People v. Taylor

Docket No. 99756.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.

MICHAEL TAYLOR, Appellee.

Opinion filed May 18, 2006.

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the

court, with opinion.

Justices Freeman, McMorrow, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman,

and Karmeier concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

This appeal presents the question of whether a minor who

has been adjudicated delinquent in proceedings conducted

under article V of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (hereinafter,

the Juvenile Court Act or Act) (705 ILCS 405/5B101 et seq.

(West 1998)) is considered a Aperson convicted of a felony@ for

purposes of the offense of escape as set forth in section

31B6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (hereinafter, the Code or

the escape statute) (720 ILCS 5/31B6(a) (West 1998)).

BACKGROUND

On the evening of December 23, 1998, defendant was a

16-year-old juvenile incarcerated at the Audy Home, a juvenile

temporary detention center located in Cook County. On that

night, Terrance Willis, who was also a juvenile incarcerated at

the facility, escaped from his cell and cut the throat of a

detention center counselor. Defendant was locked in his cell

during the attack, but Willis took the jail keys from the stricken

counselor and opened defendant=s cell. According to

eyewitness testimony, defendant then aided Willis in shoving

the counselor into a cell and locking it. Defendant and Willis

were apprehended a short time later after they had fled in

separate directions.

Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, the juvenile division of

the circuit court of Cook County held a discretionary-transfer

hearing in connection with the December 23, 1998, incident.

The court transferred defendant to the jurisdiction of the

criminal division on December 20, 1999, on charges of

attempted first degree murder, attempted escape, aggravated

battery and aggravated unlawful restraint. The cause then

proceeded to a jury trial on these charges.

To prove one of the elements of the attempted escape

chargeBi.e., that defendant was a Aperson convicted of a

felony@ at the time of the attempted escapeBthe State

introduced a certified copy of a finding of delinquency entered

by the juvenile court on August 7, 1998, that was based on an

allegation that defendant had committed a robbery. The record

shows that following a dispositional hearing on this delinquency

adjudication for robbery, the juvenile court committed

defendant to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division.

Consequently, defendant was incarcerated at the Audy Home

on December 23, 1998, awaiting transport to the Department of

Corrections, Juvenile Division, when the events that formed the

present criminal charges took place.

Defendant testified at his criminal trial that he was asleep at

the time Willis broke out of his cell on December 23, 1998, that

defendant had no plan to escape, and that he was ordered out

of his cell. He denied participating in putting the counselor in

the cell, but instead claimed that he ran to the bathroom first

and then to summon help for the counselor.

At the completion of his jury trial, defendant was convicted

of the offenses of attempted escape, aggravated battery and

unlawful restraint, but was acquitted of the attempted first

degree murder count. The trial court sentenced him to five

years in prison on the attempted escape charge to run

concurrently with sentences of five years= and three years=

imprisonment on the other two charges.

Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 353

Ill. App. 3d 462. The State conceded before the appellate court

that defendant did not commit the substantive offenses of

aggravated battery and aggravated unlawful restraint. Instead

the State argued that defendant was guilty of these charges on

an accountability theory for his participation in the escape.

Because defendant=s accountability on these two charges

depended on whether he was guilty of the escape attempt, the

appellate court first examined the escape charge. It noted that

the escape statute requires as an element of the offense that a

defendant must be a Aperson convicted of a felony@ or Acharged

with the commission of a felony@ at the time of the offense. 353

Ill. App. 3d at 471. It then concluded that defendant=s

delinquency adjudication was not a Aconviction@ for purposes of

the escape statute. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 472-75. Accordingly, the

appellate court held that under the plain language of the

escape statute, defendant could not be found guilty of the

offense of escape as a matter of law. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 475.

We allowed the State=s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d

R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

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Before this court, the State contends that the term

Aconviction@ as defined in the Code is ambiguous. According to

the State, the Code must be read in pari materia with various

provisions of Juvenile Court Act to find a legislative intent to

punish a juvenile for any escape attempt from a penal

institution. 1 Specifically, the State points out that the term

Adelinquent minor@ under the Juvenile Court Act means Aany

minor who prior to his or her 17th birthday has violated or

attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any

federal or State law, county or municipal ordinance.@ 705 ILCS

405/5B105(3) (West 1998). Moreover, proceedings under the

Act may be instituted for such violations, unless the Act

requires that the minor be prosecuted criminally. 705 ILCS

405/5B120 (West 1998). The State contends that section 5B130

of the Act requires that all escape attempts be prosecuted

criminally, rather than in a juvenile proceeding. See 705 ILCS

405/5B130 (West 1998). According to the State, the appellate

court=s interpretation of the escape statute would lead to an

absurdity if an adjudication is not considered a Aconviction,@

because then a minor who attempts to escape from

confinement following a juvenile adjudication would not be

subject to prosecution under either the criminal laws or the

Juvenile Court Act.

