The opinion
FOURTH DIVISION
January 26, 2006
No. 1-05-0778
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PARK FOREST )
HEIGHTS SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 163, )
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
) the Circuit Court
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) of Cook County.
)
v. )
)
THE STATE TEACHER CERTIFICATION BOARD )
AND ITS MEMBERS, JOSEPH KACZANOWSKI, )
in his previous capacity as Regional )
Superintendent of Schools for )
Suburban Cook County, ROBERT )
INGRAFFIA in his current capacity as ) Honorable
current Regional Superintendent of ) Anthony L. Young
Schools for Suburban Cook County, ) Judge Presiding.
MICHAEL DUBOSE and DAVID M. SMITH, )
in his capacity as Hearing Officer, )
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Board of Education of Park Forest-Chicago Heights
School District No. 163, Cook County, Illinois (Board of
Education or Board), filed a complaint for administrative review
seeking to reverse a decision by defendant State Teacher
Certification Board that overturned the suspension of defendant
Michael DuBose's teaching certificate. The circuit court
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reversed the decision of the Certification Board and held that
DuBose's teaching certificate should be suspended for one year.
DuBose appeals that determination. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I. Background
DuBose is a probationary teacher who was employed by the
Board of Education during the 2000-01 and 2001-02 school years.
He did not receive a notice of nonrenewal at the end of the 2001-
02 school year and was therefore rehired for the 2002-03 school
year. On August 21 and 23, 2002, DuBose attended a teacher
institute at District 163. He reported for teaching duties on
August 26, 28 and 29, 2002. However, he used paid personal days
on August 27 and 30, 2002.
DuBose submitted a written resignation on August 30, 2002,
which was effective September 2, 2002. DuBose testified that the
reason he resigned was due to an increase in the district's
insurance premiums. DuBose also had a conversation with Robert
Rubenow, the interim business manager for the district, when he
submitted his resignation. DuBose indicated to Rubenow that he
accepted a teaching position with District 89. DuBose testified
that he was tendered a contract by District 89 on September 3,
2002, and started a teaching assignment on that day.
On September 4, 2002, the Board of Education filed a
complaint with defendant Joseph Kaczanowski, the Regional
Superintendent of Schools for Suburban Cook County (Regional
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Superintendent). The Board requested that the Regional
Superintendent commence a hearing to suspend DuBose's teaching
certificate pursuant to section 24-14 of the Illinois School Code
(105 ILCS 5/24-14 (West 2002)), which provides that "no teacher
may resign during the school term, without the concurrence of the
board, in order to accept another teaching assignment."
The Regional Superintendent conducted a hearing on October
16, 2002. On December 5, 2002, the Regional Superintendent
issued his decision to suspend DuBose's teaching certificate for
one year. The Regional Superintendent determined that section
24-14 of the School Code applied to both tenured and nontenured
teachers and suspended DuBose's teaching certificate for
violating that section.
On December 16, 2002, DuBose filed an appeal to the State
Teacher Certification Board (Certification Board) pursuant to
section 21-23 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/21-23 (West 2002)).
The Certification Board advised the parties that the proceedings
would be governed by appeal procedures adopted by the
Certification Board on January 3, 2003, entitled "Appeal to State
Teacher Certification Board," which among other things provided
for the participation of the local school board.
On July 14, 2003, DuBose filed a motion to bar use of the
Certification Board's procedures, alleging that the procedures
were not properly adopted pursuant to the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act (5 ILCS 106/1-1 et seq. (West 2002)). DuBose
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requested that the Board of Education be barred from
participating in the proceedings before the Certification Board.
DuBose also filed a motion for a de novo hearing.
On July 16, 2003, the hearing officer for the Certification
Board denied both of DuBose's motions and confirmed the school
district's standing to participate in the proceedings. On July
24, 2003, defendant Robert Ingraffia, the successor to Joseph
Kaczanowski as Regional Superintendent, informed the
Certification Board that he had no interest in the matter and
would not participate in the proceedings.
On August 7, 2003, following a hearing, the Certification
Board found that section 24-14 applied to only tenured teachers
and reversed the suspension of DuBose's teaching certificate.
On September 24, 2003, the Board of Education filed a
complaint for administrative review of the Certification Board's
determination.
