The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 3, 2009
No. 08-11344
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 06-60178 CV-JIC
EARL HUGHES BURGEST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
SHERIFF KEN JENNE, et al.,
Defendants,
BRENDA WEST, #11548,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 3, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
I. BACKGROUND
Earl Hughes Burgest was an inmate in a Florida jail. While in jail, another
inmate told Burgest that a guard, Deputy Brenda West, had been telling inmates about
Burgest’s HIV status. Burgest filed a grievance alleging that West had disclosed
private medical information. When the jail did not respond to the initial grievance
in a timely fashion, Burgest filed additional grievances. Ultimately, the jail
responded to one of his grievances, and found no merit in it.
Burgest brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against West, alleging that she
violated his constitutional right to privacy by disclosing his HIV status to other
inmates.1
West moved for summary judgment, arguing that Burgest had provided no
competent evidence that she had disclosed Burgest’s HIV status to other inmates.
Additionally, West argued that summary judgment was appropriate because Burgest
had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him before bringing his
§ 1983 suit as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). The magistrate judge agreed with both of West’s arguments, and his report
recommended granting summary judgment to West. The district court, however,
1
The complaint also alleged claims against other defendants, which were dismissed early in
the litigation. (R.14 at 1.)
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adopted only those portions of the magistrate judge’s report that addressed
exhaustion, and granted summary judgment to West because Burgest had not
exhausted his administrative remedies. Burgest appeals.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES & ISSUES ON APPEAL
Burgest argues that the district court’s grant of summary judgment was
inappropriate because he did exhaust his administrative remedies. Specifically,
Burgest contends that his administrative remedies were exhausted when the jail failed
to comply with its own grievance policy and respond to his grievance in a timely
manner.
West responds that the jail’s lack of a timely response to Burgest’s grievance
is irrelevant to the inquiry of whether he exhausted his administrative remedies. West
contends that Burgest has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies since he did
not complete all steps outlined in the jail’s grievance policy. West argues
alternatively that summary judgment is appropriate because she is entitled to qualified
immunity, as Burgest has presented no admissible evidence that West disclosed his
HIV status to anyone, and even if West did violate Burgest’s constitutional right to
privacy, such a right was not clearly established at the time of the violation.
3
We address in this appeal whether Burgest has produced any admissible
evidence of the alleged constitutional violation. Because this issue alone is
dispositive of the appeal, we do not address the other contentions of the parties.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment to West.
Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary
judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
Burgest, the non-movant, presents no genuine issue of fact and compels judgment as
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
IV. DISCUSSION
West argues that the she is entitled to qualified immunity because Burgest has
not produced any admissible evidence of a constitutional violation. Specifically, she
argues that Burgest has only produced inadmissible hearsay evidence that she
disclosed his HIV status to other inmates. Because we conclude that Burgest has not
produced any admissible evidence of the constitutional violation he alleges, we need
not reach the issue of whether the disclosure of his HIV status by West would, under
the circumstances of this case, be a violation of Burgest’s constitutional right to
privacy. We assume for the sake of this appeal that it is.
4
Burgest points to the affidavit of Devon Thomas, an inmate, as competent
evidence that West told other inmates about Burgest’s HIV status. Thomas’s
affidavit, however, includes only hearsay evidence of the alleged constitutional
violation, as he did not witness any disclosure by West, but only heard about it from
another inmate. (R.69 at 4-5.) Inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered when
deciding a motion for summary judgment. Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322
(11th Cir. 1999).
Burgest argues alternatively that we should not address the issue of whether
there is adequate evidence of a constitutional violation because the district court has
not yet addressed it. We disagree. We will affirm a grant of summary judgment if it
is correct for any reason supported by the record, even if the district court did not rely
on that reason. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282,
1301 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. $121,100 in U.S. Currency, 999 F.2d
1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993).
Finally, Burgest contends that he was unable to obtain an affidavit from one of
the inmates whom West told about his HIV status because the prison housing him
refused his requests to communicate with the prisoner. Had he been able to get in
touch with this prisoner, Burgest argues, he could have provided admissible evidence
of the alleged constitutional violation. If this is so, Burgest should have moved to
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continue the motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to permit more
discovery and thus allow him an opportunity to obtain competent evidence of the
alleged disclosure.2 Regardless, we review whether summary judgment was
appropriate based only on the evidence in the record. Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman,
509 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007). Because there is no admissible evidence in the
record that West disclosed Burgest’s HIV status, summary judgment was appropriate.
Because we conclude that the grant of summary judgment was appropriate
since Burgest produced no competent evidence of the alleged constitutional violation,
we need not address whether Burgest exhausted his administrative remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
Burgest has failed to provide any admissible evidence of the constitutional
violation he alleges. West is therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and summary
judgment was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
2
Burgest did file a Rule 56(f) motion to continue. (R.65.) But, his motion to continue sought
to first compel West to serve him with copies of West’s answer to his complaint and the exhibits
filed in support of the motion for summary judgment, and then to continue the motion for summary
judgment until he had received those documents and had time to respond to them. (Id. at 3.) The
motion to continue did not seek time to conduct discovery needed to oppose the motion for summary
judgment.
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