The State=s argument raises a question of statutory

interpretation, and the principles governing our analysis are

well known. The construction of a statute is an issue that is

reviewed de novo. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 434 (2004).

Courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in

mind the subject it addresses and the legislature=s apparent

objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135

(2002). But our inquiry must always begin with the language of

the statute itself, which is the surest and most reliable indicator

1

The doctrine of in pari materia provides that when two statutes deal

with the same subject, they will be considered with reference to each other

to give them a harmonious effect. Collinsville Community Unit School

District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 185

(2006), quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill.

2d 414, 422 (2002).

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of the legislature=s intent. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42

(2000). When the language of a statute is clear, it must be

applied as written without resort to further aids or tools of

interpretation. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d 428, 433 (2006).

Furthermore, criminal or penal statutes are to Abe strictly

construed in favor of the accused, and nothing should be taken

by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal

meaning of the statute.@ People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330,

337 (1998). We cannot, under the guise of statutory

interpretation, remedy an apparent legislative oversight by

rewriting a statute in a way that is inconsistent with its clear

and unambiguous language. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42. However,

if the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may look to tools

of interpretationBsuch as the doctrine of in pari materiaBto

ascertain the meaning of a provision.

The statute at issue here is the escape statute, which

provides that A[a] person convicted of a felony or charged with

the commission of a felony who intentionally escapes from any

penal institution or from the custody of an employee of that

institution commits a Class 2 felony.@ 720 ILCS 5/31B6(a)

(West 1998). Under the statute=s plain language, proof of a

prior felony conviction is an element of the offense of escape in

the present circumstances. 2 See People v. McCollum, 72 Ill.

App. 3d 174, 176 (1979). The question before us, then, is

whether a juvenile adjudication can be considered a felony

conviction for purposes of this statute. The term Aconviction@ is

specifically defined by the Code in the general definitions

contained in Article II (see 720 ILCS 5/2B5 (West 1998)) and

that definition governs our inquiry, as the words and phrases

defined in article II have the same meaning throughout the

Code as is designated in article II unless the context clearly

requires a different meaning (720 ILCS 5/2B5 (West 1998)).

Section 2B5 of the Code states as follows:

2

Proof that a person is in custody on a charge of committing a felony at

the time of the escape is an alternative element, but the State does not

charge this element and it is not at issue in this case. See 720 ILCS

5/31B6(a) (West 1998).

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A >Conviction= means a judgment of conviction or

sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict

or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally

constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction

authorized to try the case without a jury.@ 720 ILCS

5/2B5 (West 1998).

Under both the plain language of this statute and the

various provisions of the Juvenile Court Act cited by the State,

juvenile adjudications are not mentioned as being included in

the Code=s definition of conviction. Nor has any Illinois case

ever held that a juvenile adjudication constitutes a criminal

convictionBalthough Illinois cases have specifically held that

juvenile adjudications do not constitute convictions. See In re

W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53, 57 (1983); People v. Rankin, 297 Ill. App.

3d 818, 824 (1998). Additionally, we emphasize that the

escape statute requires a prior felony conviction, not merely a

conviction. We simply do not believe that the term Aperson

convicted of a felony@ can be read to include juvenile

adjudications under the plain meaning of the existing statutory

framework at issue here, especially when the nature of such

adjudications are closely examined in comparison with the

statutory language.

The Code=s definition of Aconviction@ has two basic parts,

both of which must be satisfied for a conviction to take place.

The first clause requires a judgment or sentence entered upon

a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an

offense. The second clause requires that any verdict or finding

of guilty must be rendered by a jury or a court authorized to try

the case without a jury. Neither part of the definition has been

satisfied under the facts of this case.

With respect to the first clause, we note that defendant was

adjudicated delinquent on August 7, 1998, on an allegation of

robbery. This is the predicate offense that is supposed to serve

as his prior felony conviction for purposes of the escape

charge. The Juvenile Court Act, however, did not provide for a

Aplea of guilty@ or a Afinding of guilty@ of an offense at the time

that defendant was adjudicated delinquent on an allegation of

robbery in August 1998. Nor did the Act provide for a

Asentence.@ Instead a minor named in a delinquency petition in

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1998 was merely subject to Aan adjudicatory hearing,@ after

