of 2010 would

shed light on the reasonableness of their actions. Likewise, while Defendants’

knowledge of heat-related policies and procedures in place at the Garza West

Unit and similar transfer facilities is more probative than their knowledge of

policies and practices at other TDCJ facilities, we cannot say that discovery as

to the latter is unnecessary. Defendants’ knowledge of any heat-related TDCJ

policy or procedure (or lack thereof) would bear on whether they acted

reasonably in promulgating (or declining to change) the alleged policies for

which the complaint seeks to hold them responsible. The same holds true for

the district court’s authorization to discover Defendants’ knowledge of

complaints by all inmates rather than simply complaints by those inmates with

medical vulnerabilities. See Gates, 376 F.3d at 340 (observing that prior

complaints by other inmates are probative of deliberate indifference). Both are

relevant to the reasonableness of Defendants’ actions, and we cannot say that

discovery regarding the former—though perhaps less probative than the

latter—is unnecessary.

To the extent we might have any lingering doubt about the breadth of

the discovery order, we note that the district court was careful to state that

discovery will be “limited to the personal knowledge and personal conduct of

each Defendant as it relates to Albert Hinojosa and the circumstances leading

to his death.” This provides an outer boundary for all of the specific discovery

items that follow, and those items should be interpreted with that boundary in

mind. If Plaintiff requests discovery that is irrelevant to Defendants’

knowledge and personal conduct regarding Hinojosa and the circumstances

leading to his death, Defendants can seek enforcement of the plain language

in the district court’s order that prohibits such discovery.

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V.

Because, as set forth above, the district court’s order complies with our

precedent, we DISMISS this interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. We

express no opinion on how the district court should rule on Defendants’

qualified immunity defense.

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JONES, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

No one doubts the tragedy of a prisoner’s life lost to heat stroke during a

hot Texas summer. The question here, however, is not whether better prison

policies or procedures might theoretically have prevented Hinojosa’s death in

the Garza West transfer unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(“TDCJ”). As in all cases of qualified immunity, the question is whether the

three top officials of the TDCJ (“Executive Defendants”), whose 111

institutions supervise over 150,000 prisoners at a time, must endure litigation

and potential personal liability in damages for this prisoner’s death because of

some arguably defective “condition of confinement.” See Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. ___, 2015 WL 6829329 (Nov. 9, 2015) (summarily reversing Fifth

Circuit denial of qualified immunity to police officer because his conduct did

not violate clearly established law under the circumstances he confronted). I

would also reverse the district court order denying qualified immunity on the

pleadings. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2815

(1985) (“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly

established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to

dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”) (emphasis added).

The majority opinion here violates the clearly established law of

qualified immunity by holding that under “clearly established” constitutional

law, these officials may have been deliberately indifferent to the vaguely

specified conditions under which Hinojosa succumbed. This is because there

is no allegation that they directly participated in any way in the management

of this prison unit, and the plaintiff herself makes significant countervailing

allegations about TDCJ policies, training, and procedures designed to address

the risks of high temperatures. If the majority opinion is correct, then the top

TDCJ officials might also be personally liable for any other injury-causing

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“condition of confinement”—a salmonella outbreak in a prison unit’s food

service, the crash of a prison transport bus, a mishandled hurricane

evacuation, 1 slippery prison showers, or even heart attacks or prison suicides.

The implications for suicide prevention would be obvious, except that the

majority opinion is squarely at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Taylor v. Barkes, which held as a matter of law that the top official of the

Delaware prison system and the particular institution’s warden violated no

“clearly established law” by failing to oversee “proper implementation of

adequate suicide prevention protocols.” 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per

curiam). In so doing, the Court overruled a Third Circuit decision denying

summary judgment. Statistically, far more prisoner deaths are caused by

suicide than heat stroke, 2 and the Court did not deny that generally, the

prisons are responsible for the protection of inmates. See, e.g., Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). Yet, the Supreme Court

summarily reversed, holding that no court opinion has placed beyond doubt a

prisoner’s right to the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention

protocols, much less “identif[ied] any minimum screening procedures or

prevention protocols that facilities must use.” Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044–45.

By the lights of Taylor, Mullenix, and many other Supreme Court

decisions, the majority opinion is indefensible for two primary reasons. First,

1 Cf. Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 659 (5th Cir. 2010).

2 Hinojosa’s complaint alleges that between 2007 and 2012, 13 TDCJ prisoners died

of heat stroke (prior to Hinojosa’s own death). During the period from 2001 to 2013, 326

prisoners died in TDCJ custody as a result of suicide—an average of approximately 25 deaths

a year, more than eight times the average number of deaths per year alleged in this case (less

than 3). See Margaret Noonan et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mortality in Local Jails and State

Prisons, 2000-2013 – Statistical Tables 25 tbl.25 (2015), available at

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljsp0013st.pdf.

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it defines the allegedly “clearly established right” of Hinojosa in an overbroad

and ambiguous way, the antithesis of what qualified immunity stands for.

Qualified immunity is due these officials as a matter of law. Second, it affords

credence to pleadings that are insufficient under Iqbal 3 to raise a question

about these officials’ liability under any circumstances. The pleadings thus

failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 4

I. BACKGROUND

A brief synopsis of the relevant pleadings and the majority’s

characterization of the alleged constitutional violations is important. Hinojosa

was transferred to the Garza West transfer unit, which houses well over 2,000

inmates, in August 2012. He was middle aged and obese and was under

medication for hypertension, diabetes, and schizophrenia. Within two days of

his arrival at this non-air conditioned facility, another prisoner in his dorm

room observed him going into convulsions late at night and called for medical

help. It took about two hours for “emergency” assistance to arrive, and

Hinojosa was pronounced dead shortly thereafter. No facts are pled about

remediation within the prison unit for heat conditions other than an alleged

gross deficiency of drinking water and personal (not institutional) fans.

