Sandefur v. Cunningham Township Officers Electoral Board

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Sandefur v. Cunningham Township Officers Electoral Board, 2013 IL App (4th) 130127

Appellate Court LAURA SANDEFUR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CUNNINGHAM

Caption TOWNSHIP OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD; CAROL ELLIOTT,

in Her Official Capacity as Cunningham Township Supervisor and

Member of the Cunningham Township Officers Electoral Board;

PHYLLIS D. CLARK, in Her Official Capacity as Cunningham

Township Clerk and Member of the Cunningham Township Officers

Electoral Board; ROBERT E. LEWIS, in His Official Capacity as

Cunningham Township Trustee and Member of the Cunningham

Township Officers Electoral Board; and JOHN D. STEBBINS, as the

Objector to the Candidacy of Laura Sandefur Before the Cunningham

Township Board, Township Officers Electoral Board, Defendants-

Appellees.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-13-0127

Rule 23 Order filed March 15, 2013

Rule 23 Order

withdrawn April 25, 2013

Opinion filed March 15, 2013

Held Section 10-4 of the Election Code does not prohibit any person from

(Note: This syllabus circulating petitions for a political party in a consolidated primary and

constitutes no part of later circulating a petition for an independent candidate in a consolidated

the opinion of the court general election.

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County, No. 13-MR-79; the

Review Hon. Charles McRae Leonhard, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed.

Counsel on Andrew W.B. Bequette, of Beckett Webber, P.C., of Urbana, for

Appeal appellant.

Frederic M. Grosser, of Champaign, for appellee Cunningham Township

Officers Electoral Board.

Ruth E. Wyman, of Ruth E. Wyman Law Office LLC, of Urbana, for

appellee John D. Stebbins.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the

court, with opinion.

Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Justice Pope specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 On January 3, 2013, defendant John D. Stebbins filed an objection to the nominating

petition of plaintiff, Laura Sandefur, challenging her placement on the ballot for the April

9, 2013, consolidated general election for township assessor. On January 18, 2013, defendant

the Cunningham Township Electoral Board (the Board) sustained Stebbins’ objection,

ordering plaintiff’s name not be placed on the ballot.

¶2 Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the Board erred by ordering her name not be placed on the

ballot. Having expedited the case, we agree and reverse.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Plaintiff, with the help of Kevin Sandefur, her husband, began her campaign for township

assessor by circulating nominating petitions for that office as a Democratic candidate for the

Democratic consolidated primary election to be held on February 26, 2013. Plaintiff and

Kevin signed several of those petitions as the circulating parties. Sometime before the

Democratic primary, plaintiff declared her candidacy for the township assessor as an

Independent.

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¶5 As part of her campaign as an Independent, plaintiff circulated nominating petitions for

the office of township assessor for the April 9, 2013, consolidated general election for that

office. That circulating campaign resulted in 303 signatures, 195 of which were collected by

plaintiff and Kevin. (The minimum number of signatures required to secure a place on the

ballot was 248.)

¶6 In January 2013, Stebbins filed an objection to plaintiff’s nominating petitions for her

candidacy as an Independent, asserting, in pertinent part, that plaintiff and Kevin violated

section 10-4 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2010))–which purports to prohibit

any person from circulating petitions for more than one political party (or candidate, if an

Independent) in a single election cycle. The Board agreed that plaintiff and Kevin had

violated section 10-4 of the Election Code. As a result, the Board disqualified 195 of the

signatures–which, as previously stated, represented the number collected by plaintiff and

Kevin–rendering plaintiff ineligible to be placed on the ballot because she fell short of the

248 signatures required to placed on the ballot.

¶7 Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision. In

February 2013, the trial court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding, in pertinent part, that

the record showed that the Board “correctly applied section 10-4 to the undisputed facts of

record and correctly concluded that [plaintiff] is ineligible to be on the April ballot.”

¶8 This appeal followed.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Plaintiff argues that the Board erred by ordering her name not be placed on the ballot.