which the juvenile court judge was to Amake and note in the

minutes of proceeding a finding of whether or not the minor is

delinquent.@ (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5B20 (West

1996). Thereafter, the cause did not proceed to Asentencing@

but rather to a Adispositional hearing@ where the court was to

determine whether Ait is in the best interests of the minor and

the public that he be made a ward of the court.@ 705 ILCS

405/5B20 (West 1996). If the court determined that the minor

should be made a ward of the court, it was then incumbent on

the court to determine the proper disposition best serving the

minor and the public. 705 ILCS 405/5B22 (West 1996). The

kinds of dispositional orders that the court could enter were

listed in section 5B23 of the Act. Upon comparing the language

of the Juvenile Court Act in effect in 1998 with the Code=s

definition of Aconviction,@ it is clear that defendant=s 1998

juvenile adjudication did not satisfy the first part of the definition

of Aconviction@ under the Code because he was not found guilty

and sentenced, but was instead adjudicated delinquent and

then subjected to a dispositional order.

The Juvenile Court Act was radically altered, however, after

the date of defendant=s August 7,1998, delinquency

adjudication and after the alleged offenses were committed in

the present case. The General Assembly amended the Act with

Public Act 90B590, effective January 1, 1999. 705 ILCS Ann.

405/5B101 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1999). The amendatory

changes renumbered the sections and largely rewrote article V

of the Act to provide more accountability for the criminal acts of

juveniles and, from all appearances, to make the juvenile

delinquency adjudicatory process look more criminal in nature.

Compare 705 ILCS 405/5B1 et seq. (West 1996) with 705 ILCS

405/5B101 et seq. (West 2000). For starters, the 1999

amendments provided a new purpose and policy section, which

states in relevant part as follows:

A(1) It is the intent of the General Assembly to

promote a juvenile justice system capable of dealing

with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that

will protect the community, impose accountability for

violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with

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competencies to live responsibly and productively. To

effectuate this intent, the General Assembly declares

the following to be important purposes of the this Article:

(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime

(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly

accountable for his or her acts.

(c) To provide an individualized assessment of

each alleged and adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in

order to rehabilitate and to prevent further delinquent

behavior through the development of competency in

the juvenile offender. As used in this Section,

>competency= means the development of

educational, vocational, social, emotional and basic

life skills which enable a minor to mature into a

productive member of society.

(d) To provide due process, as required by the

Constitution of the United States and the State of

Illinois, through which each juvenile offender and all

other interested parties are assured fair hearings at

which legal rights are recognized and enforced.

(2) To accomplish these goals, juvenile justice

policies developed pursuant to this Article shall be

designed to:

***

(b) Provide secure confinement for minors who

present a danger to the community and make those

minors understand that sanctions for serious crimes,

particularly violent felonies, should be

commensurate with the seriousness of the offense

and merit strong punishment;

(c) Protect the community from crimes committed

by minors;

***

(j) Hold minors accountable for their unlawful

behavior and not allow minors to think that their

delinquent acts have no consequence for

themselves and others.@ 705 ILCS 405/5B101 (West

2000).

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Although proceedings under the Act are still not criminal in

nature even in the aftermath of the 1999 amendments and are

to be administered in a spirit of humane concern for the minor

and to promote his general welfare, the policy statement in

section 5B101 represents a fundamental shift from the singular

goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding concerns of

protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders

accountable for violations of the law. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313,

317 (2001). Consistent with this end, the 1999 amendments

changed some of the terminology of the Act. The Act now

provides for a number of features common to a criminal trial.

Pertinent to our analysis are the following provisions. The

legislature has now indicated an intent that the term A >trial=

replace the term >adjudicatory hearing= and be synonymous

with that definition as it was used in the [Act].@ 705 ILCS

405/5B101(17) (West 1998). Furthermore, the Act now allows

for a Aplea of guilty@ in a delinquency proceeding (705 ILCS

405/5B605 (West 1998)), and if a trial is conducted, the court is

required, at its conclusion, to Amake and note in the minutes of

the proceeding a finding of whether or not the minor is guilty.@

(Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5B620 (West 1998). If the

court finds the minor Aguilty,@ the cause then proceeds to a

Asentencing hearing,@ where it is determined whether or not it is

in the best interests of the minor or the public that he be made

a ward of the court, with the possibility that if defendant is

adjudicated a ward of the court, he could be committed to the

Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. 705 ILCS

405/5B620, 5B705, 5B710 (West 1998). In sum, the Act now

provides for pleas of guilty, findings of guilty and

sentencingBlanguage which effectively tracks with the first

clause of the term Aconviction@ as defined in the Code.

