In re Detention of Hunter

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

In re Detention of Hunter, 2013 IL App (4th) 120299

Appellate Court In re: the Detention of ANTHONY L. HUNTER, a Sexually Dangerous

Caption Person, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-

Appellee, v. ANTHONY L. HUNTER, Respondent-Appellant.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-12-0299

Filed January 9, 2013

Rehearing denied February 4, 2013

Held The order for respondent’s commitment as a sexually dangerous person

(Note: This syllabus was upheld over his contentions that the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act

constitutes no part of violated the confrontation clause and that the evidence did not satisfy the

the opinion of the court demonstrated-propensities requirement of the Act, since the expert

but has been prepared testimony admitted under the Act concerning respondent’s propensities

by the Reporter of did not implicate the confrontation clause, even though it was based on

Decisions for the hearsay police reports and interviews, and the expert testimony

convenience of the sufficiently proved that it was substantially probable that respondent

reader.)

would reoffend if not confined.

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 10-CF-245; the

Review Hon. Peter C. Cavanagh, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Michael J. Costello (argued), of Costello Law Office, of Springfield, for

Appeal appellant.

John Milhiser, State’s Attorney, of Springfield (Patrick Delfino, Robert

J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen (argued), all of State’s Attorneys

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Knecht concurred in the

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Respondent, Anthony L. Hunter, was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault

(720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1) (West 2008)) and criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(1)

(West 2008)). While those criminal charges were pending, the State instituted a civil

commitment proceeding, pursuant to Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725

ILCS 205/0.01 to 12 (West 2008)). After a jury trial, the circuit court declared respondent

a sexually dangerous person and ordered his commitment. Respondent’s posttrial motion was

denied, and he appealed.

¶2 Respondent argues his commitment as a sexually dangerous person should be reversed

because (1) the Act is unconstitutional, on its face and as applied, as violative of the

confrontation clause, or in the alternative, (2) the State’s evidence was insufficient to satisfy

the demonstrated-propensities requirement of the Act. We find no constitutional violation

and affirm on both grounds.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 13, 2010, respondent was charged by information with one count of aggravated

criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(1) (West 2008)) and one count of criminal

sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(1) (West 2008)) for physically attacking Emma in

respondent’s home and penetrating her vagina with his fingers on April 20, 2010. The

criminal charges were pending when, on May 19, 2010, the State filed a petition to declare

respondent a sexually dangerous person. The State requested the appointment of two

psychiatrists to examine respondent. Pursuant to the circuit court’s order, respondent was

subsequently examined by Drs. Terry Killian and Lawrence Jeckel. After examining

respondent, both concluded respondent qualified as a sexually dangerous person as defined

in the Act.

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¶5 A hearing was conducted on March 7 and 8, 2012. At the hearing, the State presented the

testimony of Drs. Killian and Jeckel, both of whom testified that respondent was a sexually

dangerous person. Dr. Killian testified he was employed as a forensic psychiatrist and, in that

capacity, he had evaluated around 150 people to determine whether they were sexually

dangerous. When conducting the initial evaluations, he has found the person to be sexually

dangerous in approximately 60% of the cases. The circuit court accepted Dr. Killian as an

expert in the field of psychiatry.

¶6 Dr. Killian testified he conducted respondent’s evaluation on August 26, 2010. The

prosecutor had forwarded over 100 pages of documents to be reviewed. A social worker in

Dr. Killian’s office reviewed the records and prepared a summary for the doctor’s use during

the interview with respondent. Included in the documents was information about particular

incidents of respondent’s past sexual misconduct. Dr. Killian testified it was “normal and

routine” and “essential” for psychiatrists to rely on police reports of prior criminal conduct

in performing sexually-dangerous-person evaluations. He said he takes “all the information

that is available to [him], which includes the police reports and sometimes other documents,

could be [Illinois Department of Children and Family Services] reports, and the information

from evaluating, from interviewing the defendant, as well as any other documents [he has],

mental health records, other evaluations that have been done, take all of that, put it together

to try to make the best sense of how everything fits together.”