On December 22, 2003, DuBose filed a motion to dismiss
challenging plaintiff's standing and arguing that the
Certification Board's procedures were invalid. On July 21, 2004,
the trial court denied DuBose's motion to dismiss.
On February 28, 2005, the circuit court reversed the
Certification Board's determination. In so doing, the court
found that section 24-14 of the School Code, which prohibits
teachers from resigning during the school year to take teaching
jobs elsewhere, applied to both tenured and nontenured teachers.
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The court noted that the Regional Superintendent conducted an
evidentiary hearing and found that DuBose resigned during the
school year to accept another position. The court concluded that
"[a]ny other finding would be against the manifest weight of the
evidence." The court upheld the determination of the Regional
Superintendent suspending DuBose's teaching certificate for one
year.
On appeal, DuBose contends that plaintiff lacked standing to
file a complaint for administrative review; that he was entitled
to a de novo hearing before the Certification Board; that the
Certification Board's procedures were invalid; that the
Certification Board's determination is not reviewable where it
failed to make factual findings; and that section 24-14 of the
School Code applies only to tenured teachers. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
II. Analysis
A. The School Board's Standing
DuBose first argues that plaintiff lacked standing to file a
complaint for administrative review in this case.
The right to seek review under the Administrative Review Law
(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2002)) of an administrative
decision is limited to parties of record whose rights,
privileges, or duties are affected by the decision. Maybell v.
Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 246 Ill. App. 3d 14, 17 (1993).
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We find that the Board of Education had standing to file its
complaint for administrative review. As the circuit court noted,
the Board of Education was an original party in the
administrative hearing which was conducted on December 5, 2002.
Also, the Board of Education's rights, privileges, and duties are
affected by the Certification Board's determination. The Board
of Education has an interest in maintaining classroom and staff
stability in its schools. Contrary to DuBose's assertion that
the Board of Education "gains nothing from having the teaching
certificate suspended," the Board of Education has an interest in
deterring teachers from resigning during the school year by the
possibility of certificate suspension. Teacher resignations
during a school year require the Board of Education to hire new
teachers, lose negotiation leverage and disrupt the students'
learning environment.
We also reject DuBose's argument that pursuant to section
21-23 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/21-23 (West 2002)), the
appropriate parties in this case are the teacher and the Regional
Superintendent. Section 21-23 does not include any language that
supports DuBose's contention. Rather, section 21-23 merely
provides that "[w]hen a certificate is suspended, the right of
appeal shall lie to the State Teacher Certification Board." 105
ILCS 5/21-23(a) (West 2002)). In addition, the Regional
Superintendent was not a party of record in the original action
but rather was responsible for conducting hearings and
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determining whether DuBose's teaching certificate should be
suspended.
B. The Certification Board's Review of the Superintendent's
Determination
DuBose next contends that the Certification Board erred by
denying him a de novo hearing. DuBose argues that pursuant to
subsection 21-23(c) of the School Code and the Certification
Board's adoption of administrative regulations, the Certification
Board was required to conduct a full de novo hearing.
However, DuBose has failed to assert or prove any prejudice
from the Certification Board's alleged error. In fact, the
Certification Board granted the relief requested by DuBose when
it overturned the suspension of DuBose's teaching certificate.
As a general rule, a party cannot complain of error that does not
prejudicially affect it, and one who has obtained by judgment all
that has been asked for cannot appeal from the judgment.
Argonaut-Midwest Insurance Co. v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co.,
338 Ill. App. 3d 423, 427 (2003), citing Geer v. Kadera, 173 Ill.
2d 398, 413-14 (1996). Accordingly, this court need not consider
the merits of DuBose's contention where he has failed to show any
prejudice in this case.
Even if we consider the merits of DuBose's argument, the
Certification Board was not required to conduct a de novo hearing
under section 21-23 of the School Code.