These amendments support the notion that a juvenile

adjudication in 1998 was not considered a Asentence entered

upon a plea of guilty@ or a Averdict or finding of guilty of an

offense.@ As previously mentioned, the above-discussed

changes to the Juvenile Court Act did not become effective

until January 1, 1999, several months after defendant=s juvenile

adjudication. Accordingly, they have no application here other

than to illustrate that the legislature could have satisfied the

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first part of the statutory definition of Aconviction@ under the

Code if it had included the appropriate language to specify that

an adjudication is a Afinding of guilty.@ But this would not end

our analysis because even with the 1999 amendments to the

Juvenile Court Act, a juvenile adjudication still does not satisfy

the second clause of the term Aconviction@ as defined by the

Code.

The second clause of the definition requires that the finding

of guilt be rendered by a Alegally constituted jury or by a court

of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a

jury.@ 720 ILCS 5/2B5 (West 1998). The Juvenile Court Act

plainly states that minors do not have a right to a jury trial

unless it is specifically provided for in article V of the Act. 705

ILCS 405/5B101(3) (West 1998). A juvenile proceeding based

on an allegation of robbery, like the one at issue in the present

case, is not one allowing for a right to a trial by jury under the

Act, and there is no indication that defendant was afforded the

right to a jury trial on his delinquency adjudication. Instead, the

Act requires the circuit court to conduct a bench trial on such

juvenile adjudications. See 705 ILCS 405/5B605(1) (West

1998). This is all that is constitutionally required in juvenile

delinquency proceedings. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.

528, 545, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 661, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 1986 (1971).

This is because a juvenile proceeding is not Aa >criminal

prosecution,= within the meaning and reach of the Sixth

Amendment.@ McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 658,

91 S. Ct. at 1984. Nevertheless, juvenile adjudications cannot

be deemed criminal felony Aconvictions@ under the Code

because the Code=s definition of Aconviction@ requires that the

finding of guilt be made by a court authorized to try the case

without a jury, and the law does not authorize a felony

conviction in the absence of a right to a trial by jury. Both our

federal and state constitutions preclude a criminal felony

conviction without the right to a jury trial. Specifically, the sixth

amendment to the United States Constitution states that A[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.@ U.S. Const.,

amend. VI. Similarly, our state constitution provides that A[i]n

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right *** to

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have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in

which the offense is alleged to have been committed.@ Ill.

Const. 1970, art. I, '8. Moreover, Illinois courts have long

recognized that the right of an accused to a trial by jury in a

criminal felony case is absolute unless specifically waived and

the defendant has been properly and adequately informed of

his rights. People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 257-65 (1930); People

v. Cowart, 51 Ill. App. 2d 388, 390 (1964).

In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 20 L. Ed. 2d

491, 496, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 1447 (1968), the Supreme Court

called the right to trial by jury in criminal cases Afundamental to

the American scheme of justice@ and held that the right applied

to state prosecutions under the due process clause whenever

the right would attach under federal law in a criminal case. A

right to trial by jury is afforded criminal defendants to prevent

oppression by the government. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56,

20 L. Ed. 2d at 499, 88 S. Ct at 1451. As the Court in Duncan

noted,

AThe framers of the constitutions strove to create an

independent judiciary but insisted upon further

protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused

with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him

an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or

overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant,

biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the

common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored

but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single

judge, he was to have it. A Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156, 20

L. Ed. 2d at 500, 88 S. Ct. at 1451.

We believe that when the Code uses the phrase

Aauthorized to try the case without a jury@ (720 ILCS 5/2B5

(West 1998)), it is referring to a situation where the defendant

expressly waived his right to a jury trial if the case is one

involving a felony offense. Thus, we conclude that for a

defendant to be deemed a Aperson convicted of a felony@ within

the meaning of the escape statute (720 ILCS 5/31B6(a) (West

1998)), he must have been afforded the right to a trial by jury

on the predicate felony. The law does not Aauthorize@ anything

less. Under the current legislative language employed in

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defining the term Aconviction@ in the Code and in the absence

of any clear language in the Juvenile Court Act, we simply

cannot find that a juvenile adjudication is tantamount to a

felony conviction for purposes of the escape statute.

Even if we were to consider the escape statute to be

ambiguous, as the State urges, we still would not find that the

legislative intent, as expressed in various provisions of the

Juvenile Court Act, requires a different result. The policy that

seeks to hold juveniles accountable for their actions and to

protect the public does not negate the concept that

rehabilitation remains a more important consideration in the

juvenile justice system than in the criminal justice system and

that there are still significant differences between the two,

indicating that Athe ideal of separate treatment of children is still

worth pursuing.@ McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 546 n.6, 29 L. Ed. 2d at

661 n.6, 91 S. Ct. at 1986 n.6.