3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

4 Additionally, the majority opinion condones abusive discovery that has already

amassed thousands of pages of documents, plus depositions against these defendants,

rendering their ultimate exoneration a hollow victory. This discovery far exceeds the case at

hand, as it covers a lengthy time frame and the entirety of the TDCJ prison system. Qualified

immunity, after all, is “immunity from suit, and extends beyond just a defense to liability to

include all aspects of civil litigation.” Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1986);

see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity

doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including avoidance of disruptive

discovery.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Hinojosa’s lawsuit included as defendants not only the three top officials

of the TDCJ, appellants here, but also the head of the Correctional Managed

Care Program at the University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston, which is

responsible for medical care of most TDCJ inmates, regional administrators,

and wardens. Relevant to these top officials, the majority opinion culls from

the plaintiff’s pleadings as follows: TDCJ policies “reflect” the officials’

knowledge that prisoners with medical conditions and treatment like

Hinojosa’s are unusually susceptible to excessive heat. TDCJ “policies”

acknowledge the importance of acclimating inmates “to reduce the risk of

heatstroke” as they transfer from air conditioned county jails to TDCJ, “but

TDCJ did not have any housing assignment policy for newly arrived inmates

to help them acclimatize [sic].” More precisely put, TDCJ “policies” specify that

(a) newly arrived inmates with heat-sensitive conditions may not work or

engage in recreation in high temperature conditions, and (b) no newly arrived

inmates may labor outdoors until they have had an intake physical exam,

which may not occur for up to ten days. “[T]hey are nonetheless housed in

high indoor temperatures along with the rest of the inmate population.” These

defendants’ “policies” made no accommodation for newly arrived inmates or

inmates with heat-sensitive medical conditions. These defendants “failed to

ensure that inmates timely received intake physicals, and failed to implement

any other protective procedures.” Livingston allegedly “took part in the

decision not to employ medical staff at the Garza West Unit during night hours,

and . . . all three supervisory Defendants were responsible for an alleged lack

of adequate training that correctional officers received.”

The majority omit mentioning many other allegations in the plaintiff’s

complaint directed to proving liability on the part of the medical defendants

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and wardens who were situated closer to or at Garza West. These telling

allegations include:

• Dr. Owen Murray of the UTMB’s Correctional Managed

Care Program “oversees the medical, mental health and

dental services provided to prisoners [in] . . . the Garza

West Unit.” (Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 13.)

• “Murray is responsible for ensuring that TDCJ facilities

serviced by UTMB provide adequate health care to

prisoners, that prisoners have access to adequate health

care, that infirmaries at units . . . are adequately staffed

to handle medical conditions and emergencies that occur,

and for formulating policies to ensure that prisoners

receive adequate care, that serious medical needs are not

treated with deliberate indifference, and that prisoners

are not subjected to dangerous conditions as a

consequence of their health issues and medical needs.”

(Id. at ¶ 31.)

• “Murray has not instituted any practice or policy

concerning safely housing inmates known to be especially

vulnerable to the heat.” (Id. at ¶ 41.)

• “As the wardens and regional director, respectively,

Guterrez and Kennedy are directly responsible for

training the front-line officers charged with protecting

prisoners’ lives.” (Id. at ¶ 73.)

• “[A]fter . . . two men died in 2007, Dr. Murray instituted

no changes to UTMB’s intake and housing practices, and

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continued to leave vulnerable prisoners at risk of heat

stroke system-wide.” (Id. at ¶ 78.)

• “Despite . . . ten deaths in 2011, Dr. Murray and UTMB

continued to house vulnerable inmates in extremely hot

temperatures without any protections. And he did this

knowing that some areas of TDCJ units, including at

Garza West Unit, have air conditioned spaces available.”

(Id. at ¶ 89.)

According to the majority and the plaintiff, this is an Eighth Amendment

“conditions of confinement” case in which liability is based on an objective

standard of constitutionally inhumane prison conditions and a subjective

standard embodying the defendants’ deliberate indifference to those

conditions. Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 592 (5th Cir. 2015). In such

circumstances, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that top officials of TDCJ

either personally participated in or knew about Hinojosa’s imprisonment so

long as they knew generally of the risk of high heat to particularly vulnerable

prisoners. Consequently, according to the majority, these defendants are not

being sued “in their supervisory capacity,” but rather for “their own actions in

promulgating—and failing to correct—intake and housing policies that

exposed Hinojosa and other inmates like him to extreme temperatures without

adequate remedial measures.”

The defendants’ qualified immunity defense is rejected by the majority

because the “right that [the complaint] asserts . . . is the well-established

Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to extremely dangerous

temperatures without adequate ameliorative measures.” The majority concede

that “[w]hile we have not had occasion to give an exhaustive list of acceptable

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remedial measures, we have held that the provision of fans, ice water, and

daily showers can suffice.” See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 339–40 (5th Cir.

2004). 5 The majority conclude that immunity cannot be awarded on the

pleadings because “[a] reasonable prison official in our circuit knows that

during times of extreme heat, he must afford these remedies—or remedies like

them—to satisfactorily address the risk of heat-related illnesses and

fatalities.” The majority finds sufficient to overcome qualified immunity the

allegations that “Defendants knew that prisoners such as Hinojosa were

particularly vulnerable to the heat, and that through the intake and housing

policies that they promulgated, they failed to ensure that such prisoners

received any meaningful relief.” In short, the Defendants, under these

allegations “subjected Hinojosa to extreme temperatures without adequate

remedial measures, in violation of our circuit’s clearly established law.”