Specifically, plaintiff contends that the plain language of section 10-4 of the Election Code

prohibits any person from circulating petitions for (1) more than one political party in a

general primary and general election, (2) more than one Independent candidate and a political

party in a general primary and general election, (3) more than one political party in the next

consolidated election, and (4) more than one Independent candidate and political party in the

next consolidated election. It does not, plaintiff asserts, prohibit a person from circulating a

petition for a political party in a consolidated primary election and then circulating a petition

for an Independent candidate in a consolidated general election. In light of the plain language

of section 10-4 of the Election Code and the public policy related to access to ballots, we

agree.

¶ 11 A. The Standard of Review

¶ 12 Initially, we note that on appeal of an electoral board’s determination, we review the

electoral board’s decision, not the determination of the trial court. Carlasare v. Will County

Officers Electoral Board, 2012 IL App (3d) 120699, ¶ 15, 977 N.E.2d 298 (citing Jackson

v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 46, 975 N.E.2d 583). However, the

standard of review that applies on appeal is determined by the question presented on appeal.

Carlasare, 2012 IL App (3d) 120699, ¶ 15, 977 N.E.2d 298. Because the issue in this case

is one of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See id. (“[P]ure questions of law,

such as statutory interpretation, are subject to de novo review on appeal.”). Having outlined

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our standard of review, we turn to the language of the statute and the rules of statutory

construction.

¶ 13 B. Section 10-4 of the Election Code and the Rules of Statutory Construction

¶ 14 Section 10-4 of the Election Code states, in pertinent part, as follows:

“[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions for candidates of more than one political

party, or for an independent candidate or candidates in addition to one political party, to

be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such candidates and parties

with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated election.” 10 ILCS

5/10-4 (West 2010).

¶ 15 “The primary goal of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is

to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.” Jackson, 2012 IL 111928,

¶ 48, 975 N.E.2d 583. The best indication of that intent is the statuary language. Id. When

the statutory language is clear, the statute must be construed as written. Id. According to the

Statute on Statutes, the plain language of a statute should be liberally construed to effectuate

the purpose of the statute. 5 ILCS 70/1.01 (West 2010). To that end, “[t]he primary purpose

of all election laws is to ensure a fair and honest election” to further the policy of this state

to provide candidates for public office access to the ballots. Carlasare, 2012 IL App (3d)

120699, ¶ 19, 977 N.E.2d 298. Where the General Assembly has outlined specific limits on

certain policies, we will not read additional limits into a statute. See Illinois Department of

Healthcare & Family Services v. Warner, 227 Ill. 2d 223, 233, 882 N.E.2d 557, 562 (2008)

(“We cannot depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions,

limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature.”).

¶ 16 C. Section 4-10 Did Not Prohibit Plaintiff From Circulating

Petitions for More Than One Candidate in This Case

¶ 17 As plaintiff points out in her brief to this court, the Election Code recognizes four types

of elections: (1) the general primary election (held on the third Tuesday in March (10 ILCS

5/2A-1.1(a) (West 2010)); (2) the general election (held on the first Tuesday after the first

Monday of November) (10 ILCS 5/2A-1.1(a) (West 2010)); (3) the consolidated primary

election (held on the last Tuesday in February) (10 ILCS 5/2A-1.1(b) (West 2010)); and (4)

the consolidated election (held on the first Tuesday in April except during Passover) (10

ILCS 5/2A-1.1(b), 1.1a (West 2010)). “General election” encompasses those elections held

in even-numbered years, while “consolidated election” encompasses those elections held in

odd-numbered years. See 10 ILCS 5/2A-1.1 (West 2010). Because the Democratic primary

as well as the April election at issue in this case were both odd-numbered year elections, they

are both “consolidated elections” for purposes of the Election Code.

¶ 18 Again, section 10-4 of the Election Code states, in pertinent part, as follows: “[N]o

person shall circulate or certify petitions *** for an independent candidate *** in addition

to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or for such

candidates *** with respect to the same political subdivision at the next consolidated

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election.” (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2010). To determine whether the Board

erred in this case, we must decide whether this language prohibits a person from circulating

a petition for a political party in a consolidated primary election and then later circulating a

petition for an Independent candidate in a consolidated general election. In other words, we

must decide whether “consolidated election,” as that term is used in the statute, includes both

consolidated primary elections and consolidated general elections, thereby prohibiting a

person from circulating a petition for a political party in a consolidated primary election–in

this case, the Democratic party–and then circulating a petition for an Independent candidate

in a consolidated general election. This analysis requires particularized scrutiny.

