Robert Lloyd Beaudoin v. State

Opinion issued August

18, 2011.

In The

Court of

Appeals

For The

First District

of Texas

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NOS. 01-10-00058-CR

01-10-00059-CR

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Robert Lloyd Beaudoin , Appellant

V.

The State of Texas , Appellee

On Appeal from the 228th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 1197863, 1197864

Memorandum

Opinion

Appellant

Robert Lloyd Beaudoin pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled

substance. The trial court assessed

punishment at fifteen years’ confinement.

Appellant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized

from his vehicle in a warrantless search.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Very early

one morning in January 2009, while patrolling the Coppertree Apartments parking

lot, Houston police officers Jones and Lisle spotted a vehicle headed the

opposite direction from them. When the

vehicle exited the parking lot, it did not use its turn signal before making

the left turn onto Veterans Memorial and crossed two lanes of southbound traffic

and a median to enter the far right, northbound traffic lane.

The

officers followed the vehicle. They

entered the license plate into the mobile data transmitter (“MDT”) in their

patrol car, which showed a City of Houston warrant in appellant’s name.

The

police officers stopped appellant’s car and Officer Jones asked for appellant’s

identification, by which the officers identified the name on the driver’s ID as the same on the warrant response on the

vehicle. Officer Lisle testified that

they then placed appellant under arrest for the traffic violations, handcuffed

appellant and placed him in the back of the police car. The officers subsequently confirmed seven outstanding

warrants for appellant.

Neither

of the two passengers in the car with appellant carried a driver’s license, and

the officers impounded the vehicle. The

inventory search attendant to the car’s impoundment yielded a bag containing almost

four kilos of hydrocodone and approximately 226 grams of Xanax.

Appellant

filed a pretrial motion to suppress the results of the inventory search. Upon the hearing of that motion, appellant’s

attorney elicited testimony from both officers that they had arrested appellant

for his failure to use his turn signal when turning from the apartment complex

to the public street. Appellant’s

attorney argued that no turn signal was required for such a turn from private

property to a public highway and, thus, the officers had lacked probable cause for

appellant’s arrest. The trial court

denied the motion to suppress. The trial

judge later signed findings of fact and conclusions of law stating, in pertinent

part, that he found probable cause for the arrest and that, even if a turn

signal is not required for turning out of a private driveway, “the turn into

the far lane is another traffic violation DEFENDANT ROBERT BEAUDOIN could have

been arrested for, as well as the warrants for his arrest.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress

for abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon , 206 S.W.3d 587, 590

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will affirm

the ruling, therefore, “if it is reasonably supported by the record and is

correct under any theory of law applicable to the case.” Ramos

v. State , 245 S.W.3d 410, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Because the trial court is “uniquely

situated” to observe the demeanor and the appearance of witnesses and is “the

sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight

to be given their testimony,” we must view the evidence in the light that most

favors the ruling. Wiede v. State , 214 S.W.3d 17 , 24 – 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing State

v. Ross , 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (additional citations

omitted)). Those mixed questions of law

and fact that turn on the credibility and demeanor of a witness are reviewed

under an almost-total-deference standard, and those mixed questions of law and

fact that do not turn on the

credibility and demeanor of a witness are reviewed de novo . Sims v. State , 84 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

Where the issue turns upon the application of the law to historical

facts, our review is de novo . Amador

v. State , 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

NO ERROR IN DENYING

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his sole issue, appellant claims that the trial court

erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant argues that he was arrested solely

on the basis of having failed to use his traffic signal when turning left out

of the apartment complex, but that no traffic signal was required because he

was turning from private property to a public highway. Accordingly, appellant contends that there

was no probable cause to stop or arrest him and thus the trial court should

have granted his motion to suppress.

In its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found three bases for

the arrest of appellant: 1) the

left-hand turn without a turn signal; 2) the turn into the curb lane instead of

the left lane; and 3) the outstanding warrants for appellant’s arrest. The outstanding warrants against appellant provided

probable cause for his arrest, as discussed below.

A. The Initial Detention

Trial

testimony established that, prior to stopping appellant, the officers entered his

license plate on their MDT and discovered a warrant, and thus had reasonable

suspicion to justify an investigative stop.

Hurtado v. State , 881 S.W.2d

738, 742 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). Such reasonable suspicion need not need to

rise to the level of probable cause to believe appellant was the subject of one

or more of the warrants in order to authorize an officer to stop appellant’s

car. Id.

(citing Stone v. State , 703

S.W.2d 652, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).

Accordingly, we conclude that the initial temporary detention was

legal.

B. The Arrest

Once

stopped, the officers requested that he produce his driver’s license. [1] A computer check promptly verified the existence

of seven warrants for appellant.

Prior

to verification of these warrants, however, appellant had been arrested and

placed in the back of the police car. Both officers testified that appellant’s

arrest was for traffic violations. We

need not, however, limit our review to the violations that the officer cited in

executing the stop. See Singleton v. State , 91 S.W.3d 342, 347 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2002, no pet.). Instead, we must sustain

the judge’s decision if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the

case. See Ross , 32 S.W.3d at 856 .

Attendant

to any stop, law enforcement may request a driver’s license, proof of financial

responsibility, and registration and may verify the information via computer. See United States v. Brigham , 382 F.3d

500, 509 (5th Cir. 2004); Kothe v. State ,

152 S.W.3d 54 , 66 – 67 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004). If such a verification reveals outstanding warrants, probable to cause

to arrest exists. Haley v. State , 480 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Oliver v. State , 10 S.W.3d 411, 416 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2000, no pet.); Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann . art. 15.26 (West 2005).

Thus the discovery of outstanding warrants justifies an arrest even

after an earlier illegal detention. See

Johnson v. State , 496 S.W.2d 72

(Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (initial arrest, even if illegal, did not vitiate later

arrest for outstanding warrants). See also, Jones v. State, 179 S.W.3d

770, 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005), rev’d on other grounds , 223 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“If

an officer discovers a valid warrant for an individual’s arrest and the officer

arrests the individual under the authority of that warrant, any evidence found

during a subsequent search incident to the arrest is admissible even if any

illegality occurs in the initial detention.”); Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 810 (marijuana discovered after legal arrest

for outstanding warrant admissible despite earlier illegal detention).

Here,

the police officers’ initial computer search revealed one of appellant’s outstanding warrants and provided reasonable

suspicion for the initial stop. The

officers then testified that they arrested appellant for traffic violations.

After this arrest, they determined he actually had seven warrants. At that point, regardless of the viability of

any traffic violations they may have witnessed, appellant’s arrest was

supported by probable cause. As the

illegal drugs were discovered pursuant to an inventory search undertaken after

the confirmation of the valid arrest warrants, they were admissible as

evidence. Jones, 179 S.W.3d at

778 . We conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

Jim

Sharp

Justice

Panel

consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Sharp and Brown.

Do not

publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2( b).

[1] See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.025(b) (West Supp. 2010).