Annette E. Pletcher and Gregory D. Bennett v. Michelle M. Hansen, as for the Estate of Ted M. Bennett

Opinion issued

April 28, 2011

In

The

Court of

Appeals

For

The

First District

of Texas

————————————

NOS. 01-09-00516-CV

01-10-00845-CV

———————————

Annette E. Pletcher and Gregory D. Bennett , Appellants

V.

Michelle M. Hansen,

as executor for the estate of Ted M. Bennett , Appellee

On Appeal from the County

Court at Law No. 1

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial

Court Case No. 07CPR020872

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Annette

Pletcher and Gregory D. Bennett appeal a final summary judgment rendered

against them in their suit against Michelle M. Hansen. Hansen is the executor of an estate of which

Pletcher and Bennett are beneficiaries.

They sued Hansen for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion. Hansen counterclaimed, asserting, among other

claims, that the suit violated the no-contest provision of the will and seeking

to disinherit Pletcher and Bennett. On

cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court rendered judgment that

Pletcher and Bennett take nothing on their claims and that the suit violated

the no-contest provision of the will. In

an appeal filed in 2009, Pletcher and Bennett assert that the trial court erred

because their suit did not violate the will’s no-contest provision and a fact

issue exists on their claims. Hansen

filed a motion to dismiss asserting Pletcher and Bennett’s notice of appeal was

not timely filed and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction. The trial court then entered a judgment nunc

pro tunc for the purpose of enabling Pletcher and Bennett to appeal the trial

court’s summary judgment. Hansen

appealed that judgment. We conclude that

this Court lacks jurisdiction over the 2009 appeal and therefore dismiss that

appeal. We further conclude that the

trial court erred in entering the judgment nunc pro tunc and vacate that

judgment, leaving intact the trial court’s original judgment.

Procedural Background

When Ted M. Bennett died and his will was

probated, his daughter Michelle M. Hansen became executor of the estate. Pletcher, another daughter, and Bennett, a grandson,

were also beneficiaries under the will.

Dissatisfied with the way Hansen handled the estate, Pletcher and

Bennett sued her for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conversion. Hansen answered, asserting various

affirmative defenses and counterclaims.

Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. An oral hearing was conducted on March 27,

2009, according to the timeline recited in Pletcher and Bennett’s motion for

new trial and appellate brief. The trial

court granted Hansen’s summary judgment on her claim that Pletcher and

Bennett’s suit violated the will’s no-contest provision and granted Pletcher

and Bennett’s summary judgment on Hansen’s claims for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The trial court denied

the remainder of Pletcher and Bennett’s motion.

The trial court’s judgment specifically states that, as a result of the no-contest

provision of the will, Pletcher and Bennett are disinherited and orders them to

repay distributions made to them by the estate.

The judgment is nine pages long. It was hand-delivered to the trial judge on

March 27, after the hearing on the summary judgment earlier in the day, with a

cover letter from Hansen’s counsel. The

letter states that attached is a revised final judgment that the trial court

asked be delivered that day. On the

first page under the caption, the judgment begins, “On this, the _____ day of

March 2009, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as Plaintiffs’

Motion for Summary Judgment, in the above-captioned case, and both Motions were

heard before this Court.” The blank is

filled in with the numeral “27.”

According to the trial court judge, he wrote “27” in the blank on that

date, which was a Friday. The end of

that first paragraph states, “[T]he Court holds as follows and issues the

following judgment: . . . .” The next seven

pages detail the trial court’s findings and rulings. At the bottom of page eight, the judgment

states, “This is a final judgment disposing of all parties’ claims, pending any

appeal that may be brought.” This is

followed by a line under which “JUDGE PRESIDING” is typed. The trial court judge signed on the line. The

judgment does not have a separate blank or space for the judge to indicate the

date of signing on the judgment; the only blank was the date for the hearing. On the ninth page, Hansen’s attorney signed,

indicating the judgment was approved “as to form only,” but Pletcher and

Bennett’s attorney did not. The ninth

page also bears a file stamp from the county clerk indicating the judgment was

“FILED FOR RECORD” on March 30, 2009, which was a Monday.