The majority finally condone a long list of discovery inquiries allegedly

relevant to how much these defendants knew about heat-related issues in

TDCJ. According to the majority, such discovery (which has already

encompassed thousands of papers and depositions in similar pending cases)

bears on defendants’ knowledge, which is allegedly relevant both to their

subjective states of mind and the objective reasonableness of their actions for

liability and qualified immunity purposes.

II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The panel majority should have proceeded along the same lines as the

Court in Taylor v. Barkes. In Taylor, the Third Circuit approached qualified

5 See also Ball, 792 F.3d at 600 (approving remedies including diversion of cool air

from prison staff areas, allowing inmates to access air conditioning during specified times,

plus cool daily showers, cold ice water, personal ice containers, and individual fans). Ball,

however, cannot be a basis for rejecting qualified immunity, because that opinion was issued

in 2015, three years and more after the events here in dispute.

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immunity by determining first that the plaintiffs had alleged a cognizable

theory of supervisory liability, but the Supreme Court declined to consider that

issue. Taylor, 133 S. Ct. at 2043. Instead, the Court reversed the lower court

because “an incarcerated person’s right to the proper implementation of

adequate suicide prevention protocols” is not a clearly established

constitutional right. Id. at 2044.

Taylor succinctly expressed the basic standards for qualified immunity:

“Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil

damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the

challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093

(2012). “To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear

that every reasonable official would have understood that what he

is doing violates that right.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted). “When properly applied, [qualified immunity]

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “We do not require a case

directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. at 2083.

135 S. Ct. at 2044 (parallel citations omitted). Here, as in Taylor, the Executive

Defendants were neither plainly incompetent nor knowing lawbreakers. The

alleged actions of the Executive Defendants were not objectively unreasonable

in light of the clearly established law at the time of the violation, and they are

entitled to immunity from suit.

The majority assert the right that was “clearly established” at the time

of Hinojosa’s death is the right to “be free from exposure to extremely

dangerous temperatures without adequate remedial measures.” This “right”

is a tautology. Under this formulation, what “reasonable but mistaken

judgment” could the Executive Defendants have made about what the law

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requires? See al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085. If this is the “clearly established

right,” then qualified immunity would cease to exist: if adequate remedial

measures were in place, there would be no constitutional violation; if

reasonable remedial measures fell short of being adequate, there would be

liability. See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)

(“Further, the Supreme Court has held that generalizations and abstract

propositions are not capable of clearly establishing the law.”)

This broad definition of the “clearly established right,” which the

majority opinion repeats three times in its discussion of qualified immunity

and again in purporting to distinguish Taylor, is far more general than the

precise policy deficiencies charged against the Executive Defendants—intake,

housing, and medical policies geared to inmates with heat sensitive medical

conditions. Yet only “clearly established law” that is tailored to the specific

facts confronted by a defendant suffices to deprive him of qualified immunity.

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S. Ct 596, 599 (2004) (per curiam)

(“It is important to emphasize that this inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light

of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’”) (quoting

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001)).

This overbreadth is a significant error in the majority’s analysis. The

right to be free from extreme temperatures without adequate remedial

measures is too generalized to be of any use to the Executive Defendants in

deciding what actions they should or should not take regarding system-wide

policies. The qualified immunity doctrine is “highly context-sensitive.”

McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 332 n.13 (5th Cir. 2002) (en

banc) (per curiam). And the Supreme Court has repeatedly and frequently

instructed—recently with some exasperation—that courts should not “define

clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at

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2084. Instead, the right must be defined so that it is “beyond debate” that

“every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates

that right.” Id. at 2083 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987)). The Supreme

Court’s guidance underlines the real world implications of the qualified

immunity analysis. General principles are of limited use to prison officials who

must often make difficult policy choices in highly fact-dependent situations.

Because reasonable mistakes are inevitable in these settings, the “clearly

established” requirement protects mistaken judgments.

Here, it would not have been clear to a reasonable official in the position

of the Executive Defendants that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

confronted. Certainly it would not be “beyond debate” that the failure to

establish specific intake, medical, or housing policies other than those in place

when Hinojosa died would result in an Eighth Amendment violation.

Assuming arguendo the majority’s characterization of the right at issue, all

that has been fairly established by this court’s precedent is that in the face of

high temperatures, some measures must be adopted to provide “relief,” Smith

v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 381 (5th Cir. 1977), including, in limited

circumstances, extra fans, ice water, and daily showers, 6 Gates, 376 F.3d at

336. But see Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)

(“While the temperature in extended lockdown may be uncomfortable, that

alone cannot support a finding that the plaintiff was subjected to cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”)

6 Another case says prison officials should take steps to “address the risks of high

heat.” See Blackmon v. Garza, 484 F. App’x 866, 872 (5th Cir. 2012). But as an unpublished

and non-precedential opinion, Blackmon supplies no clearly established law.