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The statute governing the suspension or revocation of
teaching certificates is section 21-23 of the School Code (105
ILCS 5/21-23(a) (West 2002)), which provides, in part:
"The regional superintendent or State Superintendent of
Education shall upon receipt of evidence of immorality,
a condition of health detrimental to the welfare of
pupils, incompetency, unprofessional conduct, the
neglect of any professional duty or other just cause
serve written notice to the individual and afford the
individual opportunity for a hearing prior to
suspension. *** No certificate shall be suspended
until the teacher has an opportunity for a hearing at
the educational service region. When a certificate is
suspended, the right of appeal shall lie to the State
Teacher Certification Board. *** Any certificate may
be revoked for the same reasons as for suspension by
the State Superintendent of Education. No certificate
shall be revoked until the teacher has an opportunity
for a hearing before the State Teacher Certification
Board ***."
This court previously examined this statute and applied the
rules of statutory construction to determine whether the State
Superintendent of Education lacked the authority to revoke a
teacher's license after the Certification Board had voted not to
revoke such license. See Hunt v. Sanders, 196 Ill. App. 3d 466
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(1990). This case also requires an examination of the statute
and application of the rules of statutory construction.
The primary role of statutory interpretation and
construction is to ascertain and effectuate the true intent and
meaning of the legislature. Hunt, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 469,
citing Trigg v. Sanders, 162 Ill. App. 3d 719 (1987). In
interpreting a statute, the legislative language must be given
its plain and ordinary meaning. If the language of the statute
is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent can be
ascertained therefrom, the language must prevail and will be
given effect by the courts without resorting to other aids of
construction. Hunt, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 469.
In this case, the Regional Superintendent conducted a
hearing and suspended DuBose's teaching certificate for one year.
DuBose then filed an appeal to the Certification Board which
reversed the suspension of DuBose's teaching certificate.
The language of the statute provides that the Regional
Superintendent shall "afford the individual opportunity for a
hearing prior to suspension" (105 ILCS 5/21-22(a) (West 2002)),
which DuBose received in this case. The statute further states
that "[w]hen a certificate is suspended, the right of appeal
shall lie to the State Teacher Certification Board." 105 ILCS
5/21-22(a) (West 2002). Here, following the Regional
Superintendent's determination, DuBose appealed to the
Certification Board as provided by the statute. However, DuBose
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argues that the Certification Board was required to conduct a de
novo hearing rather than an appeal based on the record before it.
Section 21-23(a) specifically provides that when a certificate
is suspended, the right of "appeal" rests with the Certification
Board; whereas when a certificate is to be revoked, the teacher
must be afforded an opportunity for a "hearing" before the
Certification Board. DuBose maintains that the legislature's use
of the different words "hearing" and "appeal" does not
necessarily indicate that the legislature contemplated two
different modes of procedure, one de novo and one based solely on
the record. DuBose argues that subsection 21-23(c) shows that
the legislature intended that the Certification Board conduct
more than a review of the record in cases involving certificate
suspensions.
Subsection 21-23(c) provides that "[t]he State
Superintendent of Education or a person designated by him shall
have the power to administer oaths to witnesses at any hearing
conducted before the State Teacher Certification Board pursuant
to this Section." (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/21-23(c) (West
2002). Subsection 21-23(c) also provides that the State
Superintendent, or his designee, may subpoena witnesses,
administer oaths to witnesses and take testimony orally or by
depositions before the Certification Board.
DuBose argues that none of the procedures set forth in
subsection 21-23(c) are relevant if the Certification Board
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merely reviews the record before it. However, the legislature
provided in subsection 21-23(a) that no teaching certificate
shall be revoked for the reasons in that subsection until the
teacher has an opportunity for a "hearing" before the
Certification Board. Similarly, in subsection 21-23(b), the
legislature provided that "[t]he State Superintendent may revoke
any certificate upon proof at hearing by clear and convincing
evidence that the certificate holder has caused a child to be an
abused or neglected child as defined by the Abused and Neglected
Child Reporting Act." 105 ILCS 5/21-23(b) (West 2002). The
legislature again stated in subsection 21-23(b) that "[n]o
certificate shall be revoked until the teacher has an opportunity
for a hearing before the State Teacher Certification Board."
(Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/21-23(b) (West 2002). Accordingly,
we find that the procedures set forth in subsection 21-23(c),
which apply to "any hearing conducted before the State Teacher
Certification Board," refer to the "hearings" provided for
teachers before the Certification Board when a certificate is to
be revoked; rather than the "appeals" to the Certification Board
after a certificate suspension.
