John Hatton v. Daniel D. Grigar

Opinion issued

February 17, 2011

In

The

Court of

Appeals

For

The

First District

of Texas

————————————

NO. 01-09-00588-CV

———————————

John Hatton , Appellant

V.

Daniel D. Grigar , Appellee

On Appeal from the 268th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial

Court Case No. 06-DCV-152034

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

John

Hatton appeals a final judgment in favor of Daniel D. Grigar and an order

imposing sanctions. Hatton filed a

trespass to try title action to determine the rights to a road across his

property. Grigar moved for summary

judgment on the grounds of res judicata.

The trial court granted the summary judgment and granted Grigar’s

motions for sanctions against Hatton.

In

four issues, Hatton contends that the trial court abused its discretion and

denied him due process and equal protection under the law when it transferred

his case from the 240th to the 268th District Court; dismissed his trespass to

try title suit with prejudice; granted a summary judgment to Grigar on the affirmative

defense of res judicata; granted a summary judgment on Grigar’s motion for

sanctions; and granted Grigar a void order for enforcement and injunction. We conclude that any error concerning the

transfer is waived, the trial court properly granted summary judgment, and the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions. We also conclude that we lack jurisdiction

over the portion of Hatton’s appeal pertaining to the motion for enforcement

and injunction. Finally, we conclude

that Hatton has waived any error relating to his assertions of due process and

equal protection violations. We affirm.

Background

This

is not the first appeal involving these parties. As the Fourteenth Court of Appeals summarized,

This appeal arises from a longstanding dispute over the

ownership of a road. In 1997, Daniel D. Grigar sought a declaratory judgment

that the gravel road abutting John Hatton’s property, which provided access to

Grigar’s landlocked property, constituted a public easement. On June 23, 2000, after a bench trial, the

trial court entered a judgment in favor of Grigar (the “2000 judgment”),

finding that: (1) Grigar’s land was in fact landlocked, (2) the road

constituted a public road, and (3) an easement of ingress and egress existed by

necessity, prescription, and implication in favor of Grigar. Hatton appealed the judgment to this court,

and we affirmed. See Hatton v. Grigar , 66 S.W.3d 545, 557 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Although

not detailed by the parties in this appeal, the same facts underlying the 2000

judgment and our decision in Hatton have apparently given rise to

several proceedings in other state and federal courts.

Hatton v. Grigar , No. 14-05-01053-CV, 2006

WL 3365494 , *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] Nov. 21 2006, no pet.). In that case, despite having previously

appealed the adverse 2000 judgment, Hatton attempted to file a bill of review

to attack the 2000 judgment a second time.

Id. The Fourteenth Court affirmed the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment for Grigar.

Id. As part of that case, Hatton also appealed

the trial court’s imposition of sanctions against him and his attorney, Robert

Wallace, for frivolously filing the bill of review. Id. The Fourteenth Court affirmed the

sanctions. Id.

One of the other proceedings referenced

by the Fourteenth Court was a trespass to try title action—the same claim

Hatton brings in this cause—filed in the District Court for the Southern

District of Texas . [1] There, as here, Grigar sought dismissal based

on res judicata. Grigar asserted that the

“2000 judgment” was res judicata of Hatton’s current claim for trespass to try

title. Hatton v.

Grigar , No.

H-06-3981, 2007 WL 624343 , *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2007). Citing the Fourteenth Court’s opinion, the

federal district court concluded that Hatton’s trespass to try title claim

raised the same issues as the claims adjudicated in the 2000 judgment—namely,

whether the road was a public road and whether Grigar had a right to use the

road. [2] Id. The district court granted Grigar’s motion to dismiss, and

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Hatton v. Grigar , 258 Fed.

Appx. 706, 707 , 2007 WL 4370888 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit explained that Hatton was

attempting to have his title in the road be confirmed but that Hatton had

raised the same issue in the prior case and the trial court rejected it,

finding instead that the road was a public road. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States denied

the petition for writ of certiorari. Hatton v. Grigar , 129 S. Ct. 411 (2008).