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Further limiting these cases’ applicability to the Executive Defendants’

qualified immunity is that all were confined to particular inmates or particular

sections of prisons. Gates, for instance, was an injunction limited to

Mississippi’s death row; Smith an injunction placed upon the El Paso County

Jail. This distinction is critical because the Supreme Court has admonished

that the clearly established law should generally be derived from cases that

“squarely govern[]” the facts presented. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 201, 125 S. Ct.

at 600. Measures that are necessary or appropriate to address high

temperatures at one prison unit may not be constitutionally required at

another. Compare, at just one analytical level, the needs of medical units, low

security units, and high security units. It makes no sense to extrapolate from

a couple of fact-dependent prison conditions cases the constitutional

requirements for TDCJ’s policies covering its 111 statewide units. Indeed,

even the majority opinion concedes there is no “exhaustive list of acceptable

remedial measures” in prior cases, leaving only “remedies like them” as the

vague constitutional baseline. In other words, not one of the housing and

intake policies advocated in the complaint and the majority opinion are

required or even mentioned in this court’s clearly established law. 7 It is

disingenuous to conclude that it would have been clear to any reasonable

7 The plaintiff frequently complains about the lack of air conditioning in Garza West.

(See, e.g., Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 35 (“Though extreme indoor temperatures at the Garza West Unit

in the summer are well known to TDCJ and UTMB officials, TDCJ’s leadership, including

Kennedy, Stephens, Thaler, and Livingston, has taken no steps to air condition prisoner

housing areas at the Garza West Unit.”)). It is unlikely that such a remedy could be

undertaken by the Executive Defendants without legislative approval due to the cost. In

addition, to the extent this court’s precedents speak about more comprehensive heat

remedies, they reject that air conditioning must be installed to ensure cool prisons. See Ball,

792 F.3d at 599; Blackmon, 484 F. App’x at 872 n.6.

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Executive Defendant that his conduct violated an established constitutional

right. 8

Moreover, the plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates that the Executive

Defendants acted reasonably under these circumstances. The complaint

discusses that TDCJ policies recognized the risk of heat stroke. (See Pl.’s

Compl. at ¶¶ 19, 48–50.) The complaint discusses that TDCJ training covers

the risk of heat stroke. (Id. at ¶¶ 71–72.) The complaint avers that TDCJ

policy requires the provision of a certain amount of water per day. (Id. at ¶

60.) The complaint specifies that, under current policies, all prisoners arriving

at Garza West were forbidden to labor outdoors until they had a physical exam,

and those with heat-sensitive conditions could neither labor nor engage in

recreation in high temperature conditions. (Id. at ¶¶ 65, 123.)

The plaintiff’s mere dissatisfaction with the specificity and breadth of

policy and training does not render the policies objectively unreasonable for

the purposes of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Whitt v. Stephens Cty., 529 F.3d

278, 284 (5th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has cautioned against second-

guessing the specificity and coverage of existing policy and training in the

context of § 1983 damages actions because every time a state actor violates a

constitutional right, “a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the

[state] ‘could have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.” Connick v.

8 And this is “[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that a right can be ‘clearly

established’ by circuit precedent despite disagreement in the courts of appeals.” Barkes, 135

S. Ct. at 2045. Otherwise, any right “clearly established” in our case law must be compared

against the pronouncements of other courts of appeals that have had occasion to consider hot

temperatures in the prisons. See, e.g., Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1297–98 (11th Cir.

2004) (finding no constitutional violation where temperatures ranged from 80 to 95 degrees

(“not unconstitutionally excessive”) and the prison’s remedial measures were a ventilation

system, prison cells not in direct sunlight, prisoners not compelled to wear heavy clothing or

perform laborious tasks, and prisoners with access to running water and a drinking cup).

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Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 392, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1206 (1989)).

In fact, as the complaint recognizes, the state did do something to

address potential adverse medical consequences of high temperatures: these

defendants rely on the University of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston in

formulating policies and taking actions relating to the health and medical

safety of prisoners. (Pl.’s Compl. at ¶¶ 13, 15, 31, 143.) Our case law allows

prison officials to defer to medical professionals on a wide range of health

issues. See, e.g., Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 2015). Because

our cases have sometimes held prison officers liable for not seeking

professional medical attention for prisoners, few things seem more reasonable

than relying on the judgment of a well-respected medical organization to

address health and safety policies concerning the prevention and treatment of

heat stroke. See, e.g., Thompson v. Upshur Cty., 245 F.3d 447, 457–64 (5th Cir.

2001) (reviewing cases and holding that a jail official violated clearly

established law by failing to “arrang[e] for professional medical assistance for

. . . serious medical need”); Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d

752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (calling decisions to provide medical treatment a

“classic example of a matter for medical judgment”); see also Lee v. Young, 533

F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n determining the best way to handle an

inmate’s medical needs, prison officials who are not medical professionals are

entitled to rely on the opinions of medical professionals.”).

It is not clearly established that TDCJ needed to have more specific

policies regarding how to deal with heat-vulnerable prisoners during high heat

conditions. It is certainly reasonable for the Executive Defendants to rely on

subordinates, be they doctors or wardens or prison guards, to take the

necessary steps to address problems that arise on an individual or unit level.

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See Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Like all prison

officials, these supervisory defendants have a duty to take reasonable

measures to protect inmates. Yet given the size of the operation that they

oversee, they cannot be expected to intervene personally” in every threat that

arises.) (citation omitted). Without more definitive court rulings, it is not

objectively unreasonable when prison policies and training exist to avert heat-

related illness, but they ultimately prove inadequate to address every

conceivable situation.

Contrary rules would implicate a core function of qualified immunity:

government efficiency and effectiveness. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 814, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2736 (1982) (describing one of qualified immunity’s

chief concerns as “the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues”).