More importantly, if we were to accept the State=s position,

it would mean that juveniles would have the Aworst of both

worlds,@ one in which, unlike their adult counterparts, they are

denied a right to a jury trial, yet their adjudications are deemed

prior criminal convictions for the purpose of criminal statutes

that require a prior conviction as an element of an offense, all

the while without the statute specifically identifying an

adjudication as a prior conviction. See United States v. Kent,

383 U.S. 541, 556, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84, 94, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 1054

(1966) (Athere may be grounds for concern that the child

receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the

protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and

regenerative treatment postulated for children@). When the

United States Supreme Court held in McKeiver that a jury trial

is not guaranteed by the federal Constitution in juvenile

adjudications, it rested its holding mainly on the notion that

juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from criminal

proceedings. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541-51, 29 L. Ed. 2d at

658-64, 91 S. Ct. at 1984-89. The plurality of the Court noted

that juvenile proceedings are undergirded by the ideal of

rehabilitation rather than punishment. The plurality feared the

possibility that if a jury trial were mandated in juvenile

proceedings, it would Aput an effective end to what has been

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the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective

proceeding.@ McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 661,

91 S. Ct. at 1986. According to the plurality, a jury trial would

not greatly strengthen the fact-finding function and would,

contrarily, Aprovide an attrition of the juvenile court=s assumed

ability to function in a unique manner.@ McKeiver, 403 U.S. at

547, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 662, 91 S. Ct. at 1987. The McKeiver

plurality concluded by stating the following:

AFinally, the arguments advanced by the juveniles

here are, of course, the identical arguments that

underlie the demand for the jury trial for criminal

proceedings. The arguments necessarily equate the

juvenile proceedingBor at least the adjudicative phase of

itBwith the criminal trial. Whether they should be so

equated is our issue. Concern about the inapplicability

of exclusionary and other rules of evidence, about the

juvenile court judge=s possible awareness of the

juvenile=s prior record and of the contents of the social

file; about repeated appearances of the same familiar

witnesses in the persons of juvenile and probation

officers and social workersBall to the effect that this will

create the likelihood of pre-judgmentBchooses to ignore,

it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of

sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile

court system contemplates.

If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process

are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system,

there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps

that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for

the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.@

McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550-51, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 664, 91

S. Ct. at 1989.

McKeiver=s reluctance to extend the right to a jury trial to

juvenile proceedings and the absence of such a right in the

Juvenile Court Act is ample reason to reject the notion that the

1999 amendments to the Act should be read to equate an

adjudication with a criminal conviction in the present context.

We are well aware that the 1999 amendments represent a shift

from Athe singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding

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concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile offenders

accountable for violations of the law.@ In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d

313, 317 (2001). It is on this very basisBthat the historical

differences between juvenile an adult systems may no longer

existBthat some commentators have criticized McKeiver and

have urged that the right to a trial by jury be extended to

juvenile proceedings. See J. Hochberg, Should Juvenile

Adjudications Count as Prior Convictions for Apprendi

Purposes?, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1159, 1190-91 (2004); C.

Murphy, The Use of Prior Convictions After Apprendi, 37 U.C.

Davis L. Rev. 973, 1012-13 (2004). But without the actual

extension of the right to a trial by jury, it would be incongruent

to hold that juvenile adjudications constitute criminal felony

convictions as a matter of course or, as the State urges here,

that they constitute Aconvictions@ for purposes of a statute that

requires as an element of the offense that the defendant be a

Aperson convicted of a felony.@

The question before us is to be distinguished from the

somewhat analogous issue of whether a juvenile adjudication

is considered a Aprior conviction@ for sentencing enhancement

purposes under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L.

Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In Apprendi, the Court

stated that A[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.@ (Emphasis added.) Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The

federal circuits are divided over the question of whether

nonjury juvenile adjudications can be characterized as Aprior

convictions@ as that term is used in Apprendi. See United

States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005); United States

v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v.

Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Tighe,

266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). In each of these cases,

defendants were charged with violating the Armed Career

Criminal Act (the federal Act) (18 U.S.C. '924(e) (2000)), which

provides that a defendant convicted of being a felon in

possession of a firearm is subject to a maximum sentence of

10 years. The federal Act further provides, however, that if the

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convicted felon is found to have three previous convictions for

a violent felony, a minimum sentence of 15 years is required.

18 U.S.C. '924(e) (2000). Furthermore, the federal Act

expressly states that the term Aconviction@ is defined to include

Aa finding that a person has committed an act of juvenile

delinquency involving a violent felony.@ 18 U.S.C. '924(e)(2)(C)

(2000).