The clerk sent notice to the parties

on April 3, 2009, stating that “ On the 30th day of March, 2009, in the

County Court at Law 1, Fort Bend County, Texas,

a(n) Agreed Final Judgment was rendered.” Pletcher

and Bennett filed a motion for new trial on April 29, 2009, 33 days after March

27 and 30 days after March 30. The trial

court overruled the motion for new trial on June 1, and Pletcher and Bennett

filed their notice of appeal on June 2, 2009.

This appeal was assigned cause number 01-09-00516-CV in this Court (the

“2009 appeal”).

Initially,

both sides treated March 30 as the date of the signing of the judgment. For example, Hansen, in her response to the

motion for new trial, stated the trial court ruled from the bench on March 27,

2009 and “memorialized” the court’s ruling by entering judgment on March

30. Similarly, in her designation of

items to be included in the clerk’s record, Hansen identified “The Court’s Final

Judgment dated March 30, 2009.”

Hansen later

changed her position. Over one year

later, on April 8, 2010, Hansen filed a motion to dismiss in this Court,

asserting for the first time that the final judgment was signed on March 27,

2009. As proof, Hansen relied on the

judge’s writing of “27” in the blank on the first page of the judgment and the

county clerk’s table of contents in the clerk’s record for this appeal which

contains an entry for “Agreed Final Judgment (Signed March 27, 2009).” Pletcher and Bennett responded that, rather

than the date the trial court indicated it heard the motions for summary

judgment or the date the trial court clerk included in a table of contents, the

best evidence of the date of the signature is the file stamp indicating the

judgment was filed with the clerk on March 30.

Since then,

the parties have been maneuvering in attempts to support their respective

positions. Over a year after the summary

judgment hearing, the trial court signed a certification pursuant to Rule 306a(2)

indicating that it had signed the judgment on March 27, 2009. The trial court judge signed the

certification at Hansen’s request after a hearing with counsel for both

sides. Hansen then filed in this Court

an amended motion to dismiss. In the

motion, Hansen asserted that the trial court’s certification of the March 27,

2009 signing date conclusively established that Pletcher and Bennett’s notice

of appeal was untimely and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction. Hansen further asserted that, because

Pletcher and Bennett did not join in the motion to dismiss based on the trial

court’s certification, she was entitled to sanctions for attorney’s fees because,

after the certification, “it should have been apparent to any licensed attorney

that this appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”

In response, Pletcher and Bennett filed

in the trial court a “Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc and Verified Motion to

Extend Post Judgment Deadlines.” In the

motion, they asked the trial court to sign a judgment nunc pro tunc “correcting

th[e] clerical omission” of the date of signing pursuant to Rule 316. The trial court granted this motion, signing

a judgment nunc pro tunc on August 24, 2010 that is identical to the prior

judgment, only specifying that it was signed on March 27, 2009. Pletcher and Bennett did not oppose the trial

court specifying the date of signing of the judgment as March 27, 2009, because

the trial court had already determined that date when it signed the

certification in June 2010. In fact,

because the trial court had already stated his recollection of the date of

signing, Pletcher and Bennett requested the court to utilize that day in the judgment

nunc pro tunc. Pletcher and Bennett then

filed an appeal from the judgment nunc pro tunc. That appeal was assigned cause number

01-10-00845-CV in this Court (the “2010 appeal”).

In their verified

motion to extend post judgment deadlines filed with trial court, Pletcher and

Bennett asserted that they did not receive notice that judgment had been signed

on March 27, 2009 within 20 days of the date of signing. Pursuant to Rule 306a(4), they asked for

their time periods to begin running from the date that they received notice

that the judgment was signed on March 27, 2009—that is, June 22, 2010, when the

trial court signed the certification.