Imagine if TDCJ’s Executive Director had to personally oversee the amount

and temperature of water afforded to prisoners at all 111 TDCJ facilities or

else face the risk of personal liability. (See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 60 (“Throughout

the system . . . the jugs did not contain enough water for each prisoner to drink

enough to protect them from the heat, and are frequently filled with lukewarm

water.”). Such a rule would reduce government functioning to a crawl while

high-level officials micromanaged their subordinates for fear that mistakes

would subject them to “punitive and compensatory” judgments in federal court.

(See id. at ¶¶ 8–10.)

This leads us back to Taylor v. Barkes, which should control this case,

but which the majority confine to a dismissive paragraph. Taylor also

originated in tragedy: a jail suicide. 135 S. Ct. at 2043. The plaintiffs sued the

head of the Delaware Department of Corrections and the prison warden for

failing to prevent the suicide by not properly supervising the medical personnel

who administered the suicide screening protocol. Id. Denying summary

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judgment, the Third Circuit found it clearly established that a “particular

vulnerability to suicide” was a serious medical need encompassed within the

Eighth Amendment. Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 328–29 (3d

Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2044. The Third Circuit then

pivoted to conclude that such a finding “place[d] it beyond debate that

appropriate suicide-preventive measures are a required component of the

Constitution’s command that prison administrators provide adequate mental

and physical health care for inmates.” Id. at 329 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

A unanimous Supreme Court summarily reversed and granted qualified

immunity as a matter of law. Id. at 2044. The Court held that even under

Third Circuit precedent, a right “to the proper implementation of adequate

suicide prevention protocols” was not clearly established. Id. The Court

recognized that the Third Circuit’s cases may establish that where prison

officials “know . . . of the particular vulnerability to suicide of an inmate, they

have an obligation not to act with reckless indifference to that vulnerability.”

Id. at 2045 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Colburn v. Upper

Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir. 1988)). But such cases did not clearly

establish “that detention facilities must implement particular procedures to

identify such vulnerable inmates, let alone specify what procedures would

suffice” or “identify any minimum screening procedures or prevention protocols

that facilities must use.” Id. In this light, the Court concluded, “even if the

[jail’s] suicide screening and prevention measures contained the shortcomings

that respondents allege, no precedent on the books . . . would have made clear

to petitioners that they were overseeing a system that violated the Constitution.”

Id. (emphasis added).

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The parallels between Taylor and this case are obvious. Like the Third

Circuit majority, the majority here affirm an Eighth Amendment right of

medically vulnerable inmates not to be subjected to extreme temperatures

without adequate remedial measures. Like the Third Circuit majority, the

panel majority here approve a claim that these defendants were deliberately

indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs because their policies failed

to provide certain “adequate remedial measures” or “measures like those”

mentioned in prior circuit case law. Moreover, as in Taylor, it is alleged that

the Executive Defendants knew their system was inadequate because thirteen

other inmates died from heatstroke in five years before Hinojosa’s death. The

Taylor plaintiffs also explicitly alleged that the Delaware prison officials “were

aware that the suicide rate in the Delaware prisons was above the national

average.” Third Am. Compl. at ¶ 54(i), Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., No. 06-

104-LPS, 2012 WL 2914915 (D. Del. July 17, 2012).

The majority’s analytical mistake in this decision is the same mistake

made by the Third Circuit. Simply substituting “heat stroke” for “suicide” in

the Supreme Court’s language proves my point. Paraphrasing Taylor,

[Fifth Circuit] cases may establish that where prison officials

“know . . . of the particular vulnerability to [heat stroke] of an

inmate, they have an obligation not to act with reckless

indifference to that vulnerability.” Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2045

(internal quotation marks omitted). But that does not clearly

establish “that detention facilities must implement procedures to

identify such vulnerable inmates, let alone specify what

procedures would suffice” or “identify any minimum screening

procedures or prevention protocols that facilities must use.” Id.

(emphasis added). Thus, “even if [TDCJ’s heat vulnerability and

heat stroke] screening and prevention measures contained the

shortcomings that respondents allege, no precedent on the books

[in August 2012] would have made clear to petitioners that they

were overseeing a system that violated the Constitution.” Id.

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No prior Fifth Circuit case comes close to giving these Executive

Defendants fair notice that they needed additional system-wide housing,

medical, or intake policies to avoid running afoul of the Constitution and

exposing themselves to personal liability. This court should grant the

Executive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING EXECUTIVE DEFENDANTS’

LIABILITY

Underlying all qualified immunity cases is the question “whether the

plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.” Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231–32, 111 S. Ct 1789, 1793 (1991). The plaintiff must

assert the constitutional violation in a complaint containing “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). A complaint

consisting of “labels and conclusions” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further

factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id., 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1965–66). Instead the plaintiff must plead

enough facts to “nudge[] [the] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Id. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1960).

To assert a violation of the Eighth Amendment for deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s health or safety, the plaintiff’s complaint must

plausibly allege that “prison conditions . . . pose[d] an unreasonable risk of

serious damage” to the plaintiff and that prison officials “acted with deliberate

indifference to the risk posed.” Ball, 792 F.3d at 592 (internal quotation marks

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omitted). Deliberate indifference is not mere negligence; the plaintiff must

allege more than that the Executive Defendants should have known about the

risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–36, 114 S. Ct. at 1978. Instead, the plaintiff

must plead that the Executive Defendants actually knew about the risk and

failed to respond reasonably in the face of it. See id. at 844–45, 114 S. Ct. at

1982–83; see also Johnson, 385 F.3d at 544 (“Finally—and significantly . . .—

there is no liability if the official responded reasonably to the risk, even if the

harm ultimately was not averted.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf.