The Ninth Circuit has held that nonjury juvenile

adjudications may not be considered as prior convictions for

Apprendi purposes to enhance a sentence under the federal

Act (Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1191-95), but the Third, Eighth and

Eleventh Circuits have held that they may be so used (Burge,

407 F.3d at 1187-91; Jones, 332 F.3d at 694-96; Smalley, 294

F.3d at 1031-33). 3 In Tighe, the Ninth Circuit quoted the

following language from Apprendi: A >There is a vast difference

between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction

entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to

a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the

required fact under a lesser standard of proof.= @ Tighe, 266

F.3d at 1194, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496, 147 L. Ed. 2d

at 458-59, 120 S. Ct. at 2366. Tighe interpreted this language

to require that Athe >prior conviction= exception to Apprendi=s

general rule must be limited to prior convictions that were

themselves obtained through proceedings that included the

right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.@

(Emphasis added.) Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194. Accordingly,

Tighe held that the defendant=s sentence could not stand

because the fact that the prior nonjury adjudication had actually

occurred was not something that was presented to the jury.

Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194-95.

The majority of courts have not followed Tighe. See United

States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005)

3

As of yet, the United States Supreme Court has not resolved the

conflict.

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(collecting cases). Instead they have noted that Apprendi

excluded prior convictions from its general rule because of the

existence of procedural safeguards that buttress the

convictions, namely, the right to a jury trial and the right to

require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Representative of the approach of the majority of courts

is the observation that Apprendi did not specifically address

juvenile adjudications, which unfortunately A >lie in between

these two poles,= because they do not provide a jury trial but do

require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.@ See Ryle v. State,

842 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2005), quoting Smalley, 294 F.3d at

1032. The majority of courts have then concluded that the

question of whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt

from Apprendi=s general rule should turn on Awhether juvenile

adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due

process of law is not offended by such an exemption.@ Smalley,

294 F.3d at 1032-33. The majority of courts then hold that

given the panoply of procedural safeguards in place in a

juvenile proceedingBincluding proof beyond a reasonable

doubtBjuvenile convictions can be considered constitutionally

reliable enough to satisfy Apprendi=s exception without the right

to a trial by jury. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032-33.

We take no position here with respect to the division among

the federal circuits. We only discuss the jurisprudence on the

use of nonjury juvenile adjudications for Apprendi purposes

because we find it helpful to our analysis to illustrate the

important differences between the case before us and the

federal cases cited above. In each of the federal cases, a

statute specifically defined a Aconviction@ as a prior juvenile

adjudication for purposes of the offense at issue. Here, in

contrast, the legislature has not defined the term Aconviction@ in

the escape statute to include juvenile adjudications. Moreover,

the key issue in the present case involves proof of a prior

conviction as an element of the offense where the applicable

statute fails to define an Aadjudication@ as a Aconviction.@ Thus,

the primary issue here turns on a question of statutory

construction, while the principal issue in the federal cases

turned on whether an adjudication could be classified as a prior

conviction for Apprendi purposes, not on whether it could be

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classified as a Aconviction@ for purposes of establishing an

element of an offense. The distinction is critical, of course,

because nothing in a penal statute may be construed against a

defendant by intendment or implication (Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d

at 337).

In the absence of a statute expressly defining a juvenile

adjudication as a conviction, Illinois courts have consistently

held that juvenile adjudications do not constitute convictions.

See In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53 (1983); People v. Rankin, 297 Ill.

App. 3d 818 (1998). In In re W.W., a juvenile was adjudicated

delinquent. On appeal, the appellate court assessed a $50 fee

against the minor pursuant to a statute that entitled the State=s

Attorney to the fee for each appeal prosecuted or defended by

him upon Aconviction@ of Athe defendant.@ Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979,

ch. 53, par. 8; In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d at 54-55. This court

vacated the order of the appellate court and held that a juvenile

adjudication does not constitute a Aconviction@ for purposes of

the statute. In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d at 57-58. Relying on previous

Illinois precedent, this court reiterated the following: A[J]uvenile

proceedings are not criminal in nature. As such, a minor is

neither >convicted= nor considered a >defendant= or an

>accused.= Nor is a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act

denominated a >conviction.= @ In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d at 57. This

court concluded its analysis in In re W.W. by emphasizing that

it would not extend the statutory provision by intendment or

implication. In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d at 58.

In Rankin, the defendant was convicted of unlawful

possession of a weapon by a felon. A prior criminal conviction

for aggravated battery was used to serve as the predicate

felony for the charge . In support of its sentencing argument,

the State maintained that the defendant=s prior juvenile

adjudication, based on an allegation of residential burglary,

could constitute a Aconviction@ for purposes of extended-term

sentencing. The appellate court rejected the State=s argument.

