Opinion

Bryant v. United States

  • 618 F. App'x 683
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Oct 14, 2015
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Prost, Wallach, Taranto
Cited by
34 cases
Authority
More cited than 96.5%

“If a party fails to pay the requisite filing fee, despite adequate notice and ample opportunity to do so, the [Court of Federal Claims] acts within its discretion when it dismisses the action, just as it did in this case.” (citing Brown v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 795, 798 (2009))

How later courts described this case

  • “If a party fails to pay the requisite filing fee, despite adequate notice and ample opportunity to do so, the [Court of Federal Claims] acts within its discretion when it dismisses the action, just as it did in this case.” (citing Brown v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 795, 798 (2009))
  • “If a party fails to pay the requisite filing fee, despite adequate notice and ample opportunity to do so, the Claims Court acts within its discretion when it dismisses the action [pursuant to RCFC 41(b)].” (citation omitted)
  • upholding a denial of IFP status due to pension income
  • “[P]roceeding in forma pauperis . . . is a privilege, not a right.” (alteration in original) (quoting White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1998))

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

RODNEY A. BRYANT,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2015-5065

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in No. 1:14-cv-00657-MCW, Judge Mary Ellen

Coster Williams.

______________________

Decided: October 14, 2015

______________________

RODNEY A. BRYANT, Jamaica, NY, pro se.

PAUL ANDREW ALLULIS, Tax Division, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-

appellee. Also represented by ROBERT WILLIAM METZLER,

CAROLINE D. CIRAOLO.

______________________

2 BRYANT v. UNITED STATES

Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Rodney A. Bryant appeals the decision of

the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Claims

Court”) dismissing his action because he failed to pay the

requisite filing fee. Appellee’s App. 2. Prior to the dis-

missal, the Claims Court rejected Mr. Bryant’s request to

proceed in forma pauperis. Id. at 3. Because the Claims

Court did not abuse its discretion in reaching these con-

clusions, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In May and June 2014, the United States Department

of Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued

notices announcing that it would seek to collect delin-

quent federal income tax liabilities that Mr. Bryant owed

for the years 1998 to 2003, as well as civil penalties

imposed upon him for the years 2002 and 2004. Appel-

lant’s Informal Br. 5–6. Mr. Bryant altogether owed over

$200,000 in unpaid taxes and civil penalties. Id.

In July 2014, Mr. Bryant sued the IRS in the Claims

Court, arguing that the IRS wrongfully levied upon his

wages and financial accounts. Id. at 3–4. When Mr.

Bryant filed his complaint, he also filed a motion for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis, which if granted would

relieve him of paying the requisite $350 filing fee. Appel-

lee’s App. 10; see 28 U.S.C. § 1926(b) (2012) (explaining

that the Claims Court “may require advance payment of

fees by rule”); Claims Ct. R. 77.1(c)(3) (2008) (explaining

that parties must pay a filing fee “in advance” unless

granted leave to proceed in pauper status);

Claims Court Fees Schedule, available at http://www.usco

urts.gov/services-forms/fees/us-court-federal-claims-fee-

schedule (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) (providing filing fee of

$350 owed at the time Mr. Bryant filed his Complaint).

BRYANT v. UNITED STATES 3

The Claims Court denied the motion the next day because

the record demonstrated that Mr. Bryant received a

monthly pension payment of $7,998.96 and, thus, he had

not shown good cause for the request. Appellee’s App. 3.

Some eighty-five days after the Claims Court denied

Mr. Bryant’s motion, the Government filed a motion to

dismiss the Complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to

Claims Court Rule 41(b). 1 Id. at 11. In relevant part, the

rule permits the Claims Court to dismiss an action if “the

plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with” its rules,

Claims Ct. R. 41(b), including the payment of the filing

fee, Claims Ct. R. 77.1(c)(3). Mr. Bryant did not respond

to the motion or pay the filing fee in the interim. The

Claims Court granted the Government’s motion and

entered judgment dismissing the action. Appellee’s App.

1–2.