Defendant further argues that the Certification Board's
adoption of rules under the Illinois Administrative Code (Code)
(See 23 Ill. Adm. Code ''475.10 through 475.100 29 Ill. Reg.
10146 (eff. June 30, 2005)) requires the Board to conduct de novo
hearings in all cases before it under section 21-23 of the School
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Code. However, the procedures set forth in the Code apply only
to "administrative hearings" rather than "appeals" to the
Certification Board from the suspension of a teaching
certificate. The Certification Board's adoption of rules for
"hearings" under the Code does not preclude its ability to
conduct "appeals" solely upon the record. Section 21-23 of the
School Code provides a separate procedure for suspension of a
certificate, providing a teacher with a hearing before the
Regional Superintendent and an appeal to the Certification Board.
C. The Certification Board's Procedures
DuBose next contends that this court should invalidate the
Certification Board's procedures, entitled "Appeal to State
Teacher Certification Board," because they are "rules" that were
not adopted in accordance with the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act (Act) (5 ILCS 100/5-5 (West 2002)). Defendant
argues that these procedures prejudiced him because they
prevented him from receiving a de novo hearing before the
Certification Board and permitted the Board of Education to
participate in the proceedings.
However, DuBose has failed to show any prejudice from the
Certification Board's alleged error. As previously discussed,
DuBose was not entitled to a de novo hearing under section 21-23
of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/21-23 (West 2002)), and the Board
of Education was a proper party to participate in the
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proceedings. In addition, the Certification Board granted the
relief requested by DuBose when it overturned the suspension of
DuBose's teaching certificate. DuBose cannot complain of error
that does not prejudicially affect him and where the
Certification Board granted him the relief that he requested.
Argonaut-Midwest Insurance Co., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 427.
Furthermore, issues that are not essential to a disposition of
the cause or where the result will not be affected regardless of
the determination of the issue will not be considered by a
reviewing court. R.L. Polk & Co. v. Ryan, 296 Ill. App. 3d 132,
136 (1998); Argonaut-Midwest Insurance Co., 338 Ill. App. 3d at
428. Even if this court construed the Certification Board's
procedures as a "rule" within the Act and found that the
Certification Board failed to follow statutory procedures, that
determination would not impact the present case. Accordingly, we
need not consider DuBose's contention.
In addition, DuBose's request for attorney fees is denied.
DuBose notes that pursuant to the Act, "[i]n any case in which a
party has any administrative rule invalidated by a court for any
reason, *** the court shall award *** reasonable attorney's
fees." 5 ILCS 100/10-55(c) (West 2002). However, since this
court need not determine the validity of the Certification
Board's procedures, attorney fees are not warranted in this case.
D. DuBose's Claim That This Cause Must Be Remanded to the
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Certification Board for Factual Findings
DuBose next claims that the circuit court's determination
must be reversed and remanded to the Certification Board because
it failed to make factual findings in this case. DuBose argues
that the Certification Board was required to make such findings
pursuant to section 10-50(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Section 10-50(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
"A final decision or order adverse to a party
(other than the agency) in a contested case shall be in
writing or stated in the record. A final decision shall
include findings of fact and conclusions of law,
separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in
statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise
and explicit statement of the underlying facts
supporting the findings." 5 ILCS 100/10-50(a) (West
2002).
Section 475.100 of the Administrative Code (23 Ill. Adm.
Code ' 475.100 29 Ill. Reg. 10146 (eff. June 30, 2005))
("Contested Cases and Other Formal Hearings") provides:
"The hearing officer's findings and conclusions shall
be in writing and shall include findings of fact and
conclusions of law separately stated and in conformance
with Section 10-50(a) of the Illinois Administrative
Procedure Act [(5 ILCS 100/10-50(a))]."
We therefore find that the Administrative Procedure Act does
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not require that the Certification Board's determination contain
factual findings. Rather, the requirement in this case applies
to the Regional Superintendent, who conducted the hearing, not
the Certification Board, which reviewed DuBose's appeal.
Moreover, the factual findings in this case were sufficient
to permit judicial review. The purpose of an agency's findings
in an administrative proceeding is to permit orderly and
efficient judicial review. O'Neill v. Rodriguez, 298 Ill. App.