¶7 The first of respondent’s prior sexual incidents occurred in 1987 and involved a victim

named Sheri. Dr. Killian noted that respondent pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal

sexual abuse related to this incident. A police report revealed that Sheri had described the

incident as a violent rape. She had been helping respondent move to a different home when

he grabbed her, dragged her into the bedroom, and dug his fingernails into her mouth to keep

her quiet while he raped her. The police had observed injuries consistent with her version of

the event. Respondent had given police a very different version, where he had portrayed

himself as the victim. He said Sheri had asked him to have sex with her, and then “ ‘for no

reason,’ ” she assaulted him. In his interview, respondent told Dr. Killian he had no memory

of the incident or of a person named Sheri.

¶8 Approximately 16 months after that incident, in 1989, respondent, then age 23, was

involved in another incident–this one involving a victim named Laticia, age 15. Laticia said

she had known respondent and that he had been at her home on the day of the incident. She

was asleep, but she awakened to find respondent on top of her. He overpowered her and

raped her. Dr. Killian said this case had been dismissed for unknown reasons.

¶9 In 1998, respondent was involved in another incident wherein he had been repeatedly

asking an acquaintance named Rebecca, age 21, to remove her clothes. He offered her money

to have sex with him and placed his hand on her upper thigh. Rebecca was respondent’s

friend’s roommate.

¶ 10 In 2002, respondent had sexually assaulted his niece by marriage, Ashley, who was 13

years old. Respondent was copying movies to sell and Ashley indicated she wanted some for

herself. Respondent told her the only way she could have copies was to sleep with him. She

refused. He then grabbed her, pulled off her clothes, raped her, and told her not to tell

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anyone. Respondent pleaded guilty because the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence

against him was “definitive.” His semen was found in her vagina, and the medical

examination indicated this was her first vaginal sexual experience. Respondent told the

police the girl had begged him to have sex with her and he finally gave in.

¶ 11 During Dr. Killian’s interview with respondent, respondent said he remembered the

incident with Ashley, while he had not remembered anything about the three previous

incidents. He said Ashley had wanted a copy of a movie and he told her “ ‘Ass, grass, or

cash. Nobody rides for free.’ ” He said she agreed to have sex with him in exchange for a

copy of the movie. Respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault.

¶ 12 Finally, in 2010, respondent was involved in the incident leading to the current charges.

The victim, Emma, was respondent’s “personal assistant.” Respondent owed her money and

she had gone to his home to collect. When she arrived, he grabbed her, pulled her into the

bedroom, removed her clothes, and raped her. He told the police he was angry because

Emma had cashed a check that he had written for $7,000 that was not to be cashed. The

check was written only to teach Emma how to write a check for over $1,000. Respondent

threatened to call the police on her for cashing this fraudulent check. According to

respondent, Emma accused him of rape in response to his threat of turning her in on cashing

a fraudulent check.

¶ 13 Dr. Killian also considered (1) respondent’s nonsexual criminal history, which included

“many arrests,” and (2) three actuarial instruments in evaluating and predicting respondent’s

risk of reoffending. (Respondent admitted he had been arrested for domestic battery more

than 10 times.) The first of the actuarial instruments used was the Static 99. Respondent

scored a six, which indicated a high risk of reoffending. The second instrument was the

Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offender Recidivism (RRASOR). Respondent scored a

three, which placed him in the category of having a 36.9% likelihood over a 10-year period

of reoffending. The third instrument was the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool

(MnSOST-R). Respondent scored a 10 (Dr. Killian corrected his testimony on cross-

examination to reveal that respondent had actually scored a 12), which placed him in the

high-risk category.

¶ 14 In addition to the actuarial testing, Dr. Killian also considered respondent’s level of

antisocial behavior in determining recidivism. During his interview with respondent, Dr.