Taylor, 135 S. Ct. at 2045 (characterizing Third Circuit cases as holding that

where prison officials “know . . . of the particular vulnerability to suicide of an

inmate, they have an obligation not to act with reckless indifference to that

vulnerability.”).

Despite its length, the plaintiff’s complaint here is rife with bare

conclusional allegations against the Executive Defendants and irrelevant

specific allegations. The complaint fails to plead their knowledge of

unconstitutional conditions at Garza West and in fact demonstrates that they

acted reasonably to provide “adequate remedial measures.”

A. Generalized, conclusional allegations

The Supreme Court has made plain that, “[a]bsent vicarious liability,

each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his

or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. When the

plaintiff’s complaint uses blanket terms covering all the defendants, by

lumping them together or calling them collectively “TDCJ,” these allegations

are properly disregarded unless the reference to the Executive Defendants can

be clearly inferred. Accord. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792

F.3d 1313, 1323 & n.14 (11th Cir. 2015) (describing this form of “shotgun

pleading” as a “sin” consisting of “asserting multiple claims against multiple

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defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for

which acts or omissions”). For instance, the plaintiff alleges that “Defendants

provide grossly inadequate amounts of water to help prisoners survive the

extremely-high temperatures indoors.” (Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 60.) It is not a

plausible inference that TDCJ Executive Director Brad Livingston, all the way

from his Huntsville office, personally provides grossly inadequate amounts of

water to prisoners in Beeville, Texas. All such allegations should have been

disregarded.

The complaint against the Executive Defendants depends on three

propositions that they allegedly knew. First, excessive heat can be deadly. 9

Second, excessive heat can be even riskier for those with certain medical

conditions. 10 Third, the Executive Defendants knew that it could be extremely

hot in the units of the Texas prison system, including at Garza West. 11 These

9 See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 18 (“As each of the Defendants have long known and discussed

internally at high-level TDCJ and UTMB leadership meetings well before 2012,

temperatures this elevated cause the human body to shut down.”); id. at ¶ 94 (“Livingston,

Thaler, [and] Stephens . . . knew extreme temperatures can be deadly.”).

10 See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 22 (“It was well known to TDCJ and UTMB leadership,

including the Defendants, that people with certain medical conditions, like diabetes or

hypertension, or who take certain medications, like antipsychotics or diuretics, are much

more vulnerable to extreme temperatures.”); id. at ¶ 37 (“Defendants TDCJ, Livingston,

Thaler, [and] Stephens . . . know many prisoners have medical conditions that make the

extreme heat deadly.”); id. at ¶ 52 (“TDCJ and UTMB officials, including Livingston, Thaler,

[and] Stephens . . . know prisoners in TDCJ custody suffer from these disabilities, and are at

increased risk of heat-related injury and death.”); id. at ¶ 67 (“To put it simply, TDCJ officials,

such as . . . Thaler, Stephens, . . . and Livingston . . . know that TDCJ and UTMB fail to

immediately identify prisoners with heat-sensitive medical conditions and know that this

failure endangers prisoners[.]”).

11 See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 92 (“Livingston, Thaler, [and] Stephens . . . knew indoor

temperatures in TDCJ facilities regularly exceeded 90 degrees during the hot Texas

summers”); id. at ¶ 93 (“Livingston, Thaler, [and] Stephens . . . knew inmate living areas at

the Garza West Unit were not air conditioned and that the apparent temperatures routinely

skyrocketed during the hot Texas summers and routinely exceeded 90 degree indoors.”); id.

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bare accusations of knowledge are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.”

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (rejecting a similar allegation

that defendant “knew of [and] condoned . . . [the] harsh conditions of

confinement”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a case charging a former

Texas prison director with liability for an inmate-on-inmate murder, this court

long ago rejected similar allegations of knowledge and condonation, declaring

that even when coupled with “conclusory allegations and . . . technical buzz

words” they flunked the minimal pleading standard. See Jacquez v. Procunier,

801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986) (Reavley, J.). Thus, allegations that there

was a substantial risk to vulnerable inmates from the heat and the Executive

Defendants were aware of it merely track the elements of a deliberate

indifference claim but do not alone suffice to allege an Eighth Amendment

violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“A pleading that offers

. . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The conclusory and threadbare nature of these allegations is to be

expected, of course. The Executive Defendants oversee an entity that houses,

clothes, feeds, and cares for 150,000 people a day across 111 different facilities.

There is no allegation that the Executive Defendants played any direct role in

the management of the Garza West unit, much less in Hinojosa’s intake or

incarceration. See id. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“Determining whether a

complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task

that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.”). That is the nature of large, complex organizations and the

at ¶ 97 (“Thaler, Stephens, and Livingston are aware that daily temperature readings are

taken at the prison and that these readings are routinely above 90 [degrees] at all times

during the summer months.”).

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reason why prisoner lawsuits are almost always directed at a unit’s warden or

individual guards, not the TDCJ Executive Director and his immediate

subordinates. Because the Executive Defendants do not bear vicarious liability

for the actions or inaction of subordinates, it is more challenging for a plaintiff

plausibly to allege facts showing these defendants’ deliberate indifference.

Consequently, this court has uniformly affirmed dismissal or otherwise

rejected personal liability for high-ranking prison officials when knowledge is

based only on system-wide problems. In addition to Jacquez, this court, in

Walker v. Livingston, rejected a theory of Livingston’s liability for an inmate’s

murder based on knowledge and condonation of systemic deficiencies. We

concluded that there were no allegations of “any facts or any sort of knowledge

on the part of these defendants that would suggest any reason to believe there

was any likelihood of actual subjective awareness on their respective parts of

the specific risk to [the plaintiff].” 381 F. App’x 477, 480 (5th Cir. 2010); see

also Lott v. Edenfield, 542 F. App’x 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2013); Hinojosa v.