3d 897, 902-03 (1998). Where an agency's findings are sufficient
to permit the reviewing court to make an intelligent decision,
the standard is met. O'Neill, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 903. Where
the testimony before the administrative agency is preserved for
review in the record, specific findings of fact by the agency are
not necessary for judicial review. O'Neill, 298 Ill. App. 3d at
903.
The record shows that the Regional Superintendent determined
that section 24-14 applied to both tenured and nontenured
teachers and suspended DuBose's teaching certificate for
violating that section. On appeal, the Certification Board
interpreted section 24-14 and determined that the statute was not
applicable to DuBose. As a result, the Certification Board noted
that it need not decide whether DuBose violated the statute.
The evidence regarding DuBose's violation of section 24-14
is preserved in the record for review by the court where a
transcript of the hearing before the Regional Superintendent is
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included in the record. The factual findings in this case were
sufficient to permit orderly judicial review. In fact, the
circuit court adopted the Regional Superintendent's factual
findings that DuBose resigned during the school year to accept
another teaching position and determined that any other finding
would be against the manifest weight of evidence in the record.
Therefore, we find that reversal of the circuit court's decision
is not warranted on this basis.
E. Section 24-14 of the School Code
DuBose lastly contends that the circuit court erred in
construing section 24-14 of the School Code as applying to both
tenured and nontenured teachers.
Section 24-14 of the School Code provides:
"Termination of contractual continued service by
teacher. A teacher who has entered into contractual
continued service may resign at any time by obtaining
concurrence of the board or by serving at least 30
days' written notice upon the secretary of the board.
However, no teacher may resign during the school term,
without the concurrence of the board, in order to
accept another teaching assignment. Any teacher
terminating said service not in accordance with this
Section is guilty of unprofessional conduct and liable
to suspension of certificate for a period not to exceed
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1 year, as provided in Section 21-23." 105 ILCS 5/24-
14 (West 2002).
We are asked to determine whether the second sentence of
this statute applies to both tenured and nontenured teachers.
The construction of a statute is a question of law, and this
court's standard of review is de novo. Quad Cities Open, Inc. v.
City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498, 508 (2004). Long-standing
principles of statutory construction dictate that this court give
effect to the intention of the legislature. Quad Cities Open,
Inc., 208 Ill. 2d at 508. When the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to the plain and
ordinary meaning of the language without resort to other tools of
statutory construction. People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 504-
05 (2002). Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being
understood in two or more ways by reasonably well-informed
people. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997).
We find that section 24-14 is not clear or unambiguous.
Rather, as demonstrated by the Certification Board and the
Regional Superintendent and trial court, the statute is
susceptible to two conflicting interpretations. The first
sentence of section 24-14 permits only "[a] teacher who has
entered into contractual continued service" (tenure) to resign at
any time with the school board's concurrence or 30 days' written
notice. (105 ILCS 5/24/-14 (West 2002)) The second sentence
provides that "no teacher may resign during the school term,
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without the concurrence of the board, in order to accept another
teaching assignment." 105 ILCS 5/24-14 (West 2002). The second
sentence prohibits "all teachers" from resigning during the
school year to accept another teaching position. The meaning of
that sentence becomes ambiguous when it is read in conjunction
with the first sentence. Reasonably well-informed people can
read the second sentence literally as applying to all teachers,
as the Regional Superintendent and trial court determined, or can
infer that it applies to only tenured teachers, as the
Certification Board found.
In resolving this statutory ambiguity, this court must apply
rules of statutory construction. One rule of statutory
construction provides that when a particular provision appears in
a statute, the failure to provide the same provision later in the
statute will be deemed to have been intended by the legislature.
Nolan v. Hillard, 309 Ill. App. 3d 129, 144 (1999); Siciliano v.
Village of Westchester Firefighters' Pension Fund, 202 Ill. App.
3d 964, 967 (1990). Similarly, the legislature intended
different results where it uses certain words in one instance and
different words in another. Chicago SMSA Ltd. Partnership v.
Department of Revenue, 306 Ill. App. 3d 977, 983 (1999). The
first sentence of section 24-14 qualifies teachers as those who
have "entered into contractual continued service." The second
sentence contains no such qualification but only uses the term
"teacher." Therefore, the failure to limit teachers in the
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second sentence to those who have "entered into contractual
continued service" must have been intended.