¶ 19 One could perhaps read the phrase “at the next primary or general election” to mean “at

the next election, either primary or general,” rendering the last portion of the statute that

discusses consolidated elections as a continuation of that point. Therefore, the statute would

be read as excluding the circulating of such petitions “at the next election, either primary or

general, as well as in consolidated elections, either primary or general.” Or, put another way,

the statute would be read as excluding the circulating of such petitions “at the next even-

numbered year primary and general election, as well as odd-numbered year primary and

general elections.” Our review of the Election Code, however–particularly, the plain

language of section 10-4–reveals that such a reading of the statute would render a significant

portion of the statute superfluous. See Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill.

2d 169, 187, 874 N.E.2d 1, 12 (2007) (phrases in statutes should not be construed in

isolation, but interpreted in light of other relevant portions of the statute so that, if possible,

no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless).

¶ 20 As previously explained, section 10-4 of the Election Code states, in pertinent part, as

follows: “[N]o person shall circulate or certify petitions *** for an independent candidate

*** in addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general

election, or for such candidates *** with respect to the same political subdivision at the next

consolidated election.” 10 ILCS 5/10-4 (West 2010). If read to include both the consolidated

primary and the consolidated general election, the phrase “for such candidates *** with

respect to the same political subdivision” would be completely unnecessary. That is, if read

to include both the odd-numbered year primary and general election, the statute would

merely require that “no person may circulate petitions for an independent candidate in

addition to one political party, to be voted upon at the next primary or general election, or

at the next consolidated election.” The General Assembly did not draft section 10-4 that way,

instead electing to include the phrase “for such candidates *** with respect to the same

political subdivision.” We assume the General Assembly did so for a reason–perhaps to

establish a separate prohibition on circulators in odd-numbered year general elections, but

not on circulators in odd-numbered year primary elections, better known as the “consolidated

election” cycle. Whatever the reason, our role is not to judge the wisdom of the statute, but

to determine, when asked, what the legislative intent was behind the statute. See General

Motors Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Review Board, 361 Ill. App. 3d 271, 292, 836 N.E.2d 903,

921 (2005) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring) (“[N]either the wisdom nor the desirability

of that legislation is subject to review by this court.”).

¶ 21 Having construed section 10-4 of the Election Code with an eye toward the policy of this

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state to provide candidates for public office access to the ballots (Carlasare, 2012 IL App

(3d) 120699, ¶ 19, 977 N.E.2d 298), we conclude that section 10-4 of the Election Code does

not prohibit any person from circulating petitions for a political party in a consolidated

primary and later circulating a petition for an Independent candidate in a consolidated general

election. As a survey of the Election Code reveals, the General Assembly understands

politics and knows how to use the terms “primary,” “general,” “consolidated,” and “election”

advisedly. The plain language of section 10-4 of the Election Code shows that the General

Assembly chose not to make a specific distinction between primary and general elections in

odd-numbered years. We will not second-guess that choice. Accordingly, we reverse the

Board’s decision to keep plaintiff’s name off the ballot.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we reverse the Board’s determination; plaintiff’s name should

appear on the ballot.

¶ 24 Reversed.

¶ 25 JUSTICE POPE, specially concurring.

¶ 26 I concur with the result in this case. I would also note prior to the consolidated primary

to be held on February 25, 2013, Sandefur withdrew her petitions for nomination in the

Democratic primary and declared her candidacy as an Independent candidate for township

assessor at the consolidated election to be held on April 9, 2013.

¶ 27 To me, this case is simple. Section 2A-1.1 of the Election Code states:

“(b) In odd-numbered years, an election to be known as the consolidated election

shall be held on the first Tuesday in April except as provided in Section 2A-1.1a of this

Act; and an election to be known as the consolidated primary election shall be held on

the last Tuesday in February.” 10 ILCS 5/2A-1.1(b) (West 2010).

Section 10-4 makes no reference to the consolidated primary election. It refers only to the

“next consolidated election.” As section 2A-1.1 delineates, “consolidated election” is the

election held on the first Tuesday in April. By failing to include “consolidated primary

election” or by failing to even add an “s” to “next consolidated election(s),” the legislature

made section 10-4 inapplicable to consolidated primary elections.

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