The opinion
NO. 4-05-0053 Filed: 1/26/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CONSUMERS IL WATER COMPANY, ) Direct Administrative
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Review of the
v. ) Illinois Property Tax
THE VERMILION COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW ) Appeal Board
and THE ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL ) No. 02-00059.001-C-3
BOARD, )
Respondents-Appellees. )
_________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the
court:
Petitioner, Consumers IL Water Company, owns a 117.23-
acre tract of land in Vermilion County that contains a water-
retention dam and lake. In December 2001, petitioner filed an
application for an open-space valuation for the 2002 tax year
under section 10-155 of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS
200/10-155 (West 2002)) for the entire 117.23 acres with the
Vermilion County Supervisor of Assessments' office. That office
denied the application, and petitioner filed an assessment
complaint with respondent, the Vermilion County Board of Review
(Board of Review). In December 2002, the Board of Review denied
petitioner's request for the open-space valuation, and petitioner
filed a complaint with respondent, the Property Tax Appeal Board
(PTAB). After an August 2004 hearing, PTAB found the land
qualified for an open-space valuation but not the dam.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 335 (155 Ill. 2d R. 335)
and section 16-195 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-195 (West 2002)),
petitioner seeks direct review of PTAB's decision, contending the
dam should not be assessed separately. We reverse and remand
with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
The evidence submitted at the August 2004 hearing shows
the Vermilion County Supervisor of Assessments' office gave the
117.23 acres an assessed value of $58,953 and the improvements on
the land $1,437,411. In reviewing petitioner's assessment
complaint, the Board of Review did not make any changes to the
above assessed values. The photographs submitted by petitioner
and the parties' witnesses' testimony indicate the 117.23-acre
property contains a lake created by a large, man-made dam. A
fence surrounds the dam, and buoys are in the water with warnings
to stay away from the dam. Petitioner leases the lake to the
Vermilion County Conservation District for public purposes. The
public uses the lake for recreational purposes such as boating
and fishing.
Michael Lipowsky, a local real estate appraiser,
testified for petitioner. He described the physical characteris-
tics of the property and was the one who took the photographs of
the land submitted by petitioner. Lipowsky stated the land was
not used for residential purposes.
Don Crist, Vermilion County Supervisor of Assessments,
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testified on behalf of the Board of Review. He testified the
primary purpose of the lake was to provide a water supply for
petitioner to make a profit. Crist further noted golf courses
were the only type of property in Vermilion County that received
an open-space valuation. In the case of golf courses, the land
got the open-space valuation but not the clubhouse. The open-
space valuation for golf courses in Vermilion County was around
$400 to $500.
In its December 2004 decision, PTAB awarded petitioner
an open-space valuation for the entire 117.23 acres of land only
and thus reduced the Board of Review's assessed value for the
land from $58,953 to $19,536. Specifically, PTAB found (1) the
land had to satisfy only one of subsections (a) through (f) of
section 10-155 (35 ILCS 200/10-155(a) through (f) (West 2002))
and (2) the 117.23 acres met subsection (c) (35 ILCS 200/10-
155(c) (West 2002)) and all of the other requirements of section
10-155. However, PTAB disagreed with petitioner's argument that
once the land qualifies for an open-space valuation, the addi-
tional ground improvements cannot be taxed separately. This
appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 through
3-113 (West 2002)) governs our review of PTAB's decision. 35
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ILCS 200/16-195 (West 2002). Our review extends to all questions
of law and fact presented in the record. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West
2002). With questions of law, the agency's decision is not
binding on this court, and thus our review is de novo.
Illini Country Club v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 263 Ill. App.
3d 410, 416, 635 N.E.2d 1347, 1353 (1994), overruled on other
grounds by Peacock v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 339 Ill. App. 3d
1060, 1071, 792 N.E.2d 367, 376 (2003). As to questions of fact,
we will not reverse them unless they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Illini Country Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at
417, 635 N.E.2d at 1353. A finding is against the manifest
weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly
evident. Peacock, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 1068, 792 N.E.2d at 373.
If a case presents a mixed question of law and fact, we
review the agency's ruling under a clearly erroneous standard.
