Opinion

Board of Education of Auburn Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Illinois Department of Revenue

Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Filed
May 19, 2011
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.4%

The opinion

Docket Nos. 110395, 110422 cons.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF AUBURN COMMUNITY

UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 10, Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al., Appellees and Cross-

Appellants.

Opinion filed May 19, 2011.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The issue in this case is whether the Property Tax Extension

Limitation Law (PTELL) (35 ILCS 200/18–185 et seq. (West 2006))

applies to all portions of the Auburn Community Unit School District

No.10 (Auburn District) after territory in a county that has not

considered a PTELL referendum was annexed into the Auburn

District. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the entire Auburn

District remains subject to the PTELL.

BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2007, the Regional Board of School Trustees of

Sangamon County (Regional Board), pursuant to article 7 of the

School Code (105 ILCS 5/7–01 et seq. (West 2006)), dissolved the

Divernon Community Unit School District No.13 (Divernon District),

which was partially located in Montgomery County, and annexed

almost all of the Divernon District territory to the Auburn District.

Prior to the annexation, the Auburn District was located entirely

within Sangamon County. The annexation gave the Auburn District

a small amount of territory in Montgomery County such that the

reconstituted district has approximately 99.7% of its equalized

assessed valuation (EAV) in Sangamon County with the remaining

0.3% in Montgomery County. Sangamon County voters approved

PTELL by referendum in November 1996 and, pursuant to section

18–213(e)(1) (35 ILCS 200/18–213(e)(1) (West 1996)), PTELL

became applicable to all non-home-rule taxing districts located

exclusively within Sangamon County on January 1, 1997, including

the Auburn District. Montgomery County has not considered a

PTELL referendum.

The purpose of PTELL is to provide greater citizen control over

the levy of the taxes that citizens are required to pay. Acme Markets,

Inc. v. Callanan, 236 Ill. 2d 29, 42 (2009). The PTELL limits the

increases in property tax extensions and amounts levied by taxing

districts in non-home-rule counties in which PTELL is applicable. 35

ILCS 200/18–195 (West 2006). A taxing district subject to PTELL

may not ordinarily extend taxes at a rate that exceeds the previous

year’s extension by more than 5%, or the percentage increase in the

Consumer Price Index (CPI), whichever is less, without referendum

approval. 35 ILCS 200/18–205 (West 2006). County boards of

counties other than Cook and the collar counties1 decide whether or

not to allow voters to choose by referendum if property tax extensions

should be limited. 35 ILCS 200/18–213(a), (b) (West 2006). A

PTELL referendum may be placed on the ballot at any election other

than a consolidated primary election if the county board passes an

ordinance or resolution within the required time period before the

election. 35 ILCS 200/18–213(b), (c) (West 2006). After the last

referendum affecting a multicounty taxing district is held, the

1

PTELL automatically applies to all non-home-rule taxing districts in

Cook and the collar counties. 35 ILCS 200/18–185 (West 2006).

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Department of Revenue is responsible for determining whether the

taxing district is subject to PTELL and notifying the county clerks of

all the counties in which the taxing district is located if the district is

subject to PTELL. 35 ILCS 200/18–213(f) (West 2006).

Subsequent to the annexation in 2007, the Auburn District

intended to finance improvements at two elementary schools and one

middle/high school through the issuance of bonds. The Auburn

District was unable to proceed with its plans, however, because it was

unclear whether bonds could be issued to finance the project over the

debt extension limitation that was in place under PTELL for the EAV

located in Sangamon County prior to the annexation. On April 3,

2008, the Sangamon County clerk’s office informed the Auburn

District that it was treating the reconstituted district as a non-PTELL

district for purposes of calculating the district’s aggregate tax

extension. On April 24, 2008, in connection with the planned bond

measure, counsel for the Auburn District sent a letter to the

Department of Revenue (Department) seeking an opinion as to

whether the reconstituted Auburn District was subject to PTELL.