In doing so, the appellate court noted that section 5B5B3.2 of

the Unified Code of Corrections authorized extended-term

sentencing when a defendant is convicted of a felony, A >after

having been previously convicted in Illinois or any other

jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or greater class

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felony.= @ (Emphasis in original.) Rankin, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 824,

quoting 730 ILCS 5/5B5B3.2(b)(1) (West 1994). The court

examined the specific definition of Aconviction@ found in the

Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5B1B5 (West 1994)),

which is identical to the definition of Aconviction@ found in the

statute at issue in our case. Rankin observed:

AThis definition does not include juvenile adjudications.

Further, a term of well-known legal significance can be

presumed to have that meaning in a statute. Advincula

v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 678 N.E.2d

1009, 1017 (1996). >Conviction= is commonly known to

mean >the result of a criminal trial which ends in a

judgment or sentence that the accused is guilty as

charged.= Black=s Law Dictionary 333 (6th ed. 1990).@

(Emphasis added.) Rankin, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 824.

Rankin contrasted the situation before it with the use of juvenile

delinquency adjudications in sentencing generally. It noted that

subsection (a)(3) of section 5B5B3.2 of the Code expressly

provides that courts may consider as aggravating factors in

sentencing A >a history of prior delinquency or criminal

activity.= @ (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5B5B3.2(a)(3) (West

1994). Rankin then concluded that the legislature could have

included a juvenile delinquency adjudication in its definition of

conviction under the Unified Code of Corrections or made

specific reference to such adjudications in section 5B5B3.2(b),

discussing when an extended-term sentence may be imposed.

Rankin, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 825. Because it did not do so, the

court concluded that defendant=s juvenile delinquency

adjudication did not provide a basis for imposing an extended-

term sentence. Rankin, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 825.

We find In re W.W. and Rankin to be well reasoned and

supportive of our position here. Similar to Rankin, we conclude

that the legislature could have included juvenile adjudications

within its general definition of Aconviction@ in the Code, or it

could have mentioned juvenile adjudications in section 31B6 of

the escape statute itself. It did not do so, and we are

constrained to find that it had no intent to do so.

It is readily apparent that the legislature understands the

need for specifically defining a juvenile adjudication as a

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conviction when that is its intention. In In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50

(2003), one of the issues before this court was whether the

defendant could be considered a Asexual predator@ as defined

by the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730

ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)). Defendant had been

adjudicated delinquent based on two instances of aggravated

criminal sexual assault. The legislature defined a Asexual

predator@ in section 2(E) of the Registration Act as Aany person

who *** is *** [c]onvicted of a violation of any of the following

Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961 *** : *** 12B14

(aggravated criminal sexual assault).@ 730 ILCS 150/2(E)(1)

(West 2000). The legislature in turn provided in section 2(AB5)

of the Registration Act that Aconvicted@ was to have the same

meaning as Aadjudicated@ for purposes of section 2. 730 ILCS

150/2 (AB5) (West 2000). In re J.W. found the legislative

attempt to define Aconvicted@ so as to include juvenile

adjudications to be clear and unambiguous. In re J.W., 204 Ill.

2d at 64. Accordingly, this court gave effect to the statute as

written and found that the defendant qualified as a Asexual

predator@ under the statute. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 64. In

contrast to In re J.W., the legislature in the present case has

not chosen to include juvenile adjudications in the definition of

Aconviction@ for purposes of the escape statute, and again we

may not read such an inclusion into a penal statute by

intendment or implication.

The State contends that the Aexcluded jurisdiction@

provision contained in section 5B130(5)(a) of the Juvenile Court

Act warrants a different result. We reject that contention.

Section 5B130(5)(a) provides as follows:

AThe definition of delinquent minor under Section

5B120[4] of this Article shall not apply to any minor who

is charged with a violation of subsection (a) of Section

31B6 or Section 32B10 of the Criminal Code of 1961

when the minor is subject to prosecution under the

criminal laws of this State as a result of the application

4

A footnote in West=s Illinois Compiled Statutes 1998 states that this cite

to section 5B120 Aprobably should read >5B105.= @

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of the provisions of Section 5B125, or subsection (1) or

(2) of this Section. These charges and all other charges

arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted

under the criminal laws of this State.@ 705 ILCS

405/5B130(5)(a) (West 1998).