In this case, Hatton filed a trespass

to try title suit in the 240th District Court in Fort Bend County. Pursuant to local rules, the 240th District

Court transferred the case to the 268th District Court because it was a “filing

involving substantially related parties and claims” as the previous suit in the

268th District Court. Grigar moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that res judicata barred this suit. Grigar also moved for sanctions against

Hatton and his attorney, Wallace. The

trial court granted Grigar’s motion for summary judgment and also imposed

sanctions against Hatton, but not Wallace, for $14,325 for filing a frivolous pleading

and $7,500 for Grigar’s attorney’s fees.

Transfer of Case

In

his first issue, Hatton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

transferring his case from the 240th to the 268th District Court. Within this issue, Hatton recites the appropriate

standard of review for abuse of discretion.

However, Hatton cites no authority concerning a trial court’s discretion

to transfer a case to another district court in the same county pursuant to

local rules. After reciting the standard

of review for abuse of discretion, Hatton asserts, “The issue in this case is

whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in dismissing [Hatton’s] Trespass

to Try Title action.” The merits of the

case are a different issue than whether the trial court abused its discretion

by transferring the case. Hatton also

asserts—without citation to any authority—that he “was entitled to have his

title to this road tried in the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Texas or sent back to the 240th Judicial District Court” because

Judge Elliott, the judge of the 268th District, signed the 2000 judgment that

granted Grigar an easement and declared the road a public road.

Texas

Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires that an appellant’s brief “contain

a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record.”

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). “Rule 38 requires [a party] to provide us

with such discussion of the facts and the authorities relied upon as may be

requisite to maintain the point at issue.”

Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc. , 106 S.W.3d

118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). “This is not done by merely uttering brief

conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations.” Id.

“Issues on appeal are waived if an appellant fails to support his

contention by citations to appropriate authority . . . .” Abdelnour v. Mid Nat’l Holdings, Inc. ,

190 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Similarly, appellate issues are waived when

the brief fails to contain a clear argument for the contentions made. Izen v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline , 322 S.W.3d 308,

322 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. struck). Because Hatton’s argument within this issue

cites no relevant authority concerning the transfer of cases, we conclude the

issue is waived due to inadequate briefing.

See Abdelnour ,

190 S.W.3d at 241 .

We overrule Hatton’s first issue.

Summary

Judgment on Hatton’s Trespass to Try Title Claim

In his second issue,

Hatton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Grigar’s

motion for summary judgment. In this

issue, the crux of Hatton’s argument is that the trial court, by signing the

2000 judgment, divested Hatton of title in the road. Therefore, Hatton argues, until that moment,

he had no right to file a trespass to try title action. Hatton concludes that res judicata based on

the 2000 judgment cannot bar this suit.

Hatton

misapprehends the applicable law. In the

prior lawsuit, the trial court found, and the court of appeals affirmed the

finding, that Hatton’s predecessors in title had impliedly dedicated a road for

public use. Hatton , 66 S.W.3d at 557 .

Among the cases discussed by the Fourteenth Court were Scott v. Cannon , 959 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.—Austin

1998, pet. denied) and Las Vegas Pecan

& Cattle Co. v. Zavala County , 682 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. 1984). Both cases make clear that an implied

dedication of a public road theory grants an easement. Las

Vegas , 682 S.W.2d at 257 ; Scott ,

959 S.W.2d at 718–20. An easement does

not divest title from the landowner. Stephen

F. Austin State Univ. v. Flynn ,

228 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2007) (“An easement does not convey title to property.”); see

also State v. Brownlow , 319 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Tex. 2010) (stating that

u nder Texas property

law concerning easements, the owners of land subject to

an easement remain the title

holders of the land) (ci ting Brunson v. State , 418 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. 1967)). In

fact, part of the Supreme Court’s holding in Las Vegas was that the trial court erred in awarding title to

Zavala County because, under an implied dedication of a public road theory,

only an easement is at issue, not title.

Las Vegas , 682 S.W.2d at 257 . Because the prior judgment awarded the

public an implied dedication of a roadway easement and did not divest Hatton’s

title, there is no question of title to be tried in a trespass to try title

suit.

Furthermore,

stripped of the erroneous assertion that the 2000 judgment divested him of his

title in the road, a review of Hatton’s petition and argument in this case makes

clear that he is seeking to prohibit Grigar’s use of the road in question. This issue has been determined before. See Hatton , 66 S.W.3d at 554–57. Hatton

has also tried to assert the same issue in his improperly filed bill of review,

see Hatton , 2006 WL 3365494 at *1,

and in federal court, see Hatton , 2007

WL 624343 , at *1. To the extent Hatton

is seeking a determination of Grigar’s (or the public’s) right to use the road,

this issue has been fully litigated between these same parties to a final

judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction.

