The opinion
FIRST DIVISION
FILED: December 27, 2010
No. 1-10-1956
DON NOWAK, ) APPEAL FROM THE
) CIRCUIT COURT OF
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) COOK COUNTY.
)
v. ) No. 09 M6 2436
)
THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB )
HILLS, ) HONORABLE
) LORETTA EADIE-DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellee. ) JUDGE PRESIDING.
JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, Don Nowak, brought this action against the
defendant, the City of Country Club Hills (City), seeking
reimbursement, pursuant to the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act
(PSEBA)(820 ILCS 320/1 et seq. (West 2006)), of his proportionate
share of health insurance premium payments incurred after he
sustained a disabling injury. The circuit court entered summary
judgment in favor of the City, and the plaintiff has appealed.
The record establishes the following undisputed facts. In
August 2005, the plaintiff was a full-time law enforcement officer
for the City and also was a member of the local police union, which
had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the City.
The terms of the collective bargaining agreement provided that the
City would offer health insurance coverage for all police officers
and that those officers who chose to participate in the plan were
obligated to contribute 20% of the applicable insurance premium.
No. 1-10-1956
The plaintiff was a participant in the plan, and his 20%
proportionate share of the insurance premium was regularly deducted
from his paycheck.
The plaintiff was injured in the line of duty while attempting
to make an arrest on August 21, 2005, and never returned to work as
a police officer. For the 12-month period from the date of his
injury to August 21, 2006, Nowak received 100% of his salary as
required by section 1(b) of the Public Employee Disability Act
(PEDA) (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2004)). In addition, he also received
his full salary and benefits until September 1, 2006, through a
combination of accrued sick and vacation time, two weeks’ light
duty, and temporary total disability payments pursuant to the
Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq.(West 2006)).
During the period that the plaintiff was receiving his salary under
the PEDA, the City continued to deduct his 20% share of his health
insurance premium from his paycheck, in accordance with the
collective bargaining agreement. The total amount of the
plaintiff’s health insurance premium contributions during that
period was $3,083.88.
After the expiration of the one-year PEDA entitlement period
in August 2006, the plaintiff continued to participate in the
City’s health insurance plan and paid his 20% premium contribution
to the City on a monthly basis. The plaintiff’s payments of his
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No. 1-10-1956
share of the health insurance premiums after expiration of his PEDA
salary benefits totaled $4,945.88.
In February 2008, the plaintiff applied for disability
benefits, and on October 14, 2008, the City’s police pension board
awarded him a line-of-duty disability pension, effective September
1, 2006. After the pension board determined that the plaintiff was
entitled to a disability pension, the City began paying 100% of his
health insurance premium costs, as required by section 10(a) of the
PSEBA (820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2006)). Thereafter, the plaintiff
requested that the City reimburse him for that portion of the
health insurance premium paid by him prior to the issuance of the
pension board’s decision, but the City refused.
The plaintiff then brought this action seeking reimbursement
for his health insurance premium contributions from the date of his
injury to and including the date he was awarded a disability
pension, which included the contributions that were deducted from
his paychecks while he was receiving the PEDA benefits and the
contributions paid by him after the PEDA benefits expired.
The parties submitted a stipulation of the material facts and
filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following briefing and
argument, the circuit court denied the plaintiff’s motion and
entered summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the
PSEBA “does not authorize retroactive payment of health insurance
benefits prior to the Pension Board’s determination.” This appeal
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No. 1-10-1956
followed.
The plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment for the City and in denying his cross-motion for
summary judgment because the stipulated facts and applicable
statutory provisions establish that he is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. On appeal, a grant of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo. Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213,
228, 864 N.E.2d 176 (2007). Further, the propriety of the circuit
court’s decision turns upon a question of statutory construction,
which is also subject to de novo review. See Acme Markets, Inc. v.
Callanan, 236 Ill. 2d 29, 35, 923 N.E.2d 718 (2009); Senese v.
Village of Buffalo Grove, 383 Ill. App. 3d 276, 278, 890 N.E.2d
628 (2008).
The fundamental issue presented by this appeal is the date on
which the plaintiff’s entitlement to the health insurance benefit
provided in section 10(a) of the PSEBA was triggered. The
plaintiff contends that his right to benefits under that provision
accrued on August 21, 2005, the date of his disabling injury. The
City, on the other hand, asserts that the plaintiff’s right to the
health insurance benefits did not accrue until the police pension
board found him to be disabled on October 14, 2008. We observe
that section 10(a) of the PSEBA does not specify when its benefits
become effective, and we have found no Illinois cases that have
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No. 1-10-1956
considered the matter. Consequently, we address this issue as one
of first impression. In resolving this question, we are called
upon to construe the language contained in two separate and
distinct statutes that relate to special benefits afforded to law
enforcement officers and other public safety employees who sustain
disabling injuries in the performance of their duties.