The record does not contain a ruling from the trial court on this

motion.

In Pletcher

and Bennett’s response to Hansen’s motion to dismiss and for sanctions, they

assert that the clerk’s notice states the original judgment was rendered on

March 30, 2009 and a judgment cannot be signed before it is rendered. In other words, they ask this Court to give

conclusive effect to the clerk’s notice rather than the trial court’s

certification. In the alternative,

Pletcher and Bennett contend that they should be allowed to appeal the August

24, 2010 judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to Rule 306a(6). Hansen also appeals the judgment nunc pro tunc,

contending that the trial court erred in rendering that judgment.

Jurisdiction

As a

threshold matter, we must determine if this Court has jurisdiction over the 2009

appeal. Hansen has moved for dismissal

asserting that Pletcher and Bennett’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.

A. The

date of signing determines the time to file a motion for new trial and notice

of appeal

In

the absence of a timely notice of appeal,

this court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal and

must dismiss. Garza v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank , 227 S.W.3d 233, 233 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); s ee

Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys. , 160 S.W.3d 559, 564 (Tex. 2005).

A notice of appeal “must be filed within 30 days after the judgment is

signed.” Tex. R. App . P. 26.1.

The time to file a notice of appeal may be extended by, among other

things, a timely filed motion for new trial.

Tex. R. App. P .

26.1(a)(1). A motion for new trial must

be filed “prior to or within thirty days after the judgment or other order

complained of is signed.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a).

Rule 329b(a) and Rule 26.1 both

expressly state the beginning of the time period to file a motion for new trial

or notice of appeal begins on the date the judgment is signed. Id. ; Tex. R. App . P. 26.1. Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure also expressly states this start date, and provides other rules for determining

the beginning of a party’s time period to file a motion for new trial,

including rules concerning the other issues involved in this case, such as when

a judgment does not state the date of signing and when a party does not receive

notice of the signing of a judgment.

Rule 306a, entitled “ Periods to Run From Signing of Judgment,”

provides, in pertinent part:

1. Beginning of periods. The date of judgment or order is signed as

shown of record shall determine the beginning of the periods prescribed by

these rules . . . for filing in the

trial court the various documents that these rules authorize a party to file

within such periods including, but not limited to, motions for new trial, . . . ; but this rule shall not determine what

constitutes rendition of a judgment or order for any other purpose.

. . . .

3. Notice

of judgment. When the final judgment

or other appealable order is signed, the clerk of the court shall immediately

give notice to the parties or their attorneys of record by first-class mail

advising that the judgment or order was

signed . Failure to comply with the provisions of this rule shall not affect

the periods mentioned in paragraph (1) of this rule, except as provided in

paragraph (4).

4. No notice of judgment. If within twenty days after the judgment or

other appealable order is signed, a party adversely affected by it or his

attorney has neither received the notice required by paragraph (3) of this rule

nor acquired actual knowledge of the

order , then with respect to that party all the periods mentioned in

paragraph (1) shall begin on the date that such party or his attorney received such notice or acquired actual knowledge

of the signing , whichever occurred

first, but in no event shall such periods begin more than ninety days after the

original judgment or other appealable order was signed.

5. Motion, notice and hearing. In order to established the application of

paragraph (4) of this rule, the party adversely affected is required to prove

in the trial court, on sworn motion and notice, the date on which the party or

his attorney first either received a notice of the judgment or acquired actual knowledge of the signing and that this date was more than twenty days after

the judgment was signed.

6. Nunc pro tunc order. When a corrected judgment has been signed

after expiration of the court’s plenary power pursuant to Rule 316, the periods

mentioned in paragraph (1) of this rule shall run from the date of signing the

corrected judgment with respect to any complaint that would not be applicable

to the original document.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a (emphasis

added) .