“At their core, Hatton’s present

claims rest on exactly the same issue litigated before the state court; whether

the road at issue is a private or public road.”

Hatton , 258 Fed. Appx. at 707 , 2007 WL 4370888 at *1. The trial court did not err by granting

Grigar’s motion for summary judgment on res judicata grounds. See

Igal v. Brightstar

Info. Tech. Grp., Inc. 250 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex. 2008)

(stating elements of res judicata: “(1) a prior final judgment on the merits by

a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the same parties or those in privity

with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or

could have been raised in the first action”).

We

overrule Hatton’s second issue.

Sanctions

In

his third issue, Hatton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

imposing sanctions against him. Specifically,

Hatton contends that his filing of this trespass to try title action was done

in good faith because, as discussed above, once the trial court signed the 2000

judgment, an issue concerning the title to the road arose and, therefore, he

had to file a trespass to try title action to resolve the title issue.

We review a

trial court’s imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Low v.

Henry , 221 S.W.3d 609, 614

(Tex. 2007). In reviewing the sanctions

order, we review the entire record to determine whether the trial court abused

its discretion. Am. Flood Research,

Inc. v. Jones , 192 S.W.3d

581, 583 (Tex. 2006).

Under rule

13, a court may impose sanctions if a pleading is “not groundless and brought

in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment.” Tex. R. Civ. P . 13. A pleading is “groundless” when it has “no

basis in law or fact and [is] not warranted by good faith argument for the

extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. Bad faith involves conscious wrongdoing for a

dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose. Hatton , 2006 W L 3365494, at *7 (citing Elkins v. Stotts-Brown , 103 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2003, no pet.)). “‘Harass’ is used in a variety of legal contexts to describe

words, gestures, and actions that tend to annoy, alarm, and verbally abuse

another person.” Id. (citing Elkins , 103 S.W.3d at 664 ). “When making its determination to award

sanctions on the grounds that a case is frivolous or legally invalid, a trial

court should consider the entire history of the case.” Id.

(citing Falk & Mayfield L.L.P. v. Molzan , 974 S.W.2d 821 , 824–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,

pet. denied)).

As

discussed above, well-established Texas precedent shows that the trial court’s

2000 judgment did not divest Hatton of title.

Therefore, there is no basis in law for Hatton’s contention that the

instant suit is not another in a series of attempts to re-try the issue of

Grigar’s right to use the road— a right the trial court determined over 10

years ago after a full trial on the merits. Based on the record before us, the long

history of this dispute, and the long-standing precedent contrary to Hatton’s

arguments, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by imposing sanctions.

We

overrule Hatton’s third issue.

Motion for Enforcement and

Injunction of 2000 Judgment

In

his fourth issue, Hatton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

granting Grigar’s motion for enforcement and injunction. We note that the motion for enforcement and

injunction and the order granting it were filed in trial court cause number

97-DCV-098376, the lawsuit that resulted in the 2000 judgment. Hatton filed a notice of appeal in trial

court cause number 06-DCV-152034. The

clerk’s record before this Court in this cause does not contain the order

appealed from or a notice of appeal filed in trial court cause number

97-DCV-098376. Absent a timely-field

notice of appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss the appeal. See Verburgt

v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).

Accordingly, we dismiss that portion of this cause that attempts to

appeal the order granting the motion for enforcement and injunction in trial

court cause number 97-DCV-098376.

Due Process and Equal

Protection

Within all four of his issues, Hatton contends that,

in addition to abusing its discretion, the trial court “denied [Hatton] due

process and equal protection under the law.”

Within his first issue, Hatton argues,

Pursuant to Peralta

v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485

U.S. 80, 86 ; 108 S. Ct. 896 , 899–900 (1988) and Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d

721, 723 (Tex. 1988), [Hatton] was denied the most basic and fundamental

right of due process which was notice to avail himself of his Constitutional

right to preserve and protect his valuable real property rights from being

taken without due process and equal protection under the law.