Johnson, 277 F. App’x 370, 379 (5th Cir. 2008). In sum, allegations that the

Executive Defendants knew generally of risks in the prison system from high

temperatures do not make it plausible they were deliberately indifferent to the

unconstitutional conditions in Garza West. 12

B. Specific Allegations

To shore up otherwise insufficient general allegations, the complaint

relies on several facts designed to allow an inference of the Executive

Defendants’ deliberate indifference. First, thirteen other TDCJ prisoners died

from heat stroke between 2007 and 2012. Second, several lawsuits have been

12This court’s injunctive cases relating to prison heat conditions involved, unlike this

case, executive defendants’ personal knowledge of the adverse conditions and dangers to

particular prisoners. See, e.g., Ball, 795 F.3d at 594–95; Gates, 376 F.3d at 335.

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pursued against TDCJ for alleged heat-related injuries. Third, TDCJ policies

recognize the risk of heat stroke. Fourth, pigs receive more air conditioning

than prisoners. Fifth, a Texas state representative sent a letter to TDCJ in

2011 expressing concern about the high temperatures and asking that TDCJ

take preventative measures. Finally, as the majority opinion asserts, the “open

and obvious nature of the dangerously hot conditions would also support an

inference of deliberate indifference.”

Arguably the most substantial factual allegation is that the Executive

Defendants knew that thirteen other prisoners with various medical conditions

died from heat stroke between 2007 and 2012. According to the complaint,

these deaths were “regularly discussed” at meetings attended by Thaler and

Stephens (but evidently not Livingston). Again, the complaint pleads little

more than that the Executive Defendants “knew” a fact, instead of pleading

how they knew and the significance of that knowledge. See Jacquez, 801 F.2d

at 792 (dismissing a complaint against Texas prison director where plaintiff

“omit[ted] any explanation of how or in what way the defendants knew” of an

imminent attack against one inmate) (internal quotation marks omitted). That

the deaths were “regularly discussed” at high-level meetings is nothing if not

vague about the nature or extent of the discussion. See Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau

of Narcotics, 796 F.3d 435, 443 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[S]ome allegations, while not

stating ultimate legal conclusions, are nevertheless so threadbare or

speculative that they fail to cross the line between the conclusory and the

factual.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Peñalbert–Rosa v. Fortuño–Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011)).

Even accepting that the Executive Defendants were aware of these

deaths, this allegation lacks the context necessary to evaluate it. In a prison

system housing over 150,000 inmates at any given time, it is hardly plausible

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that thirteen deaths over six years from a single cause raise awareness of a

substantial risk to the inmate population. 13 While we must view well-pleaded

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this does not discharge the

plaintiff’s burden to provide the factual information and context necessary to

evaluate his complaint. See, e.g., Burgis v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d

63, 70 (2d Cir. 2015); McTigue v. City of Chi., 60 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1995)

(statistics without context are “insufficient to satisfy even the loose

requirements of notice pleading”); cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States,

433 U.S. 299, 312, 97 S. Ct. 2736, 2744 (1977) (“Statistics . . . come in infinite

variety . . . . Their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and

circumstances.”) (brackets omitted) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1856–57 (1974)).

Relatedly, the complaint alleges that it is even more plausible that the

Executive Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the danger to Hinojosa

because he shared some medical characteristics with prisoners who had

already died of heat stroke. But the story here is mixed. The complaint alleges

that only four of the 14 decedents (including Hinojosa) were hypertensive and

13 Statistics publicly available from the Justice Department indicate that between

2007 and 2012, almost 2,600 prisoners died while in TDCJ custody. Including Hinojosa’s

death, this means that 0.5% of Texas prisoner deaths during this time period resulted from

heat stroke. See Noonan et al., supra note 2, at 25 tbl.25. As noted above, during the period

from 2001 to 2013, 326 prisoners died in TDCJ custody as a result of suicide and 54 as a

result of homicide—an average of approximately 25 and 4 deaths a year, respectively, more

than the average number of deaths per year alleged in this case (less than 3). Yet, our

precedents have emphasized that both suicide and violence are part of prison life. See

Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (suicide); Newton v. Black, 133 F.3d 301, 307 (5th Cir. 1998)

(violence). Presumably, this court would not allow a plaintiff to plead that the Executive

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a personal threat to them of homicide or suicide

based solely on these comparatively more common occurrences.

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that three of the 14 were diabetic. 14 Ten of the 14 (including Hinojosa) were

prescribed a psychotropic drug and three of the 14 (not including Hinojosa)

were prescribed a diuretic. The ages of those who died ranged from 36 to 62,

but Hinojosa was among the youngest at 44. The places of death vary, too,

including the Coffield Unit and Mitchell Units in Tennessee Colony (300 miles

away from Garza West), several TDCJ locations in Huntsville (over 250 miles

away), the Hodge Unit in Rusk (over 300 miles away), the Hutchins State Jail

in Dallas (over 300 miles away), and the Connally Unit in Kenedy (30 miles

away). In short, no clear picture emerges from the profiles of the men who had

already died. Consequently, it is hardly plausible to draw the inference of the

Executive Defendants’ deliberate indifference to a prisoner in Hinojosa’s

position at Garza West.