Killian noted that respondent mumbled “very badly,” as if he had suffered a stroke. Then,

after approximately 10 minutes, respondent began speaking more clearly. The doctor

believed respondent was faking a speech problem to present himself as a weakened or

disabled individual.

¶ 15 Based upon Dr. Killian’s observations, the review of the materials, and the results of the

actuarial instruments, in his opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, respondent

suffers from antisocial personality disorder, a mental disorder where he repeatedly violates

other people’s rights without remorse. This diagnosis, coupled with respondent’s “strong

tendencies to commit sex offenses,” predisposes him to the commission of sex offenses. In

Dr. Killian’s opinion, respondent’s mental disorder has existed for at least a year prior to the

filing of the petition. Within a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, Dr. Killian opined

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that respondent’s mental disorder is coupled with a propensity to commit sex offenses. He

also opined that, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, it is substantially probable

that respondent will engage in the commission of sex offenses in the future if he is not

confined. Finally, Dr. Killian opined that, to a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty,

respondent is a sexually dangerous person.

¶ 16 Next, Dr. Jeckel testified as the State’s second expert. He said he operates a general

practice in Champaign, Illinois, where two-thirds of his practice consists of general

psychiatry and one-third consists of forensic psychiatry. This case was his thirty-fifth

sexually-dangerous-person case. Like Dr. Killian, Dr. Jeckel reviewed the records related to

respondent’s criminal, psychiatric, substance-abuse, and incarceration history. He

acknowledged it was this “type of information that psychiatrists would normally rely upon

to do this kind of evaluation.” After his review of the documentation, Jeckel personally

interviewed respondent and prepared a report reflecting his observations and opinions.

¶ 17 On July 14, 2010, Dr. Jeckel interviewed respondent. With regard to the incident

involving the victim Sheri, Dr. Jeckel noted respondent’s aggressiveness in that situation as

the most significant. With regard to the incident involving Laticia, Jeckel noted that

respondent had “surprised,” then “blitzed her with his sexual aggression.” With regard to the

incident involving Rebecca, Jeckel commented on respondent’s insistence and demanding

demeanor. With regard to the incident involving Ashley, Jeckel noted her familial

relationship with respondent–the fact that he knew when she would be alone, and he again

“blitzed her, pushed her down, had sex with her.”

¶ 18 According to Dr. Jeckel, respondent had portrayed Ashley as aggressive, flirtatious, and

“coming on to him.” He noted respondent tended to portray his victims as the aggressors.

With regard to the underlying incident involving Emma, the doctor again noted the victim

was “allegedly blitzed” by respondent, but respondent had portrayed her as flirtatious and the

aggressor. Dr. Jeckel further noted that during the police interview, respondent initially acted

and appeared “very decrepit,” was difficult to understand, and appeared “very disabled,” yet

at other times, he would “talk very clearly.” This conduct led Dr. Jeckel to believe that

respondent “is capable of malingering, that is, capable of faking or exaggerating his

neurological deficits for the purpose of escaping culpability.”

¶ 19 Dr. Jeckel testified he also considered respondent’s nonsexual criminal history to

determine whether respondent demonstrated a pattern of violence or violating social norms.

Jeckel noted respondent’s history of substance abuse and sociopathy. His family had a history

of substance abuse and criminal activity. Respondent told Jeckel he had been sexually

molested, but Jeckel was not convinced that was true.

¶ 20 Unlike Dr. Killian, Dr. Jeckel did not use actuarial instruments in respondent’s

evaluation. He said he was “not a big believer in it.” Instead, he relied heavily on the clinical

evaluation. At the conclusion of his evaluation, Dr. Jeckel opined that, to a reasonable degree

of psychiatric certainty, (1) respondent suffers from two mental disorders, depressive

disorder and a personality disorder (respondent’s history of depression precluded a diagnosis

of antisocial personality disorder); (2) respondent’s mental disorder is coupled with a

propensity to commit sex offenses; (3) respondent will engage in the commission of sex

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offenses in the future if he is not confined; and (4) respondent is a sexually dangerous person.

