Ronald R. Wright v. Larry D. Young

Opinion issued June 7, 2012.

In The

Court of

Appeals

For The

First District

of Texas

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NO. 01-11-01101-CV

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Ronald R. Wright , Appellant

V.

Larry D.

Young , Appellee

On Appeal from the 281st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1026941

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ronald

Wright appeals from the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Larry Young

on Young’s claim for breach of a settlement agreement. Wright contends that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment because Young did not conclusively prove the amount

of damages caused by Wright’s breach of contract. Finding no error, we affirm.

Background

In 2010, Young and Wright settled a dispute over Wright’s

purchase of Young’s ownership interest in Wright & Young, LLC, a business that operates car care facilities. Pursuant to their settlement agreement,

Wright was required to make monthly payments to Young, with a final balloon

payment due February 2011. The parties

later amended the agreement to provide for payment in full by March 2011. After Wright failed to make payments in

accord with the terms of the settlement agreement, Young sued for breach of

contract. Wright generally denied the claims

and raised the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction.

In July 2011, Young moved for a traditional summary judgment,

contending that the evidence conclusively established each element of his

breach of contract claim. Young’s

summary judgment motion also claimed that Wright could not prove his

affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. In support, Young included his

sworn affidavit, the settlement agreement, record excerpts, and checks drawn on

Wright’s bank account, which the bank had returned for insufficient funds.

Wright responded that a fact issue existed with respect to

the amount due under the settlement agreement.

Wright claimed that Young had sold a Pasadena car-care store owned by

Wright & Young, LLC and had not credited the sale proceeds against the

amount Wright owed him, as the settlement agreement required. Wright proffered his sworn affidavit, in

which he averred “I understand that [Young] sold the store for $200,000 with a

lease/purchase option.”

In reply, Young offered a copy of the purchase and sale

agreement for the disputed property into the summary judgment record. The contract reveals that the buyer paid no

money to Young, but assumed payment of outstanding liens and discharged Wright

& Young’s debt to secured lien holders on the property. Though the trial court left the record open

for supplementation of the summary judgment evidence, Wright offered nothing

further.

Discussion

Wright contends that the trial court erred in rendering

summary judgment in favor of Young on his breach of contract claim, because his

affidavit questioning the Pasadena sale raises a fact issue about the amount

owed under the settlement agreement.

Standard of Review

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must conclusively

prove all essential elements of its claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a( a),(c);

MMP, Ltd. v. Jones , 710 S.W.2d 59, 60

(Tex. 1986). We review de novo the trial

court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors,

Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as

true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant , and

indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d at

661 ; Provident Life & Accid . Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c),

the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c);

Knott , 128 S.W.3d at 215–16.

Breach of Contract

To be entitled to summary judgment on his breach of contract

claim, Young was required to prove, as a matter of law, the essential elements

of breach of contract: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance

or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the

defendant; and (4) damages sustained as a result of the breach. Simien v. Unifund CCR

Partners , 321 S.W.3d 235, 247 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Williams v. Unifund

CCR Partners , 264 S.W.3d 231 , 235–36 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

Young established that he was damaged by Wright’s breach of

the settlement agreement. The settlement

agreement required Wright to pay $5,000 monthly for five months, and to remit a

final balloon payment of $115,000. Young

introduced returned checks drawn on Wright’s bank account to the order of Larry

Young. Young averred that Wright had not

paid any of the money he promised to pay under the original settlement

agreement or the revised settlement agreement, and that Wright owed him

the full amount due under the terms of the settlement — $140,000.

In response, Wright contends that his affidavit proves that

Young sold a store and that the “information available” to Wright “evidenced a

sale for $200 ,000 ,” thus entitling him to a

credit. He does not contend that the

settlement agreement entitles him to a credit for a third party’s assumption of

debt. Neither does the settlement

agreement provide for a credit for a sale of the business to a third party — whether for cash or for assumption of

a debt. Rather, the settlement agreement

unconditionally requires cash payments.

Given the terms of the settlement agreement, Wright’s speculative

understanding — without

any further factual support — about the Pasadena sale fails to demonstrate a factual

dispute as to the amount of damage he owes for his breach of the settlement

agreement. See Ryland

Group, Inc. v. Hood , 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996) ( conclusory

statement in affidavit insufficient to raise fact issue in response to motion

for summary judgment). We

therefore hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment.

Conclusion

We hold that Young established his damages as a matter of law,

and the summary judgment evidence supports the trial court’s judgment that Young

is entitled to recover $140,000 for the amounts due and owing under the

parties’ settlement agreement, plus interest, and attorney’s fees. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

Jane

Bland

Justice

Panel

consists of Justices Bland, Massengale, and Brown.