On August 26, 2008, the Department declined to issue a formal

opinion or ruling because it concluded that the statute does not

contain an explicit provision that addresses the situation. The

Department nonetheless advised the Auburn District that, based upon

its analysis of sections 18–213 and 18–214 (35 ILCS 200/18–213,

18–214 (West 2006)), the taxing district remains subject to PTELL

and its restrictions. The Department concluded that the applicability

of PTELL to the district is consistent with the intent of the PTELL

statute to provide transparency and voter participation. The

Department emphasized that Sangamon County already voted to

approve PTELL and that the vast majority of the district is contained

within Sangamon County.

In October 2008, the board of education of Auburn Community

Unit School District No.10 (Auburn board) filed a complaint for

declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Sangamon County against

the Department and Brian Hamer, the Director of Revenue (hereafter

Department). The Auburn board sought a declaration that PTELL no

longer applied to the Auburn District following the annexation of

territory which resulted in the district obtaining some EAV in a county

that has not considered a PTELL referendum. In November 2008, the

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Auburn board amended its complaint to include Sangamon County,

Montgomery County, and the clerks of both counties as defendants.

In April 2009, the Auburn board moved for summary judgment.

Thereafter, the Department filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment on behalf of the

Auburn board after concluding that under the plain language of

section 18–213, PTELL no longer applied to the Auburn District

because Montgomery County has never held a PTELL referendum.

The Department was the only defendant that appealed.

The appellate court disagreed with the circuit court and concluded

that sections 18–213 and 18–214 do not contain a revocation

provision for a taxing district that acquires territory through

annexation. 398 Ill. App. 3d 629, 637. The appellate court held that

section 18–214 provides a specific mechanism for the removal of

PTELL and that the mandated referendum for the removal of PTELL

from the Auburn District had not taken place in Sangamon County. Id.

The appellate court also found that there is no authority under section

18–213 for applying PTELL to the Montgomery County territory that

was annexed. Id. The appellate court concluded that “[o]nly public

referenda in Montgomery County to adopt or reject then remove

PTELL and/or a referendum in Sangamon County to remove PTELL

will change the PTELL status of these counties.” Id. at 638.

Consequently, the appellate court held that the portion of the Auburn

District located within Sangamon County would be subject to PTELL,

while the portion in Montgomery County would not. Id.

The Auburn board and the Department both filed petitions for

leave to appeal that were allowed by this court, which consolidated

the cases. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). We apply a de novo

standard of review to issues of statutory interpretation and summary

judgment rulings. First American Bank Corp. v. Henry, 239 Ill. 2d

511, 515 (2011).

ANALYSIS

At issue is whether the Auburn District remains subject to PTELL

following the annexation. The Auburn board and the Department

acknowledge that there is no specific provision in the PTELL

statutory framework that addresses the consequence of a PTELL

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taxing district acquiring territory via annexation in a county that has

not considered PTELL by referendum. The parties both argue that

sections 18–213 and 18–214 of the statute should govern our

determination of the issue. The Auburn board contends that PTELL

does not apply to the entire Auburn District following the annexation

because the statute requires that each of the counties in which any of

the taxing district’s EAV is located have held a PTELL referendum,

and Montgomery County has not done so. The Department relies

upon the same provisions and argues that once PTELL became

applicable to the Auburn District prior to the annexation under section

18–213, the only way to remove PTELL is under the requirements

found in section 18–214, which have not occurred. The parties agree

that there is no basis in the statute for splitting a taxing district along

county lines and applying PTELL to only one portion of the district,

as the appellate court did.

We begin our analysis within a familiar framework. The cardinal

rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent. In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 246 (2006).

This court has long held that the best indication of this intent remains

the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary

meaning. Id. A statute must be read in its entirety, keeping in mind the

subject it addresses and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting

it. Board of Education, Joliet Township High School District No. 204

v. Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District

No. 210, 231 Ill. 2d 184, 198 (2008). This court, when interpreting a

statute, will presume that the legislature did not intend absurdity,

inconvenience, or injustice. Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction

Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195 (1992).