As noted above,

the parties dispute when the judgment was signed. If it was signed on March 27, 2009, Pletcher

and Bennett’s motion for new trial filed on April 29 was not timely and did not

extend the time for filing a notice of appeal absent a showing of grounds set

forth in Rule 306a(4) for extending that deadline. Under this scenario, the June 2, 2009 notice

of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the judgment and was not

timely. See Tex. R. App . P. 26.1. If, however,

the judgment was signed on March 30, the motion for new trial and the notice of

appeal were both timely. See Tex.

R. App . P. 26.1(a). Thus, the

first matter we must determine in this case is when the judgment was signed.

B. Signing

of the original judgment

The evidence supports the trial

judge’s certificate that he signed the judgment on March 27. The trial judge signed a certificate, and

later, a judgment nunc pro tunc, stating that he signed the judgment on March

27, 2009. At the hearing before he

signed the certificate, the trial judge stated in open court that he determined

the date based on his own recollection.

The record also contains a letter dated March 27, 2009 that accompanied

the hand-delivery of the judgment to the trial court and states that the judge

had ordered the judgment to be delivered to him that day. The listing of the dates of various pleadings

in the clerk’s record also states that the original judgment was signed on

March 27, 2009.

Pletcher and

Bennett argue that the trial court clerk’s notice of April 3, 2009, that stated

the judgment was rendered on March 30, 2009, “is much stronger and conclusive

evidence than the trial judge’s recollection of the event more than one year

later.” We are in no position to

disagree with the trial court’s determination, particularly when his

recollection is supported by other facts in the record. Rule 306a(2) expressly provides that the date of signing of

a judgment “ may be shown in the record by a certificate of the judge or

otherwise” when the date of the signing is not recited in the judgment. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(2); see also Burrell v. Cornelius , 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978)

(accepting trial court’s change to date judgment signed when trial court’s

judgment stated date matter was heard but not date of signing of judgment); cf. Barton v. Gillespie , 178 S.W.3d 121, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding trial court may rely on its recollection in

determining whether a clerical error was made and a judgment nunc pro tunc is

appropriate).

Pletcher

and Bennett also contend that because the clerk’s notice states the judgment

was rendered on March 30, 2009, it is impossible for the judgment to have been

signed on March 27, 2009. [1] Not so.

The judgment here could have been signed on Friday March 27 and given to

the clerk and filed on Monday March 30.

The clerk could then have used the term “rendered” for the date of the

filing.

Pletcher and Benett rely on

language in various opinions that a written judgment is rendered when it is

filed with the clerk.

A judgment routinely goes through three stages: rendition, reduction to writing and judicial signing, and entry. A judgment is “rendered” when the trial court’s

decision upon the matter submitted to it for resolution is officially announced

either orally in open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk.

In re Bill Heard

Chevrolet, Ltd. , 209 S.W.3d 311 , 315 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding) (citing Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell,

450 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1970)) (emphasis added). [2] This language suggests that a judgment may be

signed before it is rendered, or, “announced . . . by memorandum filed with the

clerk.” Id.

Whether

the judgment was “rendered” when it was signed or when it was filed with the

clerk is legally insignificant because the signing starts the applicable

appellate time tables. Coinmach, Inc. v. Aspenwood Apt. Corp. , 98 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding that when a trial court signed a judgment,

but it was not filed with the clerk for several days, the post-judgment time

periods nevertheless began to run on the date of signing, not the date the

judgment was filed with the clerk).

Therefore, w e

do not

need to determine whether the signing of the original judgment by the trial

court constituted a rendition of judgment.

Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence

supports the trial court’s certificate that the judgment was signed on March

27, 2009. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(2) (date

of signing “ may be shown in the record by a certificate of the judge or

otherwise”); Burrell , 570 S.W.2d at 384 (trial court’s

correction to date in judgment supported by other facts in record).