Lake Point Tower Garage Ass'n v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 346
Ill. App. 3d 389, 392, 804 N.E.2d 717, 720 (2004). Under that
standard, a reviewing court will not reverse the agency's deci-
sion unless the court has a definite and firm conviction the
agency was mistaken. Lake Point Tower Garage Ass'n, 346 Ill.
App. 3d at 392-93, 804 N.E.2d at 720.
Here, the parties disagree as to the appropriate
standard of review. Our resolution of the case requires us only
to address questions of law, and thus our review is de novo
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(Illini Country Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 416, 635 N.E.2d at
1353).
B. Open-Space Valuation
Ordinarily, property is valued based on its fair cash
value (also referred to as fair market value), "meaning the
amount the property would bring at a voluntary sale where the
owner is ready, willing, and able to sell; the buyer is ready,
willing, and able to buy; and neither is under a compulsion to do
so." Illini Country Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 635 N.E.2d at
1353; see also 35 ILCS 200/9-145(a) (West 2002). An exception to
that rule is section 10-155 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-155 (West
2002)), which provides an alternative valuation if certain
criteria are met. Additionally, county assessment officials
generally value property and its improvements separately since
they must list the assessed value of the property in one column,
the assessed value of improvements in another, and the total
valuation in a separate column. See 35 ILCS 200/9-155 (West
2002).
At issue in this case is whether a dam, an improvement,
located on property that qualifies for an alternative valuation
under section 10-155 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-155 (West 2002))
can be separately assessed. Petitioner contends that property
satisfying the section 10-155 criteria can receive only a single
assessment. Conversely, PTAB and the Board of Review contend the
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dam can be separately assessed because section 10-155 applies
only to the land itself, not improvements. Thus, we first
address whether section 10-155 of the Code applies only to the
land itself.
Section 10-155 of the Code provides as follows:
"In all counties, in addition to valua-
tion as otherwise permitted by law, land
which is used for open[-]space purposes and
has been so used for the 3 years immediately
preceding the year in which the assessment is
made, upon application under [s]ection
10-160, shall be valued on the basis of its
fair cash value, estimated at the price it
would bring at a fair, voluntary sale for use
by the buyer for open[-]space purposes.
Land is considered used for open[-]space
purposes if it is more than 10 acres in area
and:
(a) is actually and exclu-
sively used for maintaining or
enhancing natural or scenic re-
sources,
(b) protects air or streams or
water supplies,
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(c) promotes conservation of
soil, wetlands, beaches, or
marshes, including ground cover or
planted perennial grasses, trees
and shrubs and other natural peren-
nial growth, and including any body
of water, whether man-made or natu-
ral,
(d) conserves
landscaped ar-
eas, such as
public or
private golf
courses,
(e) enhances the value to the
public of abutting or neighboring
parks, forests, wildlife preserves,
nature reservations, sanctuaries,
or other open spaces, or
(f) preserves historic sites.
Land is not considered used for open
[-]space purposes if it is used primarily for
residential purposes." 35 ILCS 200/10-155
(West 2002).
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Section 10-160 (35 ILCS 200/10-160 (West 2002)) sets forth the
application process for obtaining the section 10-155 valuation,
and section 10-165 (35 ILCS 200/10-165 (West 2002)) describes
what takes place when the land is no longer used for open-space
purposes.
In interpreting statutes, courts seek to ascertain and
give effect to the legislature's intent. They begin by examining
the statute's language. The words are given their plain and
commonly understood meanings as viewed, not in isolation, but in
light of the statute's other relevant provisions. When a stat-
ute's language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect
without resort to statutory-construction tools. State Board of
Elections v. Shelden, 354 Ill. App. 3d 506, 512, 821 N.E.2d 698,
704 (2004).
In this case, some of the parties have cited legisla-
tive history. However, that statutory-construction tool is not
necessary since section 10-155 is not ambiguous. Illini Country
Club, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 418, 635 N.E.2d at 1354.
Sections 10-155 through 10-165 of the Code consistently
use the term "land." 35 ILCS 200/10-155 through 10-165 (West
2002). Section 1-130 of the Code defines the term "land" (as
well as property, real property, real estate, tract, and lot), in
pertinent part, as follows:
"The land itself, with all things con-
tained therein, and also all buildings,
structures and improvements, and other perma-
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nent fixtures thereon, including all oil,
gas, coal[,] and other minerals in the land
and the right to remove oil, gas[,] and other
minerals, excluding coal, from the land, and
all rights and privileges belonging or per-
taining thereto, except where otherwise spec-
ified by this Code." 35 ILCS 200/1-130 (West
2002).