In addition, because the second sentence is ambiguous, it is
appropriate to examine the legislative history of section 24-14.
Franklin v. Cernovich, 287 Ill. App. 3d 776, 780 (1997). The
sentence in question was added to section 24-14 by Public Act 83-
710 (Pub. Act 83-710, eff. September 23, 1983), which originated
as House Bill 427 (83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 427, 1983
Sess.). The legislative minutes show that the language was not
originally part of House Bill 427 but was added out of concern
for teachers leaving during the school year for positions at
other schools and their prior schools being unable to find
qualified replacements. The legislature explained its concerns
as follows:
"SENATOR COLLINS:*** I think the amendment, it is my
understanding, took care of most of my concerns and
that was allowing a district or a school to be without
a specific teacher in a... in an area where there was
the scarcity of teachers... of qualified teachers with
the same skills. It is my understanding that the
amendment would mandate that the teacher remain until
such time they find a replacement. In addition to
that, that she could not leave for the sole purpose of
taking another job. *** I think the way the bill has
been amended, it satisfies their problems and it offers
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adequate protection to the school districts where there
may be a scarcity of teacher[s] in the particular...
teaching that particular subject matter, and I support
the bill." 83D Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,
June 21, 1983, at 172 (statements of Senator Collins).
"Nelson: *** [T]his is the bill that would allow
teachers to break their contracts. Many of us know
that in other kinds of sectors people who sign
contracts are expected to fulfill them, and if a
teacher can resign during the school year, it makes it
very, very difficult for a board of education to find a
good replacement in time." 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, June 28, 1983, at 23 (statements of
Representative Nelson).
The legislative history of section 24-14 demonstrates that
the legislature was concerned with school districts being unable
to replace teachers who resign during the school year to take
teaching positions elsewhere. DuBose argues that the legislature
expressed no opinion on whether the amendment applied to
nontenured teachers. However, there was no need for the
legislatures to distinguish between teachers and non-tenured
teachers. School districts and their students suffer the same
consequences when teachers leave during the school year and
cannot be replaced with teachers qualified to teach the same
subject matter, whether the departed teachers are tenured or
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nontenured.
Furthermore, a comparison of the previous version of section
24-14 shows that the legislature intended for the second sentence
to apply to "all teachers." The first sentence of the earlier
version of section 24-14 began with language referring to tenured
teachers and prohibited teachers from resigning at any time from
60 days before the start of the school year through the end of
the school year. The second sentence began with the same
language regarding tenured teachers and prohibited teachers from
resigning at any other time without serving written notice on the
board secretary. Public Act 83-710 changed the order of the
sentences. The first sentence still begins with the language
regarding tenured teachers and allows such teachers to resign at
any time with the concurrence of the board or by giving 30 days'
written notice. The second sentence prohibits any teachers from
resigning during the school year to accept other teaching
positions. Unlike both sentences in the prior version of section
24-14, and the first sentence in Public Act 83-710, the second
sentence makes no reference to tenured teachers. In light of the
previous use of that language in both sentences, and its use
again in the first sentence, the omission of that language from
the second sentence must have been intentional. Accordingly, we
find that the prohibition on resigning during the school year to
take another teaching position provided in section 24-14 applies
to both tenured and nontenured teachers.
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DuBose argues that the title of section 24-14, "Termination
of Contractual Continued Service By Teacher," should be used to
assist this court in interpreting the scope of the statute.
However, such a title is considered only as a short-hand
reference to the general subject matter involved and cannot limit
the plain meaning of the text. Michigan Avenue National Bank v.
County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 505-06 (2000). In addition, no
other section of the School Code discusses teacher resignation,
whether by tenured or nontenured teachers. If we accepted
DuBose's contention that only tenured teachers are prohibited
from resigning during the school year to accept another teaching
position, there would be no limit on nontenured teachers. They
would be able to resign anytime, even during the school year. We
find that there is no reason the legislature would make such a
distinction when it was concerned that schools would not be able
to replace teachers who resign during the school year.
III. Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court.
CAMPBELL and GREIMAN, JJ., concur.
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