C. The appeal of the

original judgment

Having

determined that the record supports the trial court’s determination that the

original judgment was signed March 27, 2009, Pletcher and Bennett’s motion for

new trial filed 33 days later on April 29, 2010 is untimely. Their notice of appeal had to have been filed

by 30 days after the judgment, or April 27, 2009. [3] See

Tex.

R. App .

P. 26.1. It was not filed until June 2,

2009.

Before the

trial court, Pletcher and Bennett sought an extension of time pursuant to Rule

306a(4). As noted in our statement of

facts, the trial court did not rule on that motion. Thus, any error is waived. See

Tex. R. App . P. 33.1(a)(2)(A) (ruling

by trial court required

to preserve issue for appeal).

Accordingly, we dismiss the 2009 appeal

for lack of jurisdiction. [4]

Appeal of the judgment nunc pro

tunc

In the 2010 appeal, both sides have appealed the trial

court’s judgment nunc pro tunc. In her

sole issue, Hansen contends that the trial court erred by signing the judgment

nunc pro tunc because—except for specifying the date—it was identical to the

original judgment and signed for the sole purpose of extending Pletcher and

Bennett’s time to perfect their appeal.

In their first issue in the 2010 appeal, Pletcher and Bennett assert

that the trial court erred by signing the judgment nunc pro tunc stating that

the judgment was signed on March 27, 2009.

In other words, Hansen contends the trial court erred by signing the

judgment nunc pro tunc at all ,

whereas Pletcher and Bennett complain that the trial court erred by making the

correction it did.

After a trial court loses plenary

power, it may not change its judgment. A

judgment nunc pro tunc may, however, be issued after a trial court’s plenary

power expires to “correct a clerical error” in a judgment or order. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f); Tex. R. Civ. P. 316; Gutierrez v. Gutierrez , 86 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2002, no pet.); Jenkins v. Jenkins ,

16 S.W.3d 473, 482 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.)

To be

clerical in nature, the error must be one that is not the result of judicial

reasoning, evidence, or determination. Andrews v. Koch , 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986); Barton ,

178 S.W.3d at 126 . Conversely, a

judicial error arises from a mistake of law or fact that requires judicial

reasoning to correct. Barton , 178

S.W.3d at 126 . A clerical error occurs

in entering final judgment, while a judicial error is made in rendering

a final judgment. Escobar v. Escobar , 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex.1986); Barton , 178 S.W.3d at 126 . Whether an error is judicial or clerical is a

question of law. Escobar ,

711 S.W.2d at 23 2. In determining whether a correction is of a judicial or a

clerical error, courts examine the judgment actually rendered, not the judgment

that should or might have been rendered.

Id . at 231. A judgment rendered to correct a

judicial error after plenary power has expired is void. Hernandez v. Lopez , 288 S.W.3d 180, 185 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop.

Owners, Inc. , 976 S.W.2d

680, 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).

The

correction of the date of signing is the type of mistake, a clerical error,

that may be corrected

by a judgment nunc pro tunc. See In re Taylor , 113 S.W.3d 385, 393

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Broussard , 112 S.W.3d 827, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding). One court has held that the omission of the

date of signing may be corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc. See Owens-Corning

Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak , 883 S.W.2d 402 , 404–05 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994,

no writ) (stating omission of date of signing is clerical error that may be

corrected by judgment nunc pro tunc).

Nevertheless, the trial court erred in granting the request

for a judgment nunc pro tunc because a trial court cannot sign a judgment nunc

pro tunc for the sole purpose of extending appellate deadlines. Anderson

v. Casebolt , 493 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1973). In Anderson ,

the trial court signed a final judgment on August 18, 1971. Id. More than 30 days later, the trial court

signed an identical order with the date of September 20, 1971. Id. There was also a recital stating that

plaintiff’s counsel did not have knowledge of the August 18 judgment in time to

perfect an appeal. Id. The Supreme Court held

that the September 20 judgment “could serve no purpose other than to enlarge

the time for appeal” and, thus, was improper.