¶ 21 Based upon this evidence, the jury found respondent to be a sexually dangerous person.

Thereafter, the circuit court ordered respondent confined in a treatment facility operated by

the Illinois Department of Corrections. After a hearing, respondent filed a posttrial motion,

which the court denied. This appeal followed.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 Respondent appeals, claiming his commitment order as a sexually dangerous person must

be vacated because the Act violates his right to confrontation and is contrary to the principles

set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Respondent contends he was

unable to confront his accusers, and therefore, he claims, the psychiatrists should not be

allowed to rely upon hearsay in the form of police reports and police interviews with the

victims to determine whether respondent has the propensity to commit sex offenses in the

future. In the alternative, respondent contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he is a sexually dangerous person.

¶ 24 A. Constitutional Challenge

¶ 25 We begin by noting:

“All statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. [Citation.] To overcome

this presumption, a party challenging a statute must clearly establish that it violates the

constitution. [Citation.] This court will affirm a statute’s constitutionality if the statute

is reasonably capable of such an interpretation. [Citation.] The question of whether a

statute is unconstitutional is a question of law, and our review is de novo. [Citation.]”

People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007).

¶ 26 Under Crawford, “testimonial” out-of-court statements are admissible only where (1) the

declarant is unavailable, and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine

the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. Our supreme court has observed that “[t]he sixth

amendment guarantees that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

*** to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125,

142 (2010) (quoting U.S. Const., amend. VI), aff’d, Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132

S. Ct. 2221 (2012).

¶ 27 However, we are not faced with a criminal prosecution in this case. It is understood that

proceedings conducted under the Act are civil in nature. People v. Burns, 209 Ill. 2d 551, 553

(2004). Under the Act, the State may seek an involuntary, indeterminate commitment in lieu

of a criminal prosecution if a respondent is charged with a criminal offense and is believed

to be sexually dangerous. Burns, 209 Ill. 2d at 553. A sexually dangerous person is defined

as a person who has suffered from a mental disorder for a period of not less than one year,

who has criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who has demonstrated

propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children. 725 ILCS

205/1.01 (West 2008).

¶ 28 Though these proceedings are civil in nature (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2008)), a

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respondent is entitled to counsel, may demand a jury trial on the State’s petition (725 ILCS

205/5 (West 2008)), and must be proved sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt (725

ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2008)). That is, the respondent is “provided with some of the same

procedural rights guaranteed in a criminal proceeding.” People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318,

324 (2001). This is so because the proceedings may result in a respondent’s deprivation of

liberty and incarceration for psychiatric treatment. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 328.

¶ 29 The supreme court has stated that the purpose of the Act is “(1) to protect the public by

sequestering a sexually dangerous person until such a time as the individual is recovered and

released, and (2) to subject sexually dangerous persons to treatment such that the individual

may recover from the propensity to commit sexual offenses and be rehabilitated.” Trainor,

196 Ill. 2d at 323-24. Therefore, the Act is aimed at care and treatment, rather than

punishment and deterrence. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 325.

“While the question of whether an individual is a sexually dangerous person is one

of fact, it is one which, by its nature, cannot be answered by a court or jury without

hearing the opinions of people who have a special knowledge in the field of mental

disorders and sexual aberration. [Citation.] Thus, after filing a petition alleging sexual

dangerousness, the trial court must appoint two psychiatrists to make a personal

examination of the person so charged and determine whether such person is sexually

dangerous. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998).” Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 327.

The two psychiatrists must rely on their personal examinations of respondent in light of their

professional expertise to determine the issue. Drs. Killian and Jeckel testified that to do so,

they each review an overall history of a respondent, including prior arrest records, police

reports, witness statements, mental-health records, and any other documents they find

relevant to the issue to be determined. In fact, section 5 of the Act provides that “it shall be

competent to introduce evidence of the commission by the respondent of any number of

crimes together with whatever punishments, if any, were inflicted.” 725 ILCS 205/5 (West

2008). This information, respondent argues, is hearsay and should not be allowed to be used

in the jury’s determination of whether he is a sexually dangerous person.