When interpreting a statute, the primary goal is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the most
reliable indication of the legislature’s intent is the plain
language of the statute. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 34-35,
805 N.E.2d 1165 (2004). Where the language of the statute is clear
and unambiguous, it is to be given effect without resort to other
aids of statutory construction. Metzger, 209 Ill. 2d at 35. Each
word, clause and sentence of the statute should be given reasonable
meaning and not rendered superfluous or meaningless. In re
Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163, 761 N.E.2d 153 (2001). A
reviewing court will not depart from the plain language of a
statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions
that conflict with the express legislative intent. Town & Country
Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d
103, 117, 866 N.E.2d 227 (2007). Moreover, we are mindful that the
legislature enacts laws with full knowledge of existing laws and of
the construction those laws have been given by the courts.
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No. 1-10-1956
Illinois Dept. of Healthcare and Family Services ex rel. Wiszowaty,
394 Ill. App. 3d 49, 58-59, 913 N.E.2d 680 (2009).
The two statutes at issue in this case are the PSEBA and the
PEDA. The PSEBA is designed to guarantee, inter alia, the health
benefits of public safety employees who have suffered a career-
ending injury, and section 10(a) of that Act provides that the
employer of a full-time law enforcement officer who suffers a
“catastrophic injury” in the line of duty shall pay the “entire
premium” of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured
employee, his spouse, and his dependent children. 820 ILCS
320/10(a) (West 2006). The supreme court has interpreted the term
“catastrophic injury” as used in this provision to be synonymous
with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability pension under
the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2006)).
Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 398-400, 789 N.E.2d
1211 (2003). Section 10(b) of the PSEBA specifically provides that
“[n]othing in this Section shall be construed to limit health
insurance coverage or pension benefits for which the officer,
firefighter, spouse, or dependent children may otherwise be
eligible.” 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2006).
The PEDA is designed to protect an injured employee’s income
for a period of one year, and section 1(b) of that statute states,
in relevant part, as follows:
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No. 1-10-1956
“Whenever [a full-time law enforcement officer] suffers
any injury in the line of duty which causes him to be
unable to perform his duties, he shall continue to be
paid by the employing public entity on the same basis as
he was paid before the injury, with no deduction from his
sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime
accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public
employee pension fund during the time he is unable to
perform his duties due to the result of the injury, but
not longer than one year in relation to the same injury.”
5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2006).
Section 1(d) of the PEDA provides that a disabled employee
receiving salary benefits under that statute “shall not be entitled
to any benefits for which he would qualify because of his
disability under the provisions of the Illinois Pension Code.” 5
ILCS 345/1(d) (West 2006). In addition, any salary compensation
due to the injured employee from workers’ compensation or other
type of insurance carried by the employing public entity shall
revert to that entity while the employee receives salary benefits
under the PEDA. 5 ILCS 345/1(d) (West 2006).
Upon examination of the above statutory provisions, we find
that the language contained in both the PSEBA and the PEDA is clear
and unambiguous. Section 1(b) of the PEDA provides that an injured
police officer is entitled to collect his full salary for a period
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No. 1-10-1956
of one year, and section 10(a) of the PSEBA provides that such an
officer is also entitled to the additional benefit of having his
employer pay the entire premium for the health care plan for the
police officer and his family. Nothing in the plain language of
either statute precludes an injured police officer from receiving
benefits under both of these statutes at the same time. Thus,
contrary to the ruling of the circuit court, there is no explicit
prohibition against the “retroactive payment” of health insurance
benefits under the PSEBA for the period of time from the date of
the disabling accident to the pension board’s decision that the
officer is eligible for a disability pension. In light of this
circumstance, we construe section 10(a) of the PSEBA and section
1(b) of the PEDA together and find that benefits may be granted
under both provisions simultaneously without offending the purpose
of either statute. Though this interpretation allows a very
generous benefit to public safety employees who sustain disabling
injuries in the line of duty, we see nothing in the language of
either statute to indicate that the legislature did not intend to
confer such a benefit.
In seeking to avoid this result, the City first argues that
section 10(a) of the PSEBA confers a benefit that is unknown at
common law and, as such, constitutes a statute in derogation of
common law that must be strictly construed in favor of the
employing entity that is subjected to its operation. See Murphy v.