Id. at 510–11. While this case is distinguishable because

the trial court’s judgment did not reflect the date of signing, the correction

was unnecessary because the date was already established by the trial court’s

July 2010 certificate setting forth the date that the judge signed the original

judgment. Thus the “sole” purpose of the

judgment nunc pro tunc was to extend time for filing an appeal. We conclude that Anderson bars the trial court from signing the judgment nunc pro

tunc.

We sustain Hansen’s sole issue, and

vacate the trial court’s judgment nunc pro tunc, leaving intact the trial

court’s original judgment.

E. Conclusion

In summary:

•

The trial court’s determination that the

original judgment was signed March 27, 2007 is supported by the record.

•

Pletcher and Bennett’s notice of appeal of the

trial court’s original judgment in appellate cause number 01-09-00516-CV was

not timely filed.

•

The trial court erred by signing a judgment nunc

pro tunc.

Accordingly,

we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the 2009 appeal, and we vacate the

judgment nunc pro tunc signed on August 24, 2010.

Conclusion

We grant

Hansen’s motion to dismiss and dismiss cause number 01-09-00516-CV for want of

jurisdiction. We vacate the judgment and

dismiss the appeal in cause number 01-10-00845-CV. We deny Hansen’s motion for sanctions and

dismiss all other pending motions as moot.

Harvey

Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Justices

Jennings, Higley, and Brown.

[1]

Specifically,

Pletcher and Bennett rely on Wittau v.

Storie , in which the court held that when a “trial court signs a judgment

on an issue without first making an oral pronouncement in open court, the act

of signing the judgment is the official act of rendering judgment.” 145

S.W.3d 732, 735 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Courts have repeatedly

found that the trial court’s act of signing the judgment constituted the

official act of rendering the judgment. See, e.g. , Bd. of Trs. of Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Toungate , 958 S.W.2d

365, 367 (Tex. 1997); Reese v. Piperi ,

534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. 1976). But in these

cases the issue was whether the rendition occurred before the judge signed the

judgment, not whether it occurred after the judge signed the judgment. In all of these cases, including Wittau , the issue involved whether the

judge had rendered a judgment or order by an oral pronouncement that was before

the date the formal order was signed. In

this case, the signature occurred before the date that Pletcher and Bennett

claim constituted “rendition.”

[2]

The Texas Supreme Court has offered two

definitions of when a judgment is rendered.

Compare Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell , 450 S.W.2d

56, 59 (Tex. 1970) (“A judgment is in fact rendered whenever the trial judge

officially announces his decision in open court . . . in his official capacity

for his official guidance whether orally or by written memorandum the sentence

of law pronounced by him in any cause.”) and

S amples Exterminators v. Samples , 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982) (quoting Comet ) with S & A Restaurant

Corp. v. Leal , 892 S.W.2d 855 , 857–58 (Tex. 1995) (judgment

is rendered when the court makes an official announcement, “either orally in

open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk”) and Dunn v. Dunn , 439 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1969) (same).

[3] Actually, 30 days after the judgment

was April 26, 2009. April 26, 2009,

however, was a Sunday. Therefore, their

notice of appeal was due Monday, April 27, 2009. See

Tex.

R. App. P. 4.1(a).

We also note that a notice of appeal

filed within 15 days of the deadline can be timely if accompanied by a motion

for extension of time and a reasonable explanation for the untimely

filing. See Tex. R. App .

P. 26.3 and 10.5(b) (concerning motion for extension of time to file notice of

appeal); Verburgt v. Dorner , 959

S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (implying motion for extension of time if notice of

appeal filed within 15 days of deadline).

Fifteen days from April 27, 2009 was May 12, 2009, well before the notice

of appeal in this case was filed.

[4] Pletcher

and Bennett further argue that dismissal of the appeal denies them due

process. They have not, however, cited

any authority in support of this proposition.

It is, therefore, waived. See Tex.

R. App . P. 38.1(i). We do,

however, deny the motion for sanctions.