¶ 30 Our supreme court has noted that in proceedings under the Act, even though they are

considered civil in nature, the right to due process applies and “entitles the defendant to the

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying against him.” Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d

at 329. “[O]ur legislature intended rigid adherence to rules of evidence and that every

necessary element of the State’s petition be proved by competent evidence.” Trainor, 196

Ill. 2d at 329. Thus, Crawford applies to proceedings under the Act.

¶ 31 The issue in this case though is whether the testimony of the psychiatrists, by relying, at

least partially, on hearsay evidence not subject to cross-examination, violated Crawford and

in turn, violated respondent’s right to confront witnesses against him. Based on the

following, we find no constitutional violation.

¶ 32 Illinois courts have “long held that prohibitions against the admission of hearsay do not

apply when an expert testifies to underlying facts and data, not admitted into evidence, for

the purpose of explaining the basis of his opinion.” People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97, 142

(2009). This was first decided in Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981), a decision in which

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our supreme court adopted Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 705 (Fed. Rs. Evid. 703, 705),

governing the content of an expert’s testimony. “[A]n expert may give opinion testimony

which relies upon facts and data not in evidence, as long as the underlying information is of

the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.” Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 142.

“While the contents of reports relied upon by experts would be inadmissible as hearsay if

offered for the truth of the matter asserted, an expert may disclose the underlying facts and

conclusions for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for his opinion.” People v. Nieves,

193 Ill. 2d 513, 528 (2000).

¶ 33 “The underlying information ‘must be sufficiently trustworthy to make the reliance

reasonable.’ [Citation.] Provided the foundational requisites are met, an expert is permitted

‘not only to consider the reports commonly relied upon by experts in their particular field,

but also to testify to the contents of the underlying records.’ ” In re Commitment of Hooker,

2012 IL App (2d) 101007, ¶ 51 (quoting Bass v. Cincinnati Inc., 281 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1024

(1996), and Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143). This standard has been codified in the Illinois Rules

of Evidence, effective January 1, 2011. See Ill. R. Evid. 703 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“The facts

or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be

those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type

reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences

upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.”).

¶ 34 Both experts identified several types of documents considered relevant by psychiatrists

in gathering a respondent’s history, including police reports, witness statements, health

records, and mental-health records. The documents relied upon by Drs. Killian and Jeckel

“contained a wide range of data about respondent, including his own statements and

admissions as well as opinions and observations of him and even accusations against him,

couched in possibly multiple levels of hearsay.” Hooker, 2012 IL App (2d) 101007, ¶ 63

(addressing a respondent’s inadmissible hearsay argument in the context of a sexually violent

person case).

¶ 35 However, the information gathered from the various documents contained competent

factors for the experts to consider in conducting their evaluations. In particular, the

information contained in the police reports and witness statements, though testified to at trial

by the experts, was not admitted as substantive evidence. The circuit court instructed the jury

that such evidence was admitted “for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of the expert

opinion; it should not be considered *** as substantive evidence as to the issue of whether

the defendant has demonstrated a propensity to commit sex offense[s].” Each expert testified

he relied upon the information contained in these police reports and other documents in

making his overall determination of respondent’s sexual dangerousness, as is typical of

experts in the field of psychiatry.

¶ 36 Although the information testified to by the State’s experts (the contents of the police

reports) would be inadmissible hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it was

not offered for that purpose, and therefore, it does not trigger a confrontation violation. The

record is clear that the experts’ testimony was offered for the limited purpose of explaining

how they arrived at their respective opinions. The reports upon which they relied were of the

nature and type routinely reviewed and relied upon by experts in the field and the experts

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here were subject to cross-examination. Consequently, we hold respondent’s right to confront

witnesses was not violated by the presentation of the testimony of Drs. Killian and Jeckel.

Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194 (“allowing expert opinions based on facts not in evidence dispenses

with ‘the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating

witnesses. *** [The physician’s] validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-

examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.’ ” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 703, Advisory

Committee Note)). That is, “the confrontation clause does not bar the admission of

testimonial statements that are admitted for purposes other than proving the truth of the

matter asserted.” Williams, 238 Ill. 2d at 142.

¶ 37 Recently, the United States Supreme Court affirmed our supreme court’s decision in

Williams, where a plurality of the Supreme Court, composed of Chief Justice Roberts and

Justices Kennedy, Breyer and Alito, held that the confrontation clause of the sixth

amendment was not implicated by expert opinion testimony from a forensic DNA analyst

who did not personally conduct the DNA analysis. The Court affirmed the judgment of the

Illinois Supreme Court. Williams, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2244. The plurality of the

Court concluded that the confrontation clause was not violated. The Court majority held:

“We now conclude that this form of expert testimony does not violate the

Confrontation Clause because that provision has no application to out-of-court

statements that are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. When an expert

testifies for the prosecution in a criminal case, the defendant has the opportunity to cross-

examine the expert about any statements that are offered for their truth. Out-of-court

statements that are related by the expert solely for the purpose of explaining the

assumptions on which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus fall

outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause.” Williams, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at

2228.

The Court further noted: “For more than 200 years, the law of evidence has permitted the sort

of testimony that was given by the expert in this case. Under settled evidence law, an expert

may express an opinion that is based on facts that the expert assumes, but does not know, to

be true.” Williams, 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S. Ct. at 2228. Overall, the Illinois Supreme Court’s

decision remains unaffected and the rule stands that the confrontation clause is not violated

when an expert’s testimonial statements are admitted for purposes other than proving the

truth of the matter asserted. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d at 142.

¶ 38 It is apparent from the record that Drs. Killian and Jeckel did not testify as to the contents

of the police reports and other documents to establish the truth of the matter asserted in those

reports. Rather, the information, as testified to, was presented for the purpose of explaining

the bases for their opinions. See Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143. “Consequently, there was no

confrontation clause violation.” Williams, 238 Ill. 2d at 144.

¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to allow the

State’s experts to testify regarding respondent’s past misconduct as it pertained to their

evaluations. The testimony did not violate respondent’s constitutional right to confront

witnesses against him.

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¶ 40 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 41 Next, respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. In particular, he contends

the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the fourth and fifth propositions set

forth in the jury instruction defining a sexually dangerous person. He claims the experts’

testimony on these matters was unsatisfactory since they cannot possibly accurately predict

the future. He contends this inability to predict leads to the reasonable conclusion that they

cannot state, beyond a reasonable doubt, that respondent “will engage in the commission of

sex offenses in the future if not confined.”

¶ 42 We begin with the language of the Act, which defines the term “sexually dangerous

persons” as follows:

“All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed for

a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition

hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex

offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts

of sexual molestation of children ***.” 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 2008).

¶ 43 Pursuant to this definition, commitment under the Act requires the State to convince the

trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt (725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 2008)) that (1) the person

has a “mental disorder” of the prescribed duration, (2) the mental disorder is associated with

criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and (3) the person has actually

demonstrated that propensity. This statutory definition and the supreme court’s decision in

People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305, 330 (2003), were used to fashion the jury instruction,

which set forth five propositions the State needed to prove in order for the jury to find

respondent to be a sexually dangerous person. In this appeal, respondent challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence related only to the final two propositions, namely that (1)

respondent had “demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual

molestation of children,” and (2) it was “substantially probable the respondent will engage

in the commission of sex offenses in the future if not confined.”

¶ 44 On appeal from a jury’s ruling on a sexually-dangerous-person petition, the reviewing

court will affirm the judgment, after considering all of the evidence introduced at trial in the

light most favorable to the State, if it determines that any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Bailey, 405

Ill. App. 3d 154, 171 (2010). “The reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that

of the trial court or jury on the factual issues that have been raised in the petition, unless the

evidence is so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a sexually

dangerous person.” Bailey, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 171.

