relying on TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3
How later courts described this case
- relying on TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON
ORDER ON CONTINUING ABATEMENT
Appellate case name: Concierge Nursing Centers, Inc. and Houston Concierge
Care, L.P. v. Antex Roofing, Inc., Nevco Waterproofing,
Inc., Conex Constructors, Inc., and Mitchell Chuoke
Plumbing, Inc.
Appellate case number: 01-11-00882-CV
Trial court: 80th District Court, Harris County
Trial court case number: 2008-64390
The Court’s records indicate that the Court may not have jurisdiction over
this appeal because not all claims and parties have been disposed of. The record
filed in the Court reflects the following facts:
1. Concierge Nursing Centers, Inc. and Houston Concierge Care, L.P.
(collectively “Concierge” or “Concierge plaintiffs”) jointly asserted two
causes of action against each of the appellees, who were defendants in
the trial court (collectively the “Subcontractors”): (1) breach of a
contractual obligation of indemnity originally owed to a third-party
(“First Cause of Action”), and (2) breach of a contractual obligation to
make a third-party an additional insured (“Second Cause of Action”).
2. In the trial court, the Concierge asserted an additional cause of action
against other defendants who are not parties to this appeal, namely,
Travelers Property Casualty Company of America, Evanston Insurance
Company, Amerisure Insurance Company, and Nautilus Insurance
Company (collectively the “Insurers”). Moreover, several other parties
who are not parties to this appeal—namely, Bay 4 Capital, Edward L.
Abrams, the Edward L. Abrams Living Trust, Brock T. Strom, and Claire
A. Strom (collectively the “Intervenors”)—intervened in the case and
asserted one or more causes of action against Conex.
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3. On May 6, 2010, Nevco and Conex each separately moved for partial
summary judgment on the First Cause of Action and the Second Cause of
Action.
4. On May 6, 2010, Antex moved for partial summary judgment on the
Second Cause of Action, but not on the First Cause of Action.
5. On June 9, 2010, Mitchell Chuoke moved for partial summary judgment
on the First Cause of Action and the Second Cause of Action.
6. On June 25, 2010, Antex again moved for partial summary judgment, this
time on the First Cause of Action, but not on the Second Cause of Action.
7. On August 19, 2010, Mitchell Chuoke again moved for partial summary
judgment, again on the First Cause of Action and the Second Cause of
Action.
8. On August 20, 2010, the trial court signed the “Order on [Nevco’s]
No-Evidence and Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment,” ordering
that the Concierge plaintiffs “do have and take nothing” from Nevco in
the case.
9. On August 20, 2010, the trial court signed the “Order Granting Conex
Constructor Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,” ordering that
Concierge plaintiffs “do have and take nothing from Conex Constructors,
Inc.” This order also orders that the Intervenors “do have and take
nothing from Conex Constructors, Inc.”
10.On September 14, 2010, the trial court signed the “Order Granting
Mitchell Chuoke Plumbing, Inc.’s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion
for Summary Judgment,” ordering that the Concierge plaintiffs “take
nothing” from Mitchell Chuoke in the case.
11.On September 16, 2011, the trial court signed the “Order on Partial
Summary Judgment and Severance,” ordering that the Concierge
plaintiffs “do have and take nothing from Antex Roofing, Inc.” for the
First Cause of Action and that the Concierge plaintiffs “have and take
nothing against Antex Roofing, Inc. on this cause of action.” This order
does not reflect any disposition on the Second Cause of Action against
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Antex, nor does it reflect any order of severance.
12.On October 7, 2011, Concierge filed notice of appeal from the two orders
signed on August 20, 2010, the order signed on September 14, 2010, and
the order signed on September 16, 2011.
In its appellate briefing, Concierge states that it nonsuited the Insurers and
therefore presents no issue on appeal regarding its causes of action against the
Insurers. Concierge also states that it waives on appeal any issue regarding the
Second Cause of Action against the Subcontractors. However, the record on appeal
does not reflect that Concierge’s causes of action against the Insurers were either
nonsuited or otherwise disposed of. Moreover, the record does not reflect that the
Second Cause of Action against Antex was disposed of.
Generally, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. See Lehmann
v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). “A judgment is final for
purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record,
except as necessary to carry out the decree.” Id. The record in this appeal does not
reflect that the trial court disposed of all pending parties and claims because there
is no indication that Concierge nonsuited the Insurers and that the Second Cause of
Action against Antex was disposed of.
Accordingly, the Court rules as follows:
1. Concierge may file a written response to this order that provides a
detailed explanation with citations to relevant portions of the record,
statutes, rules, and case law to show that, on the basis of the record
presently filed, this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal.
2. Alternatively, if Concierge does not file the response contemplated in
paragraph (1) above, Concierge may file a supplemental record
demonstrating that all pending parties and claims in the trial court record
were disposed of prior to Concierge having filed its notice of appeal.
3. Alternatively, if Concierge does not file the response contemplated in
paragraph (1) above or the supplemental record contemplated in
paragraph (2) above, Concierge may file in the trial court a nonsuit
against the Insurers, a nonsuit of its Second Cause of Action against
Antex, or both. In order for the judgment to then be final and appealable,
the trial court must either sign an order granting the nonsuit(s) or a
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judgment memorializing the nonsuit(s), which is a ministerial act. See
Iacono v. Lyons, 6 S.W.3d 715, 716–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, order) (per curiam). Concierge may then file a supplemental record
demonstrating that by way of the nonsuit(s), all pending parties and
claims in the trial court record are disposed of. We may then treat the
jurisdictional defect, if any, as cured and resolve the appeal. See id.
(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 27.2).
4. We retain continuing jurisdiction over this appeal, but we abate the
appeal to give Concierge an opportunity either to demonstrate that the
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal or to cure the jurisdictional defect,
if any. If a response as contemplated in paragraph (1) above, or a
supplemental record as contemplated in paragraphs (2) or (3) above, is
not filed by 5:00 p.m. on March 28, 2013, the Court may dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction without further notice. To the extent that
we may dismiss the appeal, this order constitutes notice of intent to
dismiss under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3. See Iacono, 6
S.W.3d at 717 (relying on TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3).
It is so ORDERED.
Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown
Acting individually
Date: March 7, 2013
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