1 In the alternative, the Government argued that

the Claims Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

Mr. Bryant’s action. Appellee’s App. 4. Whether a plain-

tiff properly instituted its action, such as by paying the

requisite fees, antecedes any question regarding a court’s

authority to hear the issues presented. See, e.g., Costello

v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285 (1961) (finding dismis-

sal appropriate when a plaintiff fails “to comply with a

precondition requisite to the Court’s going forward to

determine the merits of his substantive claim”); United

States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1956) (same); see

also Fed. Cir. R. 52(c) (explaining that in this court “[t]he

clerk is not required to docket any proceeding or perform

any other service until all fees due the clerk are paid

unless a party has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis”). Because we affirm the Claims Court’s dismis-

sal for Mr. Bryant’s failure to prosecute, we need not

address that argument.

4 BRYANT v. UNITED STATES

Mr. Bryant appeals. The court has jurisdiction pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Bryant argues that the court should enter “judg-

ment in [his] favor” and order the “release [of his] proper-

ty.” Appellant’s Informal Br. 2. He makes no specific

argument regarding the Claims Court’s denial of his

request to proceed in forma pauperis or its dismissal of

his action. The court gives Mr. Bryant the same lenient

treatment typically accorded to pro se litigants and con-

strues his statement as a challenge to the Claims Court’s

denial of his request for pauper status and dismissal of

his case. See, e.g., Beriont v. GTA Labs., Inc., 535 F.

App’x 919, 926 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (unpublished).

The court reviews for an abuse of discretion the denial

of an in forma pauperis request, as well as the dismissal

an action pursuant to Claims Court Rule 41(b). Kadin

Corp. v. United States, 782 F.2d 175, 176 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

(discussing dismissal under Claims Ct. R. 41(b)); see also

Colida v. Panasonic Corp. of N. Am., 374 F. App’x 37, 38

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citing Denton v. Hernan-

dez, 504 U.S. 25, 33–34 (1992); Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de

Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337 (1948)) (discussing

denial of a request for pauper status). An abuse of discre-

tion occurs when a court “exercise[s] its discretion based

on an error of law or clearly erroneous fact finding.”

Qingdao Taifa Grp. v. United States, 581 F.3d 1375, 1379

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

The Claims Court did not abuse its discretion in deny-

ing Mr. Bryant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis.

“‘[P]roceeding in forma pauperis . . . is a privilege, not a

right.’” White v. Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir.

1998) (brackets omitted) (quoting Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d

719, 724 (11th Cir. 1998)). A party may proceed in forma

pauperis if it “is unable to pay” fees in a “court of the

BRYANT v. UNITED STATES 5

United States” or “give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1); see id. § 2503(d) (treating the Claims Court

as “a court of the United States” for purposes of § 1915).

The Claims Court found that Mr. Bryant’s pension paid

him roughly $8,000 per month, or $96,000 annually,

meaning that he possessed the financial means to pay the

$350 filing fee. Appellee’s App. 3. The record does not

indicate that he would have experienced undue financial

hardship in paying the fee. Cf. Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t

of Health & Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir.

2001) (unpublished) (“Although pauper status does not

require absolute destitution, the question is whether the

court costs can be paid without undue hardship.”). Thus,

the Claims Court acted within its discretion in denying

his request. 2 Cf. § 1915(a)(1).

The Claims Court also did not abuse its discretion

when it dismissed Mr. Bryant’s action. Mr. Bryant re-

ceived notice that he did not qualify for pauper status on

July 29, 2014. Appellee’s App. 3. Between the dates on

which Mr. Bryant received that notice and the Govern-

ment filed its motion to dismiss, Mr. Bryant did not seek

reconsideration of the Claims Court’s denial or supple-

ment his application to proceed in forma pauperis, nor did

he pay the fee. After the Government filed its motion to

dismiss, Mr. Bryant had a month to respond. Id. at 11.

Mr. Bryant did not avail himself of that opportunity, nor

did he pay the fee during that time. If a party fails to pay

the requisite filing fee, despite adequate notice and ample

opportunity to do so, the Claims Court acts within its

discretion when it dismisses the action, just as it did in

2 Notably, Mr. Bryant paid the $505 filing fee re-

quired to appeal his case to this court in March 2015, only

months after failing to pay the Claims Court fee. See

Bryant v. United States, No. 2015-5065, Docket No. 1 at 3

(Fed. Cir. Mar. 13, 2015).

6 BRYANT v. UNITED STATES

this case. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl.

795, 798 (2009) (stating that dismissal is proper when a

party fails to pay a filing fee and does not qualify for

pauper status).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the United States Court of

Federal Claims is

AFFIRMED

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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