¶ 45 To prove the fourth proposition, that respondent has demonstrated propensities toward

acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children, the State was required to prove

respondent had committed or attempted to commit at least one act of sexual assault or

molestation. People v. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d 91, 105 (1985). The State was not required to prove

multiple sex crimes. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 105. The primary purpose of the definition in the

statute (and the corresponding propositions set forth in the jury instructions) is for the trier

of fact to predict a respondent’s future conduct. Thus, there exists the requirement that a

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respondent must have demonstrated the propensity by the commission of at least one act.

This way, the determination of whether the respondent is a sexually dangerous person will

be based on something more than “psychological speculation.” Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 105.

¶ 46 In this case, the State introduced a certified copy of respondent’s (1) 1987 conviction for

criminal sexual abuse of Sheri, and (2) 2002 conviction for criminal sexual abuse of Ashley,

who was 13 years old. Pursuant to Allen, this evidence alone was sufficient to prove

respondent had demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault. Contrary to

respondent’s claim, the State did not rely on witnesses who “relied upon both hearsay reports

which were inadmissible.” As discussed in our analysis above, Drs. Killian and Jeckel were

entitled to rely upon, and testify to, the contents of the documents which they reviewed in

preparing their reports. Nevertheless, our supreme court in Allen held that the State

sufficiently satisfies its burden of proving a respondent’s propensities by proving respondent

committed at least one act of sexual assault or molestation. Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 105. The

certified copies of respondent’s convictions introduced into evidence satisfied the State’s

obligation.

¶ 47 Respondent also claims the State failed to put forth sufficient evidence to prove the fifth

proposition, that it was substantially probable respondent will engage in the commission of

sex offenses in the future if not confined. He contends the experts’ testimony was

“unsatisfactory and clearly a reasonable doubt existed as to the fifth proposition.” He claims

the experts are unable to predict the future and therefore, cannot determine beyond a

reasonable doubt that respondent will engage in the commission of sex offenses in the future

if not confined.

¶ 48 On this subject, this court has stated:

“While ‘the statute is primarily concerned with prediction of the defendant’s future

conduct’ (Allen, 107 Ill. 2d at 105, 481 N.E.2d at 697), the statute does not require proof

that anything ‘will’ happen in the future. As respondent pointed out at trial, it is

impossible to prove what ‘will’ happen in the future. The State need only prove the

respondent has demonstrated his propensity to commit acts. Having a propensity to

commit acts necessarily implies that the propensity will be acted upon in the future.”

People v. Hancock, 329 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (2002).

¶ 49 The testimony of both well-qualified experts supported the State’s claim that it was

substantially probable that respondent would reoffend if he was not confined. Each expert

stated his opinion to this effect based on his respective review of the documentary evidence

and his personal interview with respondent. Dr. Killian relied on three actuarial instruments

in determining respondent’s likelihood of reoffending. He believed these instruments

provided a reliable assessment of the risk. Coupled with his interview, his diagnosis of

respondent’s mental disorder, and his review of the documents provided, he opined with

reasonable certainty (a stated 90% certainty) that it was substantially probable that

respondent would commit a sex offense in the future if not confined.

¶ 50 Dr. Jeckel noted respondent’s pattern of surprising and “blitzing” his victims with

aggression, as well as his practice of portraying the victims as the aggressors and himself as

a victim. He concluded that these characteristics, coupled with his observations from the

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clinical interview of respondent and his review of the documents, supported his opinion that

he too believed it was substantially probable that respondent would reoffend if not confined.

¶ 51 We conclude, based on the evidence presented at trial, any reasonable jury could have

found the elements sufficiently proved to determine respondent was a sexually dangerous

person. The evidence was not so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt. See Bailey, 405

Ill. App. 3d at 171.

¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 53 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 54 Affirmed.

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