The fact that TDCJ had been sued previously, and generally

unsuccessfully, by inmates complaining of extreme temperatures does not

create plausible inferences against these defendants. We have held in a

similar context that the assertions in pleadings are “not . . . particularly strong

evidence” to show defendants’ knowledge. Ball, 792 F.3d at 595. Furthermore,

the cases the plaintiff discusses in the complaint are all distinguishable. In

Valigura, a lawsuit involving Garza East, this court indeed said that

“temperatures into the nineties and hundreds are allegations that are

sufficiently serious to” violate the Eighth Amendment. Valigura v. Mendoza,

265 F. App’x 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). A jury, however, apparently

disagreed that those conditions existed at Garza East and rendered a complete

14It has been estimated that during a recent period under study approximately 19.2%

and 4.2% of the male population of the Texas prison system are afflicted with hypertension

and diabetes, respectively. See Amy J. Harzke et al., Prevalence of Chronic Medical

Conditions Among Inmates in the Texas Prison System, 87 J. Urb. Health 486, 491 tbl.1

(2010).

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defense verdict after a two-day trial. See Jury Verdict at 1, Valigura v.

Mendoza, No. 2:05-CV-513 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2008). Livingston himself was

dismissed as a defendant in Blackmon v. Kukua because the district court

found he had no knowledge of the extreme temperatures that were complained

of. 758 F. Supp. 2d 398, 411 (S.D. Tex. 2010). In Ruiz, a decision reversed by

this court, there is only a passing mention of expert testimony that heat was a

danger. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 904 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d and

remanded sub nom., Ruiz v. United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).

The remaining factual allegations fail to nudge this complaint toward

plausibility. The fact that TDCJ policies recognized the risk of heat stroke does

not mean that the Executive Defendants were deliberately indifferent to heat

levels in the prisons. Cooling measures approved for TDCJ’s swine herd add a

melodramatic flair but are irrelevant to human inmates’ conditions of

confinement. And a letter from a single state representative “expressing

concern” about high temperatures does not lead to an inference of knowledge,

either. The complaint quotes from the letter that temperatures inside prison

cells “do not fall below 100 degrees at night,” but his charge is flatly

contradicted by the plaintiff’s own pleadings. 15 A letter containing dubious

facts and otherwise just “expressing . . . concern” over prison conditions is too

weak to support the proposition that unconstitutional conditions were such a

pervasive problem that the Executive Defendants had actual notice of the

substantial risk to Hinojosa.

Finally, the majority, perhaps recognizing the complaint’s deficiencies,

throw their hands up in the air: “In any event, the open and obvious nature of

15See Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 139 (“Though it was late at night when Hinojosa suffered the

heat stroke, the indoor heat index was still 92 degrees.”).

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the dangerously hot conditions would also support an inference of deliberate

indifference.” This is ordinarily the language of negligence, not deliberate

indifference. A cognizable Eighth Amendment claim arises only if the

Executive Defendants acted unreasonably in the face of “open and obvious”

conditions. Cf. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843–44, 114 S. Ct. at 1982–83. And

reasonable measures, even if ultimately inadequate to prevent the injury, do

not support a finding of deliberate indifference. See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 526.

As I explained in the discussion of qualified immunity, the plaintiff’s own

pleadings acknowledge that reasonable measures had been taken to prevent

heat-related injuries: prisoners at Garza West could not perform outdoor labor

before they had intake physicals; prisoners vulnerable to heat could not labor

outdoors or engage in recreation before they had intake physicals;

management of prison health measures was delegated to the professional

medical oversight of the UTMB-Galveston; and extra water (though allegedly

in inadequate quantities) was prescribed during hot conditions.

When a court evaluates the legal sufficiency of a complaint, it reviews

the allegations holistically, as alleged facts are all judicial admissions. See

Ikossi-Anastasiou v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 550

(5th Cir. 2009). The facts pled here should preclude a deliberate indifference

claim against the Executive Defendants because the complaint includes

reasonable policy measures to avert the very injury suffered by Hinojosa. See

Brauner, 793 F.3d at 499, 502 (holding there was no deliberate indifference on

the part of prison officials where the plaintiff’s own pleadings were “replete

with examples of attentive and varied treatment from his physicians” and

“supervisory diligence” on the part of the assistant warden).

A final irony proves the injustice of footing this claim on broad

allegations about the Executive Defendants’ (a) knowledge of “open and

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obvious” dangers from excessive heat in the prisons and (b) failure to

implement more policies and training. The majority is allowing potential

liability on a more lenient basis than would be required for the actual

treatment Hinojosa received at Garza West. In an inmate suicide case, this

court granted qualified immunity to the treating physician while carefully

noting the critical difference between medical malpractice and Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference:

Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to

meet. It is indisputable that an incorrect diagnosis by prison

medical personnel does not suffice to state a claim for deliberate

indifference. Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir.

1985). Rather, the plaintiff must show that the officials “refused

to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him

incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly

evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Id.

Furthermore, the decision whether to provide additional

treatment “is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.”

Estelle [v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107, 97 S. Ct. 285, 293 (1976).]

Domino, 239 F.3d at 756.

How can it be that the standards for imposing liability on the Executive

Defendants have become, in the majority’s eyes, easier to meet than those for

imposing liability on the medical staff or duty guards? Especially after Iqbal,

the plaintiff has not provided the careful factual allegations to meet the burden

of pleading, with plausibility, that three of the highest-ranking officials in the

Texas prison system were deliberately indifferent to Hinojosa’s vulnerability

to heat in the conditions he faced at Garza West.

I dissent.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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