Section 18–213 sets forth the referenda process on the

applicability of PTELL. 35 ILCS 200/18–213 (West 2006). The

county board of a county that is not subject to PTELL may, by

ordinance or resolution, submit to the voters of the county the

question of whether to make all non-home-rule taxing districts that

have all or a portion of their EAV situated in the county subject to

PTELL. 35 ILCS 200/18–213(b) (West 2006). If the county board so

decides, the question shall be placed on a separate ballot and shall be

in substantially the following form:

“Shall the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (35

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ILCS 200/18–185 through 18–245), which limits annual

property tax extension increases, apply to non-home rule

taxing districts with all or a portion of their equalized assessed

valuation located in (name of county)?” 35 ILCS

200/18–213(c) (West 2006).

Section 18–213(e)(1), relied upon by the Department, provides

with respect to taxing districts that have all of their EAV located in

the county:

“[I]f a majority of the votes cast on the proposition are in

favor of the proposition, then this Law becomes applicable to

the taxing district beginning on January 1 of the year

following the date of the referendum.” (Emphasis added.) 35

ILCS 200/18–213(e)(1) (West 2006).

Section 18–213(e)(3), relied upon by the Auburn board, provides,

in relevant part, with respect to taxing districts that do not have all of

their EAV located in a single county:

“[I]f each county *** in which any of the [EAV] of the taxing

district is located has held a referendum under this Section at

any election, except a consolidated primary election, held in

any year and if a majority of the [EAV] of the taxing district

is located in one or more counties that have each approved a

referendum under this Section, then this Law shall become

applicable to the taxing district on January 1 of the year

following the year in which the last referendum in a county in

which the taxing district has any [EAV] is held. For the

purposes of this Law, the last referendum shall be deemed to

be the referendum making this Law applicable to the taxing

district.” (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/18–213(e)(3) (West

2006).

A “[t]axing district” in section 18–213 has the same meaning as

provided in section 1–150. 35 ILCS 200/18–213(b) (West 2006).

Section 1–150 defines a taxing district as “[a]ny unit of local

government, school district or community college district with the

power to levy taxes.” 35 ILCS 200/1–150 (West 2006). This would

include the Auburn District, a school district with the power to levy

taxes under the School Code. See 105 ILCS 5/17–2 (West 2006) (the

school board of any district having a population of less than 500,000

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inhabitants may levy a tax annually upon all the taxable property of the

district).

Section 18–213(e)(1), by its plain language, addresses the initial

imposition of PTELL, and provides that if a taxing district has all of

its EAV in the county that has held a PTELL referendum, then

PTELL “becomes applicable” to the taxing district beginning on

January 1 of the year following the referendum. PTELL became

applicable to the Auburn District on January 1, 1997, after a

successful referendum in Sangamon County in 1996, because all of the

taxing district’s EAV was located in that county at the time. Section

18–213 does not contain any provision for reexamination of such an

existing taxing district’s PTELL status because of a subsequent

change in the district’s boundaries. Therefore, once PTELL became

applicable to the Auburn District in 1997, section 18–213, which sets

forth the referenda process for the initial imposition of PTELL, had no

further relevance in determining the district’s PTELL status because

it is a taxing district that is already subject to the law.

As recognized by the parties, the Regional Board did not create a

new school district when it dissolved the Divernon District and

annexed the majority of the territory to the Auburn District. The

Regional Board acted under section 7–11 of the School Code, which

permits, in relevant part, a regional board of school trustees to attach

the territory of a dissolved school district to one or more existing

school districts. See 105 ILCS 5/7–11 (West 2006). Consequently,

while the boundaries of the district changed, the Auburn District itself

is the same district under the School Code as it was in 1997, when

PTELL became applicable to taxing districts wholly located within

Sangamon County. Because the Auburn District is not a new school

district for purposes of the School Code, we find no basis to conclude

that it is somehow a new taxing district under section 18–213.

We are therefore unpersuaded by the Auburn board’s reliance on

section 18–213(e)(3) for the proposition that based on the district’s

current geographical boundaries, each county must consider a PTELL

referendum before the law may “become applicable” to the district.

Section 18–213(e)(3) does not apply to the Auburn District because

at the time PTELL became applicable to the district, it only had EAV

located in Sangamon County. We reiterate that there is no provision

in section 18–213 for the reexamination of an existing taxing district’s

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PTELL status. The only mechanism for removing PTELL from such

an existing taxing district is found in section 18–214.