The State mistakenly believes that this statute cannot be

read in harmony with the escape statute as interpreted by the

appellate court. Section 5B130(5)(a) does not purport to define

the offense of escape in any way. Rather, it only ensures the

prosecution of a minor as an adult under the criminal laws for

escape where the minor escapes from custody when he is

subject to prosecution under the criminal laws of this state as a

result of the transfer provisions listed in section 5B130(5)(a),

namely, sections 5B125 and subsections (1) and (2) of section

5B130. These transfer provisions list situations in which a minor

must be charged and tried as an adult. Section 5B130(5)(a) is

thus consistent with the escape statute=s alternative element

that A[a] person *** charged with the commission of a felony

who intentionally escapes from any penal institution or from the

custody of an employee of that institution commits a Class 2

felony.@ (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/31B6(a) (West 1998).

By way of example, we note that section 5B130(1)(a), which is

one of the transfer provisions listed in section 5B130(5)(a),

provides for mandatory transfer when any minor who is at least

15 years old at the time of the offense commits one of the

following offenses: first degree murder, aggravated criminal

sexual assault, armed robbery when the armed robbery was

committed with a firearm, or aggravated vehicular hijacking

when the hijacking was committed with a firearm. 705 ILCS

405/5B130(1)(a) (West 1998). We further note that section

5B130(5)(a) does not provide any impediment to a juvenile

proceeding for the offense of escape when the escape

allegation is based on a prior felony rather than a pending

charge subjecting the minor to prosecution as a result of

application of section 5B125, 5B130(1) or 5B130(2). In other

words, when the escape allegation is based on a prior felony,

the juvenile may be prosecuted in adult court pursuant to the

discretionary transfer provision of the Act (see 705 ILCS

405/5B805(3) (West 1998)), or he may be prosecuted in

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juvenile court. But if the escape offense is based on an

allegation that defendant escaped while awaiting prosecution

under the criminal laws as a result of the application of the

mandatory-transfer provisions listed in section 5B130(5)(a)Bas

would be the case where a defendant had committed the

offense of first degree murder and was in custody awaiting

prosecutionBthe defendant may only be prosecuted for the

offense of escape in adult court under criminal law. We find

nothing in section 5B130(5)(a) that evinces a legislative intent

to prosecute a minor for the offense of escape where the minor

was in custody based on a juvenile adjudication at the time of

the escape.

The legislative distinction apparently drawn between minors

with juvenile delinquency adjudications and minors who have

been convicted of felonies or who are currently subject to

prosecution for felonies under the criminal law does not mean

that a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent may leave

a detention center at his own whim without consequences.

Because the circuit court in juvenile proceedings maintains

jurisdiction until the minor turns 21 years of age, the court

would be free to exercise its discretion in modifying a minor=s

term of commitment, when possible, for any infraction involving

a minor leaving a detention facility without authorization. See

705 ILCS 405/5B710(3), 5B750, 5B755 (West 1998). Moreover,

such infractions could also be handled by a station adjustment,

which allows for the informal or formal handling of a minor=s

misbehavior by a juvenile police officer. 705 ILCS 405/5B301

(West 1998).

Finally, we note that the cases relied upon by the State are

easily distinguishable. See People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder,

208 Ill. 2d 457 (2004); People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483 (2000);

Fitzsimmons v. Norgle, 104 Ill. 2d 369 (1984); People v. Smith,

345 Ill. App. 3d 179 (2004); People v. Baaree, 315 Ill. App. 3d

1049 (2000). None of the State=s cases hold that a juvenile

adjudication is tantamount to a Aconviction@ in any context, nor

do any of the cases even consider the question. Moreover, the

general principles articulated in the State=s cases are

supportive of our analysis here. For example, in Baaree, the

issue turned on defendant=s age at the time he was Aconvicted@

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of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to

deliver. Under the sentencing statute at issue, if defendant was

at least 21 years old at the time of Aconviction,@ he was eligible

for an extended-term sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5B5B3(c)(8) (West

1998); Baaree, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1050. The defendant turned

21 between the date he was found guilty and the date he was

sentenced. With respect to the question of whether the date of

the finding of guilt or the date of sentence constituted the

conviction, the appellate court found that the statute did not

favor one approach over the other. Baaree, 315 Ill. App. 3d at

1052. Because penal statutes are to be strictly construed in

favor of the accused, Baaree held that the construction

favoring the accused had to be adopted. Baaree, 315 Ill. App.

3d at 1052-53.

In the present case, we hold that under the plain meaning

of the escape statute, a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent

is not a Aperson convicted of a felony.@ However, even if we

were to consider the term Aconviction@ to be ambiguous, we still

would not find a juvenile adjudication to be a conviction for

purposes of the escape statute. Like Baaree, we would

conclude that the State=s interpretation is not favored over

defendant=s, and therefore the statute must be strictly

construed in favor of the accused.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

appellate court.

Affirmed.

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