This is Hatton’s entire argument concerning due process and

equal protection. [3] He does not identify what act or acts the

trial court committed to deprive him of due process. [4] Hatton makes no assertion and cites no

authority concerning what process was due and that he was denied that process

or concerning his equal protection rights. [5] Although he cites two cases, he makes no

attempt to analyze or explain the cases or how the cases apply to his

situation. We conclude that this issue

is waived due to inadequate briefing. See Abdelnour , 190 S.W.3d at 241 .

We overrule

Hatton’s four issues to the extent they assert a violation of due process or

equal protection.

Conclusion

We

affirm the trial court’s judgment and the trial court’s order imposing

sanctions.

Harvey

Brown

Justice

Panel consists of

Justices Jennings, Higley, and Brown.

[1] In his brief, Hatton asserts that when

he learned of the transfer from the 240th to the 268th District, which he

contends was done “without cause, without notice, and without a hearing,” he

filed the suit in federal court described above, “seeking relief and

instructions under 42 USC Sections 1981 and 1983 in regard to the biased and

improper transfer” of his case. However,

as described above, the federal court characterized Hatton’s suit as a trespass

to try title action. Hatton’s pleading

in federal court was entitled “Plaintiff’s Trespass to Try Title and

Application for a Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Permanent

Injunction.” The relief sought by Hatton

was to “prevent [Grigar] . . . from entering upon” the road and that the 2000

judgment “be declared invalid and unlawful and [Hatton] be awarded judgment for

title to and possession of” the road.

[2] The district court also explained

that, “[i]n a later judgment entered December 20, 2002, Hatton was enjoined from

obstructing the public road. In September 2003, Hatton was held in contempt and

ordered to remove barricades and obstructions from the public road in question.

The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed Hatton’s appeal as frivolous and

sanctioned him and his attorney. See

Hatton v. Grigar , 2004 WL

583045 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004[, no pet.]).” Hatton v. Grigar , No. H-06-3981, 2007 WL 624343 , *1 n.2

(S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2007).

[3] We acknowledge that within other

issues, Hatton makes numerous conclusory statements that the trial court denied

him due process and equal protection, without making any substantive analysis

or argument. A typical excerpt follows:

The Honorable Judge further abused his discretion and

denied the Plaintiff, JOHN HATTON ,

due process and equal protection under the law pursuant to Article 1, Section

13, of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution when the Honorable Judge granted the Defendant, DANIEL D. GRIGAR’S [,] Motion for Sanctions

since the Plaintiff, JOHN HATTON ,

and his Attorney, ROBERT T. WALLACE ,

had signed Plaintiff’s Trespass to Try Title And Application For A Restraining

Order, Temporary Injunction, And Permanent Injunction in No. 06-DCV-152034 in good faith and for the purpose of determining

Title to HATTON ROAD which was

renamed GRIGAR ROAD by the Trial

Court, since the Plaintiff, JOHN HATTON ,

was entitled to file Plaintiff’s Trespass to Try Title And Application For A

Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, And Permanent Injunction in No. 06-DCV-152034 in the 240th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT of Fort

Bend County, Texas, pursuant to Section 22.001 of the Texas Property Code which

states that “a trespass to try title action is the method for determining title

to lands, tenements, or other property” and pursuant to Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex. 2004), wherein

the Texas Supreme Court has held that the trespass-to-try[-title]-statute

governs the parties[’] substantive claims in this case. That statute expressly provides that it is

“the method for determining title to . . . real property.”

Because

this excerpt and the others similar to it do not attempt to analyze the trial

court’s order granting the motion for sanctions in light of any relevant

authority concerning due process or equal protection, any review of the issue

is waived. See Abdelnour v. Mid Nat’l Holdings, Inc. , 190 S.W.3d 237,

241 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v.

Nabors Drilling USA, Inc. , 106 S.W.3d 118, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).

[4] To the extent Hatton is complaining of

the proceedings that resulted in the 2000 judgment, we note that Hatton already

appealed that judgment and filed a frivolous bill of review in an attempt to

collaterally attack that judgment. That

proceeding is not at issue in this appeal.

[5] Furthermore, to the extent Hatton

complains of the proceedings that resulted in the 2000 judgment, that judgment

was entered after a trial during which Hatton was represented by counsel,

presented evidence, and cross-examined the witnesses for Grigar. Hatton does not explain how he was deprived

of due process or equal protection during the prior trial.