The open-space valuation provisions do not set forth a
different definition of "land" or indicate improvements should be
treated differently. Conversely, the provisions addressing
farmland valuation (35 ILCS 200/10-110 through 10-147 (West
2002)) expressly set forth different valuation formulas for
"farmland," "farm dwellings," and "other improvements." Accord-
ingly, we find that when sections 10-155 through 10-165 of the
Code state "land," they refer to the land itself and improve-
ments.
Since "land" includes the ground and improvements, both
the ground and the improvements must meet the requirements of
section 10-155 of the Code. If any portion of the land included
in a section 10-160 application is not used for open-space
purposes, then all of the land is not entitled to the valuation.
See 35 ILCS 200/10-165 (West 2002). In this case, PTAB
expressly found both the lake and the dam met the section 10-155
requirements.
We next must address whether the dam and land are to be
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assessed separately or as a single assessment. We agree with
petitioner that section 10-155 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/10-155
(West 2002)) provides a single assessment value, and thus im-
provements do not have their own assessment value.
As stated earlier, the statute expressly requires the
land and its improvements to be for open-space purposes. There-
fore, the improvements and land together are fulfilling a purpose
the legislature found valuable. "Open space" is defined as
follows:
"'Any parcel or area of land or water
essentially unimproved and set aside, dedi-
cated, designated[,] or reserved for public
or private use or enjoyment or for the use
and enjoyment of owners and occupants of land
adjoining or neighboring such open spaces.'"
(Emphasis added.) Illini Country Club, 263
Ill. App. 3d at 419, 635 N.E.2d at 1355,
quoting Black's Law Dictionary 984 (5th ed.
1979).
Thus, while the land has improvements, those improvements are
contributing to the open-space nature of the land.
Our interpretation of section 10-155 of the Code is
consistent with the Third District's interpretation in Knox
County Board of Review v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 185
Ill. App. 3d 530, 541 N.E.2d 794 (1989). There, the court
concluded the Code contemplated a single assessment for open-
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space land. Knox County, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 541 N.E.2d at
797.
The Board of Review suggests the Third District's
conclusion was inconsistent since it also sustained the improve-
ment assessments for a house and building. However, the facts
indicate the petitioner applied for an open-space valuation for
the 76.5-acre golf course, not the other acre of the tract that
contained the house and building. Knox County, 185 Ill. App. 3d
at 532, 541 N.E.2d at 795. Thus, the open-space land did receive
only one assessment.
The Board of Review further asserts Knox County's
holding should be limited to golf courses because tees, fairways,
and greens are inseparable components of the golf course. Yet,
in this case, the man-made lake would not exist but for the dam.
Accordingly, the Board of Review's distinction is meritless.
PTAB also asserts Knox County's holding should be
limited to golf courses because golf courses are "land that has
been configured in specialized ways." However, we have already
concluded the statute refers to "land" as the land itself and its
improvements. Thus, this distinction is also meritless.
Additionally, we note that where a statute has been
judicially interpreted, considerations of stare decisis weigh
heavily since the legislature is free to change its legislation
in response to such interpretations. Lake County Board of Review
v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 192 Ill. App. 3d 605, 617, 548
N.E.2d 1129, 1137 (1989). With section 10-155 of the Code, the
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legislature has made only one major change in the criteria for
receiving an open-space valuation since the Knox County decision.
Compare 35 ILCS 200/10-155 (West 2002) with Ill. Rev. Stat.
1987, ch. 120, par. 501g-1. In that amendment, it removed the
requirement that the county in which the land was located have a
population of less than 200,000. See Pub. Act 89-137, '5, eff.
January 1, 1996 (1995 Ill. Laws 2120).
Last, we recognize the paradox our interpretation
yields. While it is hard to conceive of land improved with a
large structure as being assessed like unimproved land, the
language of the Code provides for such a result.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse PTAB's judgment and
remand the cause to PTAB to remove the improvement assessment for
the dam.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
STEIGMANN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
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