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No. 1-10-1956
Mancari’s Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 381 Ill. App. 3d 768, 774, 887
N.E.2d 569 (2008); Delaney v. Happel, 185 Ill. App. 3d 951, 954,
542 N.E.2d 46 (1989). This argument necessarily fails because the
strict-construction rule relied upon by the City commands only that
the court “will not presume that the legislature intended an
innovation of the common law further than that which the statutory
language specifies or clearly implies.” Williams v. Manchester,
228 Ill. 2d 404, 419, 888 N.E.2d 1 (2008). Therefore, even a
strict construction of a statute in derogation of the common law
must be anchored in the statutory language. As set forth above, we
find nothing in the plain language of section 10(a) of the PSEBA
that imposes any time limitation on a disabled public safety
employee’s right to collect the benefit provided therein.
The City also contends that the plaintiff’s entitlement to the
health benefits under section 10(a) of the PSEBA was not triggered
until October 14, 2008, because that is the date on which the
police pension board determined that he had suffered a
“catastrophic injury,” which is a condition precedent to the
receipt of benefits under the PSEBA. We note, however, that the
underlying basis of this argument is fundamentally flawed where the
pension board found that the plaintiff was eligible to collect a
disability pension as of September 1, 2006, which was the
termination date of his salary benefits under the PEDA, accrued
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No. 1-10-1956
sick and vacation time, two weeks’ light duty, and workers’
compensation payments. Thus, the pension board clearly determined
that the plaintiff was disabled and entitled to a pension as of the
date of the injury, but his right to collect such payments was
deferred so as not to result in duplicative salary benefits from
multiple sources. We find that the pension board’s decision was
consistent with the language in section 1(d) of the PEDA, which
specifically precludes an injured employee who is receiving salary
benefits under that statute from also receiving salary compensation
under the pension code or as a result of workers’ compensation or
other insurance carried by the employing public entity. See 5 ILCS
345/1(d) (West 2006)). That determination does not, however,
affect the claimant’s right to recover under section 10(a) of the
PSEBA because that statutory provision does not relate to salary
compensation but confers an entirely different benefit: the payment
of the employee’s share of his health insurance premium.
Consequently, we conclude that an employee who has suffered a
career-ending injury is entitled to payment of his proportionate
share of his health insurance premium by the employing entity as of
the date of the injury, without regard to the fact that the
employee has not yet been found to be eligible for a disability
pension.
This reasoning leads us directly to the City’s next argument
that its obligation to provide the health insurance benefit under
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No. 1-10-1956
section 10(a) of the PSEBA does not arise until after the
expiration of the salary benefit provided by section 1(b) of the
PEDA. In support of this claim, the City relies on section 1(d) of
the PEDA and argues that the salary benefit conferred by the PEDA
is intended to place the injured employee in the same, but not a
better, position as that he would have occupied if he had not been
injured. We find this argument to be unpersuasive.
First, the City’s argument fails to take into consideration
the fact that the PSEBA grants additional benefits that are not
dependent upon or limited by other benefits afforded under the PEDA
or any other statute. As we have previously observed, there is no
language in the PSEBA that prevents application of its terms to
circumstances in which the injured employee is receiving salary
benefits under the PEDA.
Second, the City’s reliance on section 1(d) of the PEDA is
entirely misplaced. As set forth above, that provision
specifically precludes an injured employee from collecting salary
compensation in the form of a disability pension or as a result of
workers’ compensation or other insurance carried by the employing
public entity while also receiving the salary benefit provided in
section 1(b) of the PEDA. See 5 ILCS 345/1(d) (West 2006)). Yet,
section 1(d) makes no mention of section 10(a) of the PSEBA. Under
the interpretive principle of expressio unius est exclusio
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No. 1-10-1956
alterius, “the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is construed
as an exclusion of all other exceptions.” See People ex rel.
Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 286, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003);
Plock v. Board of Education of Freeport School District No. 145,
396 Ill. App. 3d 960, 967, 920 N.E.2d 1087 (2009). Thus, the fact
that section 1(d) of the PEDA does not reference the PSEBA
indicates that the legislature did not intend for the benefits
under these two statutes to be mutually exclusive.
Finally, the City contends that the circuit court’s decision
should be affirmed because the interpretation we have adopted above
creates “obvious practical problems” and “obvious budget
difficulties” for a municipal employer who may not know for several
budget years whether it will be obligated to reimburse disabled
employees for their health insurance premium contributions.
Acceptance of the City’s argument would require us to depart from
the plain language of section 10 of the PSEBA by reading into it an
exception in the form of a time limitation that does not appear in
the statute. Such an interpretation would dilute the effect of the
PSEBA by restricting its application in a manner that was not
expressed by the legislature and would run counter to the purpose
of the Act. We decline the City’s request to do so. Accordingly,
even if the City’s contention with regard to its budgetary concern
is true, it cannot serve as a basis for our insertion of a
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No. 1-10-1956
limitation that the legislature did not express.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Cook County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
circuit court with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
HALL, P.J., and LAMPKIN, J., concur.
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