Simply stated, the annexation of territory by the Regional Board

had no cognizable effect under the PTELL statutory framework on the

Auburn District. The post-annexation Auburn District is the same

school district with the power to levy taxes that became subject to

PTELL in 1997. Consequently, because PTELL was already

applicable to the Auburn District at the time of the annexation, it

could only be removed from the district pursuant to the removal

referendum process found in section 18–214.

Section 18–214 provides for the removal of PTELL from any non-

home-rule taxing district that became subject to the law under section

18–213 of PTELL. 35 ILCS 200/18–214(b) (West 2006). The county

board of a county that became subject to PTELL by referendum may

again ask its voters using the same ballot question whether PTELL

shall apply to non-home-rule taxing districts with all or a portion of

their EAV in that county. 35 ILCS 200/18–214(c), (d) (West 2006).

Section 18–214(g) then provides, in pertinent part, with respect to

taxing districts that do not have all of their EAV located in a single

county:

“[I]f both of the following conditions are met, then this Law

shall no longer apply to the taxing district beginning on

January 1 of the year following the date of the referendum.

(1) Each county in which the district has any [EAV]

must either, (i) have held a referendum under this Section,

(ii) be [Cook or a collar county], or (iii) have held a

referendum under Section 18–213 at which the voters

rejected the proposition at the most recent election at

which the question was on the ballot in the county.

(2) The majority of the [EAV] of the taxing district,

other than any [EAV in Cook or a collar county], is in one

or more counties in which the voters rejected the

proposition.” (Emphases added.) 35 ILCS 200/18–214(g)

(West 2006).

Because the Auburn District has not met either of these removal

requirements contained in section 18–214(g), PTELL continues to

apply to the entire district.

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We also find the appellate court erred by splitting the Auburn

District and applying PTELL to only one portion of the taxing district.

Throughout the PTELL statute, taxing districts, including those that

cross county lines, are treated as a single entity. See, e.g., 35 ILCS

200/18–190 (West 2006) (provides that all taxing districts subject to

this law are authorized to seek referendum approval of each

proposition described and set forth in this section); 35 ILCS

200/18–205 (West 2006) (a taxing district may increase its extension

limitation for one or more levy years if that taxing district holds a

referendum before the applicable date); 35 ILCS 200/18–213(f),

18–214(h) (West 2006) (requires the Department, after the last

referendum affecting a multicounty taxing district is held, either to

adopt or rescind PTELL, to determine whether the taxing district is

subject to the law). Most importantly, the only two sections of the

statute that specifically address referenda on the applicability and

removal of PTELL, sections 18–213 and 18–214, treat taxing districts

as a singular entity throughout. See 35 ILCS 200/18–213, 18–214

(West 2006). We also note, as recognized by the parties, that splitting

a taxing district, and applying PTELL to only one portion, not only

violates the statute, but would create serious implementation problems

for county clerks and taxing districts that are not addressed in the

statute.

We emphasize that our interpretation of the statute is consistent

with the legislative purpose of PTELL to provide greater citizen

control over the property taxes that citizens are required to pay. As

previously recognized, approximately 99.7% of the Auburn District’s

EAV in located in Sangamon County, where voters have already

approved PTELL. We recognize that citizens in Montgomery County

now make up a portion of the Auburn District and have not

considered PTELL by referendum. Going forward, however,

Montgomery County voters will have input on the taxing district’s

PTELL status, like any other multicounty taxing district. Under the

Auburn District’s current configuration, PTELL cannot be removed

from the taxing district, pursuant to the requirements contained in

section 18–214, without the consideration of a PTELL referendum in

Montgomery County. Our interpretation also avoids the possibility

that territory could be annexed by a regional board from a county that

has not considered PTELL, to a taxing district that is subject to the

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law, simply to permit the district to escape PTELL’s restrictions,

without any referenda on its removal being presented to the voters.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the PTELL continues to

apply to the Auburn District in its entirety.

CONCLUSION

The judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court are

reversed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment reversed.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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